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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation compares and contrasts John Wesley's pre-critical, 
essentially Reformation theology of justification by faith interpreted from 
an Arminian-Calvinist perspective with Rudolf Bultmanri s modern. 
Reformation theology of justification by faith interpreted from a historically 
critical, existential perspective. In the first section, the paper sets forth 
John Wesley's description of justification as "pardon and acceptance with 
God" procured by the atoning "merits of Jesus Christ". 
Though the nuances shift over John Wesley's lifetime, justifying faith, 
which makes effectual in the believer Jesus Christ's saving death, was 
for 
him as for English Puritans an immediately perceptible, Divine, inner 
conviction given by the Holy Spirit of Christ's atoning love for "me". 
Justifying faith was dialectical in that it was both a Divine "gift" and a 
personal decision, both an instantateous act as well as an unfolding 
development. 
In the second section, the thesis sets forth Rudolf Bultmanri s 
existential-ontological description of "justification" as "forensic- 
eschatological" which means the coming, decisive, eschatological judgment 
is viewed as already having taken place in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ which delivers the believer from the "old age" with its 
"powers" of the sinful self-understanding and opens up to the believer the 
"new age" of authentic self-understanding. This "Righteousness" becomes 
a genuine "occurrence" and happening in one's existence when one 
"resolves" by faith to "obey" the Gospel proclamation which summons one 
to accept Jesus event as God's saving deed which unveils to one a new 
self-understanding. "Faith", for Rudolf Bultmann, has both the character 
of "gift" and "decision", and, though a "state", is not an act performed once 
for all. 
In the last section, both theologies are compared, contrasted, and 
evaluated. Taking into consideration that the two theologians are 
separated by nearly two centuries of thought, their fundamental 
differences, nonetheless, largely represent the clash of age-old, conflicting 
assumptions. 
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SECTION ONE 
JOHN WESLEY'S UNDERSTANDING 
OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH 
CHAPTER ONE 
JUSTIFICATION 
INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF JUSTIFICATION 
What place %Rd justification by faith in John 
Wesley's theological scheme? From 1738 onwards until his death In-1791. 
justification by faith was one of the two, overarching doctrines which he 
ranked above others. From his first discovery of this experiential reality in 
1738 to his arrival at "the borders of the grave" fifty years later in : 1790, he 
never ceased to proclaim it. ' Unenlightened prior to 1738 to the doctrine of 
justification as it was construed in the classical Reformation tradition, he 
states that when he "had a clearer view than before of justification by faith... ". 
he professed - that wherever he preached, "salvation by faith was my only 
theme. "' 
Most frequently repeating justifications importance between the late 
1750's and the latter 1760's, in 1765 he advised John Knox to adhere to the 
"two fundamental points, Justification by Faith and Holiness" 3 In -1785 he 
referred to justification- along with sanctification as the "two grand branches" 
of salvation 4 Indeed, John Wesley proclaimed justification and 
sanctification as the twin pillars of his - theological scheme. ' He consistently 
placed justification by faith and sanctification side-by-side, speaking of them 
both in the same breathe Faith was the "gate" or "means" into love: that is, 
into the "room" or "end" of "heart religion". The "room " was, also referred to 
as sanctification or sometimes "salvation". " Though love deserved the greater 
honour and was more excellent than faith, - justification by faith was 
immensely valuable and integral to salvation. ' 
The Scriptural proclamation "By grace ye are saved through faith" was so 
important that he foresaw that "whenever we give up this fundamental truth, 
the work of God by us will come to an end. "9 Undoubtedly, the Church of 
2 
England's rotten main beams of "salvation by works" must be replaced by the 
firm beam, salvation by faith". ` For being "justified by faith is the corner- 
stone of the whole Christian building, " he declared. " 
In spite of these comments, did John 'Wesley consistently maintain 
justification's co-equal place with sanctification? Did he eventually allow the 
doctrine of holiness to eclipse that of justification? Calvinist Richard Hill 
accused him of contradicting his statement that the truth "The Lord our 
righteousness" (which he said was closely connected with the truth of 
"justification by faith") "is articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae [what Luther 
affirmed of justification), the pillar of that faith of which alone cometh 
salvation... ". Moreover. the 1770 Methodist Conference Minutes were 
interpreted by strict Calvinists to exemplify John Wesley's deemed heretical 
theology of "works righteousness". " 
John Wesley identified himself with Martin Luther and other Reformers in 
the high regard he had for justification by faith. He affirmed that "whether a 
man be justified by faith or works is a point of the, last importance" because 
"our Reformers", being wise and good men.: "could not have answered to God 
their spending much time upon it". " When a disputant in 1761 claimed that 
the heirs of the Apostles (the Roman Catholics) anathematized the doctrine, 
John Wesley-retorted that when the Council of Trent did this, for all intents 
and purposes the Council had anathematized the Apostle Paul. " 
Nonetheless, as we shall see, John Wesley did not= accord justification by 
faith supremacy over sanctification as did Martin Luther and Rudolf Bultmann 
like him, who viewed it as the "chief article"- which acted as the hermeneutical 
principle of other doctrines. " This fact - and John Wesley's stress on 
holiness - contributed to other evangelicals' suspicion of his commitment to 
justification by faith. 
At various points in his life, he reaffirmed justification by faith and stated 
that he thought on it just as he had always done. " For example, in the year 
before his death in 1790, some fifty-two years after Aldersgate, he reaf Irmed 
3 
his long-standing position again. " 
Nevertheless, justification's formal position and significance in relation to 
sanctification remained where it had been. He emphasized sanctification in 
the 1760's and the 1770's because he believed it necessary for the particular 
pastoral and religious needs of his societies at that particular time. 18 Indeed, 
in. 1762 he could rebuke the "fringe Methodist" Thomas Maxfield who in 
preaching his "brand of perfection" depreciated justification. 19 John Fletcher, 
the vicar of Madeley and associate of John Wesley, viewed John Wesley's 
apparent shift toward stressing good works not as a shift in theology but as 
offering different people. or the same people at different times, contrary 
directions depending on their need at the time. 20 
THE SCOPE OF SALVATION 
John Wesley's 1765 sermon "The Scripture Way of Salvation" represented 
perhaps his most comprehensive effort to gather up and systematize in one 
sermon the various constituents of genuine, Scriptural Religion into one 
cohesive scheme. For him, just two words encompassed the marrow of all 
Scripture: faith and salvation. Salvation (on other occasions, "love") was the 
end of genuine religion; faith was the means to the end? ' The salvation 
which preoccupied Paul's attention in Ephesians 2: 8 and John Wesley's is 
that which is now present and is expressed by the text, "Ye are saved", or, 
equally, "Ye have been saved. "' However, viewed in its utmost extent, this 
salvation might be extended to Include God's entire work, from "the first 
dawning of grace" (preventing grace") in the soul till it was consummated in 
glory. " In other words, the 'term "salvation" for John Wesley in its ' most 
comprehensive use might include the full spectrum of God's saving activity 
from "preventing grace" to salvation s consummation, or "final salvation". 
Nonetheless, "salvation" was typically viewed as "present" salvation and "final" 
salvation, this bifold distinction being already explicitly described as such by 
1744' 
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In the first half of the Revival, salvation as "going to heaven" or the 
blessing on the other side of death ("final" salvation) was put aside while 
"present salvation" was center stage 25 More attention came to be placed upon 
"final salvation" later, particularly in reference to the 1770 Minutes 
controversy. 26 "Present" salvation denoted what God did in this life; that is, 
He gave justification, sanctification, and "full salvation" (entire sanctification). ' 
By 1744, the sweep of salvation, comprising both "present" and "final" 
salvation, was expressed in the three distinct, sequential, nodal operations of 
God which punctuated it: "pardon, holiness, and glory". ' Salvation was 
viewed in terms of degrees of salvation . 
2' He stated that as soon ' as one's 
justification was witnessed to him by the Holy Ghost, unless his faith was 
shipwrecked, "salvation gradually increases in his soul"90 Indeed, "salvation" 
may be equated only with justification. " In so doing, It most always was 
qualified by the term "faith" as in such typical expressions as "salvation by 
faith" or the even more common phrase "saved by faith"'' On the other 
hand, salvation could also be equated with either holiness or full 
sanctification' 
Set within God's overarching schema for mans salvation, justification by 
faith Is properly framed. Salvation was the preeminent conception in John 
Wesley. It comprehended both justification and sanctification which were 
equal constituent parts which must be held together In tension and 
equilibrium. Neither were to be allowed to belittle or to gain ascendancy over 
the other. Salvation was complemented by both together. " 
The equal overall position that John Wesley formally gave to justification 
and sanctification was looked upon not only as a guard against Martin 
Luther's (by extrapolation, Rudolf Bultmanri s) errors, but also against the 
Council of Trent's error of totally confounding sanctification and justification 
together. ' It is a constructive, mediate proposal which is reminiscent of the 
seventeenth century English Arminian-Calvinist Puritans. 
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THE DEFINITION OF JUSTIFICAflON 
In establishing his definition of justification, let us first -canvass the brief 
terms and the phraseology he generally employed. In the earliest formal 
definition in his June, 1738, sermon, "Salvation by Faith". he defined 
justification as "a salvation from sin, and the consequences of sin", 
"deliverance from guilt and punishment". and "a deliverance from the whole 
body of sin". ' In 1745, Justification was similarly described as "a present 
deliverance (or salvation) from sin". In 1785, it signified "being saved from the 
guilt of sin, and restored to the favour of God"" 
Early on in 1745 and 1746 the word "pardon" was viewed synonymously 
with justification'8 This was reiterated. in 1765'9 One was justified when 
"God pardons and absolved him. i40 As early as the 1740's "pardon" was also 
paired with "acceptance" to form a duet which remained a favorite throughout 
his lifetime. The 1744 Minutes are illustrative of an early way of stating this 
pairing. To be justified was "to be pardoned, and received into God's 
favour"" Equally in 1745, justification was described as "present pardon and 
acceptance with God* . 
`2 With slight variation, from then on this remained one 
of his most favourite definitions. " In 1756, he allowed that pardon and 
acceptance may be distinguished but could not be divided. In the very same 
moment that God forgave one's sins, one became His son and was accepted. " 
Therefore, the term "acceptance" was interchanged with "pardon" and used 
in its own right. Justification was referred to in 1745 as "the first acceptance 
or pardon". or "our first acceptance with God" `s 
A synonym for justification as "pardon" was typically expressed as "the 
forgiveness of sins. "' Like "pardon". the term "the forgiveness of sins" was 
coupled with what it necessarily implied, "acceptance with God". He declared. 
"It is the forgiveness of all our sins, and (what is necessarily implied therein) 
our acceptance with God* .7 
Equivalent to the terms "pardon" and "the forgiveness of sins". "remission 
of sins" was another favorite expression which was found in both the 
6 
Scriptures and in the Homilies " This may variously appear early on in the 
Awakening as "the present remission of our, sins". or later on simply as 
"remission of sins". "' Similar to "pardon" and "the forgiveness of sins, 
"remission of sins" may be interchanged with "our first acceptance with 
God". ' The phrase "the remission of sins" may be further explained as 
"acquittal". the "non-imputation of sin". or that one's "sins are blotted out". s" 
In the early and middle years of the Awakening, justification may be said 
to mean that God "'declares his righteousness or mercy52 by. or for the 
remission of the sins that are past'" 5' One was justified when "faith is" then 
"counted to him for righteousness". ' While he would allow that to be justified 
was to be "accounted righteous before God" or to have "the righteousness of 
Christ imputed". these phrases in comparison to the others are used more 
sparingly and usually with an accompanying qualification of their meaning 55 
He was cautious in employing the term "the righteousness of Christ imputed" 
because the Calvinists to his mind had so maligned and twisted the 
expression that using it was given to misunderstanding. 
Having set forth the most common summary phrases used generally 
through the range of his life to characterize justification, let us examine how 
these terms were more fully explicated. In his 1738 sermon "Salvation By 
Faith", he provided us with an early full-blown definition. He said 
justification implied in the largest sense "a deliverance from guilt and 
punishment, by the atonement of Christ actually applied to the soul of the 
sinner now believing on Him, and a deliverance from the whole body of sin, 
through Christ formed in his heart. ", "6 In a word, justification was salvation 
from sins' It was the salvation foretold of Jesus who would "save his people 
from their sins" 5' All that believed in him he would save "from original and 
actual, past and present sin, of the flesh and of the spirit7. ' Whereas all 
were guilty before God, through the redemption in Jesus Christ there was now 
no condemnation to those who believed 60 
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In his A Farther Appeal in 1745, he stated that justification meant 
"present forgiveness, pardon of sins, and consequently acceptance with God, 
who therein 'declares his righteousness or mercy, by or 'for the remission of 
the sins that are past', saying, 'I will be merciful to thy unrighteousness, and 
thine iniquities I will remember no more'". The condition of this justification 
was faith 81 
Moreover, being saved from guilt, the believer was saved also from the fear 
of punishment and the wrath of God. He need no longer regard God as a 
"severe master, but as an indulgent Father". ' Lastly, he was saved from the 
power of sin. Quoting 1 John 3: 5.6, he cited "Whosoever abideth in him 
sinneth not. " So that the believer sinned not by "habitual sin". for sin could 
not reign in the one who believed. Neither did he sin by "wilful sin". his will 
being set against all sin; nor, by "any sinful desire"; nor finally did he sin by 
infirmities. ' 
In -answer to the question of the 1744 Conference "What is it to be 
justified? % the Minutes recorded, "To be pardoned, and received into God's 
favour, into such a state, that if we continue therein, we shall be finally 
saved. " The Minutes further stated, "Every one who believes, is justified. "6' 
In a letter to Thomas Church in 1746, he showed his agreement with 
Thomas Church on justification by appropriating Thomas Church's words. He 
agreed that "Justification is the act of God, " pardoning our sins -and receiving 
us again to His favour. This was free in Him, because undeserved by us; 
undeserved, because we had transgressed His law. and could not. nor even 
can now. perfectly fulfill It. "' ' Therefore. we. could not be - justified by our 
works, or "an external show of religion". or "by any superstitious observances". 
To be so justified would be "to be justified by some merit of our own" and 
not by the life and death of our Lord who was "the sole meritorious cause of 
this mercy, which must be firmly believed and trusted in by us. "' One's faith 
was the means and instrument whereby he embraced and received the 
promises of pardon through him. ' 
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The 1746 sermon "Justification by Faith" he recommended as a source for 
his sentiments at large on the subject of justification. In it he presented 
justification, as he believed the apostle Paul did in Romans, as "that act of 
God the Father whereby, for the sake of the propitiation made by the blood of 
his Son, he 'showeth forth his righteousness (or mercy) by the remission of 
the sins that are past'". 68 Citing Romans 4: 7.8, he stated that to the one 
justified or forgiven, God "will not impute sin" to his condemnation. On that 
account He will not condemn him either in this world or in the world to come. 
"His sins, all his past sins. In thought, word, and deed, 'are covered', are 
blotted out; shall not be remembered or mentioned against him, any more 
than if they had not been, " said John Wesley. ' Because God's Son had 
suffered for him, God would not inflict upon the sinner what he deserved to 
suffer. In a composite statement which appears to be his own expression he 
said, "And from the time we are 'accepted through the Beloved'. 'reconciled to 
God through his blood, he loves and blesses and watches over us for good. 
even as if we had never sinned. "' 
In the 1765 A Treatise on Justification: Extracted from Mr. John Goodwin. 
he declared that to justify "imports a sovereign Judge being the supreme 
Magistrate discharging a man from the guilt and punishment of those things 
whereof he is or might be justly accused; not because he is innocent of those 
things or justifiable according to the strictness of the law but because the 
Judge having sovereign power is willing, upon sufficient considerations, to 
remit the penalty of the Law and to discharge him as if he were innocent. " 
God's justification of a sinner was an act whereby he freely forgave him all 
that he had done against the Law and acquitted him from all the punishment 
due to such offenses. He was acquitted not upon any consideration pleaded 
for him according to the Law, but upon the consideration of that done for him 
by Jesus Christ who made an atonement for the world to purge its sin. Faith 
was the condition which brought him to this justification purchased by 
Christ. 72 
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In the 1765 sermon The Scripture Way of Salvation, John Wesley gave a 
concise description of justification which, while saying nothing new but 
rehearsing past affirmations, is useful as a statement of the later Revival. He 
affirmed that it was 
"the forgiveness of all our sins, and (what is necessarily implied therein) 
our acceptance with God. The price whereby this hatte been procured for 
us (commonly termed the 'meritorious cause' of our justification) is the 
blood and righteousness of Christ, or ... all that Christ 
hath done and 
suffered for us till 'he poured out his soul for the transgressors. " 
THE GROUND OF JUSTIFICATION 
Having looked at a representative selection of his customary ways of 
explaining justification, we turn now to examine the constituent makeup of 
this description of justification. The backbone of the matter lay in what was 
considered to be the ground or cause of justification. Essentially. the ground 
was "the merits of Jesus Christ" or merely the same, "what Christ hath done 
and suffered for us. "' 
The issue of justifications cause in the largest sense had not been made 
as simple as it might seem: both the Council of Trent and the Scholastically- 
minded Puritans had divided the 'cause into numerous sub-causes. One can 
only conclude from a study of John Wesley that" he was not interested in 
putting too fine a point on it. Perhaps it smacked too much of arid, subtle 
speculation which would go missing on his audience and even detract from 
the heart of the matter. " 
Nonetheless, without analytically attempting to bring attention to the 
distinction, he did distinguish several causes. The principal cause was "the 
ineffable love of God the Father". It was "of mere grace, of free love, of 
undeserved mercy, that God hath vouchsafed to sinful man any way of 
reconciliation with himself. "" In 1738, "grace" was designated as "the source" 
of salvation while similarly in 1779, he affirmed that "the foundation of all 
real religion" was the truth "by grace we are saved through, faith". " - The 
"source" or cause was of course God Himself, but God Himself particularly 
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manifested in His free love and His grace, His unmerited and undeserved 
mercy. He himself through grace provided for mans best end by the best 
means. 78 
Actually. John Wesley was in line with traditional statements which 
consciously categorized this cause. The cause which John Wesley referred to 
as "the grace of God" corresponded to the traditional designation of "efficient 
cause". The Council of 'fl-ent identified the "efficient cause" as the "merciful 
God" while Richard Baxter and John Goodwin identified it as simply "God". 
John Goodwin indicated the infinite love, the graciousness, and goodness of 
God as the "moral 'cause" while Richard Baxter described the "moral 
persuading cause" as the intercession of Christ's 
Assuming the logical progression of the chain of causes, the "meritorious 
cause" was the next significant cause. John Wesley and others incessantly 
referred to it as the pillar and foundation of justification. The "meritorious 
cause" was the "free grace of God in Christ", or "the grace of God, through 
Jesus Christ thy Lord", or in John Wesley's recitation of the notable 
affirmation, "that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself' eO 
The "meritorious cause" was seen to be centred both in Jesus Christ 
Himself and, more specifically, in his life and sacrificial death. Prior to 
Aldersgate, John Wesley perceived Jesus Christ in similar manner as his 
"significant others% such as Thomas ä Kempis and William Law. Judging 
from his The Christian Pattern, Thomas ä Kempis was not drawn to Christ 
primarily as the one who satisfied God's justice, but as the martyr and 
example. In what Gustaf Aulen calls the "Devotion to the Passion" concept of 
atonement, Thomas ä Kempis directed Christians to meditate upon and 
imitate Christ's whole life as a "cross" and as one of suffering. " 
This was the image and work of Christ which John Wesley had adopted 
prior to the Spring of 1738. He accused William Law of directing him in his 
pre-Aldersgate days to "Christ our Pattern". " He had not Ignored Christ prior 
to Aldersgate but gazed upon him as the great suffering Exemplar. According 
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to the Christian Pattern, Jesus appeared to be a tragi-heroic -figure who, 
having been through the suffering of this life and having triumphed over it, 
was now up ahead In the victor's circle. Christians, following in the rear, 
were called to struggle after his example. Personal union with Christ was the 
goal for which the Christian strove, having heroically and successfully denied 
himself and renounced the world. "' 
Several observations ought to be made. In John Wesley's thought prior to 
Aldersgate. Christ as "satisfaction" in the Anselmian tradition is not explicitly 
in evidence. Instead, Christ is revered and followed as suffering 'martyr and 
Exemplar. Since grace was conceived in a Catholic fashion as gratia creata, a 
hybrid supernatural quality neither God himself nor nature, Christ himself 
was not believed to be given in bestowed grace. He was the transcendent 
ascended Christ. He was once removed from the viator. Personal union and 
communion with Christ was essentially an eschatological reward. For the 
Christian, everlasting life was yet to be gained. The perfect Christ. separated 
from the sinful Christian pilgrim by degrees of mortifications yet to be, was 
only vaguely and relatively near. From the high heavenly chambers, He the 
Example, behind the upper veiling-blur exhorted the wayfarer below and 
behind obediently to follow. 
However. in the Spring of 1738, John Wesley's previous understanding of 
Jesus Christ was shattered and re-cast. Rather' than conceiving of him as 
Example, he now claims to know him experientially as his own Saviour, the 
ground and cause of his justification and salvation, and of all religious 
endeavors. His dramatically changed experience and understanding of Jesus 
Christ manifested itself in his inquisition of William Law on May 20,1738. 
"Why did I scarce ever hear you name the name of Christ? never, so as to 
ground anything upon 'faith in His blood'? " said he " He took him to task for 
not laying Christ as his foundation: for recommending to him a book which 
spoke of "Christ our Pattern, but nothing express of Christ our Atonement". " 
John Wesley had now learned differently. "I build on Christ, the Rock of 
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Ages; on His sure mercies described in His Word, " he wrote to Samuel, Jr. in 
October 1738 ' The living Person Jesus Christ was the cause and ground of 
justification. He was "our Atonement", our propitiation. Only through Jesus, 
the Saviour, could all that man was to know of and receive from God -- 
including justification -- now be realized. The substance of "the gospel", and 
of the whole revelation made to men by Jesus Christ was summed up, "Jesus 
Christ came into the world to save sinners w87 He, "the Saviour of sinners". 
was the foundation and the fountainhead of the panoptical spectrum of 
salvation, of every blessing, of love and mercy, of all knowledge, of everlasting 
life, of the best means and end of man. John Wesley declared, "Christ, is all 
in all, our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption: that all life, 
love, strength are from Him alone, and all freely given to us through faith. "" 
Parallel to Martin Luther's breakthrough, John Wesley had abandoned his 
previous understanding that though the grace of Christ was present, Christ 
Himself was absent. - He now accepted that the everliving Jesus of Nazareth, 
the crucified, raised, and eternally alive Person the Son of God, the 
transcendent and immanent Lord who, once living on this earth with his 
apostles Peter and John, now continued to work his once-for-all wrought 
salvation in persons -- even in him -- in present history. Jesus Christ "our 
Atonement", the cause and benefactor of all grace, was Himself immediately 
and immanently before the sinner, waiting to set up his throne, to, Indwell 
and live within him. " John Wesley proclaimed to his audience, "The God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who now standeth in the midst of us" who 
keeps "mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin" 
was now present to be known by the sinner. 80 Reconciliation and fellowship 
with Him was not simply an eschatological hope. It was present reality. He 
stood Immediately before the Individual sinner in the here and now, "even at 
the door". ready to give Himself. "He is nigh that justifieth; He is nigh that 
supplies all your wants! " he pleaded. "' The individual who believed in the 
Lamb of God as the One who takes away "thy sins" has God reigning in his 
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soul. has the Son reigning in his heart, is spoken to by the Holy Spirit, and 
experiences "the kingdom of heaven" opened in his soul. He. therefore. may 
declare before angels and men, "Everlasting life is won: Glory is on earth 
begun". "You may this hour enter, thereinto. " he invited his listeners. ' 
Through knowing Jesus Christ as the Lamb who takes away thy sins, a 
personal relationship commenced with the Three-Person God in which 
immediate access, union, and communion with Him was realized. 
For Rudolf Bultmann the move from the concept of Christ as "pattern" to 
that of Christ as "our Atonement" had - little significance. since both 
conceptions were derived from, a false world-view and flew in the face of 
modern biblical research. To contrive such a false picture of Jesus did not 
take into account the great' uncertainty regarding what sayings could and 
could not be attributed to Jesus of Nazareth; nor did it recognize that the 
ascriptions made of him were not to be taken as objective, analytical 
descriptions of him but expressions of the disciples' existential self- 
understanding of Jesus in faith. 
Nevertheless, he and John Wesley both accepted that the death of Jesus 
was the ground of justification. However. Rudolf Bultmann would sharply 
repudiate John Wesley's further connection of the death of Jesus with the so- 
called living resurrected person Jesus Christ whose existence was believed to 
have continued on after death and from whose Person the efficacy of his cross 
was derived and now given by Him to believers. In other words, the cause of 
justification for Rudolf lBultmann could not be traced back further to the 
person Jesus Christ who was now believed to be alive and actually dispensing 
the efficacy of his death to persons in the present. For him, the cause of 
justification was focused in- the actual proclaiming of the cross, not In the 
supernatural person Jesus. 
If John Wesley thought of Jesus Christ the Saviour Himself as the 
"meritorious cause" of justification, he located the cause of justification and 
salvation specifically in Jesus' obedient life and atoning death comprehended 
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together as one "work". 
The "meritorious cause" was Jesus Christ distinctively in his having 
fulfilled a perfectly obedient life and his having died on the cross. John 
Wesley's terminology representing this double edge, though varying slightly. 
was fairly epitomized in the following phrases which frequently recurred 
throughout the span of his evangelical career. He stated that the "sole cause" 
of the remission of our sins (justification) is "the merits of Christ"; the only 
cause of present and eternal justification is what "Christ hath done and 
suffered for us"; and "the blood and righteousness of Christ" are "the sole 
meritorious cause of our salvation". ' 
The significance with which he regarded "the merits of Christ" may be 
judged from his unreserved affirmation (in Martin Luther's words) that Christ's 
meritorious work was the articulus stantis vel cadentis eccleslae. Moreover, it 
was certainly "the pillar and ground of that faith of which alone cometh 
salvation". " Stated another way, it was the object of true. justifying faith. " 
He allowed that one might be unclear or have doubts regarding the' doctrine of 
justification by faith and yet still be saved as long as he trusted in the reality 
to which the doctrine referred: the merits of Christ " Herein was the 
absolutely fundamental cause of salvation. 
Therefore, the "merits of Christ" as the principal cause excluded everything 
else as "cause". For ten years he confessed he had been "(fundamentally) a 
Papist" because he had wrongly held that we were justified by good works or, 
put more decently as he said, by faith and good works 97 Good works and 
sanctification were to be excluded as a cause because man had no merit of 
his own " Not even faith was meritorious. " The justifying power of faith was 
suspended upon the will, the free grace and the pleasure of God. Only the 
faith which laid hold of Christ could justify. 10° 
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JESUS' PROCUREMENT OF SALVATION EXPLAINED 
Why were "the merits of Christ" considered to be the ground and 
"meritorious cause" of justification? How did the life and death of Jesus 
Christ procure justification and salvation? The answer, which lies in John 
Wesley's conception of the atonement, gave rise to his definitions of 
justification which we have surveyed: "present pardon and acceptance with 
God"; "the forgiveness of sins" or the "remission of sins"; and "the 
righteousness of Christ imputed". As we consider the atonement, we shall see 
that it is the controlling lynchpin for John Wesley which determines his 
definitions and understanding of justification. 
One may not unfairly say that in the early eighteenth century Church of 
England the "orthodox" doctrine of the atonement as expressed in the 
"satisfaction" theory was not so much denied as it was Ignored or relegated to 
the background. ` Perhaps the temper of many ministers was represented by 
Archbishop 'Tillotson who seemed a bit jaded with its particular over-use in 
seventeenth century argumentative divinity. 102 In any case, the Methodists, 
whose preaching and testimony once again raised its profile, put Jesus 
Christ's atonement and "merits" at the centre and heart of their message. 
Curiously, John Wesley seems not to have published any single tract on this 
cardinal point. 103 His own largest thoughts on the subject were presented in 
his criticism of William Law's views on "justice" in 1755. However, they are 
only hurried affirmations with little defense leaving much to be desired for an 
adequate treatment. 104 
The soteriological meaning which John Wesley thought the Scriptures 
assigned to the life and death of Jesus Christ encompassed Anselm's theory of 
"satisfaction" as developed and expressed in the Reformed tradition. More 
particularly, the Anselmian idea, based upon the Scriptures and the Roman 
Catholic sacrament of penance, in which Jesus death was an acceptable 
reparation and compensation for mans sin of affronting God's majesty and 
violating His moral order, had been adopted and tailored to accommodate the 
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Reformed emphasis upon Jesus enduring the suffering of the lauds penalty in 
the place of humankind ("penal" theory). 105 Moreover, Osiander's distinction 
between the active and passive obedience of Christ which became 
characteristic of Reformed thought also impacted John Wesley's understanding 
of the nature of Christ's merits. The "satisfaction" and "penal" theories are 
the standard explanations in John Wesley though the "recapitulation" theory 
and the "ransom" theories are stated. 
Let us more thoroughly delve into his explanations of how Jesus life and 
death produced our justification. Perhaps his most complete exposition was 
taken from a seventeenth century Dutch work Eukleria by Anna Maria Van 
Schurman and included in his letter to William Law. 1°° Herein, the idea of 
"satisfaction" was most pronounced. Man owes the perfect obedience of his 
whole life to his Creator. If God does not get this, man owes a punishment in 
proportion to his transgression. But satisfying the condition is impossible 
because man can only give impartial and imperfect obedience. "" As the 
Treatise on Justification stated, even if man committed 10,000 good deeds 
these could never compensate for the immensity of even one sin against 
God. '°8 Therefore, man needed a Mediator who could repair the immense 
wrong done to the Divine majesty and satisfy the Supreme Judge who 
pronounced the sentence of death against the transgressors. This Mediator 
must suffer in the place of His people and merit for them pardon, holiness, 
and glory. 109 
From the same extract, Anna Van Schurman underscored Christ's role as 
bearer of humankind's penalty and punishment. As we noted, this "penal" 
view is equally represented throughout John Wesley's writings. Jesus was 
seen as the Lamb of God who bore the iniquities of the world on the cross. 
He was the One "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our 
iniquities. »110 With ample allusions to Isaiah 53, Anna Van Schurman spoke 
of Jesus Christ as "bearing our griefs, or sins, and carrying our sorrows". "` 
Humankind forsook God and was, therefore, liable to the highest punishment. 
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The Mediator Interposed Himself between them and the just Judge. The 
incomprehensible love of God spared them rather than the Son. The accent 
was on God himself, becoming flesh and bearing our sins, showing His Infinite 
love of divine justice, being obedient to death on the cross, and satisfying its 
utmost demand. "' In arguing against William Law, he underscored the 
centrality of God's infinite justice to the doctrine of the atonement. "' God 
willed at the creation of man "to reward every one as his work should be" and 
to render to them accordingly either good or evil. "' "Wrath", a presupposition 
of being "just", was a passion (anthropomorphically speaking he affirmed) 
which corresponded to the disposition of justice like love corresponded to 
mercy. "' ' God had anger at sin and punished it both temporally and 
eternally. 11e God's justice was manifested in punishing' sin as his mercy was 
demonstrated in providing a universal remedy for mans sin. "' 
Strategic to john Wesley's understanding of the work of Christ was the 
conception of Jesus Christ as the propitiatory sacrifice, who suffered and took 
upon Himself man's penalty, thereby averting wrath. "' Christ was sent to be 
a propitiatory sacrifice, an offering once for all to bear our sins (I Peter 2: 24) 
and to be made a curse (Galatians 3: 13) in our place in order to deliver us 
from the law's curse. For without the shedding of His blood, there was no 
remission of sins. "" , Moreover, he was a vicarious substitute for man, dying 
in his stead and receiving mans penalty for him. " Further, he suffered that 
we might be spared and may go free, unpunished and restored to His 
favour. 121 
In addition to the two recurring descriptions of the atonement, the 
"satisfaction" and "penal" images, John Wesley could employ what has been 
referred to as the "reversal of ' the sin of Adam" or the "recapitulation 
theory". "' This teaching associated first with Irenaeus was used in John 
Wesley's 1782 sermon "On the Fall of Man". The gist of the thought was that 
Adam brought evil, or disease upon his whole posterity through his sin. The 
second Adam, Jesus Christ, died for all who die as a result of the first Adam's 
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sin (I Corinthians 15: 22). Though by Adams offence came judgment, by the 
righteousness of the second Adam the free gift might come upon all "unto the 
justification of life "" This "justification of life" which is connected with the 
new birth leads us through the life of holiness to life eternal. " By Christ, the 
second Adam, we now gain "infinitely more than we have lost" under the first 
Adam. 'u Using a medical analogy, he viewed Christ as providing the remedy 
for all our guilt and disease, renewing us in His moral image. In Him, all 
natural evils changed their nature and turned to good. 12' 
Let us note several other features of John Wesley's understanding of the 
atonement which complete its portrait. One trait which distinguishes the 
Reformed expression of the satisfaction theory from previous expositions is its 
bifurcation of Christ's work into active and passive obedience. 127 This 
distinction entered into John Wesley's analysis of the atonement but we will 
reserve discussion of it under the heading "imputation of Christ". 
From 1739, when he delivered the sermon "Free Grace". -to the Bristol 
Newgate prisoners, until the end of his life, John Wesley championed, even 
against the opposing tide of fellow evangelists such as George Whitefield, the 
universal extent of Christ's redemption. He proclaimed, -"Christ gave Himself a 
ransom for all. "" He amassed a variety of biblical texts to support the claim 
that the "Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all" (Isaiah 53) and "He took 
away the sins of the world" (John 5). He opposed the strict Calvinists who 
urged that God had elected and chosen in eternity before creation who would 
be saved and, therefore, for whom alone Christ would make satisfaction. - He 
contended that the Scriptures asserted that Christ died for "the world" not for 
"believers", for the ungodly, not "the elect". " If some had not been bought at 
all, then they could not deny the Lord who bought them. Ergo, unbelief 
would not be a sin. 130 - 
Of course, John Wesley's so-called "universalism", though it did earn him 
the occasional accusation of "Socinian", was not the universalism of his 
contemporary Dr. John Taylor of Norwich or of Karl Barth in the twentieth 
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century who affirmed that God saved all men, whether or not they knew it, 
whether or not they desired it. "' ' John Wesley adhered to a theoretical or 
"hypothetical" universalism in the vein of the seventeenth century Frenchman, 
Moses Amyraldus, and advanced by Richard Baxter and John Goodwin. 
Amyraldus stated that since God's eternal purpose was to save, Christ 
Intended to the for all men to carry out His purpose. This meant offering 
salvation to all. '$2 However, like Amyraldus, John Wesley qualified this by 
saying that though God desired universal salvation it was conditional upon 
the Individual believing. When John ^ Wesley entertained the question of why 
all were not saved if Christ died for all, he retorted, "Because they believe not 
in the name.... "" Ultimately, man - empowered by grace - may choose or 
refuse the salvation offered in Christ. . 
In aü'uming an unlimited offer of atonement, John Wesley. though not 
without precedents in Protestantism, differed from the concept of "limited 
atonement" " which was implicit - in - Martin ` Luther and made explicit in John 
Calvin. " That Christ died for the whole world was also a point of agreement 
also between him and Count Zinzendorf. " 
Implicit in John Wesley's formulation of the work of Christ is both its 
subjective and objective nature. As has already been said, he accepted that 
Christ's work was as an act-of God which was objective and accomplished 
"outside" of man in a. particular place in Jerusalem at a particular time. It 
was also a subjective actin the sense that through the work of God's grace 
the faith given to the believer could lay hold on for " himself in the present the 
objective work of Christ and His atoning benefits. He and His benefits, for 
example, justification and sanctification, which were inextricably bound to His 
objective accomplishments on the Cross were communicated everlastingly 
afresh to the individual in the present experience of his personal life. We will 
examine this subjective side in discussing the "faith" which appropriates the 
death of Christ 
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Meanwhile, regarding the atonement's objective nature there is an 
interesting bridge between John Wesley and the generations of theologians 
which came after the eighteenth century. John Wesley was familiar with the 
"Socinian" thought which interpreted the atonement, as he put it, as an 
example rather than a ransom. ' He summarized Faustus Socinus' teaching 
as holding that Christ's death was a demonstration of God's redeeming love 
rather than an act of redemption. "' He was adverse to this "moral" theory 
which in the words of Socinus declared, "'lice whole of our redemption by 
Christ is a metaphor. "' John Wesley eschewed this position because it did 
not treat the death of Christ as a literal objective event which actually and 
directly affected the way in which God related to his creatures. In other 
words, it was not treated as an event in time and space with a one-to-one 
corresponding relation to the supernatural God's disposition (toward his 
creatures). ' For John Wesley, Jesus Christ's dying on the cross was an act 
purposed in God and outwardly performed by Him. 1O God gave the Son and 
in Christ's crucifixion is seen as offering Himself to do the best for man by 
providing salvation. "" In the well-relied upon text, he urged that "God was in 
Christ reconciling the world to himself. " (2 Corinthians 5: 18-19). 142 This event 
of Jesus dying on "skull hill" in Jerusalem for all to see was a necessary 
occurrence in order that God, as well as the world, be reconciled. Jesus' 
death was necessarily connected with the offering of pardon and remission of 
sins, and, therefore, justification. That God was angry with man for his sin 
was axiomatic. God's anger must be appeased and His justice satisfied in 
order that forgiveness of sins could be granted to man. The death of His Son 
was that event which necessarily effected the offer of forgiveness and procured 
justification. "" 
Indeed, John Wesley did not neglect the manward emphasis of Jesus' 
perfect obedience to the Law and His bearing the punishment for the sin as a 
sacrifice. However, by avoiding the preoccupation with the active obedience of 
Jesus and rejecting it as the sine qua non for atonement, he seemed to steer 
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clear of the strict Calvinist emphasis which Gustaf Aulen would argue 
concentrated on the human role rather than God's in effecting atonement. '" 
So, for John Wesley, God was both the subject acting and the object receiving 
the action. 
A point worth keeping in mind in our comparison of ' John Wesley and 
Rudolf Bultmann is that John Wesley did already encounter - the genre of 
approach to the atonement that came into ascendancy in - nineteenth and 
twentieth century Protestant theology. William Law. for example, in his' later 
writings was put off by the doctrine of Atonement because he could not 
"comprehend" it. "" Further, John Wesley read Andrew Michael Ramse}'s 
reference to "the deplorable ignorance of those who represent the expiatory 
sacrifice of Christ as destined to appease vindictive justice and avert divine 
vengeance*. ""' John Wesley responded that his own deplorable ignorance was 
such that he verily believed that all who denied it denied the Lord who bought 
them. 147 ,--s 
One may say without overstatement that trend-setting Protestant 
theologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were disinclined to locate 
justification in the so-called "objective" value of Christ's death as John Wesley 
did. In contrast, they gravitated toward the "subjective" influence it exerted 
upon man. They denied that the work of Christ effected a change in God and 
His relation to man but rather argued that it effected a change in man. 
John Wesley's verdict on the Socinian doctrine of the atonement was that 
it turned Christ's redemption into "a mere metaphor". '" Interestingly. Martin 
Kahler concluded after analyzing notable Aufklärung theologians Albrecht 
Ritschl's and Friedrich Schleiermachers discussions of the work of Christ that 
they tended to reduce Christ to "a mere symbol of the grace of God, without 
having any essential connection with that grace". '49 Presupposing a criticism 
of the traditional theory's moral, supernatural linkage of mar's sin and guilt 
with the necessity of Christ :s death for reconciliation with God, the view of 
Christ death as "mere metaphor" which John Wesley -had encountered 
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gathered force in the following centuries. 150 
Rudolf Bultmann did not render a systematic critique of the Reformed 
theory of the atonement. Though Rudolf Bultmann repudiated Albrecht 
Ritschl's rejection of man's bondage in original sin, he did not identify original 
sin with mans effrontery of a personal God. He would probably not disagree 
with the broad assumptions of Albrecht Ritschl's criticism of the satisfaction 
theory. Albrecht Ritschl argued that satisfaction theorists made grace 
subservient to law in arguing that Christ opened the door of grace only by 
fulfilling the justice of God. "' In contrast, his view was based on an 
understanding that when the law conflicted with the people's best moral 
interests, the head of state may waive the law in order to pardon a guilty 
Individual and serve his best moral interests. '52 However, John Wesley, 
apt to quote Augustine's remark that if he could save a million people 
eternally by a lie, he would not lie, would never have agreed that God's moral 
law was ever at odds with the best Interests of the person or public. That the 
likes of John Wesley placed grace in subservience to, justice Is Albrecht 
Ritschl's judgment and no doubt carries truth. However, John Wesley's 
emphasis on God's love and grace as well as justice moved toward a balance. 
One might also reply that Albrecht Ritschl allowed grace at the expense of 
justice. If one may waive a law at one's discretion, then, among other things, 
the good which the law purports is shown to be 'a good that is not good. '' 
One like John Wesley who accepted the presupposition that biblical laws were 
expressions of God's mind and His eternal word would not allow this. John 
Wesley may have said to Rudolf Bultmann and Albrecht Ritschl what he said 
to William Law, if there is no righteous wrath, "ye may go on, ye children of 
the devil, In, doing the works of your father. "'M 
Even, though two centuries later Rudolf Bultmann was armed with 
modern, critical investigations of New Testament sources, with new light shed 
on ancient near-eastern religions, and with a radical existential philosophy 
which turned' upside down the, traditional -- "subject-object" distinction, 
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fundamental assumptions of the past regarding the atonement were carried 
forward. Though he agreed that the death of Christ was objective, that it 
could have a supernatural nature and a supra-objective meaning was viewed 
as impossible. Scriptural statements could not be taken literally verbatim. 
However,, he articulated in a way that his predecessors had not that man's 
subjective engagement with the cross by faith must first be established before 
any meaning of the cross could be assigned. 
In Interpreting the New Testament meaning of the death of Christ, did not 
John Wesley interpret it according to the philosophy of a medieval system of 
penance rather than as the New Testament authors intended? To some 
extent the answer is "yes". His ubiquitous phrase "the merits of Christ" is 
indicative of this. With this judgment John Wesley himself might agree. 
However, it does not follow that something of the basic New Testament 
understanding of the atonement did not shine through it. 
In any case, John Wesley, like Rudolf Bultmann in . another context. 
recognized the deficiency and inadequacy of reason and theory, in coming to 
grips with the atonement. Herein, he said, "reason" was -"quickly 
bewildered". " However, in " contrast to Rudolf Bultmann at this point, he 
judged that the frail authority of reason ought to defer . to the ultimate 
authority of Holy. Scripture. He recognized in regards to the atonement that 
"to expatiate in this field, we 'find no end, in wandering mazes lost'". But the 
"only question with me, " he said, is "What saith the Scripture? " At bottom, he 
appealed finally to the literal sense of the assertions of Scripture: "God was 
in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself"; "He was wounded for. our 
transgressions and bruised for our iniquities. "158 Herein, he sought, to 
distinguish between the philosophical explanation of the Scriptural assertions 
and the Scriptural proclamation itself. Since his day, many scholars, Rudolf 
Bultmann the prime example, would argue that this was a false dichotomy. 
He argued that the Scriptural affirmation itself was itself an explanation -- a 
human one at that. : However, though the, specie of the argument has 
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changed, the genus of the argument John Wesley had with the Socinian is 
similar: is the Scriptural assertion'to be taken only as a human explanation, 
itself "a metaphor". or is it in fact God's declaration saying what God says? 
THE MEANING OF JUSTIFICATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL 
Having had a cursory glance at John Wesley's definition of justification 
and examined the account of how Jesus procured it, we now seek to ascertain 
what this purchase meant for man. In what' sense could one be said to be 
justified? 
The closest John Wesley came to providing an approximation of a 
linguistic, historical and a thorough "scientific" investigation of the Scriptural 
texts regarding justification was offered by abridgment of John Goodwin's 
Imputatio Fidel. Even at that, John Goodwin provided little grammatical or 
exegetical earthwork for his conclusions but basically argued his case through 
a logical reasoning out of the meaning of texts and by presenting the 
supportive comments of theological commentators. Realizing John Wesley's 
commendation of his extract Treatise of iustification as presenting the 
Scriptural view of justification, we rely upon It as an Important locus among 
sources for the exposition and defense of his views. 
The term "justify" and Its cognates, "justifying" and "justification", may be 
understood first by stating what they did not mean. Justification was not the 
being "made actually just and righteous" with any habitual or actual, positive 
or inherent righteousness. "" He was consistent in asserting that justification 
was a judicial' or "forensic" demonstration. He was apt to refer to Romans 
3: 25 that God "declares his - righteousness" or "showeth forth his 
righteousness". ' -- 
Herein he was agreeable to Martin Luther. -Philip Melanchthon, and 
typical Protestantism in understanding justification to refer to an "extrinsic" 
righteousness, a righteousness occurring outside of man. '-" A sharp 
demarcation which typified Protestantism after Philip Melanchthon was drawn 
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then between the external act of God delimited as "justification" and an 
inward intrinsic renewal in the Catholic sense of Jeremy Taylor and William 
Law. Moreover, in interpreting justification with a forensic and judicial motif 
he was following classical Protestantism influenced by Philip Melanchthon's 
appropriation of Erasmus' Roman legal term for justification. " 
However, while concurring that justification had a judiciary sense. John 
Wesley's Treatise of Justification was quick to clarify the meaning of this. It 
was not judiciary in the sense that a judge only had a subordinate power of 
judicature and must give sentence according to the strict rule of the law. 
This would mean that to "justify' was to pronounce a person ust or absolve 
him from punishment according to the strict terms of the law where he was 
accused as a Ti-ansgressor. 1el Rather. it was used in the judiciary sense in 
which the Supreme Judge had sovereign power to discharge a man from guilt 
and punishment in which he is or might justly be accused. ' One was 
discharged not because he was clear of such things or was justifiable 
according to the Law but, because the Judge was willing to remit the penalty, 
to discharge him as if he were innocent. " In other words, justification was 
an act whereby God freely forgave all which one had done against the law. '` 
Justification was conceived in the negative sense of the Augustinian and 
early English Reformers: it was the non-imputation of sin. Justification did 
not carry the positive sense of Reformed- orthodoxy in which the extrinsic 
perfect obedience of Christ was transferred to the sinner for righteousness. 
God "'declares his righteousness' or mercy, by or 'for the remission of the sins 
that are past', " said John Wesley. ' Justification was the acquitting of man 
from sin and the things laid to his charge, "the forgiveness of all our sins, 
and (what is necessarily implied therein) our acceptance with God". "' 
It had both an active and passive sense: active] , it signified the act of 
God whereby he absolved a believing sinner from the guilt of and punishment 
due to his sins; passively, it signified "that Alteration which is made in the 
State of a person, when he is justified" 'in that previously he was under the 
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guilt of sin and liable to condemnation, now he was free and acquitted from 
both. " This change in the religious state of a sinner John Wesley called "a 
relative change". " 
Having established this, it was true to say "that God in every Man's 
Justification doth impute Righteousness unto him... ' The justified man was 
accounted to be a perfectly righteous man. ' The nature of this "imputation" 
(im utatio and "righteousness" iustitia had long been-the subject of debate 
among Protestants, particularly among Puritans in the 'seventeenth century. 
The controversy was re-kindled during the eighteenth century Methodist 
revival when John Wesley espoused a position which was a combination of 
Calvinism and Arrninianism in the tradition of Richard Baxter, John Goodwin, 
and Daniel Williams. "' In encapsulated form, the issue was whether the faith 
of the one who truly believed or the righteousness - of Christ himself 
constituted in His obedience to the moral law was imputed to the believer for 
righteousness. 1' The latter sense was defended by Count Zinzendorf and 
Calvinists such as James Hervey who urged that the believer was considered 
to be constituted as perfectly and legally righteous as Christ Himself is. - 
In an effort to understand John Wesley's position, let us ý set forth his 
conception of "righteousness". The most thorough-going - didactic - study of 
"righteousness" was presented in John Wesley's extract Treatise of 
Justification. The endnote sets forth these various Scriptural meanings of 
"righteousness". " 
The 'uses of "righteousness" which had the higher profile in John -Wesley's 
works were "the righteousness of God" as God's method of justifying the 
sinner. as mercy. as the inward disposition and fruits in sanctification. and as 
Christ ý as, "the Lord our righteousness". "' , The term which engaged his 
continuing polemical powers was the much disputed term "the imputed 
righteousness of Christ". The question` revolved around -what; how, and in 
what sense the righteousness of Christ could be said to be the formal cause 
or the "condition" (as John Wesley typically referred to it) of justification. 
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In describing John Wesley's conception of "imputation", let us very briefly 
set him into the context of the historical theological discussion. Philip 
Melanchthon, developing what was only implicit in Martin Luther, seems to be 
responsible for going beyond the Augustinian understanding of justification as 
the non-imputation of sin and asserting a positive sense as the imputation of 
the alien, extrinsic righteousness of Christ to the believer for righteousness. "` 
This notion that the righteousness of Christ was imputed or reckoned to man 
as righteousness became the accepted view of Reformed Orthodoxy. 
However, the notion of imputed righteousness was absent in Cranmer's 
Homily of Salvation. "s Article Eleven of the Thirty-Nine Articles did not settle 
the question as to whether faith or the righteousness of Christ was imputed 
for righteousness. Alister McGrath suggests that the early English Reformers 
were inclined toward the view that faith not the righteousness of Christ was 
the formal cause of righteousness. Nonetheless, he claims the latter became 
the accepted position by the end of the sixteenth century. "" I 
John Wesley could certainly be said to be in the Reformation tradition in 
so far as he accepted that Christ's righteousness was imputed to the believer. 
However, on the question of the nature of Christ's righteousness and of this 
imputation he departed from the mainstream Reformed view and, as we shall 
now see, followed the Arminian Puritan exposition. :- 
He first seriously encountered the view that Christ's righteousness - was 
imputed to us as righteousness in the Lutheranism of the Moravians and 
Count Zinzendorf. Count Zinzendorf followed Martin Luther's christological 
approach to justification and regarded the actual presence of Christ in the 
believer as man's external righteousness (rather than locating it in God's 
forensic declaration as Philip Melanchthon and, afterwards, Rudolf Bultmann). 
In his conversation with John Wesley at Gray's Inn Walks, the Count asserted 
that at the moment, of justification, one was as pure in heart as he ever 
would be because of the literal presence of the indwelling Christ. "All our 
perfection is in Christ, " he exclaimed. " The whole Christian perfection was 
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not inherent but imputed. One was perfect in Christ but not in himself. The 
believer was righteous not because righteousness was now a part of his inner 
nature but only because Christ resided in him. Those who were cleansed by 
the blood of Jesus Christ were clothed in "the Righteousness of Jesus Christ 
as their Garment, after they have put him on here in Time. and are -found 
clothed with him". 18 
John Wesley reacted to this rendition because he judged that it preempted 
the logical necessity of the need and duty to become intrinsically righteous 
and to grow in holiness. He argued in so many words that the Count's 
teaching proposed an untenable contradiction (a "legal fiction") which made 
God a liar: a believer in Christ was pronounced temperate and chaste who in 
fact was a drunkard and a whore. 1 
The debate took a decidedly Reformed and more sophisticated twist 
particularly after James Hervey published his "Dialogues Between Thereon 
and Aspasio" in 1755 espousing "the imputed righteousness of Christ". Not 
only did it evoke a response from John Wesley but it prompted him eventually 
to edit and to publish John Goodwin s lmputatio Met as his ultimate 
response. 
The gist of the strict Calvinist position with which John Wesley interacted 
may be sketched in the following way. Derived from Johannes - Cocceius 
conception of three covenants between God and man, this "federal theology" 
became characteristic of a Reformed Orthodoxy which was distinguished from 
both John Calvin and Lutheranism. 1"O In making a covenant of works ("a 
legal covenant") with Adam, the Calvinists understood God to have given his 
law to Adam. Engraved upon his heart, he was expected perfectly to obey, it 
for his acceptance. 18' , Adams -fall led to God's establishment of a new 
covenant, the - "covenant of 'grace". " The terms of this covenant were 
established by a prior covenant in eternity between God the Father and God 
the Son in which the Father choose the elect in return for the Son's 




The Calvinists argued that the conditions within the covenant of grace 
applied not to the elect but only to Christ the Mediator. Since man, under 
the covenant of works of the federal head, the first Adam, disobeyed the 
divine law. Christ the second federal head "in our stead" fulfilled the covenant 
of the law by perfectly obeying it. '" Since he performed all that was 
conditionary in the covenant of works, his obedience was counted as the 
believer's very own obedience and his pardon. '" 
John Wesley resisted this formulation tooth and nail. He could affirm that 
he adhered to the doctrine "of the imputed righteousness of Christ; yet, 
cautioned that this term was "not scriptural". "not necessary". had "done 
immense hurt", and was not one upon which dispute was warranted. '88 
Instead, he replaced the term the "imputed righteousness of Christ" with the 
Scriptural phrase from Jeremiah 23: 6. -Me Lord our righteousness. More 
commonly he inverted the order of "the imputed righteousness of Christ" (or a 
variation thereof) to "the righteousness of Christ imputed". 187 
In good Reformation tradition, he formally acknowledged that the 
righteousness of Christ was imputed. In this he agreed with his Lutheran 
(Zinzendorf) and Calvinistic opponents. However, the controlling question was 
when and In what sense the righteousness of Christ was imputed? '" He 
accepted that God had made two covenants with man but ardently rejected 
the federal theologians notion of an intratrinitarian covenant between the 
Father and Son in which satisfaction was exchanged for an "absolute decree" 
of election. '" He agreed that God had made a covenant with Adam, usually 
called "the covenant of works" or, as he stated it, "the righteousness which is 
of the law". 190 However, he parted company with traditional Reformed theology 
in affirming that no man -- except Adam -- whether Jew or Greek was ever 
under this "covenant of works" before or after Christ. '9' 
Furthermore. under the second covenant, the "covenant of grace". "the 
righteousness which is of faith" was the condition of justification which was 
given by God to fallen man through the merits and mediation of his only 
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begotten Son. ' Increasingly this covenant was progressively revealed from 
Adam to Abraham to Moses. 
We may note that he sharply departed from Reformed theology in denying 
that this second covenant was founded upon a pact in eternity between the 
Father and Son. Rather, he insisted with all his might -- for it was an 
absolutely crucial point of contention between him and the strict Calvinists -- 
that the manner of acceptance of this covenant was that "the free grace of 
God, through the merits of Christ. gives pardon to them that believe. that 
believe with such a faith as, working by love, produces all obedience and 
holiness". " This latter view shifted the burden from a federal, strict Calvinist 
conception of a "covenant of works" In which the emphasis of justification's 
condition was upon God's election and Christ's fulfillment of the covenant by 
perfect obedience, to that of the atoning death of Christ accepted by faith. 
John Wesley disputed the strict Calvinist position by arguing that if, in fact, 
all persons from Adam to the present were under a covenant of works, those 
especially who were not elected faced an impossible prospect. In order to be 
saved, they must perfectly fulfill the law. No one such as they, who were 
already dead in their trespasses, could do this. In contrast, strictly speaking, 
the covenant of grace required no one to do anything at all but to believe in 
Him. "" 
In further considering the nature of "the righteousness of Christ imputed". 
John Goodwin had set out five signification of the word "imputed", none of 
which granted the Reformed understanding. Be that as it may, the chief 
sense of imputation was said to entail God treating the believer-as though he 
has some qualification to which special priveleges are attached, when he does 
not yet have the qualification and comes to the privileges some other way. 19$ 
Therefore, on this basis, righteousness was said to be "imputed" to him that 
believed in Christ who partly had, and shall have ' all the priveleges which 
belonged by Covenant to a perfect law-righteousness (though there be none in 
him) because Christ by his death purchased the privileges for him. "-, The 
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righteousness of Christ was imputed, that is, it supplied "the defect of 
personal performance" to those who believe. "' 
What was the righteousness of Christ which was imputed? It could not 
have been Jesus Christ's divine righteousness which pertained to his equality 
with the Father. - Neither was it his Internal human righteousness which was 
the image of God stamped on every power and faculty of his soul. The 
righteousness of Christ imputed was located in his "external" righteousness. 
The least part of this entailed his negative and positive righteousness in which 
respectively, he knew no outward sin as well as he "did all things well". 
However, his external righteousness implied more than this, more particularly 
that he suffered bearing our sins till he made a full atonement'" 
Reformed theology had assimilated Osiander s bifurcation of the 
righteousness of Christ into the active and passive righteousness of Christ. '" 
Though John Wesley could for discussions sake dissect Christ's righteousness 
Into parts, as well as allow for the necessity of both Christ's obedience and 
death, he felt that separating them was never necessary In speech or in 
thought 20° Neither Martin Luther nor John Calvin had distinguished them in 
Osiander s way. At any rate, the Reformers, Reformed theology, and John 
Wesley in principle agreed both aspects were necessary. However, the strict 
Calvinists, for example James Hervey, leaned hard upon Christ's active 
obedience, putting it on an equal level with his passive obedience as the 
immediate cause of justification X01 While John Wesley agreed that active 
obedience was in some sense necessary, he argued it was not necessary In 
the sense of providing satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. "Christ by 
His death alone" atoned for our sins he stated, quoting the Thirty-first 
Article. 20T 
He argued that if the Calvinists were right, then Christ's death was 
unnecessary. - For, if. as the Calvinists proposed. Christ s perfect obedience 
was transferred to the elect for righteousness as perfect as Jesus 
righteousness, then the "just" would not have died for the unjust (and would 
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not need to do so). ' Further, to reckon the sinner as having kept the law 
perfectly would imply that God conceived of the justified as worthy of their 
justification. Moreover. God would countenance a "legal fiction" by declaring 
one to be what in fact he was not. 2O4 Lastly, the righteousness of the law 
performed by Christ could not have been our justification. If it were, man's 
justification would have been by the works of the law. ' This the Scriptures 
(Romans 3: 28) repudiated. Man once having broken the law, could never be 
recovered by 10,000 observations of the law. For the guilt of one sin could 
only be purged by the peculiar law of mediator-ship in which "without the 
shedding of blood, there is no remission of sins" (Hebrews 9: 22). 206 
Perhaps John Wesley's gravest concerns regarding the strict Calvinists' 
interpretation of the "imputation of Christ's righteousness" were that it 
preempted the absolutely necessary condition of faith and made redundant 
the necessary role of the moral law in the Christians growth of holiness. 
According to John Wesley, faith was the condition through which the 
righteousness of Christ as the cause was imputed "D7 He was highly -- if not 
overly -- suspicious of the Moravian proposition that "Christ has done all that 
was necessary, for the 'Salvation of all Mankind'. " While this assertion was 
qualified and presumably guarded by a succeeding assertion that stated 
believing was necessary to salvation, he felt the first statement in and of itself 
was ambiguous because "Christ has not done all which was necessary for the 
absolute Salvation of all Mankind. For notwithstanding all that Christ has 
done, he that believeth not shall be damned. "' He accused Count Zinzendorf 
of asserting "Universal Salvation" by proposing that "all can and shall obtain" 
salvation. ' 
He rebutted the Reformed supposition that presumed the keeping of the 
law which Christ performed "in our stead" was the primary requirement of 
every person for justification? l° No. he protested, man is 'Justified by faith'. 
This is the corner-stone of the whole Christian building. """ He adduced, "We 
are justified without the works of the law. ""' Faith was the only condition, 
33 
for "none is justified but he that believes; without faith no man Is justified. """ 
The strict Calvinist Richard Hill levelled the charge that he made faith a 
condition necessary to justification by putting "faith" in the place of the proper 
cause of justification -- Christ's righteousness. Of course, John Wesley flatly 
denied this. He pointed out that one must distinguish between the 
"meritorious cause" of justification, the righteousness of Christ, and the 
"condition" of justification, faith in Him. 214 He stated. "I am justified through 
the righteousness of Christ, as the price; through faith, as as the condition. ""' 
Faith was not "that for which we were, accepted". but "that through which we 
are accepted". "' 
While John Wesley was less inclined to engage in the scholastic enterprise 
of dissecting the hierarchy of causes involved in justification than John 
Goodwin and others a century before, nevertheless, his espousal involved 
distinguishing between the two causes, the "merits of Christ" and "faith" 
(which he preferred to refer to as a "condition" rather than ra "cause"). 
Reformed theology averred that the righteousness of Christ was the "formal 
cause". John Wesley in accordance with John Goodwin held it to be the 
"efficient cause". Appealing to logic, John Wesley contended that the 
Reformed position countenanced a logical fallacy in assuming that Christ's 
righteousness was both the formal and efficient cause? " The relation of the 
merits of Christ and the faith of the recipient to justification must be kept 
separate; though, he acknowledged, they nevertheless were "inseparable*. "' 
The Scriptures nowhere set forth that "the righteousness of Christ" was 
imputed to man; yet, it did teach that faith was imputed to Abraham, that 
"'faith is' then 'counted to him for righteousness'. namely for preceding 
righteousness. """ That is, the Apostle did not say faith was counted to him 
for subsequent righteousness. ' Though, for John Wesley- each ' had a 
distinctive contribution, nevertheless, he , held that "faith and the 
righteousness of Christ are inseparable. "" True, Scriptural believing was 
always a believing in the righteousness of Christ since all true justification 
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had the righteousness of Christ for its object ' 
John Wesley's position was basically a re-statement of Martin Luther's and 
John Calvin s. They stressed faith assisted in justification by grasping and 
appropriating Christ while claiming that it did not justify, thus attributing all 
to Christ. 223 For John Wesley, as for them, faith was the instrumental cause 
("formal cause") and Christ and his merits was the sole cause of mans 
justification (per fidem propter Christum not propter fadem)' 
In 1779, John Wesley reminisced on the times when he had first begun 
preaching justification by faith. He had been perplexed by the charge that he 
preached salvation by works. 225 Reflecting on this accusation, he was 
thunderstruck. Those who held that all were absolutely predestined to either 
salvation or damnation saw no intermediary position between salvation by 
works and salvation by absolute decrees. He reasoned that anyone who 
assumed that the salvation of every person depended wholely and solely on 
the absolute, unconditional decree without any regard to faith or works 
foreseen excluded salvation by faith s Therefore, if one denied absolute 
decrees and admitted the condition "He that believes shall be saved", one 
must according to "decree" theology assert salvation by works because 
salvation by anything less than decree is a work' The ultimate issue for 
him was reduced to the following: either one must maintain with Scripture 
that faith was a condition and abandon "unconditional decrees" or, hold on to 
"unconditional decrees" and deny faith as the condition of salvation. ' 
THE NATURES OF JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION DISTINGUISHED 
We turn now to consider John Wesley's distinction . between "justification" 
and "sanctification". - His conceptions can be put into theological perspective 
by briefly surveying the salient historical positions. In Augustine s influential 
viewMO, hi £45 No d4//'v . 
fiM, between justification and sanctification. What 
was later delimited as "sanctification" was comprehended in Augustine under 
"justification". Namely, justification included both the event and the process 
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of an inward, inherent "being made just""s 
Finding cons, ensus on Martin Luther's view is difficult. While all agree 
that he spoke of the need for growth and progress in the Christian life 
following justification, there does not appear to be agreement on whether this 
signified an inherent "making righteous" following "imputation" . 
'0 
. In any 
case, he appears to have been reluctant to state that man actually became 
righteous in justification. Man was intrinsically a sinner while extrinsically 
righteous "' Herein, one sees a parallel between Martin Luther's view and 
Rudolf Bultmann s view. 
Like Augustine, Martin Luther did not distinguish between justification 
and sanctification but envisioned it as an all-encompassing process of 
becoming, including the beginning event and consequent process. ' Philip 
Melanchthon seems responsible for introducing the sharp distinction between 
justification as a -pronouncing righteous' and regeneration as` an internal 
process of renewal in the Holy Spirit. ' This same clear distinction between 
an extrinsic justification and an inherent sanctification is also drawn by John 
Calvin, Richard Hooker, and the early Caroline divines` 
John Calvin affirmed that justification and sanctification were notionally 
distinct yet inseparable aspects of the believers incorporation into Christ. 33 
Generally, in contrast. the Roman: Catholic tradition after Trent held that 
justification was a process in which a man was made inherently and 
ontologically righteous "- The position of the later Caroline divines. 
particularly, the influential "Holy Living" school of Jeremy Taylor and George 
Bull, espoused a position similar to the usual Roman Catholic position which 
subsumes sanctification under justification. Justifying - righteousness was 
seen as inherent to man "" Hans Kung both distinguishes and identifies 
justification and sanctification 2' 
With this background, we now come to John Wesley's view. In - the "holy 
living", moral theological tradition prior to Aldersgate , he, even according to 
his own analysis, identified justification with sanctification, handling 
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justification, if but by implication, as both an event and a life-long process. 
How did his experience of faith and assurance at Aldersgate affect his 
understanding of this relation between justification and sanctification? 
Judging from his June 1738 sermon "Salvation by Faith", he had yet to 
delimit clearly the distinction between justification and sanctification. 
Ignoring the actual term "sanctification" in this sermon, what he later in time 
would subhead under the term "sanctification" was presently subordinated 
under justification "taken in the largest sense". More specifically, 
"justification" encompassed both "deliverance from guilt and punishment" and 
"a deliverance from the whole body of sin, through Christ formed in his 
heart" 2"" Clearly, in this early sermon, justification "was treated as both a 
deliverance from sin as well as an inherent "making righteous". He had not 
as yet shed his view of justification as a "making righteous". 
However, as time passed, what he had once considered under the 
umbrella of justification he --later clearly divided - into justification, and 
sanctification. Zile crucial difference between his pre-Aldersgate and post- 
Aldersgate view of justification was that prior to Aldersgate, baptism and the 
holy life were the necessary conditions of justification; after Aldersgate, he 
understood evangelical, Christ-revealed faith to be the necessary condition. 
His immediate post-Aldersgate position was congruent with the early English 
Reformers' doctrine: for example, Thomas Cranmer, in the Homily of Salvation, 
expounded that the nature of justification consisted of man being made 
righteous "by faith only" 2'O. 
Nonetheless, as a result of his visit to Germany and reading of the 
Homilies, his late 1738 publication of his extract of the Homilies seemed now 
apprised of some distinction between being "Justified" and being "made just". " 
In September, 1739, he stated his final position. Explaining how he 
differed from other clergy of the Church of England, he declared that he 
believed "justification to be wholly distinct from sanctification, and necessarily 
antecedent to it". " Though apparently some of the Moravians had begun to 
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direct his thinking toward a contrast between justification and holiness, the 
process of achieving clarity took some time. In his 1741 sermon "Christian 
Perfection", he separated the phrase "to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" 
(which he now related to Christian perfection) from its former combination 
with "to forgive us our sins". This former combination had previously signified 
justification in his mind. 24 
He presented his most conscious and telling distinction between 
justification and sanctification in his 1748 sermon "The Great Privilege of 
Those That Are Born of God". In an allusion to Count Zinzendorf and, 
perhaps as Albert Outler suggests, William Law, he took issue with the 
position which suggested that being justified and being born of God were only 
different expressions denoting the same thing. ' Rather, he insisted, they 
were "easily distinguished as being not the same. but things of a widely 
different nature". ' Mike Philip Melanchthon, John Wesley understood these 
as two distinct ontological realities. He was insistent they should not be 
confounded because of the confusion this would bring to the interpretation of 
"whosoever is born of God doth not conunit sin. ""' 
Even though both realities had different natures, they occurred at the 
same moment. Every believer who was justified was at one and the same 
moment born of God just as every one born of God was at one and the same 
moment justified. "" However, though inseparable in point of time, John 
Wesley noted in 1760 that justification logically preceded the new birth. For 
conceptually, the turning away of God's wrath preceded the Spirit's working in 
the heart. " 
Since the moment of new birth was equally the first moment of 
sanctification, what was said of the new birth could more largely be referred 
to under the rubric of "sanctification«? A9 At the moment of the new birth, the 
gradual work of sanctification began in which the believer went from grace to 
grace to full salvation from all sin in entire sanctification. 0 John Wesley said 
"the moment a sinner is justified his heart is cleansed in a low degree". " 
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Therefore, both justification and sanctification were "undoubtedly 
instantaneous" 2 In whatever moment one believed, he was justified' The 
new birth when a person is "bornagain" is analogous to natural childbirth 
when "a man Is born' at once". Being sanctification s "gate" or "threshold% the 
new birth was only the first point of sanctification and not the whole 
process. 2`4 Gradual sanctification progressed until one may be 
Instantaneously perfected in entire sanctification. ' 
Summarizing his exposition of the relation between justification and 
sanctification in the mid to latter 1740's, John Wesley asserted that 
justification and sanctification were not only notionally but ontologically 
wholly distinct workings of God ' Justification was a "relative change", what 
God did "for us", an extrinsic reversal of relations between God and man in 
which God remitted man's sins. God's ledger was amended but man in his 
essential nature was not. However, sanctification indicated an intrinsic, 
"real change", what God did "in us", - in which God actually transformed the 
believer's human nature and re-created it into that nature which Adam had 
before the Fall. As John Wesley said, "God through Him first accounts and 
then makes us righteous. " Accordingly, '"the righteousness which is of God 
by faith" is both imputed and inherent'. ' 
This theological posture left him sitting comfortably within the Reformation 
tradition of Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, representative Reformed 
theology, Richard Hooker, the post-Reformation tradition of the earlier 
Caroline divines, and Arminian Puritans such as Richard Baxter and John 
Goodwin. ' John Wesley's theology distinguished him from Roman Catholic 
thought after Trent as well as from his former "Holy Living" school in which 
justification subsumed sanctification and. signified essentially the process of 
maxis becoming inherently and ontologically righteous. This fact also points 
out a variance between him and his oft-quoted Homily of Salvation, In which 
Thomas Cranmer described justification as a being "made just" by "fayth 
onely". 
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Although Hans King affirms that justification occurs through faith alone, 
John Wesley would dissent from Hans 'Kung's view that justification is also 
God's making man objectively and ontologically holy. ' However, if they 
dropped their own formal definitions which dictate the discussions, they 
would seem to agree that man is both declared righteous and made righteous. 
Nevertheless, a subtle difference seems to remain, that John Wesley in the 
Protestant tradition envisioned justification as a work and happening of God, 
complete in and of itself. by faith alone, and logically as well as ontologically 
divisible (which Hans Kung does not accept) from a "making righteous" and 
good works. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, John Wesley most commonly described justification as 
"pardon and acceptance with God". "the forgiveness of sins", or "remission of 
sins". He stated that justification was the act of God the Father for the sake 
of the propitiation of the Son whereby He demonstrated his righteousness or 
mercy by remitting the sins of the past and acquitting the sinner from all 
guilt and punishment due his offenses. 
The "meritorious cause" or source of justification was God's grace 
specifically expressed in "the merits of Jesus Christ" or, just the same. "what 
Christ hath done and suffered for us". A dramatic shift In his perspective of 
Jesus Christ occurred in the Spring of 1738 from "Christ our Pattern" to 
"Christ our Atonement", the "meritorious cause" of justification. His vision 
became fixed upon the eternally alive, transcendent, and abidingly immanent 
person Jesus Christ Himself. and Him expressly revealed in and through His 
obedient life and sacrificial death. In coming to know Jesus as his Saviour 
who had died for his sins, he claimed he now personally received from, 
communed with, and was himself indwelt by the actual God-Man who had 
once died for him on a cross. What had previously been an eschatological 
hope was now a present reality. Jesus Christ "the Saviour of sinners" was 
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the fountainhead of the panoptical spectrum of salvation. 
Similarly, Rudolf Bultmann located the importance of Jesus in the "deed of 
divine grace". his death on the cross, "the salvation-occurrence"., He would 
deem speculation about the divine deed's place in the chain of causes as 
irrelevant scholasticism. For Rudolf Bultmann, unlike John Wesley and other 
traditional Protestants, the life of Christ was not a factor in mari s salvation. 
The death of Jesus spoke for his life. Rudolf Bultmann would think of the 
traditional theological assertion that Jesus perfectly fulfilled the Law as a 
supposition that could never be confirmed and one which arose from a 
deficient way of thinking. The death of Christ as an objective. historical event 
could not be seen as the saving "ground" of salvation in and of itself separate 
from the faith that resolves to accept it as such. However, it is the "ground" 
in the sense ý that salvation's origin is the historical fact of Jesus' death. 
Furthermore, it is the ground by the fact that the cross' proclamation is God's 
saving Word which summons, persons to submit to it. and. thereupon, 
discover the existentiell self-knowledge that Jesus is the saving Word in the 
"eschatological now". Rudolf Bultmann would dissent from John Wesley by 
denying that the Person Jesus now reveals Himself supernaturally to men and 
personally appropriates to them the saving effects of His life and death. 
Trying to assert such of Jesus. would be trying to know Jesus "kata sarka". 
However, they both agree that the death of Christ is an event which may 
happen to and for and in man in the present. 
In explaining how the death of Jesus Christ procured justification and 
salvation, John Wesley often recited appropriate passages of Scripture which 
he interpreted literally. In explaining the atonement, he most often employed 
the "satisfaction" and "penal" theories as developed and expressed In the 
Reformed tradition. He said that Jesus' death was an acceptable price for 
man's sin in violating God's majesty and law. Moreover,, in the manner of 
Reformed theology, he also stressed Jesus suffering of the lauds penalty in 
place of humankind. Jesus Christ was the propitiatory sacrifice who suffered 
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and took upon Himself mars penalty for sin thereby averting God's wrath 
from him. 
In the tradition of Richard Baxter and John Goodwin, he preached a 
"hypothetical universalism" which - contrary to strict Calvinism'- affirmed that 
Christ died for all persons with justification having as a prerequisite belief. 
John Wesley rejected the Socinian notion that Christ's death was only "a 
metaphor" rather than an objective event which effected a change in God's 
relations with man. In the Reformation tradition, he interpreted the force of 
Christ's death to lie in the fact that it was a demonstrative act of God which 
had a necessary correlation to God and His relations with man rather than 
simply a subjective statement from which man could draw helpful insights 
and religious encouragement. 
John Wesley did not conceive of the term to "justify' in the Roman 
Catholic or Catholic-Anglican sense of "making just" but in the forensic, 
extrinsic sense of God declaring his righteousness "for the remission of the 
sins that are past". Having said this, he differed sharply from the orthodox 
Reformed position. Although he would agree with the Reformed view that 
justification was the imputation of Christ's extrinsic righteousness to the 
sinner, he defined "imputation" "negatively" as the non-imputation of sin 
(remission of sins) rather than "positively" as a transference of Christ's 
obedience to the sinner. In other words, he identified himself with a tradition, 
including the early English Reformers and the Puritans Richard Baxter and 
John Goodwin, which held that justification was the imputation of faith for 
righteousness rather than the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. ' 
What makes for confusion is that he expressed the content of the former 
position In the form of the latter. He repudiated the unmitigated, Reformed 
stress upon the righteous obedience of Christ for at least three reasons. One, 
this opinion was underpinned by "the decrees" of God; two, it detracted from 
the necessity of Christ's atoning death and personal faith: three, it undercut 
the ontological necessity of Inner and outward transformation in holiness. 
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Justification was a forensic, extrinsic declaration of God's righteousness by 
the remission of man's sins contradistinguished logically and ontologically 
from sanctification which was an intrinsic, real change in the sinners human 
nature. Though disparate from Catholic tradition which had subsumed 
sanctification under justification, his understanding followed a main, 
Reformation stream from Philip Melanchthon and John Calvin to both early 
and later Arminian-Calvinist divines such as Richard Baxter and John 
Goodwin. 
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WHO ARE JUSTIFIED? THE "UNGODLY" 
The broad outline of the 1746 sermon "Justification by Faith" serves as a 
representative blueprint for John Wesley's scheme of justification by faith. 
Building upon Its broadest outline, we move away with him now from 
justification as "objective" faith and attempt to stitch together his substantive 
formulations regarding "subjective" faith. According to John Wesley. the 
"objective" and "subjective" dimensions of justification were two weights 
absolutely necessary for a balanced. Scriptural experience and understanding 
of justification. Justifying faith was as necessary to justification as the 
"merits of Christ"; albeit, faith was only justification's condition, not the 
founding cause. 
This "subjective" aspect of justification relates to the appropriation to the 
Individual person of what Christ did and suffered. John Wesley's 
consideration of justification's "subjective" side may be introduced by his 
question: "Who are they that are justified? "' His answer, diametrically 
opposed to his pre-1738 "holy living" moral theology, was Scriptural but 
radical in the eighteenth century's Church of England context: God "justifieth 
the ungodly" (Romans 4: 5). John Wesley stated he justified the ungodly of 
every kind and degree and none but the ungodly. ' He said, "For it Is not a 
saint, but a sinner that is forgiven .... "9 He claimed they were justified whose 
depravity was total; namely, those in whom no good thing is found, who have 
no Christian temper and no antecedent righteousness -- no, not so much as a 
negative righteousness or Innocence -- till the moment God gave them faith. ` 
Jesus came to seek and to save the lost. Because forgiveness immediately 
correlated to sin and nothing else. sin alone admitted of being forgiven. He 
stated, "It is our 'unrighteousness' to which the pardoning God is 'merciful' .5 
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That God justified the ungodly was the corollary to the proposition that 
the grace of God through the merits of Jesus Christ alone saved men. For if 
it was grace alone which saved man, then the state from which man was 
saved must be such that only grace was sufficient. John Wesley was 
presumably right in asserting that this proposition had been neglected by 
those - apparently the overwhelming majority of clerics in the Church of 
England - who accepted the contrary view, which he himself once had 
maintained. 
Though his enlightenment had come from outside the English church from 
the German Moravians, he found the same truth corroborated by the English 
Reformer Robert Barnes and, more particularly, ' by the Articles and Homilies 
which he forever triumphantly quoted against hostile churchmen. 
Nevertheless, John Wesley's proclamation that the ungodly without good 
works were justified was little short of scurrilous. However complacent the 
age, its nerve could still be pinched at the prospect of the likes of John 
Wesley revivifying the inflammatory theological tenets which had ( &cthe 
previous century's internecine warfare. During the first twenty-five years of 
the Evangelical Awakening, he fielded repeated attacks against this 
proposition by such persons as vicars Thomas Church and John Downes, the 
enigmatic "John Smith". Dr. Henry Stebbing preacher of Gray's Inn. Bishops 
Lavington and Warburton, and the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Dr. George 
Horne e 
The prevailing, peace-keeping, eighteenth century view of the condition of 
justification accepted that it was neither faith alone nor good works--but faith 
together with good works. John Wesley facetiously observed that this was 
how "many wise and learned men ... explain justification 
by faith". ' He 
confessed that he had once walked in this "new path" of salvation by faith 
and works. ' 
The dramatic alteration in his conception of faith's comprehension from 
that of a Catholic, moral theologian to that of a traditional Reformation 
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Protestant may be traced by comparing two editions of his sermon "Salvation 
by Faith". In June 1738, he claimed that faith "is necessarily inclusive of all 
good works and all holiness". ' Viewing this statement in light of his later 
more developed understanding, it was essentially the moral theologian Bishop 
Bull's own position. However, in a later edition of this sermon, his theological 
understanding of faith had become sophisticated enough to recognize the 
impropriety of this assertion. Indeed, his original statement could easily have 
been taken to mean that the faith which saved Included good works and 
holiness within its parameters. That he intended to mean this is doubtful but 
open to question. Nonetheless, that he asserted this in 1738 says something 
about his then lack of clarity regarding faith. Later, he amended the 
statement to read that faith is "necessarily productive of all good works and 
all holiness". " 
The 1738 rendition would seem to compare favourably with Hans Kung's 
thought. However. John Wesley's later position, while asserting a necessary 
relation between faith and good works, was an attempt to siphon off good 
works and holiness from faith alone which was the sole condition of 
justification. 
His dialogue with Dr. George Horne is fascinating and instructive in this 
regard .. of only because here he threshed out with a notable academic the 
matter of justification by faith, but also because in locking horns with him he 
debated with a significant stream of English church thought which has 
traversed four centuries. Let us consider very briefly his interaction with 
George Horne who assumed George Bull's view of justification by faith . and 
good works. George Home's argument -was heavily indebted to the 
post-Restoration divine Bishop George Bull's exposition of justification by 
faith. The Bishop's exposition came to have a profound influence, not only 
over the post-Restoration Caroline -church. but also it seems over the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth century English church. " 
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In a sermon in which George Horne alluded to the doctrine of "the new 
lights at the Tabernacle and Foundery". he argued as George Bull that faith 
which (and as far as it) justified, must necessarily be completed by true love. ` 
Man could not be justified by faith alone. For faith, defined as reliance on 
gospel promises, must be founded on the consciousness of having performed 
the conditions. A reliance so founded was the result of works wrought through 
faith. "' John Wesley contested this by countering that this reliance was the 
result of works wrought without faith; or else the argument implied a 
contradiction. For, assuming faith to be a synonymous term for reliance, then 
George Home's argument would proffer that reliance was the result of works 
wrought through such a reliance. '' 
Further, George Horne, fusing sanctification with justification, asserted 
that Christ required repentance, faith and Its fruits for justification. John 
Wesley replied that St. Paul affirmed in Romans chapter four that "faith is 
counted for righteousness", not either repentance or its fruits. When Paul 
declared, "Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified, " 
he was arguing that no person "can be justified by his own works". In saying 
this, he was excluding all the works of all humankind antecedent to 
justification. " 
The point was that one could do nothing but sin till he was reconciled to 
God. Herein his doctrine of the total depravity of all persons expressed itself 
with its full force. 16 Was not the one who before justification fed the hungry, 
clothed the naked, prayed, et cetera doing "good works"? John Wesley agreed 
with the Reformers these were "good works" in the sense that they were good 
and profitable to men. But they were not "good works" in themselves or in 
the sight of God. " By definition "good works"' must be works which follow 
justification. Quoting Article Twelve, he stated that "good works" "spring out 
of a true and living faith". " He, set up the following syllogism to argue 
logically the point: "No works are good which are not done as God hath 
willed and commanded them to be done. " "But no works done before 
65 
justification are done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done. " 
Amplifying this, he explained that as God wills our works to be done in love, 
then in order to be done in love they must be done with the love of the 
Father in us. This love of the Father is given us only when we receive the 
"Spirit of adoption". " "Therefore no works done before justification are good. " 
he concluded. 
An ambiguity which resulted from this argument was not really addressed 
by him. If no "good works" precede justification. then the unjustified person 
who resists temptation and does not sin -- which must be God's will -- has 
not done a "good work". Moreover, the conclusion can be drawn that one who 
has resisted sin and done God's will has not by definition done what is good 
in God's sight. This was the Reformers own paradoxical conclusion. Yet, one 
must conclude that John Wesley. accepting prevenient grace, and wanting to 
avoid fatalism, accepted that such a resisting of sin is' both a sin and not a 
sin and, presumably, both a "good work" and not a good work. ' 
We must only lightly touch upon how his argument that no "good works" 
are possible before justification squared with his controversy with the 
Moravians in which he insisted that the unjustified must wait for justification 
by using the ordinances of God. The issue centered around the manner in 
which an unjustified person was to wait to receive the gift of faith. The 
Moravians, most particularly Philip Molther. (though Count Zinzendorf did not 
appear to be unsympathetic to the view), advised that the way to faith was to 
"wait for Christ" and to "be still" (hence called "stillness" or "'quietism") and 
leave off using the "means of grace", such as going to church, communicating. 
fasting, using private prayer or even reading the Scripture' Philip Molther 
argued that unbelievers -sought not to use the so-called "means of grace" 
because they "do not ordinarily convey God's grace to Unbelievers" -- Christ 
was the only means? ` Without faith, that is, full assurance, one was without 
Christ and therefore had no good. Therefore, if one was without Christ, then 
no matter what one did, one could do no good and nothing could be of help 
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to salvation. Furthermore, whatever one did without faith and Christ was sin. 
On the contrary, John Wesley argued that the way to wait for Christ was 
not to wait passively but to wait by using all the ý"means of grace" ', Several 
observations elucidate the polemic. The Moravian were not without support 
from Martin Luther for their view. He noted in his lecture on Romans that 
when grace came upon the soul, there must not be prayer or action on our 
part but only a keeping still? ' Moreover, Philip Molther. waving the 
ordinances, was only carrying out the teaching that 
whatever, was-not -of-faith was -sin to its radical conclusion. As we have noted, 
John Wesley tried to maintain this conclusion while qualifying it. 
Furthermore, the reason for their critical difference of opinion stems from 
their variant definitions of justifying faith. Philip Molther restricted justifying 
faith to a "full assurance of faith" in which there was a clear perception of 
Christ's indwelling consisting in all joy and no doubt On the other hand, 
John Wesley allowed that justifying faith was a faith short of "full assurance" 
with some joy and some doubt. ' 'Therefore. when they argued about who was 
eligible for communion, the person the Moravian considered unjustified and 
ineligible was by John Wesley's definition justified and eligible. 
John Wesley was not advocating what the rubrics of the Church outlawed: 
admitting the unbelieving, unrepentant sinner to the Lord's table 2e Basically, 
when he spoke of communion as a "converting ordinance", he meant that it 
could be the means of giving the believer with a degree of faith in his "weak" 
sense the "full assurance of faith" in the Moravian sense. 7 Those who know 
their state of "utter sinfulness and helplessness" and who "know and feel that 
they want the grace of God" were fit to communicate. 's The Moravians also 
publicly agreed in 1740 that they did not at all despise the poor, humiliated 
sinner seeking grace (probably the person John, Wesley considered "weak" in 
faith) to come to communion 2' 't 
Some of the Moravians carried an instinctive Reformation wariness which 
equated using the ordinances (even for the believer) with trusting in them. - It 
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smacked of man co-operating with God for salvation. ' John Wesley. still with 
an untempered high Church bent, seems to have viewed the ordinances not 
as acts which merited God's grace as in the Roman Catholic idea of meritum 
de condigno, but channels through which God bestowed grace. Nonetheless, 
the Moravians perhaps perceived in the High Churchman an over zealous and 
defensive attachment to the ordinances which was uncharacteristic of the 
evangelical Protestantism with which they were familiar. Later, in 1746, when 
the smoke began to clear, John Wesley could warn against saying, "I must do 
something before I come to Christ"91 
WHO ARE JUSTIFIED? THE GUILTY "UNGODLY" 
After establishing that the "ungodly" were f ze who were justified. he 
further defined who these "ungodly" were that were justified. The ungodly 
were the guilty who were not only condemned by God but also by their own 
consciences. While all ungodly persons were candidates for justification, only 
the one who was convicted of his ungodliness might be justified. Justifying 
faith presupposed "a sense of sin", a sense of inner "conviction" of the guilt 
and power of sin within the ungodly. -" 
This "convincing us of sin" was a work performed by the Holy Spirit who 
removed the veil and pricked us in the heart, convincing the unrighteous of 
our evil nature, temper, actions, and words'3 He brought the sinner to 
awareness of the full sense of his ungodliness -- his utter inability to think, 
speak or do good, and "his absolute meetness for hell-fire". ' Simultaneously 
with this work, the Spirit convinced the ungodly of the desert of our sins, so 
that we "receive the spirit of bondage unto fear". the fear of the wrath of God, 
the fear of punishment and death which we deserve. 
Faith implied that a person first renounce himself in this manner, totally 
rejecting all "confidence in the flesh" (Philippians 3: 3,4) and abandoning all 
trust. in his own works or righteousness of any kind. ' When a man stands 
thus before God, he can then, in a popular expression of the Awakening. 
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"Look unto Jesus" (Hebrews 12: 2). " When he had full conviction of his 
Inability either to remove the power or atone for the guilt of sin, he was in the 
gate of Christian blessedness " Encapsulating It, he exhorted, "Go as 
altogether ungodly, guilty, lost, destroyed, deserving and dropping into hell, 
and thou shalt then find favour In his sight"' 
How did natural ungodly man become "convinced of sin"? In 1746, John 
Wesley answered, "By some awful providence, or by his Word applied with the 
demonstration of his Spirit. God touches the heart .... "40 More specifically, 
this ordinarily meant that the Son of God convicted sinners by the _law. " 
Just as Martin Luther consistently urged the preaching of the law in order to 
humiliate and awaken penitence, so did John Wesley. 42 The "schoolmasters" 
first use was to slay the sinner and destroy the life and strength wherein he 
trusted. " By means of the law he is "convinced of sin" and brought "under 
the law", receiving the "spirit of bondage unto fear". " The natural man 
brought "under the law" begins to perceive the "inward, spiritual meaning of 
the law of God. " The guilty ungodly is convinced that the law not only related 
to outward sin but also to the secret recesses of his soul. At every point he 
sees and feels his sin such that he sees he is "all sin", and "altogether corrupt 
and abominable". " This convicted person, though desiring and striving to 
break loose from sin, feels his grievous chains even more 46 - 
For John Wesley, this conviction brought by the law implied a "species" of 
faith which if one may so describe it was the twilight straddling the darkness 
of unbelief and the light of justifying faith. In -1788. he called this specie of 
faith the "faith of a servant. " - What was revealed to one "under conviction" 
was the evidence of things which could not be seen until God revealed them `7 
How did this description of the conviction of sin. which played such a 
prominent role in Methodist theology and was in such evidence in the 
groaning and shrieking at the outdoor gatherings. ' relate to other 
understandings of the pre justification condition? As far as the standard 
Roman Catholic understanding goes. John Wesley's conception roughly 
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paralleled one of the three parts of the sacrament of penance. namely, 
contrition. " Protestants had long ago dropped the other two parts, auricular 
confession and satisfaction. While his description of the person "under 
conviction" typically related to the unsaved person, the Roman Catholic 
conception usually related to - the baptized person who once had sanctifying 
grace. Martin Luther was ambiguous in his teaching regarding penitence 
(poenitentiae) `s He seemed to affirm two contrary things at different times, 
that true penitence began with the fear and judgment of God, and later 
avowed that initial penitence sprang from faith and love. ' Albrecht Ritschl 
stated that A. H. Francke and the Gotha Pietists were the first to insist on 
contrition, the "conflict of penitence" (Busskampfl, as a precondition of living 
faiths' Similarly, Richard Baxter s Aphorismes maintained that "Conviction" 
and "godly Sorrow" were antecedent to believing. 52 
The experience of the hatefulness and loathesomeness of all sin which 
preceded faith as particularly described by Pietist and Puritan appeared in 
John Wesley. Moravian testimonies which John Wesley recorded in his 
Journal were by no means dissimilar to John Wesley's own pre-faith 
experience struggle, though Count Zinzendorf did not concede the universal 
necessity of a painful struggle of repentance prior to or after faith. An inner 
"feeling" of inner, sinful corruption, the lack of the knowledge and love of God, 
misery, darkness, fear of God's -wrath and lack of peace prior ý to justification 
were featured in these accounts s' 
Rudolf Bultmann rejects the notion of a pre-faith, agonizing struggle of 
repentance in which one has an "oppressive consciousness of sin". `- In 
teaching that only the individual of faith had an existentiell self-understanding 
of ý his sinful state, Rudolf Bultmann's view was harmonious with Martin 
Luther's view that penitence sprang from faith. 
Perhaps the experience of being "under conviction" in Methodism came to 
be expressed in stylized form; nevertheless, its signification referred to a 
particular kind of individual experience to which Catholics and Protestants 
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both seemed to bear testimony. 
At any rate, they who may be justified are the "ungodly" whose hearts are 
convinced of their utter lostness, sinfulness and complete inability to work for 
their own righteousness. On what terms were these ungodly persons who 
were under the conviction ofý sin justified? Resoundingly, he proclaimed 
throughout his life, "Faith alone therefore - justifies "s" One would not be 
justified by "having your own righteousness, which is of the law", by baptism, 
by good works, by outward religion, or even by repentance ' He declared 
"faith alone" in 1738, before the congregation in St. Mary's the University 
Church; he enunciated it to Thomas Church in 1745; to Dr George Home in 
1762; and before the mourners at George Whitefield's memorial service in 
1771 -- as well as to many others in between these dates and afters' 
WHAT FAITH IS NOT 
Before defining the faith whereby persons were saved, John Wesley set 
forth what saving faith was not. In so doing, he cut against the grain of the 
common eighteenth century understanding of saving faith which more times 
than not was typified by the "holy living" analysis of Jeremy Taylor and 
George Bull. Firstly, he denied the proposition that -the faith which justified 
encompassed and included in itself works. Faith was ý not synonymous with 
the "good life", he insisted to George Home. George Home asseverated In St. 
Mary's to the University that the faith which Paul attributed to justification 
was faith "which worketh by love". Citing several texts to prove his point. he 
capped his argument by referring to 1 Corinthians 13: 13 where Paul - showed 
faith "disjoined from Charity, or love, maketh It to be of no value .... "ý This 
was harmonious with his mentor George Bull who explained that faith which 
justified must necessarily be rendered complete by true love ' Ironically, the 
expression which represented Bishop Bull's analysis of faith, "faith which 
worketh by love", became John Wesley's encapsulated refrain for the scheme 
of salvation' 
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Though Bristol's Bishop Joseph Butler asserted "our faith itself is a good 
work; it Is a virtuous temper of mind", John Wesley disputed it sl John 
Wesley also repudiated the notion which marked the rational proclivity of 
Enlightenment theology that faith was a simple, rational assent to a 
proposition or a theological "opinion". In fairness to many who entertained 
this, the rational assent was not just a barren assent but an assent conjoined 
with praxis. In addition to those already mentioned above. churchman "John 
Smith" called faith "rational assent and moral virtue". According to him, 
ascent and moral practice must be logically and temporally synchronous ' 
In a 1748 sermon, John Wesley affirmed that the apostle John's statement 
"Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God" (1 John 5: 1) 
was not speaking of "a barely notional or speculative faith". ' Faith was not 
"a bare assent to this proposition, 'Jesus Is the Christ" , nor to all 
propositions. " Neither was faith the opinion itself or a "system of opinions" 
however true or scriptural. ' Faith, he said, was not a "speculative, rational 
thing, a cold, lifeless assent, a train of ideas in the head". ' In summary, 
faith was not simply "notional"; namely, a mental agreement that a certain 
statement was true. 
Neither for John Wesley was faith merely "an evidence and conviction of 
such or such truths". ' For instance, it was not the faith of a heathen who 
believed certain things about God such "that God is; that He rewards those 
who seek Him". ' Moreover, appropriating the thought from the Homilies, he 
stated that faith was not the "faith of a devil" who believed even more than 
the heathen; for a devil believed that Jesus is the Son of God, the Christ, the 
Saviour of the world. ' In 1763, Richard Hart insisted that being convinced of 
the reality that Jesus is the Christ alone was enough to be called faith. John 
Wesley retorted that it was not enough, for so had he once believed. 70 
Moreover, he assured - Thomas Church that the devils believed the Anglican 
Articles. " No, even if the Roman Catholics believed more than was revealed 
in the Old and New Testament and the Protestants just what had been 
72 
declared, the embracing of certain truths was insufficient faith. 72 
Lastly, faith through which persons were saved was not simply the faith 
the apostles had while Christ was on earth: nor, one might add, the faith with 
which John Wesley flirted while sailing back and forth to England. It was not 
so-called "miraculous" faith which the apostles exercised in order to work 
miracles, to heal, and to do mighty works. " 
From his comments on what faith was not, John Wesley demonstrated he 
was somewhat of an anachronism of the prevailing spirit of his age. He 
vigorously revolted against the ages reductionism of faith to credal recital and 
moral virtue and practice. The eighteenth century's religious thinking, 
influenced by the likes of John Tillotson and John Locke, sought to bring 
theology down from the divisive regions of theological speculation to the 
reasonable sphere of practical Christian morality whose truth was believed to 
be vindicated by reason and verified by its harmony with creations moral 
order. While at Oxford, John Wesley did not escape such an understanding 
being warned by his mother to avoid a solely mental concept of faith which 
excluded practice. 
` Similar to Philip Spener s, August Franckes and German Pietism 7s 
criticism of the tepid, formal, rational orthodoxy of seventeenth century 
Lutheranism, John Wesley protested against a prevailing conception of faith 
which was confined to the "head". He was utterly impatient with what 
seemed to him his age's complacent "almost Christian" whose faith went little 
further than cerebral, credal concurrence. He reacted against the trifling with 
faith which had "a form of godliness" but not its power. " Maybe they found 
the "head" but they fell short of the soul and heart. As early as his reading of 
Thomas ä Kempis and Jeremy Taylor in 1725. he became impassioned with 
the new understanding that religion must first be kindled in the interior 
man. 's After discovering true faith, he knew true faith was felt in the inner 
man. Therefore, as a result, no aspect of his existence would be unaffected or 
uninvolved. 
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John Wesley's complaint against the overly rationalistic tone of the religion 
of his day was not dissimilar to other complaints in other ages; for example, 
Friedrich Schleiermachers and Sjren Kierkegaard's in the nineteenth century 
and, in the twentieth century, Wilhelm Herrmann and, more to our point, 
Rudolf Bultmann. Here we discover a significant point of contact between 
John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann. Like his mentor Wilhelm Herrmann, 
Rudolf Bultmann rejected the identification of authentic Christianity with 
doctrinal confession and protested against the rational orthodoxy in the 
German Protestant church. '' He said only faith's radical self-surrender and 
resolve of the will to accept the saving proclamation of grace in Jesus Christ 
could effect the utter reversal of man's previous sinful state. Simple assent to 
assertions left one as a neutral observer to a salvation whose realization came 
only through faith. 
Both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultrnann asserted that true faith was a 
matter of one's whole existence and not simply the intellect. Moreover, for 
both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann, faith as assent was unacceptable for 
salvation because it construed faith to be a human work, something which 
man performed and was required of him for salvation. 
FAITH AS "ASSENT" 
Proceeding from John Wesley's understanding of what faith was not, we 
will set forth his understanding of what faith was. Although as we have 
stated he was certain that assent to divine truth was not saving faith, 
nonetheless, he, in the tradition of the Homilies, consciously presupposed and 
included "assent" as a prior aspect of "true, living. Christian faith". He stated 
that faith was "not only an assent, an act of the understanding ... " ,- "not 
only a belief of all -the -articles of our faith... but ... ". 
" The point was that the 
"living faith" took in, might not exclude, and could co-exist with prior "assent". 
When he asserted that faith was not assent he meant to say "assent" alone 
was in and of itself insufficient for salvation and, therefore, "dead faith". But 
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united with trust In the merits of Christ it was "living faith". 
Did this make assent to propositions a human work and a human 
pre-condition to faith and salvation? ' Was assent to doctrinal propositions an 
absolutely necessary pre-condition to "living faith" and, therefore, to salvation? 
He gave a flexible answer to this issue. Firstly, he did not assert that assent 
to articles of faith or to Scriptural affirmations were absolutely necessary 
to"living faith" and salvation in every case. He claimed he dare not affirm the 
contention of some that regardless of the Inner change which occurred in 
someone's heart, unless he had clear Ideas or conceptions of the capital 
doctrines, he could not benefit from Christ's death. He declared 
epigrammatically, "I believe he (the merciful God) respects the goodness of the 
heart, rather than the clearness of the head". 78 
Interestingly. Bishop Warburton accused him of separating "reason from 
grace" and argued that "in the first propagation of religion God began with the 
understanding, and rational conviction won the heart". 7e John Wesley ' gave 
qualified agreement. Frequently it was true, but, more generally, God began 
his work in the heart. For example, the jailor who in Acts chapter sixteen 
had his heart touched cried "What must I do to be saved? " before he 
understood the way of salvation. He went on to say that persons "usually feel 
desires to please God before they know how to please Him. "' People were 
first convinced in the heart by a desire to please God independently of the 
mind. Persons were saved from their sins who could not give even a simple, 
rational account of the plainest principles of religion. 
In affirming that persons did not necessarily need a' rational 
understanding of the principles of religion for salvation, John Wesley was not 
categorically disavowing the mind a role in salvation or arguing for a 
circumvention of theological propositions and doctrines. Rudolf Bultmann was 
later to argue that to require "assent" prior to faith was to require "two acts of 
faith" and, therefore, it was a "work" and a sin. His concern was not for 
those with dull understanding but for those learned persons who by assent 
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would, by his reckoning, be forced to sacrifice their intellect to incredible 
proposals. 
Rudolf Bultmann distinguished saving faith from a "work"' by affirming 
that faith was unique in that it was the only decision which was not made on 
the basis of prior premises. Rather, all prior considerations are called, into 
question and "uprooted" by faith. Saving faith could only be saving faith in 
the abandonment of all prior considerations of all security (in which having an 
"evidence" would consist). "' Therefore. to believe on the "evidence" of "things 
not seen" could only be a purposeful act of man and a "work". John Wesley 
would retort that it was not -a "work" because it was effected by the Holy 
Spirit without the assistance of man. Rudolf Bultmann would likely reply that 
it could not be the work of God because God did not work in this way. 
John Wesley's argument accepted that God cast his net widely. Albeit, God 
could work salvation in persons of varying intellectual ability, in contrast to 
Rudolf Bultmann, John Wesley was particularly predisposed to those dimmer 
or undeveloped faculties f' /' had no prior exposure to Christian truth = or 
Christian catechism. Arguing, in this way, he attempted to avoid making 
"assent" a human effort -- one which might favor certain persons over others-- 
-- which was a prior condition to faith and salvation. -This -brought a 
counterbalance to the error of an age which identified rational knowledge and 
acceptance of Christian doctrine with salvation. 
Rudolf Bultmann eschewed assent prior to faith not only because such 
affirmations of propositional doctrine led, man to trust In- his own 
understanding but also because it was deemed to force upon him intellectual 
suicide. John Wesley reacted against formal assent because in it man 
would - by relying on and resting in his own reason - cease to seek for God. 
Therefore, he would never discover the deep supra-empirical realities that God 
was waiting to reveal to him. 
Ironically, though Rudolf Bultmann maintained that the decision of faith 
must occur apart and prior to rational premises, arguably it pre-supposed a 
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hidden rationalism which dictated, at least, what faith could not be. On the 
other hand, while John Wesley ostensibly encouraged reason to play its part 
in faith, it was a qualified "reason" he had in mind, one enlightened by the 
supernatural power of the Holy Spirit which, some critics would argue. was 
simply natural reason yielding to subjective, if not irrational, inner experience. 
John Wesley showed versatility in his stance toward reason's role in faith. 
Not only would he agree with Rudolf Bultmann that reason dealt with 
theological affirmations after faith. he also allowed that reason could be very 
useful prior to salvation. Herein he distinguished himself, from Rudolf 
Bultmann s denial of such. He accepted that reason could direct persons "in 
every point both of faith and practice". 2 Reason aided persons in 
understanding the "foundation of true religion" which stood on the 
Scriptures " Some, himself to some extent. were convinced and acknowledged 
"the truth as it is in Jesus" before their hearts were Influenced., But rational 
conviction was neither faith nor could it -produce saving faith. It could 
present the image but not the reality to which the image corresponded. " 
What did this mean for those who had serious intellectual qualms with 
seemingly implausible. Christian tenets? ' Did rational doubts and rejection of 
rational doctrines affect the reception of . Justification?, - 
Could John Wesley 
avoid a subjectivity in which faith was nothing - more than anybody's 
Interpretation of their Inner experience? 
Answers to these questions must take into consideration John Wesley's 
assumptions. He drew a' crucial distinction between theological doctrines and 
theological realities '= The, somewhat relative theological doctrines contrasted 
with the existent, eternal realities to which they referred. --The theological 
realities were in their nature ultimate, unchanging verities - of God which 
existed "objectively" in a supra-empirical metaphysical realm, God's heavenly 
sphere. The rational doctrines were representations and portraits which 




transcendent realities of God. Because of their these realities 
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were encountered through God-given and God-activated spiritual sensors 
within the soul of man. In any case, whatever variations may occur in the 
rational doctrines, these supra-sensual realities were just that, actual reality. 
Assuming this, John Wesley asserted that these essential realities were 
self-evident and clearly attested to and revealed in Scripture. Moreover, in 
contrast to doctrines, the Scriptural statements and promises bore 'aý literal 
and perfect correspondence to the supra-empirical reality which they 
signified " They themselves were not essentially explanations deriving from 
man, but were divine -pronouncements issuing from the provenance of God. 
Children of God could rely upon the Scriptures to faithfully represent the 
ultimate verities of God which were essential to salvation. God would not 
allow it to be otherwise ' 
Therefore, one could not really justify the rejection of Scriptural assertions. 
In fact, whereas rational consent to theological doctrines' did not save, 
conscious denial of the objective, 'super-empirical, essential realities prior to 
justifying faith could impede the further reception of saving - faith " Even if 
"assent" did not save, he did not attempt to withstand the implication that in 
order to put oneself in the range of salvation. an acceptance, or at least a 
non-rejection of the Scriptural testimony to God's supernatural. essential 
realities, must to some extent be presupposed (however basically and simply) 
in order to receive justification 
THE DEFINITION OF FAITH IN GENERAL 
This leads us into John Wesley's consideration of the general definition of 
"faith". - In general, faith as defined by the apostle was "a divine, supernatural 
Acm)e_ý-T 
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'evidence' or conviction of things not seen". ' Introduced to this 
definition presumably by August Spangenberg, it was extracted directly from 
Hebrews 11: 1 which was assumed to be written "by the Apostle" Paul 91 
According to John Wesley, the text testified to the reality of an invisible 
and eternal world hidden. unseen, and undiscoverable by the physical senses 
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and natural faculties, such as unaided reason. ' Denying a prior knowledge 
and accepting the Lockean assumption that all mans knowledge was derived 
from the natural senses -- feeling, taste, smell, hearing, sight -- he proposed 
axiomatically that no natural sense could reach beyond the bounds of the 
visible sphere of natural phenomena (God, though invisible. could reveal 
Himself to the physical senses). " The physical senses furnished information 
about the material world but no information at all concerning the visible 
world. 84 Not even reason could give a clear satisfactory evidence of the 
invisible world ' 
Admittedly, heathens had a small degree of light. From such sources as 
the heavens and the creation, they inferred there was a God powerful and 
wise. just and merciful who rewarded those who sought him. " Faith was "the 
grand desideratum" because it could do what no natural sense could do: it 
could transcend the great gulf and give evidence of things which were not 
seen now, whether visible or invisible (God was both) in their own nature, 
whether either past. future, or spiritual" Moreover. faith gave evidence of the 
things God had revealed in His Word Faith implied two things: (1) the 
perceptive faculty itself (2) the act of perceiving God and the things of God. ° 
Expressed differently, faith implied "a kind of spiritual light exhibited to the 
soul. and a supernatural sight or perception thereof". " The Apostle also 
envisaged this operation as "the eyes or our "understanding being opened". 10' 
As a result of the Holy Spirit both opening and enlightening "the' eyes of our 
soul", one was enabled to see and understand God's invisible things which the 
natural eye had neither seen nor heard. 112 
Indeed, that rational, mental affirmation of New Testament statements 
required supernatural faith seemed to be a truism to John Wesley. "' The 
devils, who one could conclude had this supra-empirical faith, believed that 
Christ was- born of a virgin, that he wrought many miracles and declared 
himself to be God. '°` However, "faith" was distinguished from "living faith" in 
that if it "bringeth not forth repentance" It was not a "right living faith" but "a 
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dead and devilish one". "' 
John Wesley's understanding of the nature of faith's rational assent to 
Scriptural truth could well be indebted to John Pearsons analysis. 1°° A brief 
synopsis relevant to the discussion at hand is given in the endnote. 107 
However. he seems to differentiate himself from the Bishop in his conception 
of the nature of the authority which persuades one to assent. Bishop Pearson 
argues on a rational basis that one is moved to assent to divine things when 
one considers the grounds upon - which the testimony is based: God the 
Testifiers authority, His omnipotent ability and His perfect integrity. John 
Wesley. though not appearing to disagree with the Bishop as far as he goes, 
enlivens his formulation by declaring that one assents to the Scriptural truths 
through the testimony of God which, more than the "dead letter" of Scripture, 
is the supernatural evidence of the unseen Scriptural things communicated to 
the soul, thereupon inspiring the reason through the Holy Spirit. 
The supernatural working of the Holy Spirit in enlightening the 
understanding and reasoning about Scriptural and spiritual things is crucial 
to and cannot be neglected in understanding John Wesley's conception of 
faith. To form true premises of the things of God, one must be accurately 
informed about them. Since unaided reason and sense cannot penetrate 
behind the veil into the invisible, only the supernatural sense born of that 
supernatural world can accurately reveal this world. Only the supernatural 
power wrought by the Almighty can enlighten reason and give it the ability to 
discern and explore "those things which with eyes of flesh and blood no man 
h 
ath seen or can see". '°B 
In regard to the question of how one could truly apprehend and "assent" 
to Scriptural affirmations prior to faith, we see that the answer is both/and: 
one could not assent prior to faith; yet, one could assent prior to faith. The 
apparent paradox is removed when one realizes that John Wesley consistently 
taught the reality of "degrees" of faith. 109 We shall discuss this subject in 
relation to "faith in particular" and assurance. Suffice it to say, he asserted 
80 
that there were gradations of faith from the weak faith of "little children" to 
that of "fathers". ` We have already demonstrated that he accepted that the 
person "under conviction" had a species of faith. This faith-in-general which 
we have been discussing is the faith which was given before justifying faith 
and is concurrent with the state of conviction. Thus, through general faith 
prior to justifying faith one could be given at least a simple understanding of 
the supernatural reality upon which one was to believe. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, the very assumption that God could reveal to 
unjustified man transcendent reality upon which he must rely was to argue 
"according to the flesh". There was no such objective truth with a fixed 
meaning which corresponded to the words of Scripture that existed apart from 
saving faith. The meaning of the proclamation of the New Testament only 
arose in faith. While, as we have said, John Wesley acknowledged that the 
truth of the Scriptures was revealed to enlightened reason in general faith, he 
presupposed that its content and meaning existed supernaturally and 
eternally, albeit hidden and invisible, irrespective of man. While Rudolf 
Bultmann's argument was supported by the relinquishing of any presumption 
of an eternally existent, transcendent, personal God, John Wesley's was made 
defensible by the assumption of such. 
John Wesley was not out of line with historic Christian thought in 
allowing a proper role to "assent". ` His stress upon the supernatural agency 
of the Holy Spirit which brought about a spiritual sight by an inner sense, 
"the eye of faith". ranks him among seventeenth century Puritans who 
distinguished themselves by a similar emphasis. "' 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FAITH IN PARTICULAR 
INTRODUCTION 
After describing faith "in general", John Wesley discussed faith "in a more 
particular sense". In trying to come to terms with his-understanding, one is 
liable to voice Thomas Church's complaint, - "You write in other places so 
variously about this matter, that I despair to find any consistency. "' In a rare 
admission, John Wesley owned to Dr. Thomas Rutherford. Regius Professor of 
Divinity at Cambridge, that if all his sentiments were compared together from 
1725 to 1768, there would be truth in the charge that he maintained 
contradictions. In fact, he acknowledged that during the latter part of this 
period he relinquished "several of my former sentiments*. ' 
When we extend this period to the end of his life, we will find further 
adjustments to his sentiments. His refinements over the years in the matter 
of particular faith were performed with the finesse and precision of a lawyer 
subtle enough to evade the less diligent' 
John Wesley's thoughts on faith which span some fifty odd years might be 
likened to the surface of a sea in which, to the casual eye, the natural 
procession of waves roll continuously toward the shore in a current of 
seemingly rhythmic order while underneath sub-currents variously shift one 
way and then another. John Wesley consistently. urged persons throughout 
his life to seek and expect the saving faith which was an Inner. God-wrought 
consciousness of their pardon through Christ. Nonetheless, he urged - this all 
the while the conceptions of some of the various gradations of faith as well as 
the gradation of saving " faith necessary for acceptance with God were 
undergoing modification. Specifically, the year 1747 demarcated one 
understanding of saving faith from another amended version. , In 1788 
another understanding of the faith by which one Is acceptable to God 
surfaced. 
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THE DESCRIPTION OF SAVING FAITH 
1738 - 1747 
Let us consider more closely how John Wesley defined and expatiatednfaith 
"in a more particular sense"' In the first period from 1738 to 1747, faith in 
particular was denominated "justifying or saving faith"; "right living faith"; "the 
assurance of faith" (rather than the then current term. "the faith of 
assurance"); "the clear assurance of faith" and "the full assurance of faith" a 
Keeping in mind John Wesley's key assumption that faith was meted out in 
"degrees" or gradations, rather like current on a rheostat, we will see these 
above terms are not necessarily synonymous but themselves, may represent 
distinct gradations of faith. This will become clearer, hopefully, - as we 
progress. 
Within the time period 1738-1747. we notice sub-developments in his 
concept of faith as he tried to come to terms with his new-found Aldersgate 
faith. As he recognized in his letter to Dr. Rutherford, his "many different 
objectors" stretched him one way and another which forced him to think 
through his conception of faith. " His definitions of 1739, -and 1741 
demonstrate his earliest formulation of faith. In his conversation with Bishop 
Butler in 1739, he asserted that justifying faith was "a conviction wrought In 
a man by the Holy Ghost, that Christ"hath loved him and given himself for 
him, and that through Christ his sins are forgiven. "' His 1741 statement in 
"The Almost Christian" sermon, - like, his 1738 sermon "Salvation by Faith". 
was very similar: faith was not only to believe that the Holy Scriptures and 
the articles were true but also "to have a sure trust and confidence to be 
saved from everlasting damnation by Christ' -- 'whereof cloth follow a loving 
heart to obey his commandments. '"e 
One notices herein for future reference two latently distinct and separable 
strands woven together and considered as a unit. One strand is the 
conviction that Christ has loved the individual and given himself for him. The 
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second strand is the conviction that through Christ the individual's sins are 
forgiven him. We find no self-consciously expressed appreciation of the 
distinction and the strands ability to be separated at this point. 
However. when we come to the 1744 and 1745 expressions. the two 
strands are consciously distinguished yet still comprehended under the aegis 
of "justifying faith". In answer to the question "What is faith? ", the 1744 
Minutes responded in the following way: "First, a sinner is convinced by the 
Holy Ghost, 'Christ loved me, and gave himself for me. ' -- This is that faith by 
which he is justified or pardoned, the moment he receives it. Immediately the 
same Spirit bears witness, 'Thou art pardoned; thou hast redemption in his 
blood. ' And this is saving faith, whereby the love of God is shed abroad in 
his heart. "' They went on to state that, all Christians had this faith. 
Moreover, they concluded "that no man can be justified -and not know it, 
appears further from the nature of the thing. "" One notices both a logical 
and temporal distinction In the 1744 Minutes. Not only is the sinner's being 
convinced that Christ loved him a distinct thought or act In and of itself.. but 
it also temporally ("first") precedes the second thought and act of assurance of 
pardon. The temporal distinction is taken essentially logically and 
theoretically. 
Keeping in mind the above and what was previously said of "faith In 
general", let us further analyze the - nature of saving faith evinced in John 
Wesley's definition. The definition incorporates both the Moravian inspired 
element of a divine, inner "conviction" and the "Homily of The Salvation of 
Mankind" element of "a sure trust and confidence.... " 
Absolutely fundamental to justifying faith's nature Is the understanding of 
it as a divine, supernatural "conviction" wrought by the Holy Spirit within the 
individual. "Conviction" and "evidence" are often apposite and are equal in 
meaning. " Moreover. John Wesley could find little difference between these 
two terms and the term "assurance". " In this time period, "confidence" Is also 
synonymous with these three terms. " 
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The "conviction" given is expressed in the two distinct strands we have 
hitherto identified: that, firstly, Christ hath loved me and given Himself for 
me; and, secondly, that through Christ. God pardoned and forgave me my 
sins. The first strand is an assurance that God is a pardoning God and He 
has provided the way through the Sons life and atoning death for my sins to 
be forgiven. The second strand is the actual assurance that my sins are now 
forgiven and that I am reconciled to God. 
Between 1738-1747, it was absolutely crucial to saving faith that these 
two strands be taken together in the single "conviction". The Moravians had 
enlightened him to the necessity of this assurance as the two classic 
exchanges cited in the endnotes demonstrate. 14 
The 1746 Minutes set forth that the - terms "the assurance of faith" and 
"the revelation of Christ in us" were nearly of the same meaning. " In other 
words, they were so close In import that to deny one was to deny them both. 
Moreover, "assurance" and '"conviction" were essentially what was meant by 
the "testimony of God's Spirit" or "the witness of the Spirit. ""' This is 
manifested by his definition of "the testimony of the Spirit": "an inward 
impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly 'witnesses to my 
spirit that I am a child of God': that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given 
Himself for me; that all my sins are blotted out. and I, even I, am reconciled 
to God. "" Therefore, we conclude that for all intents and purposes, all these 
above terms were essentially synonymous. 
Therefore, when John Wesley explicated the character of the 
"the witness". "the testimony" or "the record", he was speaking of this inner 
"conviction". assurance. He prefaced his remarks by saying that it was "hard 
to find words in the language of men to explain the deep things of God. " 
Indeed, none could adequately express what the Spirit worked. "' The 
testimony given by the Holy Spirit with our spirit was a Person testifying. 
Obviously, John Wesley accepted that this Person was the third Person of the 
Trinity who communicated His assurance of faith to the individual. 
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In his day, that the Holy Spirit testified to the recipient was not ostensibly 
disputed. The point of the dispute was the nature of the testimony, whether 
or not there was any "direct testimony" at all. " More specifically, the main 
dispute between John Wesley and his critics was this: "Is there perceptible 
Inspiration or is there - not? "' Contrary to "John Smith" who maintained the 
Holy Spirit's inspiration was imperceptible and Bishop Thomas Sherlock who, 
according to John Wesley, stated it was "the consciousness of our own good 
works", John Wesley (drawing upon Galatians 4: 6 and Romans 8: 15-16) 
proclaimed, that Holy Spirit's testimony was "immediate". "direct", and 
perceptible. 2' 
He said he did not insist on the word "impression", but until better words 
were put = forward, this term or others like it such as "discovery", 
"manifestation", or "deep sense" would have to do. ' He depicted this supra- 
sensuous "impression" in such sensory terminology as "voice", "sight", 
"feeling". He attested to his brother Samuel in 1739 that some in their 
reception of assurance had reported having "a strong representation to the eye 
of their minds of Christ either on the cross or in glory. This is the fact. "" 
"Faith is seeing God; love is feeling God, " he instructed John Bennet in 
1744. ` In 1764 he prodded Lady Maxwell onward to look at that instant and 
"see, as it were, Jesus Christ set forth. evidently set forth. crucified before 
your eyes? 0 hear His Voice! 'Daughter, be of good cheer; thy- sins are 
forgiven thee! '"' 
He explained that he did not mean that the Spirit gave the testimony by 
"any outward voice: no, nor always by an inward voice, although he may do 
this sometimes". Neither did he suppose that the Spirit always applied to the 
heart a Scriptural text(s). ' He worked on the soul by His immediate influence 
which was a strong, but inexplicable operation. Expressing this event by 
metaphors., he. stated that the stormy wind and waves subsided; the heart 
rested in the arms of Jesus: and the sinner was satisfied that God was 
reconciled? ' 
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The testimony was also "immediate" and "direct" and not the result of 
reflection. The Spirit cried "Abba" in our hearts the moment the conviction 
was given antecedently to any reflection or sincerity or reasoning ' How may 
one who has the real witness in himself distinguish it from presumption? 
"How, I pray, do you distinguish day from night? ... or the light of a star ... 
from the light of the noonday sun? "" Like the essential difference between 
those, so there is "an inherent, essential difference between spiritual light and 
spiritual darkness; and between the light wherewith the Sun of Righteousness 
shines upon our heart, and that glimmering light which arises only from 
'sparks of our own kindling . "90 So, the difference was immediately and 
directly perceived (if spiritual senses are rightly disposed). ' 
This was clear: that the Spirit of God gave a believer such a testimony of 
his adoption by God that while it was present to the soul he could no more 
doubt the reality of his sonship than he could doubt the shining sun as he 
stood In the full blaze of his beams' The inextricable link between saving 
faith and the inner conviction (impression) of the Spirit may-be witnessed in a 
fine passage given in the endnote in which John Wesley summarily described 
the event of a person under the law receiving faith's 
In the period 1738 to 1747, John Wesley assuredly held that an assurance 
and consciousness that one's sins were forgiven and o/VE was reconciled to God 
was absolutely necessary to justification. In 1740 he' said he never knew one 
soul saved without the "faith of assurance". He warned persons not to think 
they were justified before they had a "clear assurance" that God had forgiven 
their sins' In fact. "the very essence" of saving faith was a divine 
"9 that he was now accepted in the beloved". ' Though the 1745 
Conference could not conceive of anyone believing longer than he saw a 
reconciled God, they refused to pontificate on whether there possibly might be 
some exempt cases. " 
Moreover. during the period 1738 to 1747. John Wesley developed a 
conception of faith consisting of varying "degrees" or strengths JB The first 
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"degree" identified in Scripture was typically referred to as "weak faith" or a 
"measure" of faith. The Apostle Paul and John referred to believers who were 
"little children". Jesus spoke of "ye of little faith". " Those with this faith 
were Christians, though "Imperfect" ones 60 This "weak faith" was the first 
rung of savin faith and was described as a "clear assurance" (or "the 
assurance of faith"). "Weak faith" or "clear assurance" signified faith which 
was an assurance that "my" sins are forgiven and that "I" am justified. " 
However, though a clear assurance at first, it soon became clouded or mixed 
with doubt of the forgiveness or fear of not enduring to the end. " 
Nonetheless, this faith implied accompanying peace, trust, love of God, and 
dominion over sin. "' However, though through this faith one was assured 
that oy5 was now In a state of salvation, it was not the grade of faith which 
assured one _, would persevere. 
" 
After "clear assurance", the next gradation which he isolated In the period 
1738 to 1747 wasn)Xi ö qpia- Mrr , 5or "the plerophory of faith". "the full 
assurance of faith" (Hebrews 10: 22), the phrase introduced to him by the 
Moravians. t5 This was "full" assurance, not simply assurance. Early In 
September, 1738, he seems to have viewed the term "the plerophory of faith" 
as comprehending every degree of faith. Namely, saving faith was "the 
plerophory of faith". 46 
However, later In October, 1738, he began to make a distinction between 
the 7th ° o[be p ice and a lesser degree of faith. The "plerophory" was all the 
lesser degree of faith was and more: it produced a "joy in the Holy Ghost, joy 
which no man taketh away. joy unspeakable and full of glory"" Developing 
his thoughts further by 1745, he claimed that the "plerophory" was so clear a 
perception that Christ abides in the individual as utterly excludes all doubt 
and fear and leaves him not even for an hour. It was the difference between 
the morning and midday sun 48 
Let us pause at this point and reflect upon the nature of John Wesley's 
6e1. 'stýd M, 7' 
understanding of faith in particular. At Aldersgate. John Wesley ,_, what 
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Jesus had done for "the many" was particularized to him as what Jesus had 
done and was even now doing for him alone. His May 1738 testimony of 
saving faith leaps from one personal pronoun to the next, from the object 
"me" to the subject "I". Often these were Italicized for emphasis. He was now 
conscious that Jesus salvation was personalized and applied to him as he 
wrote, "(the) Son of God hath loved me and given Himself for me: and that I, 
even I am now reconciled to God .... "`9 Salvation was not just something that 
related to a general, vague, distant, impersonal entity, "the world", from which 
one was essentially removed and with which one was only remotely involved. 
The effects of Jesus' death on the cross were now being appropriated and 
directed to Him from heaven and realized consciously in his own life. He 
became personally related and connected to God Himself and His favouring 
activity. The divine assurance -- the eternal, crucified and resurrected Jesus 
Himself -- encountered him In such a way that he knew its real existence for 
himself. The transcendent but immanent Jesus Christ impinged directly and 
immediately upon the individual's own body and soul, effecting and affecting 
the individual's very own being. 
Moreover, justifying faith was more than a personal reliance upon a 
transcendent judicial transaction in the heavenly courtroom. It was more 
than placing trust in Jesus past atoning death or In a future. eschatological, 
saving occurrence. It was a received, supernatural impression from Jesus 
that His death was now availing for "me". Faith was "felt" -- and "felt" now in 
time and space. The eternal, Invisible God who is and was and Is to come, 
who had specially spoken to Moses, Elijah. and Paul once again tore back the 
veil, making Himself known and unmistakably sensed by the individual 
person. Furthermore, with His past acts won and His future works promised, 
He perforated like a laser this aeon's prescriptions of time and space and 
realized His work once again In the individual's present. 
Rudolf Bultmann shared an understanding not altogether dissimilar from 
John Wesley's. His theology rejected an understanding of religion in which 
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man took a neutral standpoint and spoke of propositions whose significance 
was their universal validity not related to the concrete situation of the 
speaker. 'O He opposed the kind of speaking in which man put himself outside 
the actual reality of his own existence and detached himself from his concrete 
existence. That is, the religious man spoke about his existence, not from it. 
He looked on as a "subject" at an outside event viewing it as an "object" 
rather than allowing the event to happen to him. 
Allowing for Rudolf Bultmann s particular expressions, John Wesley's 
confession to Mr. Spangenberg that he knew Jesus had saved "the world" is 
not unrelated to Rudolf Bultmann's concern. John Wesley's statement 
reflected a sense in which this general affirmation was seen as only remotely 
relating to his own immediate "concrete situation. John Wesley spoke about 
a salvation but not from it. It was an outside event which had not become 
an inside event happening to him. 
Rudolf Bultmann further described this neutral observer who lacked 
justifying faith as unresponsive to the future and clinging to the past. 
However, he, like John Wesley. proclaimed that the salvation-occurrence of 
Jesus' death and resurrection was not just a past instant of vanishing time 
but the future promise of the possibility of authentic life (salvation) in which 
the eschatological now may actually occur once again in the individual's life 
as it did in Paul's. " He said. "Christ becomes contemporary in the 
preaching. "' Salvation is once again disclosed in the present when an 
individual submits to the "summons". The man of faith knows that the 
revelation has encountered him, that he is "graced" and really forgiven. Faith 
gives an understanding that man prior to faith cannot have. 
John Wesley accepted that persons prior to faith may know about saving 
faith but until they "felt" and received the consciousness of this saving faith. 
they neither had nor. knew faith. Similarly, Rudolf ' Bultmann allowed that 
persons may know (wissen) ontologically of faith's concrete, personal existence 
like a friendless person knows about friendship. But persons without faith do 
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not know what occurs in faith's ontic or existentiell, concrete personal 
existence. " Both saw faith only coming into being for the individual when 
God's salvation event became real and visibly) first-hand to him, he personally 
becoming acquainted with that which was encountered. Tue faith was the 
personal consciousness that one's existence was qualified by God in a new 
and saving way. , 
Having said this. Rudolf Bultmann resisted identifying faith with any 
human "experience". Faith, according to him, could never be identified with 
any spiritual experience. , The "new man" was of the "Beyond" and utterly 
transcendent 5' However, call it what one will, he is just as committed as 
John Wesley to the assertion that something occurs in faith in which the 
believer now knows he is "graced" and forgiven. 
Nevertheless, for Rudolf Bultmann the man of faith could not know for 
certain whether or not he has faith. Furthermore, while Rudolf Bultmann 
urged the believer to distrust and doubt his "experience". John Wesley trusted 
experience and saw it as a reliable registration of God's immanent presence. 
For him, faith was and must be experiential. The promises of the orales of 
God corresponded to and were verified in the experience of faith. This 
understanding of experience Rudolf Bultmann desired to avoid. 
1747 - 1788 
A turning point in John Wesley's understanding of faith and assurance 
occurred in July 1747. While thinking on what he considered to be a great 
need in Methodism, that is, a new inquiry into the first principles of justifying 
faith, the logic of his heretofore understanding of justifying faith was called 
into question. The issue of the nature of faith and its relation to justification 
had remained unsettled. The Conference Minutes of 1745,1746. and 1747 
regarding this issue indicate his and the Conferences' uncertainty. and 
equivocation ' Moreover, in addition to the June '1747 Conference discussion, 
John Wesley's re-thinking' might have been provoked by his reading of the 
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works of the Nonconformists, particularly those which Philip Doddridge had 
recommended to him the previous year. For in the Conference of June 1747. 
Question Two considered the judgment of "most of the serious Dissenters" 
regarding justifying faith and Divine assurance. ' Their view, which differed 
from John Wesley's prevailing view, expressed the general understanding 
which he was soon to embrace. His polemic with "John Smith" over the Issue 
perhaps also contributed to his uneasiness. " 
In his reflection of July 1747, he asked himself, "Is justifying faith a sense 
of pardon? " He answered "Negatur". "denied". 5' This denial demarcated an 
important modification in his previously held understanding of justifying, faith 
and the assurance of faith. He recalled that the theme of justifying faith had 
once been quite new to d, YÖn account of the fact that previously they had 
"heard nothing" about justifying faith or a sense of pardon " In consequence, 
they had in the heat and hurry of controversy swayed too far one way and the 
other. His past swaying appeared to be predominately in one direction: he 
had equated justifying faith with a sense of pardon. 
Now, the implicit two strands which had composed justifying faith were 
consciously distinguished and understood to be logically and ontologically 
separate from one another. Only one prong became essential to, if not the 
very essence of, justifying faith. ' He formulated this distinction in his 
reflections of July, 1747. He now conceived justifying faith to be that faith 
which whoever had it was not "under the wrath and curse of God". "' It was 
differentiated from the second prong which was a sense of pardon, "a distinct, 
explicit assurance that my sins are forgiven". ' Hereafter, he distinguished 
between justifying faith and the sense of pardon. 
He stated quite clearly that justifying faith was not to be equated with a 
sense of pardon. He said, "But I cannot allow that justifying faith is such an 
assurance, or necessarily connected therewith. "e' He now judged it 
unscriptural to assert that those who did not have an explicit sense of 
pardon, were, as long as they had it not, under God's wrath. To assert this 
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was contrary to experience and to reason. In fact, "... it is flatly absurd, " he 
said. " "For how can a sense of our having received pardon be the condition 
of our receiving it? " he asked. '6 Similarly, in 1756 he agreed with Richard 
Tompson's statement that "the Spirit's witnessing that we are accepted cannot 
be the faith whereby we are accepted. "' In other words, a "conviction that we 
are justified cannot be implied In justifying faith". ' '` 
What then In more detail was the faith which constituted justifying faith? 
His most common conception of justifying faith based upon Galatians 2: 20 
after July, 1747, was expressed to Dr. John Free in 1758. Justifying faith 
was a divine evidence or conviction that "Christ loved me and gave Himself for 
me. "68 That he was content to leave justifying faith simply as the real, inner 
persuasion that Christ has died for me without also including the aspect of a 
conviction of one's forgiveness is elsewhere amply displayed in his writings 
throughout the period of 1747-1788. Indeed, this was essentially how the 
1747 Conference defined It, though they conceived the words to carry the 
import of the pre-1747 understanding of faith. " In the 1748 sermon "The 
Marks of the New Birth", he declared that the faith by which we are born 
again was "a true confidence of the mercy of God, through our Lord Jesus 
Christ". " He wrote to James Hervey in 1756 that the faith that justified was 
a divine evidence and conviction that "Christ loved me, and gave Himself for 
me . "71 In the 1765 sermon "The Scripture Way of Salvation" he stated that 
the faith whereby we "receive Christ" in all His offices (Prophet, Priest, and 
King) was a divine evidence, not only that 'God was in Christ, reconciling the 
world unto himself, but also that Christ loved me, and gave himself for 
me: "'2 
Therefore; John Wesley was willing to allow that there may be instances of 
persons without a clear assurance of forgiveness existing in a state of 
justification. For in 1756 Richard Thompson asked him, "Can a man who 
has not a clear assurance that his sins are forgiven be in a state of 
justification? " He replied he believed there were instances of it. " He told Dr. 
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John Green in 1761 that "a man may be a real Christian without being 
"assured of his salvation". ' 
There are several noteworthy observations to be made in regards to his 
understanding of justifying faith in the period 1747-1788. Firstly, justifying 
faith was still viewed as an "assurance". He explicitly stated the difference 
between the term "assurance" and "evidence" was too slight to call. " The 
justifying faith now asserted was, just as it was previously, an assurance or 
consciousness. However, there was an Important qualification: it was now 
only an inner sense that "Christ loved me and gave himself for me. " Indeed, 
without this direct and immediate conviction or assurance, there could be no 
good hopes of salvation. " Furthermore, this was the only faith necessary to 
all Christians. " To deny the existence of the testimony "Lord, I am damned -- 
but Thou hast died" in effect denied justification by faith. 78 
Secondly, one notices that his re-crafted conception of justifying faith still 
entailed the personal appropriation of the love and sacrificial death of Christ 
to "me". Justifying faith was more than simply being assured and convinced 
of a truth or a doctrine. To affirm such would have returned him to an 
intellectualized faith. Rather. Justifying faith was an inner persuasion that 
Christ's love and atoning death was directed to and applied to one's own 
personal existence. 
The distinction which he now drew between justifying faith and assurance 
of pardon was one which had been worked on in the seventeenth century. 
For instance, Thomas Goodwin in distinguishing between justifying faith and 
assurance stated that he did not fall into the papists' error. The papists 
taught that to believe in the general truths, such as "that Christ hath died". 
was "true faith". However, he argued, unless the belief in the general truth 
was allowed to draw the heart in to Christ in particular, to rest on Him for 
one's salvation, then it was "a vain faith". 79 The belief "that Christ hath died" 
applied to the heart was salvation. 
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Thirdly. John Wesley did not cease either to hold or to assert "a distinct. 
explicit assurance that my sins are forgiven". ' He continued to urge that the 
"proper Christian faith" necessarily implied the conviction of sins being 
forgiven. " The divine conviction that "I" am reconciled to God was implied in 
the justifying conviction that Christ loved me and gave himself for me. 82 
Thus, by deduction and by express acknowledgment, John Wesley taught that 
the Christian could properly expect two assurances (rather than the one as 
previously asserted). Having said that, one might very easily mistake his 
explanation in the 1765 sermon, "The Scripture Way of Salvation", as 
affirming his pre-1747 position. However, comparison with " statements 
elsewhere corroborates his intent to assert that the Christian who has 
justifying faith will also at some point in time receive the Spirit's assurance 
that he is a child of God. God would follow up at some point in time the 
assurance of justifying faith with an assurance of sonship and forgiveness eJ 
In other words, while justifying faith makes him a son, the assurance of 
forgiveness confirms the fact" 
Moreover, once he is assured he is a son, the Spirit also gives him a 
child-like confidence and reliance in God as a reconciled Father. " John 
Wesley told Richard Tompson in 1756 that the same compassion which moved 
God to pardon a mourner moved God to comfort him by witnessing to his 
spirit that his sins were pardoned " So. though justifying faith and the 
assurance of pardon were in some sense separable. In another sense they 
were, as a rule, united companions. 
Fourthly. though he permitted that one may be justified without a 
consciousness of being in the favour of God, he nevertheless continued to 
insist that it was the common privilege of Christians fearing God and working 
righteousness to have such a consciousness of pardon 87 Though the new 
distinctions were carefully in place, he could still be heard in the period 1747- 
1788 to be saying what he always had said since 1738.1. 
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For example, he confirmed in 1768 to James Morgan that Methodists and 
Scripture taught that one was lost until God spoke forgiveness to his heart. ' 
When he asserted this, John Wesley was not reneging on the distinction 45 vA" 
arrived at in 1747. As he outlined to Dr. Lavington in 1751, the faith 
necessary to all Christians was simple faith without a conviction of present 
pardon ' However, the normative faith which he exhorted and expected 
Christians to receive was "a consciousness of being in the favour of God". ' 
So, if he ran these two faiths together and was not always clear about making 
the distinction between justifying faith and the assurance of pardon (as the 
1765 sermon "The Scripture Way of Salvation" demonstrates) 91 it was 
probably because he was less interested in preaching the distinction or the 
lower level of faith than he was in emphasizing that consciousness of pardon 
was the ordinary Christian experience ' The general rule was still that the 
Christian ought to expect the Spirit of God to witness with his spirit that he 
is a child of God. " 
During the period 1747-1788, John Wesley continued to understand the 
nature of faith as consisting of varying degrees, further developing these 
various gradations. If we exclude "faith in general" (the evidence of spiritual 
things, man "under conviction") from our immediate purview, justifying faith 
as we have just been describing it was the first level of faith. The next degree 
of faith was "a consciousness of being in the favour of God" (the reception of 
"the Spirit of adoption") which was "frequently weakened, nay perhaps 
interrupted, by returns of doubt and fear". " As has been established. this 
degree of faith was a gradation beyond the faith whereby one is accepted by 
God ' The next level of faith after this was commonly called "the full 
assurance of faith", or the77 pc4ooºd 
eý7rlr al 96 This "full assurance of 
faith" was not "a distinct thing" from faith, but just a high degree of faith. 97 
The "full assurance of faith" was "a full conviction of present pardon". " The 
operative word at this level of faith was "full". What he meant by "full 
assurance of faith" was described in 1768 as the degree of assurance of being 
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now in the favor of God as excluding "all doubt and fear". 99 
Likewise, in 1781 he defined the "plerophory of faith" as "such a clear 
conviction that I am now in the favour of God as excludes all doubt and fear 
concerning it". '°° The Holy Spirit wrought this assurance just as He produces 
every degree. While Christians prior to this measure of faith may be labelled 
"little children". those with full assurance are styled "young men" (from the 
apostle John). '°' John Wesley was consistent in maintaining that "the full 
assurance of faith" did not imply the full assurance of perseverance. 102 The 
degree of "full assurance of faith" did not guarantee the Christian he would be 
finally saved. 
The next gradation of faith was not altogether free of contradiction. In 
1748, he viewed pe)(bapra 
E\7Pi so5 
, "the full assurance of hope" as 
synonymous with "the full assurance of faith". This was the testimony of the 
Spirit of God bearing witness with or to our spirit that we are children of 
God. "" Moreover, ' it was a living hope that we should see Him as He Is. 
However, as early as 1751, "the full assurance of hope" or "the 
plerophory", was now also called the "full assurance of perseverance". "' This 
"full assurance of perseverance" was an assurance given by God of everlasting 
salvation. Only given to "a few, but very few, " this assurance "excludes all 
doubt of our final salvation". "' In 1781 he asserted, "The full assurance of 
hope is such clear confidence that I shall enjoy the glory of God as excludes 
all doubt and fear concerning this. "` He was not hesitant in insisting further 
that this confidence was totally different from the opinion that no saint shall 
fall from grace. Indeed, it had no relation to it. In this latter wrong opinion, 
perseverance was believed to remain whether persons sinned or served God. 
On the contrary, the full assurance of hope which he advocated did not and 
could not continue any longer than the believer walked closely with God. 
Giving way to anything unholy either in heart or life clouded the full 
assurance of hope. Therefore, "the full assurance of hope" did not include 
any assurance of one's future behavior and could not subsist any longer than 
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the heart cleaved steadfastly to God. 107 
1788 AND AFTER 
In 1788, three years prior -to John" Wesley's death. a curious little re- 
shuffle which is difficult to assess seems to have occurred In regards to his 
conception of faith and Its relation to justification. A long-held dichotomy 
between the "servant" and "child" of God came more Into the foreground. Let 
us recall some of the relevant exchanges prior to 1788 which may help us 
assess his reshuffle. In 1746 he depicted a "servant" as one "under the law", 
"under conviction", who with , slavish fear saw God as the just and terrible 
who avenged everyone who rebelled against him. He was awakened, but had 
no peace: though, - not a son of God, he was not far from the kingdom of 
heaven. 108 These penitents who mourned after God were not to be 
acknowledged as being in the favour of God. John Wesley was clear In his 
letter to James Morgan In 1768 that this was Methodist teaching. He said, 
"We have always taught that a penitent mourned ... because he felt he was 
"not In favour of God ... and we believe he was really lost and undone .... "1O9 
In a separate but related matter, the 1745 Conference discussed the issue 
of heathens and their acceptance by God. Cornelius whose prayers and alms 
were a memorial before God provided this precedent. The Conference 
concluded he was accepted as being in God's favour "in some degree" before 
he believed in Christ. They agreed that he was accepted on the principle that 
he feared God' and did the best he could without having heard the gospel. "' 
In July, 1771. John Wesley in explaining the 1770 Minutes reaf lamed that 
among those who had never heard of Christ, the one who "fears God and 
works righteousness" according to the light he has is in the favour of God 
(Acts 10: 34ü). " 
In April, 1788, he confessed that when the Methodists first preached 
salvation by faith fifty years ago they were not sufficiently apprized of the 
difference between a "servant" and a "child" of God. "' He had now come to 
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accept that one who "feared God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of 
him. "13 Furthermore, he maintained that, according to the Apostle, whosoever 
in every nation believed thus far was "at that very moment in a state of 
acceptance" He was a "servant of God". but not properly a son. Further, 
John Wesley identified this "servant of God" as the man who was also "under 
conviction", who felt himself "at once altogether sinful, altogether guilty, and 
altogether helpless". "* 
We take note of the fact that the "servant" "under conviction" who formerly 
in 1746 was not considered "accepted of God" is now, in 1788, judged to be 
accepted in a degree. Moreover. the qualification that the one who "hears God 
and worketh righteousness" and is accepted of Him be a heathen who has not 
heard the Gospel is not present. However, this dropping of the qualification 
of having heard the gospel is not crucial. "' 
By 1788 John Wesley's writings made clear that he understood "fear" of 
God to constitute a species of faith. The heathen (like Cornelius) who feared 
God believed "according to the dispensation he is under". '"' However, for the 
one who had heard the Gospel, he must believe and, therefore, do as God 
hath willed and commanded him to do in order that it be said he feared God 
and worked righteousness. "' This meant nothing less than having a divine 
evidence of the invisible, eternal world, being convinced of ones sin, one's evil 
nature, and fearing the wrath of God. "' 
Thus, the essential variation was that In 1788 he now allowed that the 
one who was "under conviction" and had the species of faith of a "servant of 
God" was now accepted of God. Previously he had judged this person to be in 
an unsaved state. Just as it had been for the Puritans in the seventeenth 
century. this interface had always been a "gray" elusive area. In 1768 he felt 
the position he was later to adopt in 1788 to be unscriptural and unsafe. He 
argued it directly tended to dampen the desire for the revelation of Christ and 
the Spirit's witness of adoption. "" Now in 1788 the balance of burden of 
responsibility in a sense was shifted from man to God. The "servant" "under 
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conviction" was one ready to receive; the timing of the giving of fuller faith lay 
with God. Moreover, the faith that one had as a "servant" was already a 
demonstration that God had called him "to his honorable service". 120 The 
"servant" was accepted and unless he "halt by the way". he "will receive the 
adoption of sons" said John Wesley. "' 
The argument that a low degree of faith already implied God's will to 
complete the salvation begun reflects a Reformed argument with a Wesleyan 
twist. For example, William Perkins held that a person who "doth but begin 
to be converted". who "sighs and groans" for a lively faith, had already the 
seed (or bud) and first signs of regeneration. For one with the seed of faith, 
regeneration had already begun. 122 - 
Both John Wesley and the strict Reformed position held that believing as a 
"servant" indicated that God would bring the "servant" to full adoption. The 
difference between him and the Reformed lies in that whereas the strict 
Reformed asserted that whomever God truly called He irresistibly regenerated. 
John Wesley allowed the possibility that the one called may stall and not 
receive full faith. 
In 1788 the basic description of faith and its calibrations remained as 
before. What he=now did was to lower the threshold of initial acceptance with 
God. Was the faith of the "servant" "under conviction" who was accepted in a 
"low degree" now considered to be justifying faith? By deduction this would 
seem to be the conclusion. Nonetheless, John Wesley never labels Was such 
and the matter is left in ambiguity. - In fact. he does not bring into the 
discussion the terms saving or justifying faith in his, 1788 sermons "On Faith" 
or "The Discoveries of Faith". 
Was the person accepted with his sin forgiven or unforgiven? If his sin 
was forgiven, then what place was there for the next gradation of faith, 
justifying faith? If he was accepted without forgiveness, why should God 
arbitrarily and redundantly require another justifying faith which would grant 
pardon from sin which was not necessary since an acceptance had already 
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been attained? 
Moreover, as he was accepted as a "servant", was he not accepted 
(according to the definition of a "servant's" faith) without having a 
consciousness that Jesus loved him and gave himself for him". One must 
remember that in this issue of "the servant of God" and his acceptance John 
Wesley was trying to deal with the seam of the garment and not the garment 
itself. If the line between reprobation ° and justification (regeneration) eluded 
John Wesley, so had it eluded the, greatest` of - the seventeenth century 
Puritans before him. ' 
His discussion in 1788 on the "servant of God" was not motivated by a 
desire to lessen or retract the necessity of the justifying faith which he had 
always preached. This was still intact. = He was rather tempering his deemed 
misguided cut-and-dry condemnation of sincere persons who feared God and 
who straddled the line of ambiguity because they had not felt the assurance 
of faith. 124 
In spite of this adjustment to his theology, he did "not cease to exhort 
persons to receive the faith normative for Christians. Though one who has 
the faith of a servant "is not in anywise to be despised". he was "exhorted not 
to stop there: not to rest till he attains the adoption of sons". " John Wesley 
continued to affirm that "the proper voice of a child of God" was "Christ 
revealed in his heart". " He enjoined the "servant" "to expect it every 
moment! " and not to be satisfied with less. 127 Though advising the "servant" 
not to undervalue the faith given him, he warned hire to beware of resting 
there. He encouraged him to "press on till you receive the Spirit of adoption. 
Rest not till that Spirit clearly witnesses with your spirit that you are a child 
of God. "" Then the believer may become a "Father" In the faith in which he 
would be delivered from doubts and fears and also from sin -- inward and 
outward. Moreover, he then would enjoy the "full assurance of hope" while he 
rejoiced evermore, prayed without ceasing, and in everything, gave thanks. '' 
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In conclusion, the essential content and nature of faith calibrated in 
various degrees remained constant throughout John Wesley's evangelical life. 
What particularly fluctuated regarding faith and justification was the degree of 
faith considered to be the absolute bare minimum for acceptance with God. 
From 1738 to 1747, it was the divine, inner impression given by the Holy 
Spirit in the individual's soul that Jesus loved "me" and gave himself for "me" 
and had forgiven "me" my sin and accepted me as a child of God; from 1747 
to 1788 the threshold was lowered a degree to the divine. personal conviction 
that Jesus loved "me" and gave himself for "me". Lastly. he was willing to 
concede that persons who were enlightened to the invisible world and who 
were under the conviction of sin were accepted in a "low degree" by God and 
would be brought to full acceptance if they did not halt. 
Perhaps more than anything this was to give the benefit of the doubt to 
the person who, equally athirst for salvation, sought after God with the same 
degree, of sincerity and earnestness as another person but rather than 
receiving consciousness of his favour went without it. 19O Nonetheless, this 
"servant's" faith did not appear to be necessarily devoid of faith in Jesus and 
his capacity as atoning Saviour. In June, 1788, he described the one that 
had this low level of faith as one who knew by faith that God the Son lived 
and died for mans salvation, rising, ascending, and reigning in heaven. "' 
ANALYSIS 
How did John Wesley's understanding of faith compare and contrast with 
other descriptions In theological history? John Wesley claimed, in - 1756 
Luther, Melanchthon, and many other of the reformers "frequently and 
strongly assert that every believer is conscious of his own acceptance with 
God, and,, that by. a supernatural evidence .... "12 Martin Luther's 
understanding of faith did comprehend feeling and experience. He explained 
like John Wesley after him that the "feeling" associated with faith was not the 
feeling of the physical senses and every day experience. As Hebrews chapter 
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eleven affirmed, it had to do with things not seen. Justifying faith involved 
"another feeling" not related to the sensate organs. 
Nonetheless, Martin Luther like John Wesley appropriated experiential 
expressions in speaking of faith. He used the terms "convinces" or "grasps"; 
the heart "feels how true and right the word is"; it must "know", "feel", and 
"taste". " He held the believer feels he has a gracious God and feels that 
Christ is in his heart, living and acting within him. " 
While both Martin Luther and John Wesley agreed personal experience of 
faith was necessary to have Christ as Saviour, John Wesley, at least for most 
of his life, pressed the identity of faith and experience to synonymity. That is, 
one was not saved until one had the inner witness. Albeit. Martin Luther 
readily accepted that experience may be paradoxical to " faith, John Wesley 
assumed that one's feelings directly and harmoniously correlated with one's 
faith. 
Though Rudolf Bultmann s view was represented in Martin Luther, Rudolf 
Bultmann went beyond him. ' As Martin Luther, he resisted identifying faith 
with any "human experience of this world. No person -- the man of faith or 
his observer -- could know empirically that he had faith. '" However, Rudolf 
Bultmann rejected the suggestion that a transcendent, personal Deity 
interpenetrated the - believer. Claims of "religious experience"- brought 
Christianity under attack. ' 
Whereas Martin Luther rested the believer's confidence in the believer's 
holding to God's-promise of -Scripture, John Wesley laid the believer's 
confidence, in . God's 
Scriptural promise of forgiveness supernaturally 
manifested and supra-empirically received by the believer. 
For Rudolf Bultmann. God's revelation and the Spirit's witness were 
present and active in the world only In the Word. That the proclamation 
could be the occasion- of seeking internal or external assurance that one Is 
forgiven or has faith was the epitome of secularization and sinful existence. 
Faith meant abandoning a search for proof and forsaking all confidence. It 
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was deciding for a proclamation spoken from beyond our existence which did 
not carry rational or empirical evidence or proof. "" Contrary to Martin 
Luther, faith for Rudolf Bultmann was not confidence In the Scriptural 
proclamation but the resolution to be obedient to Its demand. In contrast to 
John Wesley, justifying faith is an eschatological event which "is not a 
phenomenon of existence" and not demonstrable. 1 
For both Martin Luther and John Wesley. the Holy Spirit was the 
progenitor of the "testimony". For John Wesley, the testimony was the Holy 
Spirit's literal communication perceived within man. For Martin Luther; He 
seemed to work indirectly, subserviently, and jointly with man through man's 
trust: '39 whereas, for John Wesley. He imparted quite directly, immediately, 
and instantly His message emanating from Himself which was registered in 
For Rudolf Bultmann, neither such descriptions of the workings of the 
Inner life and expressions of experience were descriptions of the Holy Spirit's 
work but only man's speech. 1O The work of God could not be denoted as an 
activity which could be observed. '' He would judge Martin Luther as well as 
John Wesley as speaking from a sinful understanding and engaging in "self- 
deceit". '42 
Finally, neither Martin Luther nor Rudolf Bultmann 4. r/, John Wesley 
conceptualized faith in terms of "degrees" of faith nor analyzed such 
gradations. Since, for John Wesley, inner impressions and human experience 
of the Holy Spirit were directly related to the faith by which one was accepted 
of God, distinguishing between awarenesses was vital in determining what 
constituted -a justifying experience. 
Perhaps the closest historical analogy to John Wesley's mature teaching on 
justifying faith and assurance is found in English Puritanism, albeit there is 
similarity with Moravianism and German Pietism. Like John Wesley, English 
Puritans were keenly interested in determining and promoting the correlation 
between Scriptural testimony and personal, spiritual experience. "` With a 
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renewed interest in the Holy Spirit, they sought to show that grace came not 
from God as a removed Creator but through a personal experience of the 
direct operation of His Spirit. "' Grace was an "indwelling" of the Spirit which 
demanded "entertainment" in the heart. '" 
For the Puritan Richard Sibbes. the certainty of the believers acceptance 
by God was not simply the reasoned acceptance of God's promises. It was 
also felt. There was "sweet harmony between God, reconciled In Christ, and 
the soul" which resulted in inward peace and joy of the Holy Spirit and the 
shedding abroad of "the love of Christ in the soul". "' John Preston envisaged 
the witness of the Word always going hand-in-glove with the witness of the 
Spirit in true "effectual" saving faith. '47 
One of the chief characteristics of the seventeenth century, Puritans was 
their emphasis upon the doctrine of assurance of eternal salvation and related 
matters of conscience. William Perkins' question summed up their most 
important concern, "How may a man know whether he be a child of God or 
no? """ John Wesley demonstrated his kinship to the Puritans in his renewed 
preoccupation with the doctrine of assurance. However. he differed in an 
important way from the strict Reformed Puritan. While assurance of ones 
eternal state was not. as we have seen, totally, out of his purview. an 
assurance of future, eternal salvation, as he readily pointed out, was not what 
he preached. Rather, he preached an assuranceof present justification. "" He 
said, "Therefore, ... it is no evasion at all to say. "This (the faith which we 
preach as necessary to all Christians) Is not proper] an assurance of what is 
future. «150 
John Wesley, like the Puritans, was decidedly interested in determining 
how the testimony of the Spirit could be distinguished from false presumption 
in order that persons could be assured of their justification. '' As we have 
seen, determining the theological basis of justification and assurance engaged 
John Wesley throughout his -lifetime. However, his thrust was equally 
directed to re-introducing and making an appeal in his generation for the 
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present reality, nature. and absolute necessity of a direct and immediately 
inspirational awareness in the soul of the believer. An Insistent appeal for an 
inspirational, supernatural witness within a believer was necessitated by an 
Age which had been content to let what was deemed a fanatical doctrine /ie 
in the ashes of a by-gone Puritanism. 
Affirmed by Puritan theology. the concept of "degrees" of faith was present 
In John Wesleys theology at least from the date of May 29,1738 when he 
recognized that "God hath given some degree of faith even to me "15' The 
concept of "degrees" of faith seems to have been current among Moravlans 
and those influenced by them. " Moreover, he found evidence in Holy 
Scripture of various levels of believers. "4 
At any rate, an awareness of the degrees of faith was already present 
immediately after Aldersgate. Not long after, he discovered that the English 
Puritans also conceived of faith in various gradations. They had been 
developing the various distinctions of faith a century before the rise of 
Methodism. ' That the 1747 Conference had -sought the counsel of the 
English Puritan Dissenters is testimony to the fact that they, by now, had 
gained John Wesley's ear. He had not only found precedents for a self- 
awareness and supernatural evidence of one's acceptance with God In Martin 
Luther, Philip Melanchthon, the Reformers, and the Reformed Churches in 
Europe but also, happily and in particular. within the English Puritans of his 
own English church tradition. ' In -responding to the criticism that "No 
Protestant divine ever taught your doctrine of assurance, " he rattled off a list 
of Puritans such as William Perkins, Robert Bolton, Richard Sibbs (sic), and 
John Preston which he implied supported his view and with whom he was 
familiar. 137 
As we have pointed out, for almost the first ten years of his evangelistic 
career, John Wesley, as evinced by his 1747 Conference debate, differed with 
"the Judgment of most of the serious dissenters" over which species of faith 
was the common privilege of believers. He had accepted that justifying faith 
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included the assurance of present eternal life and excluded any fear either of 
death or hell. ` 
However, such Puritans as Robert Bolton affirmed that those who had 
faith, albeit "little faith" and were in doubt regarding the forgiveness of their 
sins, had faith in Christ which should not be disparaged. '" Thomas Goodwin 
concluded that the act of faith which justified a sinner was distinct from 
"prevailing assurance" in which a believer was able to say "Christ is mine, and 
my sins are forgiven" in which he knew that he had eternal life. ' =°' Thomas 
Goodwin lamented that the view which John Wesley maintained from 1738 to 
1747 condemned many just ones. 's' As has been shown; John Wesley himself 
later came to accept this criticism as he gravitated, to ; the Puritan 
understanding. Reading their writings probably helped provoke his re- 
thinking of justification by faith while also providing him with an articulation 
of the distinction between justifying faith and the full assurance of faith. 
Though we have noted that John, Wesley eventually allowed such a 
distinction between justifying faith (the assurance of faith) and the full 
assurance of faith, he did not cease in urging people not to rest in "weak" 
faith. ' His general expectation that Christians experience the full assurance 
which was their common privilege was the same note struck the century 
before, for example, by Thomas Goodwin. ' 
Having said this, John Wesley seems to have viewed full assurance as an 
easily-won and more common experience than, apparently the mainstream 
Puritans perceived it. Contrary to John Wesley, they conceived of assurance 
more as a rare blessing of a mature faith experienced after many conflicts, 
doubts, and temptations. '` They were said to be highly suspicious of the 
vulgar prophets and Quakers who claimed to have gained the blessing on 
easy terms. " 
John Wesley's use of the analogy of sense perception to explain the inner 
experience of the Spirit is also a reverberation of Puritanism. In their attempt 
to describe the inward experience of the Spirit, the Puritans like Martin 
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Luther drew a parallel to sense perception. Richard Sibbes spoke of the 
active Spirit who "warmed" his heart. " John Preston stated that the Holy 
Spirit enabled us to discern His promises and believe them by "an immediate 
voice" by which he speaks into our hearts. " , Unless there was this "secret 
voice of the Spirit of Christ" speaking to the hearts - as a minister did to the 
ears - none would come to take Christ. ' Thomas Goodwin stated the Holy 
Ghost expressed faith to us by the knowledge 'of the senses., On the basis of 
Philippians, 1: 9 he argued that spiritual knowledge was there called "sense". " 
He, like John Wesley and Martin Luther, distinguished this spiritual sense 
from natural sense perception. The ° things themselves were not seen to 
reason or to the bodily senses ý but the mind was given a new sense by which 
spiritual -things were seen. 17O This new understanding was called "a new 
eye". "' Jesus Christ, Himself the light, brought light to this new eye and 
demonstrated the image of Himself and the things of the gospel to this new 
understanding just as light brought colors to the physical eye. ' 
For the -Puritans, like John Wesley, justifying faith and assurance must 
be, to use a common Puritan expression, "effectual". Namely. the faith that 
was accepted by God must be a faith conjoined with an immediately 
perceptible impression in the Inward person given by the Holy Spirit which 
communicates a fitting word from God. Moreover, the person's ability to 
receive such a signal within was also due to the work of God. The Holy Spirit 
was responsible for both the inner supra-empirical sense organ and the Divine 
message received by it. John Wesley and - the seventeenth century Puritans 
agreed with Catholics that the Holy Spirit worked supernaturally in the soul 
of the person In a state of grace. Moreover, he - like such Puritans as Isaac 
Ambrose -- did not neglect the Catholic penchant for the inner "graces of the 
Spirit". ' However, they distinguished themselves from the Catholics in that 




In conclusion. John Wesley. for the first, nine years of his regenerated life 
and ministry, identified justifying faith with a Spirit-wrought persuasion of 
pardon. This fact distinguished him from almost everybody - including Martin 
Luther and the Reformers, the Catholics, the Puritans and Rudolf Bultmann - 
except the Moravians to whom he was most akin in this regard . In 1747, 
after having re-thought this position, he qualified his position in a way which 
showed his Indebtedness to the subtleties of Puritan scholastic theology. The 
various modifications of his theology that we have heretofore enumerated 
attest to the fact that his theology was growing as he was going. 
Nonetheless, his general understanding of faith remained essentially Intact 
throughout his post-Aldersgate life. It was distinctly supernatural and 
inspirational, Christ-centered, personal and perceptible. However, as he was 
challenged by persons' real-life experiences, his reading, and his critics to 
clarify faith's relation to justification and assurance, he found himself in a 
twilight zone in which even the best of the Puritans, had only been able to 
grope. " What was the line between reprobation and justification? What was 
the status of the person who was neither considered to have faith nor be 
entirely without it? What was the status of the person who had a conviction 
of sin and a desire for grace yet had received no inner impression of faith? 
How could a reprobate sinner who by definition was totally depraved and shut 
out from grace have an inchoate desire for grace without having already 
received the Holy Spirit? Lurking behind these questions was the whole issue 
of grace and free will. Between 1747 and approximately 1788 he judged the 
person typified by these questions to be short of justification. At least by 
1788 he determined this person to be accepted in a low degree". Both of 
these positions and more had been advocated by esteemed Puritan divines. 74 
John Wesley' s theologizing on this issue in comparison was neither any 
better nor any worse than these Puritans. What he had in common with 
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them was an increasing recognition that grace and faith may not always come 
in an abrupt lightning flash (as with the apostle Paul) as the Reformers were 
inclined to view it. But it may also occur through the faintest beginnings, 
"weak" at first until. in a moment of time, it was bright as the noon day 
sun. 75 , Herein. John Wesley distinguishes himself from Rudolf Bultmann who 
viewed faith as arising only abruptly in the moment of decision. 
John'Wesley found language impotent and inadequate in trying to describe 
the eternal Spirit's work of faith In the terms of the empirical world. u He said, 
"It is hard to find words in the language of men to explain the deep things of 
God. ""' ' The problem was and is how to describe the supernatural Eternal 
which, is . not of the temporal, spacial, empirical world in the terms of this 
world which " lacks - logical categories for it. -" How can one, world which is 
seemingly mutually exclusive of another world be spoken -of 
in the terms of 
that world? Finding no exact correlate, he found the analogy of sense 
experience to most closely approximate the experience of faith to which he 
and many others testified. However, he acknowledged that to demand a 
rigorous, more exacting philosophical account of the - "manner" whereby "the 
real witness" was distinguished from human feeling was to make a demand 
which could never be answered. " -rhe things of God" which were from the 
Beyond were above human reason and analysis. The only way one could 
understand the things of God was to experience them as God revealed them 
to the enlivened soul. "" - 
- This involves entertaining the paradox that what cannot be known in 
human experience can be known in human experience. Reason which is said 
to lack categories for the eternal-things of God comes up with categories. In 
order for_ one to liken the originally unknown Beyond to ý"sense" - "feeling", 
"impression". "voice". -' reason must- be able to ascertain qualities or 
characteristics of Him and His work in order to be able to compare Him to 
the empirical, rational world. 
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Certainly Rudolf Bultmann would concur with John Wesley that trying to 
distinguish between God's act and human feeling is a vain exercise. However, 
Rudolf Bultmann would argue that in trying to account for the Spirit's inner 
activity as any other phenomenon in time and space he had erred before he 
had begun. To try to establish general statements about God whose validity 
would be universally true would be to speak from outside one's existence and 
from outside of God. 
When John Wesley spoke of "the things of God" from the Beyond being 
above reason, he meant that God's mind, an intellect which is there in reality, 
far excelled the humans mental ability to grasp it. Moreover, God's reasoning 
was hidden from the unspiritual person. Nonetheless, there was Someone in 
existence in an existing realm who had a mind and reason which is subject to 
understanding if one only had the capability or the enabling to do so. 
Rudolf Bultmann would agree with John Wesley that the Beyond was 
above human reason. However, He was not above reason in the sense that 
man lacked the right mental equipment to understand to some degree His 
thoughts. He was above reason in that reason alone to whatever degree or 
strength and in whatever context, whether In the unspiritual or spiritual man, 
was totally inappropriate and incapable of understanding God. Reason 
severed from a prior existential-ontological pre-understanding of existence -- 
which means any reason which tries to view God as an object in reality to be 
observed and analyzed just as any other object of the natural world -- would 
always miss the reality of God. Even the enlightened spiritual man who had 
an existential-ontological understanding but who began to approach God In 
such a rational fashion would sin and speak about God rather than from 
God. According to Rudolf Bultmann, human reason cannot form rational 
statements about God because, contrary to John Wesley's assumption, no 
such God exists that may be the object of rational analysis. Thus, for Rudolf 
Bultmann, John Wesley's attempt to liken what the Holy Spirit works in His 
child to sense experience is to speak of God in a sinful way. It is trying to 
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speak of God from without as some phenomenon which can be related to 
other phenomena. ' 
Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley intersect each other at the point that 
both accept that true knowledge of God is given by God only when He reveals 
Himself by faith to the individual. For John Wesley, this was a supra- 
empirical experience in which the individual was consciously made aware by 
God of His favour toward that individual and of a consequent change of 
status which did not exclude a deepening and extending of rational 
understanding which was previously not available to him. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, this was an existentiell knowing ("experience") in 
which as a result of faith in God's act, the individual became aware of being 
put into a new situation. However, contrary to John Wesley's view, this 
existentiell knowing did not comprehend the unveiling of any new insights, or 
any knowing of an objectified God in Himself, or any communication of 
rational knowledge not heretofore known. 
The paradox and difficulty of Rudolf Bultmanri s view is in maintaining 
that the God who is God and is revealed only in existentiall understanding 
cannot ever make Himself known to the individual outside of this 
understanding. For if God Is. by Rudolf Bultmann's own working definition, 
the "reality determining all else". 180 how can He still be God when He cannot 
and does not determine and impact a part of reality, reason and the empirical 
world? Moreover, how can he call God "reality determining all else" (or "the 
power determining his (man's) concrete existence")"' when "all else" really 
determines Him? Is it credible to think of Him as "reality determining all 
else" when He cannot even determine Himself since He can never make 
Himself known apart from a particular human existential understanding? Is 
He really God if He can only and must always belong to an existential human 
understanding? If John Wesley found difficulty in explaining "the deep things 
of God" which occurred In the Christians experience, his descendant has not 
found it much easier. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SAVING FAITH AS A GIFT/ DECISION AND AS A STATE 
SAVING FAITH AS A GIFT/ DECISION 
In regards to faith's nature. John Wesley affirmed two opposite - truths 
which he attempted to hold in antinomy: that faith was both a gift of God and 
an act of man. ' He, like both Catholics and Protestants. specifically in our 
case. Rudolf Bultmann, tried to account for the intersection of God's sovereign 
grace with the human will in regard to saving faith. All agreed both 
dimensions were involved but differed as to how. ' In what manner John 
Wesley fell In between the Catholic and Reformed view is now for us to 
describe. i-" 
John Wesley zealously asserted the truth of both seemingly irreconcilable 
positions. In the classical Protestant tradition, he affirmed justifying faith was 
a privilege and sovereign free gift of God: At the same time, he affirmed the 
Catholic view that it was a decision of the human will empowered by God. ' 
Firstly, he everywhere consistently urged that faith was a free gift and, 
therefore, the work of God. "It is true repentance and faith are privileges and 
free gifts, " he said. ` As the work of God, it was not the, work of man. *' God 
is the sovereign dispenser and benefactor of justifying grace and even delays 
in giving grace for reasons only known to Him. ' Faith is -"a disposition which 
God hath wrought" In mar's -heart. " - The free grace of God applies to sinners 
the benefits of Christ's atonement and righteousness by working in them 
faith e.. I- 
While faith was declared to be God's gift, faith was also conceived to be its 
seeming antithesis, a free act of the human will. It is "the duty of man to 
believe. " John f Wesley said. ' Faith was performed by man himself so that 
"believing is the act of man". " Contrary to the Calvinists' claim. he insisted 
that this did not make faith a "work". Saving faith was a nonworking activity 
of receiving what God offered. He illustrated this by explaining that one may 
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give another a sum of money on condition that he stretch out his hand to 
receive it. " To believe meant "'Accept that faith which God is now ready to 
give! " he stated. '2 
Nevertheless, though faith was also-the act of man, it was a human act 
which could be performed only by the power of God. Namely, he stated, "God 
gives me the power to believe. "" "For no one ever did believe unless God gave 
him the power, " he said. " Consequently, the first motion of the will was not 
from human nature but from grace. In any case. John Wesley was adamant 
that as a result of Christ's death all persons were free to choose to comply 
with or to resist the grace of God. " Gainsaying the Calvinist argument of 
election and irresistible grace, he held tenaciously that the grace which 
brought faith into the soul was not irresistible and may be and had been 
resisted both before and after the moment of faith. 1e 
Indeed, though "God gives me the power to believe". He does not believe 
for me. John Wesley declared. -Though "He works faith in me ... is it not I 
that believe? " asked he. " Though God through Jesus Christ enabled the 
fallen will to decide for or against grace, he nevertheless accepted that there 
was a sense in which the individual himself was left with the responsibility of 
making his own decision. In one sweep, his scheme set forth that God in 
the atoning Christ had restored to-all fallen men liberty of will. This opened 
and allowed persons the possibility to chose for themselves to stretch out 
their hands to receive and accept the faith which God was now ready to give. 
In one sense, faith entailed two, Divine movements and one human 
movement. God presented the gift of faith and liberated the will to receive it. 
Believing constituted man using his empowered will to accept the gift of faith. 
He wrote in 1787, "When we urge any to believe, we mean, 'Accept that faith 
which God is now ready to give. ' Indeed, believing is the act of man, but it is 
the gift of God. "" 
John Wesley knew he was walking the knife-edge in affirming this 
position. Consequently, he had to protect himself from abysses on either side. 
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The classical Protestant emphasis of faith as gift was typically aligned with 
the doctrines of total depravity and unconditional election. The fallen man 
who had a completely unfree will and could therefore do nothing toward his 
salvation was justified by God's gift of faith. The question that plagued 
theology was that if maxis will was completely incapacitated and must solely 
rely upon God's gracious gift to mete out' faith for salvation, why did God not 
give the gift to all, thereby saving all persons? The answer present in Martin 
Luther and classically expounded by John Calvin, was that God, had from 
eternity especially chosen select persons to be saved from total depravity. As 
a result. these chosen people were swept to salvation by the gracious act of 
God, their wills concurring but not choosing of their own volition this 
redemption. John Wesley vehemently rejected this understanding as 
disavowing human free will. 
On the other hand, if John Wesley allowed that fallen men had free will, 
he had to face the difficulties of how those whose wills which were completely 
bound could choose salvation. Moreover. if they were free, how could it be 
said that faith was God's gracious gift. The Catholics who accepted that 
persons had the free will to choose salvation could do so on the basis that 
they rejected total depravity, believing man after the Fall still had the God- 
Invested ability in his nature to freely choose. Strictly speaking, John Wesley 
rejected this view. He avowed with Martin Luther and John Calvin that fallen 
man was totally corrupt so that his will had neither any good inclinations nor 
the power to choose good. However, he diverged from them by advocating that 
the cross benefited all persons by restoring to them the ability to decide. 
How did - he attempt to resolve - the dilemma of holding two dialectical 
theses? He stated that to say that every person can believe to justification 
"when he will is contrary to plain matter of fact". 19 This was his 
acknowledgement of the axiom that God in His sovereignty bestowed faith 
according to his inscrutable will. Experience confirmed that man could not 
believe when he will". ' The timing was in God's possession. The reasons 
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why God delayed in giving faith were the secrets of his government which he 
kept to himself. 2' Be that as it may, if the timing of faith was finally up to 
God, one could nevertheless be certain that God had not predetermined to 
withhold faith from certain persons. He was prepared and at hand to work 
faith in every person. 
Nonetheless, though man may not believe when he will, John Wesley was 
certain that, to cite a favorite quote of his, "every man may believe if he, will". 
He said that "if you deny that every man can believe if he will, -you run into 
absolute decrees*. ' ' 7hus, he affirmed the axiom seemingly antithetical and 
mutually exclusive to the sovereignty of God: one may believe if he determines 
he will. If a person seeks faith in the appointed ways, sooner or later the 
Lord's power will be present. Further, he -stated that in order of thinking 
rather than in order of time God's working went first. The believer was to 
accept the faith that God was ready to give. Man's believing was 
strengthened by God's power so that though it was man's act, it was, 
nevertheless, God's gift. ' 
He recognized that this was a matter with "a precipice on each side". 
Moreover, he acknowledged, "there will be always something in the matter 
which we cannot well comprehend or explain". ' In 1787 he advised a 
Methodist preacher. "Take it simply without reasoning, and hold it fast. " ' 
EVALUATION 
The question of how faith could be -what God wrought in man and yet 
man's free decision was equally a concern of Rudolf Bultmann. He asked if 
"man is completely dependent on God's grace ... how can we still speak of his 
being a free agent"? " As Protestantism and John Wesley before him, he 
affirmed that faith was a God-wrought "gift" in the sense, that faith could only 
become a possibility through and since God's gracious saving - act In Christ. " 
The proclamation of the saving event created the historical possibility of faith. 
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Though faith is said by Paul to "come" and "to be revealed", this does not 
rob it of its decision-character as "obedience". " Like John Wesley, he 
asserted faith Is also a "free act". Herein Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley 
share a common commitment equally integral to each one's theology. In the 
first place, they both argue for a dialectical faith which is both God-wrought 
and free-decision. In the second place, the insistence upon mans free 
decision was a characteristic hallmark of both John Wesley's "Arminian" 
interpretation and Rudolf Bultmann's existentialist interpretation. Their 
juncture at this point draws them together Into a company which stands over 
and against the Reformers. ' 
How is faith paradoxically a free act and also awareness of being chosen? ' 
How can faith be a free act of decision and yet the believer not glory in 
himself as fulfilling the condition for the reception of grace? Herein, the 
answer demonstrates the clash of his and John Wesley's opposing basic 
theological - and philosophical assumptions. Rudolf Bultmann asserts that 
thinking of both at the same time is "impossible" if one thinks speculatively of 
being "chosen" as one would in a "doctrine of predestination". He alleges that 
persons who ask how it is possible for faith to be both at the same time 
desire to see faith "from the outside". Consequently, they get themselves into 
"insoluble difficulties". 1 Herein Rudolf Bultmann is thinking of those 
theologians, including John Wesley, who study the subject as they would an 
entity in the empirical world. 
However, if one interprets (as he does) the assertion of being chosen "as a 
confession - of faith", then thinking on the subject is possible 
32 Specifically, 
when faith occurs in the free decision for God, an awareness that God is 
being allowed to act arises 3' This awareness that one is chosen exists "only 
In so far -as there is faith" M' Therefore, every conception of the idea of 
election outside of faith is labeled by him as speculative or mythological and 
is thereby to be discounted. 
135 
Though Rudolf Bultmann speaks of faith as being "God-wrought", he does 
not accept as John Wesley that this means there is a cosmic, sovereign Being 
who ultimately determines, dispenses, and directs according to His own 
unsearchable counsel an outflow of power and influence which inspires or 
produces faith within a person. He says Paul does not describe "faith as 
inspired, attributable to the 'Spirit'" ' 
While John Wesley does not deny that preaching is a means that God 
uses to produce faith, to deny that the living, supernatural God is the power 
alone which enlivens and makes the means efficacious reduces proclamation 
to an empty ritual - "a poor. dead, empty thing. "' He proclaimed, "And all 
outward things, unless he work in them and by them, are mere weak and 
beggarly elements .... We know that there is no inherent power ... In the 
letter of Scripture read, the sound thereof heard, ... but that, it is God alone 
who is the giver of every good gift .... "g' 
Faith is produced only by One coming from the outside to create within 
man an inner disposition. For John Wesley there was no power to save but 
In the Spirit of God. To contemplate anything otherwise signifies to him "dead 
orthodoxy". It would be placing trust in a work and not He who was the 
author of grace ' 
For Rudolf Bultmann there was in fact no actual choosing of a believer by 
a so-called supernatural God. Being "chosen" was entirely In the perception 
of the believer. Outside of the believer's own understanding such a choosing 
did not exist but was only mythological thinking and human projection. 
In relation to the discussion of faith as "gift" and "decision", how does 
Rudolf Buitmann treat the issue of the ability of the will to choose self- 
surrender? Though the literal words in such texts as John 6: 44,18: 37, and 
8: 43ff suggest that the unbelieving Jews are "unable to believe, because they 
come from the devil", this is not the meaning according to Rudolf Bultrmnn. 
Rather, no man's will is disparate from his action. No one can act otherwise 
than in accordance with his being; ones being is constituted in action. It is 
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mari s being which is called into decision " 
From where does one get the ability, the power, and the freedom of will to 
make one's own response of faith to God? Why do some people resolve to 
believe and others do not? John Wesley maintained that the will of natural 
man which was enslaved, to sin as a result of the Fall had been liberated by 
the atoning death of Jesus Christ. However, Rudolf Bultmann, diverging from 
Martin Luther, did not know that every natural person's will was necessarily 
enslaved to sin. For him' the possibility of free choice was an a priori of 
human existence1O He, does not attempt to justify his assumption of free 
agency on the grounds of any liberating power of Jesus' factual death through 
the Spirit as John Wesley does. Again, In contrast to John Wesley's 
assumption, there is for him in factuality no existent -Person or power 
enabling man's will to choose the faith which He desires to give. To assert 
such could only be a statement of faith. It Is a statement about the way one 
experiences something rather than a statement about the way things are in 
themselves. 
Whatever the case, both positions allow that man has the power to decide 
for himself. However, given his own philosophical pre-understanding and 
existential faith, Rudolf Bultmann in the vein of Christian tradition 
acknowledges that man is dependent on God's grace for faith. 
Be that as it may, one could argue that since the proclamation Is not 
grace until one -resolves to accept it as such, God's grace as such Is 
dependent on mans prior free act. From this angle, he is aligned more with 
Catholic teaching, excepting the fact that -even they recognize the need for 
sanctifying grace, preceding faith. Moreover, from the historical Christian 
perspective, his formulation may be reduced to an agnostic existential or 
humanistic assertion. 
Though he gives little explanation of how the two dialectical tenets may be 
reconciled, John Wesley's assumption that they both must be held together in 
creative tension is not to be discounted. In affirming both, he was attempting 
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to take seriously both the Lordship of God and the responsibility of man to 
respond. His acceptance of the Scriptures as insisting upon both Is not an 
arbitrary conclusion but one which may be seen as being manifest in the 
Scriptures. His position avoids the pitfalls of the two either/ or Christian 
positions and does not entertain a more serious seeming paradox than the 
Catholic and traditional Protestant views. 
JUSTIFICATION AS A STATE 
Throughout his entire evangelical ministry, John Wesley understood 
justifying faith to be the inauguration of a radically new state of life, of being 
and becoming. In his 1738 sermon "Salvation by Faith", he stated that the 
one "thus justified ... or saved by faith is indeed 'born again'. , He is 'born 
again of the Spirit' unto a new 'life which Is hid with Christ in God. "" 
Further, as a "newborn babe" he receives "the sincere milk of the word" and 
grows thereby, going "from faith to faith" and "from grace to grace" until he 
becomes a "perfect man". "' 
That he accepted justification as a state is repeatedly recognized 
throughout his evangelical career. In 1745 he Indicated to Thomas Church 
that "justification sometimes meant a state of acceptance with God: " Though 
by the 1770's he became guarded in speaking of a justified state, nonetheless, 
he still acknowledged that the "state of a justified person is Inexpressibly 
great and glorious". " 
The new state of life of being justified consisted of a fundamental 
alteration in a person's "vertical", transcendent relation with God. One who 
was once in a state of disfavour with God at justification was put into a state 
of acceptance with Him 4S In 1748 he spoke of justifying faith eliciting 
justification which was a "relative change" in "our outward relation to God". 
Specifically, one who was previously an enemy of God now became a child of 
God in Justification. `e 
138 
Justifying faith was the fountainhead of the state of "proper salvation" 
which commenced instantaneously at the moment of justification" This 
resulting "proper salvation" entailed both a state of being justified and a state 
of being sanctified. The instantaneous moment of justification was the 
definite demarcation between the "before" and the "after", the threshold at 
which one died to the "old" creation and became a "new" creation, the 
"corrupted" image becoming the "restored" image. Though the states of being 
justified and sanctified had wholly distinct natures, they were directly related 
to one another and were inseparable. They occurred together 
simultaneously. " The state of being justified, though distinct in thought from 
the state of being sanctified, implied -'a state of. being sanctified, and vice 
versa. Namely, whoever was justified was also born of God; whoever was born 
of God was also justified `9 The fortune of each state of being was directly 
and inseparably tied to the fortune of the other state of being. Be that as it 
may, while one may say that by losing justification one automatically forfeited 
sanctification, the reverse may not always be true. 
"Proper salvation" was conceived of as a state of linearly progressing 
salvation as well as a state of being. Salvation progressed from one degree to 
the next degree, from lower to higher. As his sermon "Salvation by Faith" 
said, one went from "faith to faith", from "grace to grace". Comprehended In 
the state of justification were the various, generally progressive gradations of 
faith from "the assurance of faith" to "clear assurance". to "full assurance", 
and finally to the "full assurance of perseverance" which excluded all doubt 
and fear of final salvation. The "degrees" of faith directly corresponded to the 
Scriptural analogy of the various stages of human development, from the 
"new-born babe", to "little children*, - to "young men". to "Fathers", to the 
"perfect man". mature in the faith. ' In 1745. he states that from the time 
one was justified, salvation gradually. Increased In one's soul. Herein he used 
a botanical metaphor of the development of a , seed to blade to ear to full corn 
in the ears' 
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In 1782 he exhorted that all the light and love we received in the moment 
of justification or sanctification should increase more and more to the perfect 
day. " The state of sanctification related positively to the progressive stages of 
justification. For example, generally speaking, the "fathers" who experienced 
perfection enjoyed the plerophory, or "full assurance of hope". " 
THE FRUITS OF FAITH 
Let us examine further John Wesley's understanding of the nature of the 
justified state issuing from justifying faith. He maintained that if a person 
had received justifying faith, then the resultant state of justification brought 
immediately with it certain "fruits" and "marks" which necessarily would be 
"felt". 54 As "living faith" was experienced, so these fruits would be "felt" or 
"experienced". Describing these "felt" Inward feelings as "sensible operations", 
he stated they are "as perceptible to the heart" and sensible in the soul "as 
sensible objects are to the senses". ' Just as one felt the wind upon one's 
body, one knew he was under the Holy Spirit's guidance by "feeling it in your 
soul". ' The "marks" "must be felt (if it ((love)) is in the soul) as much as fire 
upon the body". 57 
There were other attendants of true faith in the justified believers heart 
besides the testimony of the Holy Spirit which he insisted must also be felt. 
In 1759 he affirmed that "we believe that love, joy. peace are Inwardly felt, or 
they have no being; and that men are satisfied they have grace, first by 
feeling these, and afterward by their outward actions. " As evidenced 
particularly in the 1740's, he made a point to stress that the fruit of living 
faith was an immediate and constant Issue Inextricably bound to faith S9 If a 
person believes, then he has the marks and fruit of faith 60 However, by the 
early 1780's when John Wesley's doctrine of assurance had undergone 
adjustment, he could be more restrained in his pronouncement. Appealing to 
Robert Bolton's analysis, he told John Atlay in 1781, "Faith may subsist for a 
time with very little joy, especially if there was little sorrow before. "' 
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Nevertheless, joy was still present with living faith. 
The "fruits" that issued from 'living faith were typically those enumerated 
in Galatians 5: 226: The ones which he generally highlighted were "love, joy, 
peace", salvation from the fear of God's wrath, power over sin. -'and 
"meekness". The 1744 Conference established that the immediate fruits of 
justifying faith were the following: "Peace, joy, love, power over all outward 
sin, and power to keep down inward sin. "62 He insisted always that by faith 
alone the "blessed love of God" could be "shed abroad in our hearts" enabling 
us to love one another. 63 In 1741 he asserted true faith could not subsist 
without the mark of, among other marks, "a feeling sense of God's love to me. 
a sinner". " 
With the experience of living faith and love sprang also the experience of 
"the peace, of God which passeth r all understanding". 
` "Dost thou thus 
believe? " asked John Wesley. -Men the peace of God is in thy heart .... " he 
replied. ' 
If "love" and "peace" were fruit always married to righteousness. so was 
"joy". - "Joy", along with -"peace", should never be separated from 
righteousness. Like both righteousness and peace, "joy in the Holy Ghost" 
was given only to those who were justified by faith 87 "Joy in the Holy Ghost" 
was an inextricable part of the new state of justification. Moreover, "true 
religion is 'righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost' .... " he said. 
" 
The joy which resulted from justification was a joy not unfelt, yet a joy, in the 
words of Scripture, "unspeakable" 69 In 1781 he was willing to concede that 
faith may subsist "for a time with very little joy". 
Another concomitant of justification commonly highlighted by John Wesley 
was salvation from the fear of God's wrath. The one saved from guilt was 
saved from the fear of punishment. 70 "Thou art no' longer afraid of hell, or 
death, or him -that had once the power of death, the devil: no. nor painfully 
afraid of God himself: only thou hast a tender, filial fear . of offending him, " 
wrote John Wesley in 1746.71 Moreover, the believer was even saved from the 
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fear of falling away, though not of the possibility? 
Another immediate and constant fruit of justification which John Wesley 
relentlessly stressed was power over sin. From the hour of believing, sin had 
no more dominion over the believer. " Power over sin was such a part of 
believing existence that it could not be separated from "true, living, Christian 
faith". Power over sin meant power to triumph over outward sin of every kind 
as well as inward sin. " 
THE NECESSITY OF GOOD WORKS 
There would be some truth in the ironic assertion that John Wesley was a 
man converted ' from "salvation by good works" who spent the rest of his life 
contending for them. He spent the early dawning of the Revival in defending 
himself from the charge that he undermined good works by preaching faith. 
He spent the dusk of the Revival in defending himself from the charge that he 
undermined faith in stressing good works. His ý 1738 conversion altered his 
understanding of the sequence of good works in the theological scheme of 
salvation but it changed little his passion for the necessity of good works. 
Good works were faith's "proper, fruits, the marks whereby it is known. "'s 
Whereas they may be considered as either internal or external, the outward 
works are more properly called "good works". " He argued using a favorite 
phrase that whoever had true religion would be "zealous of good works". " 
From 1738 onward he affirmed that a true, living faith was "necessarily 
productive of all good works and all holiness". " Good works were joined to 
faith as an effect is joined to its cause. 79 Good works were so vital that 
without them, assuming there was time to perform them, none could be 
finally saved 80 If there be no immediate opportunity of practising them but "a 
sincere desire and resolution to perform them", that is sufficient for the 
present. - However, good works "must follow after as soon as occasion offers". " 
The phrase "good works" or "works" was more or less synonymous with 
"holiness". " Likewise. the term "faith working by love" noted faith working 
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itself out in *holiness*. " These three expressions were generally used 
interchangeably to speak of the qualitative, inherent change that necessarily 
commenced at justification. These expressions encompassed an "inward" 
aspect and an "outward" aspect. " The "inward" aspect denoted "our inward 
tempers". our "inward qualities or dispositions"; that is, "the love of God is 
shed abroad in the heart". ' The "outward" aspect signified "our outward 
behaviour", namely "keeping His commandments" or "holiness of ... Life". 
" 
Sanctification could be distinguished from "good works" because it Implied "a 
continued course of good works springing from holiness -of heart". 87 
Nevertheless, taken in the proper sense, "good works" referred to the external, 
outward works " 
In any case, John Wesley's axiom was that anyone who had "true faith" is 
"holy both in heart and life". "'laue faith" is the sense of the love of the 
pardoning God given to us in the atoning Christ. Only upon receiving this 
pardoning love from God in faith can reciprocal love for Him and for neighbor 
arise. Only from this love meted out by the Father can truly good works and 
holiness commence. " 
Moreover, having this divine love which arises from true faith, the believer 
has consequently all genuine virtue which produces every divine and amiable 
temper. 9O He is renewed in the image of his mind. born again, having the 
whole image of God. 81 This is the true faith by which God's power living there 
"purifies the heart" from sins - from pride. anger, desire - "from all 
unrighteousness". "from all filthiness of flesh and spirit". "from the whole of 
the carnal mind which is enmity against God". ' 
Further, the sanctified do not "continue in sin". Being "dead unto sin" 
and "alive unto God", "sin hatte not dominion over them" so they are "freed 
from -sin" and therefore do not serve it " The love resulting from true faith 
fulfills the "whole negative 'law'" comprehended in the saying, "Thou shalt love 
thy neighbour as thyself". - Not only is the negative law fulfilled but so is the 
positive law. This love continually incites the believer to do good in every 
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possible degree to all people. " 
Finally, he declared that the Christian should expect to be "perfected in 
love" and "saved from all sin" in this life such that the "evil nature", "the body 
of sin", the evil root" Is destroyed. " In this "full salvation" God would purify 
the heart "from all sin" and "fill it with all holiness". ' 
Why were "good works" "absolutely necessary to salvation"? Though John 
Wesley affirmed that justification was a state, he rejected the strict Calvinist 
interpretation of this state. For him, it was not an irrevocable and 
irrepealable persevering state from which it was impossible for the justified to 
"fall". For 'him justification did not necessarily stretch Invincibly on an 
unintermittent, unbroken line from the moment of justification to death 
irrespective of the works which did or did not follow. Contrarily, for John 
Wesley, at the moment of justification, one entered a state whose very 
existence, continuance and progress depended on continued faith as well as 
"good works". The 1744 Conference asked, "Are works necessary to the 
continuance of faith? " They answered "Without a doubt; for a man may forfeit 
the free gift of God, either by sins of omission or commission. " The follow-up 
question was, "Can faith be lost, but for want of works? " The answer, "It 
cannot but through disobedience". " 
It is obvious from these passages cited In text and endnote that John 
Wesley consistently maintained that a justified person could lose the gift of 
justifying faith and cease to continue in faith, thereby losing his justification 
and favour with God. In conclusion, good works must necessarily be added 
to faith in order to retain the grace already received. 
"Good works" were also necessary in order to "grow in grace" and "the 
image of God". Moreover, - not only could one not "grow in grace". but he 
could not reasonably expect to be sanctified fully if he willingly neglected 
"good works". Herein, John Wesley's attempt at holding in tension the two 
seemingly opposing truths, faith and works is evident. He affirmed that 
justifying faith must elicit good works if it is true, living faith; yet, he avowed 
144 
that fundamental Methodist doctrine insisted that before all things it was 
necessary to hold faith " Moreover. he maintained that perfection was always 
wrought in the soul by faith, by a simple, instantaneous act 9`' 
The dilemma was, how could works be necessary to sanctification if 
sanctification was always wrought by instantaneous faith? His attempted 
resolution paralleled the pattern he used earlier to answer how repentance 
was also a condition (though not the only absolute condition) of salvation. 
His early debate with the Moravians centred on what a person must do (or 
not do) during the interval between seeking justifying faith and receiving it. 
He vigorously contended that during this interim one must repent and "bring 
forth fruits meet for repentance", assuming there was time and opportunity. 1°O 
Regarding sanctification, he readily recognized that there was an interval or 
"an intermediate state" between the first moment of justification and the 
instantaneous event of entire sanctification. 'o' "But do we change directly 
from our first love into the highest union with God? " he asked in 1756. 
"Surely not, " he answered. 102 Sanctification which began at the moment of 
justification gradually increased until one was entirely sanctified. 103 
As to the manner of sanctification, he urged that faith was "the only 
condition of sanctification" so that "without faith no man is sanctified". 1°4 
However, he also recognized the spiritual reality: in spite of faith, there was 
usually a waiting period until entire sanctification. 1 " So, the resulting issue 
was how one was to "wait" for entire sanctification. 
On the one hand, one was to wait in faith. One must "believe always" in 
order to walk in the fullness of love. 70S In 1776 he commended ' Joseph 
Benson for pressing believers to aspire after "the full liberty of the children of 
God". Nonetheless, he warned him they must not give up their faith in order 
to do it. They must be urged to go from faith to faith; from weak faith to 
strong faith which not only conquers but casts out sin. 107 Notwithstanding, it 
was equally true in the meantime that God appointed his children to wait for 
"complete salvation" through "repentance". including the fight of faith and "the 
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practice of all good works, works of piety, as well as works of mercy". '0B In 
1774 he stated, "There are two general ways wherein - it pleases God to lead 
His children to perfection - doing and suffering. w109 How could "repentance", 
the "fight of faith", and repentance's fruits be necessary to full salvation if full 
salvation was by faith? He argued that though repentance and its fruits were 
necessary to full salvation they were not necessary in the "same sense" or In 
the "same degree" with faith. "' They were not necessary In the same degree 
because these fruits were only necessary "conditionally, if there be time and 
opportunity for them. Otherwise a man may be sanctified without them. But 
he cannot be sanctified without faith". ` Moreover, he may have much 
repentance and good works yet all this does not avail till he believes. "But 
the moment he believes, with or without those fruits, yea, with more or less of 
this repentance, he is sanctified, " he said. "' Nonetheless, though one who 
expected to be sanctified would expect to be sanctified by faith, In the 
meantime, he must know that faith would not be given but to them that 
obey. "3 
The relationship between justifying faith, consequent repentance and 
sanctifying faith of the believer was perhaps best described in his 1767 
sermon "The Repentance of Believers". He stated. "repentance and faith 
exactly answer each other". "" The justified person continued to believe in him 
"that loved thee, and gave himself for thee". "' As he continued in the 
justified state. he felt the pangs of remaining sin in his heart. "By repentance 
we feel the sin remaining in our hearts, " he said. "' This repentance in turn 
calls upon faith to appropriate God in Christ for purification of this indwelling 
sin. "' He said, "By faith we receive the power of God in Christ, purifying our 
hearts and cleansing our hands". "8 Moving from a faith in Him who saves 
one from condemnation to the faith in Him who is both able and "willing" to 
save from all uncleanness is going "from faith to faith". "' 
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FINAL JUSTIFICATION 
John Wesley vigorously maintained that holiness and good works were 
necessary to final justification in a similar way they were obligatory to entire 
sanctification. This raises an important matter in regards to his teaching on 
final justification. The issue of a twofold justification, a first justification In 
this life and a second at the Last Judgment, seems to have been addressed 
first by him In 1739. He reported in his Journal of being informed one day 
how "many wise and learned men". supposedly in keeping with the Articles 
and Homilies, held a twofold justification. 120 His less than carefully worded 
criticism of this position was later brought against him as an example of his 
theological self-contradiction. Though making a final judgment Is difficult as 
to whether or not his above 1739 Journal account reflects a current Ignorance 
or studied rejection of the doctrine of double justification, based upon the 
reasons given in the endnote, one would best conclude it reflected 
ignorance. 121 
In June, 1741, he noted In his Journal his reading of Bishop George Bull's 
Harmonia Apostolica and Bishop Bull's affirmation "That there are two 
justifications". " Curiously, he made no judgment regarding the Bishop's 
affirmation and certainly did not take him to task as he had done with his 
1739 disputants. However, in July, 1771, in his letter "To Several Preachers 
and Friends", he confesses he "was very angry with Bishop Bull because the 
Bishop distinguished "our first from our final justification". " It would appear 
from this admission taken together with the previous statement in 1739 that 
he accepted at these early dates only one justification and that he was 
uncertain of, or rejected the distinction of, a present and final justification. 
even though later he might be able to reconcile his disparate remarks. "' 
At any rate. In late 1744 he read Richard Baxter's Aphorismes which he 
found providential and in which Richard Baxter asserted two justifications. '25 
This work touched on the subject and perhaps convinced him of a legitimate, 
evangelical differentiation between a first and final justification. Thereupon. 
147 
no later than 1745, he began to make in passing an obligatory qualification 
between justifications. In his 1745 Farther Appeal he noticed that 
justification "sometimes means our acquittal at the last day. But this is 
altogether out of the present question... "128 In his 1746 sermon "Justification 
By Faith" he commented that in Romans 2: 13 the Apostle seemed . to "refer 
our justification to the sentence of the great day". 121 Likewise did the Lord 
himself in Matthew 12: 36f. However, he concluded, generally Paul spoke in 
his writings of the initial justification. " This is the kind of qualification one 
would have expected him to have made in 1739 if he had then accepted the 
distinction or been conversant with it. 
The explicit mention of a second justification remained of mainly 
parenthetical Interest to John Wesley until 1756 when he responded to James 
Hervey's Theron and Aspasio. From 1756 onward, the express mention rather 
than the assumption of a final acceptance figured increasingly in the 
discussions. Correspondingly, his understanding of final acceptance became 
more fully developed in print. In his remarks on James Hervey's work, he 
stated that the foundation of our "final acceptance" was "the merits of 
Christ". " "Yet, " he said, "we obey in order to our final acceptance through 
His merits: and in this sense by obeying we 'lay a good foundation that we 
may attain eternal life'. '3° He explained that the keeping of the 
commandments was "undoubtedly the way to, though not the cause of, 
eternal life. "'' 
Two of John Wesley's pet doctrines, the possibility of falling from present 
justification and the complementary doctrine - of the necessity of continuing 
faith and works, were protected by his understanding of a second 
justification. 1S2 Just the same, he repudiated James Hervey's contention that 
his theology made works a condition of present justification. " Nonetheless, 
he stated, "It is undoubtedly true that nothing avails for our final salvation 
without IccctV tcTICiS . 'a new creation, and, consequent 
thereon, a 
sincere, uniform keeping of the commandments of God". ' In the 1764 
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Preface to A Treatise on Justification, he again reiterated that "the only cause 
of our present and eternal salvation" was "what Christ has done and suffered 
for us". " 
Therefore, from no later than 1745 onward a "final acceptance" or -second 
justification was incorporated into his theological scheme. "Final justification" 
was more an assumed doctrine than one upon which he elaborated or gave 
frequent specific mention. His understanding of it is gleaned from occasional 
scattered remarks, from his abridgement of Richard Baxter's Aphorismes and 
from the discussion of the controversial Minutes of 1770. 
The most systematic and complete treatment of the doctrine in John 
Wesley's writings was his 1745 abridgement of Richard Baxter s Aphorismes. 
One must be cautious in seeking in every sentence material for John Wesley's 
view since he disclaimed defending Richard Baxter's - every expression. 
However, as late as 1772 he re-affirmed that he generally approved' of Richard 
Baxter's sense. " 
- In this tract, it was asserted that justification was a single act begun and 
ended upon believing; yet it was also a continued act, though complete,, 
which was still "in doing" and must continue "till the final Justification at the 
Judgment Day". 137 - This final justification consisted of the Judge Christ's 
verdict on the individual ' Christian existence which-ensued from the moment 
of the first justification. It was -conditioned upon persevering faith and 
"sincere Obedience", that Is, - "according to our Works". His proposition stated, 
"Perseverance is faithful Obedience, doth, both in Nature and Time, go before 
our complete and final Justification, and that as Part of the Condition of 
obtaining it. ""' 
This teaching assumed, contrary to common Calvinism, that justification 
was revocable and also that obedience and good works must be ' annexed to 
faith as a condition for Christ the Judge's favorable sentence at the great 
Judgment. ' John Wesley asserted that in Jesus Christ's final Judgment He 
would show forth His hatred of sins and His love of obedience. 140 He felt this 
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explanation was the only fair treatment of the Scriptural evidence. `" 
Moreover, he accepted that the contrary doctrine which declared one must 
not perform our duties "for Life and Salvation, but only from Life and 
Salvation" would cause the collapse of the use of good works and obedience in 
order to full salvation. "' Similarly, the contrary doctrine would greatly tend 
"to relax their Diligence" of obedience. "' Both he and Richard Baxter in his 
day saw their doctrine more or less as God's stay against Antinomianism. 1" 
In the days following the August- 1770, Conference, John Wesley's 
understanding, which had been present in his theology since at least 1745. 
became the subject of a great outpouring of criticism from the strict 
Calvinists. ' It was provoked by one of the 1770 Conference's responses to the 
question of how "to revive the work of God, where it is decayed". "' The 
Conference determined, as it also had done in 1744, that it had been leaning 
"too much toward Calvinism". "' As a counteractive to this "grand hindrance 
of the work of God". John Wesley and the Conference spoke without 
reservation that "works" were a necessary condition of everlasting life. 
Once again he reaffirmed in bald statements what he all along had 
maintained that man ' must be "faithful in the unrighteous mammon" as a 
condition of receiving "the true riches". "' -Likewise, he did not shy away from 
using the battle-scarred aphorism of the seventeenth-century antinomian 
controversy (used by Richard Baxter in the Aphorismes): "every believer, till he 
comes to glory, works for as well as from life «1e 
Later, in response to the Countess of Huntingdon and Walter Shirley's 
circular letter protesting his "injurious" Minutes and "dreadful heresy". John 
Wesley in July, 1771, attempted to clarify those terse. unexplained Conference 
statements. "' In regards to the expression "working for life". he said he spoke 
only of the believer. 150 Moreover, when the Conference said that "He that now 
believes in Christ with a loving and obedient heart" is "now accepted of God". 
they did not refer "to the ainin the favour of God, but the being therein, at 
any given point of time". 's" Further, when he stated that salvation was not by 
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"the merit of works, but by works as a condition" he meant by "salvation", 
"final salvation". " Here again he reaffirmed what was consistently weaving 
through his writings from 1745: that "both inward good works (loving God and 
our neighbour) and outward good works (keeping His commandments)" were a 
condition of final salvation. ". 
The critics' ostensible, root concern with the Conference's propositions was 
their perceived assertion of "salvation by works". Since it was asserted that 
we must "work for life", and that works were a necessary "condition". of God's 
acceptance, they concluded John Wesley was advocating that justification was 
earned and merited by these works. 
John Wesley attempted to treat the condition of works of final justification 
in the same manner as we have shown he treated "repentance" prior to, and 
after faith. In his 1756 letter to James Hervey he explained that "the merits 
of Christ" were the foundation, the cause of our final acceptance. Christ's 
merits earned it. While works were not the `cause. they were the - way to 
proceed to eternal life. " As John Fletcher reiterated in his "Checks", though 
"works" were something that, must be done in order to find the second 
justification, they did not merit this justification. '" 
In the 1770 Minutes and in the debate following, he reaffirmed that 
"works", did not "merit" salvation. " Herein, he broached the term "merit" in 
relation to works as the condition for final salvation. He acknowledged that 
Methodists had been "so dreadfully afraid" of the word "merit". "' Indeed, 
heretofore, he- seems not to have used it except In reference to Christ's 
atonement. In August, 1771, he confessed in writing to Charles ' Wesley, "I do 
not use the word 'merit'. I never did, neither do I now contend for the use of 
it. ""' In the 1770 Minutes, he defined the sense in which the term "merit" 
was to be used: that which deserves reward. -- He affirmed that, "We are 
rewarded according to our works. "' He conceded that he could not 
distinguish the expressions "according to our works" and "because of our 
works" from the expressions "for the sake of our works" and "secundum 
151 
merita operum", "as our works deserve". 160 In his defense of this, he offered 
Abraham as an example of one who was told "Because thou hast done this- 
thing, ... in blessing I will bless thee .... "16' 
What are we to make of John Wesley's teaching on the good works of the 
believer and its relationship to reward and final justification? It Is abundantly 
clear that John Wesley asserted the following: that no one could be finally 
saved by a faith which did not necessarily produce good works (inward good 
tempers and outward good behaviour) (there being time and opportunity): ' 
and the absolute inability of the power of human nature to think, speak, or 
act rightly. In 1770, he emphasized that the original, Methodist, grand 
principle was: there is no power (by nature) and no merit in man. 163 
These generalizations accurately correspond to, the substance of his 
printed lifetime teaching. Judging from these, the Council of Trent would 
place him under "anathema". However, one must proceed with caution here. 
John Wesley devoted no essay to "final justification" or Its relationship to 
"merit" and "reward" and wrote comparatively little on the subject. When he 
did address himself to the question, his remarks remained terse. He seemed 
rather content to leave it this way. In conclusion, John Wesley's position vis 
ä vis the -views of reformed Protestants and Roman Catholics remains 
ambiguous. Was he the "papist" the strict Calvinist made him out to be? 
The Council of Trent anathematized those who said good works of the justified 
man were gifts of God to the extent of denying they were also good merits of 
the justified man himself. '" On the basis of this pronouncement, It would 
appear that he was at odds with the Council. While both Trent and he 
agreed that good works were God's gifts, he asserted that there was "no merit 
in man". ''s Contrarily, Trent declared that the good works of the justified 
were also good merits of the man himself. Accordingly, accepting the fact of 
God's enabling of man through grace, mans own free efforts obligate God 
(self-appointed obligation) to pay man a gift. " 
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While John Wesley accepted the place of man's ultimate free decision 
throughout the scope of salvation, he seems to have denied that man's effort 
in itself merited anything. On the contrary, as he stated in George 
Whitefield's 1770 funeral sermon, all merit was "(not in man, however high 
soever in grace, but merely) in the blood of Christ". " 
The Conference's 1770 propositions regarding good works, final salvation 
and "merit" were impatiently bald and provokingly unqualified. In his 
subsequent clarifications of the term "merit", he differentiated between two 
senses of "merit". One sense was the "proper" or "strict" sense. -Though he 
does not explicitly define it, the "proper" meaning can only allude to the 
Roman Catholic understanding as outlined in the Council of Trent and noted 
above. This "proper" or "strict" sense he avowed he utterly renounced. ' He 
stated in 1773 "that there is nothing we are, or have, or do, which can, 
strictly speaking, deserve the least thing at God's hand". "° When he labeled a 
work "meritorious", he did not mean that a work merited or deserved a reward 
In the sense that something one was or had, or did in or of himself obligated 
God to return to him a favour. 170 Moreover, works were not meritorious in 
this strict sense even when accompanied by faith. "' 
However, he was willing to designate "works" as meritorious in an 
"improper" or "loose" sense. That is to say, they were meritorious only in the 
sense that they were "rewardable". " "We are rewarded (at the Last Day) 
according to our works", or "because of our works", or "secundum merita 
operum", "as our works deserve, " he said. "' While he urged "that no man can 
be saved without his own endeavors", he did not mean for one to construe 
these endeavors earning in themselves a reward from God. What he meant 
was that man was not "entirely passive in the business of salvation". 17 He 
suggested the sense in which "works" "merited" salvation in his 1771 letter to 
Philothea Briggs. He said if one were to do works thinking to "merit" 
salvation thereby, one was "quite wrong". However, if one did them because 
they were the "appointed way" wherein we wait for free salvation, then one 
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was "quite right". They were rewardable in the sense that performing them 
led one along the way toward the dessert of final salvation. "" We will further 
analyze his distinction in regards to other theological formulations in the next 
section. 
t 
ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF OTHER THEOLOGICAL FORMULATIONS 
How does John Wesley's espousal of a state of justification, the necessity 
of a faith producing good works, and good works as a condition which 
"merits" eschatological acceptance measure up to other representative. 
Protestant theological views, including Rudolf Bultmann's view? 
Like John Wesley. Rudolf Bultmann asserted that faith for Paul Indicated 
the act of becoming a believer as well as the state of being a believer. 1e 
Rather than being able to describe positively the nature of the state. he is 
much more forthcoming on the negative description of what the state is not. 
In contrast to the strict Calvinists, John Wesley and he concur that faith is 
not an act performed once for all whereby the believer is introduced into a 
state of grace in which he is continually preserved invincibly unto eternal life 
by God as a gift. ' Further, they both describe the man of faith as having a 
new existence distinguishable from his former old eldstence. 
Specifically. Rudolf Bultmann spoke of a "believing" existence and the new 
self-understanding of. faith contradistinguished from "unbelieving" existence 
and the old self-understanding just as John Wesley spoke of the "old" and 
"new" creation. 18 Both eschewed an understanding of the act of faith in 
which the believer could think he - was thereby introduced into a state of 
achievement in which he could rest and in which nothing further would be 
required of him. Notwithstanding, 'John Wesley maintained that something 
had been achieved in the moment of faith which the believer could say ý he 
possessed. I' 
Rudolf Bultmanri s description is more elusive. He has to acknowledge 
that at the moment of faith one can be described as "having" "believing 
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existence"; nevertheless, he does not accept that this faith is a "possession". 
Faith cannot be possessed but must be constantly won and realized anew in 
the decision of every new moment. 
In this sense he differs from John Wesley and classical Protestantism. To 
begin with, John Wesley and classical Protestantism affirm that the first 
moment of faith introduces one into a state of existence which begins and 
which develops out of this point in time. Indeed, in contrast to Rudolf 
Bultmann, there is a sense in which the Initial act of believing has the 
character of an "act done once for all" which begins and ends and is complete 
in itself. Moreover, the moment of initial, justifying faith is a unique moment 
of crisis, distinguishable from all other moments and a turning point upon a 
persons historical time-line. It is viewed as "punctiliar" time. 
Though for Rudolf 'Bultman the initial act of faith is viewed as punctiliary 
and as a crisis, it is not seen (as it is for John Wesley) as more than a crisis 
or as essentially and qualitatively different from every subsequent act of faith. 
Nonetheless, for John Wesley from this punctiliar moment of faith begins a 
state of "linear" time which is in progress, unfolding in a line. In this state. 
every moment does not necessarily need to be re-won. Herein, one may 
confidently rest in acceptance of God and need not be anxious or fearful of 
falling. According to John Wesley, it is a state wherein one exists for the time 
being but whose very continuance and -development Is conditioned upon 
continuing faith and good works., 
Contrary to Rudolf Bultmann., John 1iesley maintains that one does 
"possess" faith and does live in ,a state of justification. Nevertheless, he does 
affirm as Rudolf Bultmann that in this state, one Is, as Rudolf Bultmann put 
It, "constantly' under the demand of God". ' The believer Is "every moment 
pleasing or displeasing to God". 180 Both passionately resisted self-satisfied and 
complacent religiosity. Accepting their :- differences. each stresses that A he 
believer is continually answerable to God in every moment. In this fact, they 
compare favourably and are both, set' against the strict Calvinist position 
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which declared the believer was guarded once for all against "a real falling 
away" by the "gift of perseverance". "' 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the concept of an unfolding, justified state 
turns faith into "a process in the past" and a "work". ` Faith is a "state" only 
in the sense that one is "constantly relating oneself to God's act of salvation"; 
that is, "the being constantly under the demand of God". "' Rudolf 
Bultmann's denial of a justified state wherein one is under the demand " of 
God yet at the same time secure in Him would be judged by John Wesley as 
discounting the very blessing of justification. 
Furthermore, for Rudolf Bultmann, the Justified -"state" and the new 
existence characterized by "peace. -joy, love, " freedom from sin, and "the 
possession of the Spirit" does not correlate with any historical, verifiable, 
sensuous (outward or Inward) situation. Namely, It corresponds to no human 
or religious experience or personal quality or virtue and leaves no visible 
tracks attributable' to it. 184 Indeed, he recognized that from his concept of 
faith arose the polemic against all "'religion of experience', against piety, sense 
of sin, and inspiration". 's This polemic attacks the root of John Wesley's 
understanding of the justified state. For him, justifying faith was not only an 
inward, inspirational experience, but so were the "marks" and "fruit" that were 
Integral to the justified and sanctified state. ' 
Since the justified state according to Rudolf Bultmann is not a condition 
of unfolding theological progression toward the "idealistic" goal of perfection, 
power over sin is not as - In John Wesley a gradual (or instantaneous) 
liberation -"from sin --and death considered as -. powers of - nature". 
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"Sinlessness" is not a capacity "to do the good only" but a believer becoming 
what he already is by the constant appropriation of grace by faith. `' 
Like John Wesley, Rudolf Bultmann held that'the believer was a ! CLiyh knM5 
with eschatological existence characterized by love. ' Rudolf Bultmann 
acknowledged that Jesus gave the new commandment to "love" and that the 
believer is within "the law of Christ" which ý is "the demand that one love". 189 
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In love the faith which puts one into eschatological existence is at work. 19° All 
that matters for the man of faith is love. 19' While for him, as for John 
Wesley, faith and love occur together, they do not appear to be separate 
qualities or entities as for John Wesley. Rudolf Bultmann asserts that love is 
nothing but the manifestation of faith in living. ' The decision of love is 
"precisely faith itself'. "' 
Moreover, though for John Wesley true faith and love are necessarily 
causally linked and automatically occur together in the inward person at the 
moment of faith, there is a sense in his theology which love outwardly 
considered as "good works" is viewed as logically and temporally distinct from 
faith even though true faith and love are connected. John Wesley could 
conceive of true faith existing temporally without concomitant "good works" 
(such as when someone died soon after the reception of justifying faith). 
Faith and love could not be temporally distinct for Rudolf Bultmann because 
faith and its manifestation in living (love) could not be separated. for in the 
structural nature of man his inward decision (will) and outward act must 
necessarily be one. 
Furthermore. for John Wesley, the state of justification is positively related 
to and even dependent upon not just faith but also the performance of "good 
works" (love). For Rudolf Bultmann, as for John Wesley's Lutheran 
contemporary. Count Zinzendorf, the state of justification was solely 
dependent upon faith. "' 
Nonetheless, one could say both Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley accept 
that love was the necessary accompaniment of justifying faith. However. their 
understandings of the nature of this consequent love are radically different. 
Indeed, they both 'argue love is to "love your neighbor as yourself . 'as 
However, for John Wesley, it also means to love Him who had first loved me. 
Plus, love is the foreign, supernatural quality which is the present God of love 
Himself who is given to the believer. In his coming He imparts to the believer 
an inward disposition of heart which is in turn directed back to God and 
157 
outward to man. Moreover, this quality of love comprehends all genuine 
virtue which produced every good temper. 
Opposing this conception, Rudolf Bultmann renounces the Idea of love as 
a quality. Faith brings with it no supernatural Person God and no qualitative 
change in man. '" Therefore, absent in Rudolf Bultmann is the conception of 
the Person God uniting with the believer in a relationship of love. Similarly, 
faith ushers in no indwelling God of love who spiritually and morally 
transforms the inner person by purifying the heart and mind from carnality. 
In arguing this way, he shows he does not distinguish between justification 
and sanctification. 197 
For Martin Luther, the man of faith laid hold of the "alien righteousness" 
of Christ which was not and never could be his own. " Any righteousness of 
the believer was extrinsic to man and not a quality at work within man. '" 
The believer was not becoming intrinsically more and more righteous as 
Augustine, Catholics, Reformed, Pietist and Puritan Protestants argued. 0' 
John Wesley would continue the dispute with Rudolf Bultmann he had with 
Count Zinzendorf who entertained this Lutheran position. In his 1745 tract 
"A Short View Of The Difference Between The Moravian Brethren", John 
Wesley quoted the Moravians as contending a believer was never sanctified in 
himself, having no Inherent holiness In himself. The Moravian stated that a 
believer was neither more nor less holy to the day of his death. 201 This 
Lutheran understanding of which Rudolf Bultmann is a descendent disgusted 
him to his dying day. ' 
According to John Wesley, the love resulting from justifying faith 
necessarily Impinged upon the believers inner and outward life. Furthermore, 
this love subsumed Scriptural virtue, morality, ethics and "keeping His 
commandments". For Rudolf Bultmann, nothing could be less true. Love was 
not an ethical or timeless principle which gave specific answers to the 
question, "What should I do? ". Being dictated to by some external, outside 
authority and "formal" law was antithetical to authentic, believing existence ' 
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This was a characteristic of salvation by works and not eschatological 
existence. 
Martin Luther could be heard also to say that for the one who stood in 
love, an "ethic" was no longer necessary. The person of faith who had been 
set free from the law. knew what to do to love. In line with this Lutheran 
understanding, Rudolf Bultmann went on to affirm that faith did not result in 
consequences which are visible empirically or in experience. There are no 
empirical criteria of the presence or absence of love. One could not expect 
that the person with faith would be a "better" person or "better" neighbor. 203 
He prefers only to say faith makes a person no worse than his fellow. That 
Is, faith does not effect a person morally one way or another. It Is amoral. 
Herein, he has gone beyond Martin Luther. Though Martin Luther 
affirmed that the believer did not progress in inherent righteousness, he did 
maintain that accompanying phenomena, such as "good works" did result 
from faith 204 Moreover, these works were consonant with the works of actual 
morality as enjoined by the law or, more specifically, the "commandments". 
He did say that the believer who was moved by the Holy Spirit was not 
dependent on the Decalogue and did not need written declarations. Rather, 
the Spirit taught him .m However, in the same 
breath. he limited this 
statement by pointing out not every Christian had the spirit to such an 
extent. He then went on to say that abiding by the apostolic imperatives in 
the New Testament was incumbent upon the Christian. 2' 
Rudolf Bultmann (and other neo-orthodox theologians) protested against 
the turn of the century "liberalisms" accommodation to current culture; 
nonetheless, he paradoxically seems to have left the man of faith's moral and 
ethical life either to one's a priori understanding or to the caprice and 
currents of the prevailing culture. The person of faith had neither more nor 
less insight into moral situations than the person under sin. Having said 
this, his contention against liberalism was not concerned with any moral and 
ethical accommodations but in philosophical and ontological concessions. 
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Like Rudolf Bultmann, John Wesley severely criticized the established 
Christianity of his day. In his Earnest Appeal he lamented that on every side 
one saw "either men of no religion at all or men of lifeless, formal religion"207 
In 1744 he rhetorically asked the University congregation at St. Mary's if 
"scriptural Christianity" was to be found in Oxford. ' Just the same, John 
Wesley would rather have left the planet than leave persons of faith to their a 
priori moral understanding or in a condition of moral laissez-faire. For 
example, in his sermon "The Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption", he attacks 
the "men of learning" (whose philosophy Is not altogether dissimilar from 
Rudolf Bultmann's) who prove "to a demonstration that every man may do as 
he will, may dispose his own heart to evil or good as it seems best in his own 
eyes". 209 His prescription for fundamental renewal encompassed a 
foundational change In relations between God and man. In addition, this 
necessarily must result In a radical qualitative and moral transformation in 
the person of faith. This personal transformation effected ever widening 
circles of society by effecting the community of faith which In turn impacted 
the society at large. His radical criticism of perfunctory "outward religion" 
having the "form of godliness" envisaged an equally radical reformation of this 
outwardness and "godliness". x'o 
John Wesley shared with seventeenth century' Lutheran Pietism and 
Pietistic Puritanism this vigorous challenge of status quo, Christian, religious 
spirituality and praxis 2" He, like they, envisaged the, justified person 
necessarily undergoing radical and thorough-going transformation of inner and 
outer godliness (holiness). Rudolf Bultmanns proposal of justification would 
probably be judged by them (in the words of seventeenth century John Smith) 
as mere "abstract justification"? '2 
Rudolf Bultmann would retort in kind that John Wesley's proposal of a 
faith necessarily eliciting visible, good works was a proposal of salvation by 
works and not faith. He contended that the whole letter to the Galatians "was 
an aggressive attack against the misunderstanding that faith must be 
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supplemented by the performance of works? " Even more fundamental than 
this, John Wesley's whole theologizing on faith and good works must be 
inevitably indicted because it arose from the old, ontological framework and, 
therefore, could only be a proposal of works-righteousness. r Therefore, the 
question of how good works relates to the state of justification and to 
salvation was impertinent and counter-productive to Rudolf Bultmann. 
Therefore, no further comparison between he and John Wesley regarding this 
issue is possible. However, we will relate John Wesley in this matter to other 
relevant theologies. 
John Wesley's original zeal for and commitment to "holy living" was ignited 
and fueled by, among other main mentors, the master of the "holy living" 
school, Jeremy Taylor. Though he later diverged from this school in his 
understanding of original sin, grace, and justification by faith. he did not 
abandon his early conviction regarding "holy living"; rather, he accepted that 
justification by faith did not annul the ultimate need for good works but 
established the proper way to them. 
Richard Baxter, to whom John Wesley was sometimes compared by his 
contemporaries and from whose Aphorismes he drew, stated, "The bare Act of 
Believing is not the only Condition of Salvation by the New Covenant; " but 
several other Duties also are Parts of that Condition. 21 
While John Wesley's formulation of the nature of justifying faith and 
justification by faith is simpler, clearer, more decisive, and more Protestant in 
tone than the somewhat ambiguous Aphorismes, he follows Richard Baxter in 
his stress on the necessity of "good works" for final salvation. 215 
Further, John Wesley was not out of line with John Calvin and Reformed 
teaching in holding that justification could not exist without good works. In 
fact, he appears to have more kinship with them than with - the Lutheran 
understanding. John Calvin stated, "We dream not of a faith which is devoid 
of good works, nor of a justification which can exist without them. ""' There 
was further agreement in that John Calvin argued "that faith and works- are 
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necessarily connected" 21 
However, John Calvin and John Wesley diverged on a crucial point but not 
until after further agreement. John Calvin pointed out that the faith which 
apprehended the righteousness of Christ at the same time necessarily brought 
with it sanctification. He said, "Christ, therefore, justifies no man without 
also sanctifying him "218 These two blessings were inseparably and perpetually 
conjoined. With this and the understanding that justification and 
sanctification were logically distinct though contemporaneous in the moment 
of faith John Calvin and John Wesley agree. Differentiating between 
justification and sanctification set them apart from Martin Luther and Rudolf 
Bultmann. 
However, though John Calvin affirmed that justification could not exist 
without works, he was content to let faith alone be the only condition of both 
the momentary occurrence and the continuation of both justification and 
sanctification. Not so with John Wesley. The continuation of justification and 
sanctification following on from the first momentary reception of faith was 
conditioned upon the continuation of this faith and the continuing production 
of good works, where there . was 
time and opportunity. 
The difference between John Calvin, the Reformed, the English Calvinists, 
and John Wesley particularly appears when one considers A heir two 
propositions counterpoised with their other views, such as imputed 
righteousness and the perseverance of the elect. John Calvin and the 
Reformed taught that conversion's continuation and completion in glorification 
is guaranteed and is to be entirely ascribed to the gratuitous supernatural gift 
of God irregardless of the factor of the believers co-operation 21' One of the 
Holy Spirit's tasks is to preserve continually the believer in a state of grace. 
In fact, it would be Impossible for the truly faithful to revolt totally and finally 
from the holiness once begun'2° This meant that a bona fide believer whose 
faith had been evidenced by good works but who fell into sin and whose good 
works sputtered or ceased had not jeopardized his state of grace and its final 
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outcome. Even if one appealed to the Calvinistic premise that without good 
works there was no faith, since holiness and good works were not directly 
correlated to the continuing progress of the state of justification and 
sanctification, the degree to which they must be present or could be absent 
with co-existent, faith was indeterminate. Indeed, the one accepted may "fall 
into grievous sins; and for a time continue therein" but not finally fall away. " 
On the other hand, John Wesley taught that while the believer had 
assurance of the state of grace in the present, the state was not immutable. 
It's continuation, progress, and completion in glorification was directly related 
to continuing faith and continuing good works. Thus, willing neglect of good 
works threatened sanctification, the growth in grace, the gift of justifying faith 
and hence, final salvation. 
Connected with this, John Calvin rejected as an error the argument that 
anticipating a final reward was the motive for doing good works. Motive 
enough for him was we ought to "love him who first loved us". " 'Herein he 
breathed the spirit of Martin Luther. ' Contrarily. - Johnä Richard Baxter 
passionately argued that if good works were not part of the condition for full 
salvation, then who will use them to that End? "724 As strong as the appeal to 
God's love is and ought to be, John Wesley's concern was a real one. 
Some critics might say that if his formulation gives more impetus to good 
works. it does so at the expense of faith. His system does require a balancing 
act since he tries to give both faith and works, justification and sanctification. 
equal emphasis without compromising the logical integrity of each. The case 
can be argued that to do so is to grapple more realistically with the full-orbed 
presentation of the New Testament. 
The idea of a Protestant "double justification" which John Wesley seems to 
have adapted to his theological scheme harks back to Martin Bucer. Martin 
Bucer set forth a "primary justification" in which man's sins are forgiven and 
righteousness imputed to him. After this "primary justification", a "secondary 
justification" followed in which a person is made righteous. Though the 
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persons "primary justification" is conditioned on the basis of faith alone, the 
"secondary justification" occurs on the basis of good works. ' His motive in 
such a formulation appears to have been, as John Wesley's was after him, to 
forge a secure theological link between the gracious gift of justification and 
moral obligations placed upon the believer. ' 
In analyzing John Wesley's formulation of "double justification". we note 
that for him present justification is a "forensic" justification. Herein he 
differed from the Roman Catholic understanding expressed in the Council of 
Trent which rejected the notion of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. '' 
Furthermore, he differed from Martin Bucer in holding that the second 
justification is conditioned upon faith and good works rather than just good 
works. His understanding was differentiated from' Bishop Bull's in that the 
Bishop taught that the first justification hinged upon a faith which included 
within it good works. 228 
John Wesley's teaching that the justified person's future, eschatological 
blessing directly corresponds to present good works is set apart in an 
essential way from the Roman Catholic conception. The Roman Catholics 
traditionally have understood "merit" to be an act performed by man which 
places God under obligation (self-appointed) to man. - In other words, God 
promises to reward man for his efforts. In the final analysis, the traditional 
Roman Catholic view fundamentally affirms that man on his own, by his own 
free-will effort. may gain a reward from God 230 It avows that the possession 
of a reward is dependent upon man's own action alone such that if a certain 
action is performed man has a claim to apromise of God 23' This is the 
"strict merit" (condign merit)' which John Wesley consistently asserted he 
disavowed. 
In contrast to this, John Wesley not altogether unlike other Protestants 
did affirm a "loose" sense In which the believer worked for life and received a 
reward. John Calvin citing Matthew 26: 27 stated that "working" was not 
opposed to grace. '' Referring to Genesis 22: 16-18, as John Wesley himself 
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did, he observed that God promised and rewarded the works of believers with 
blessings 
." Later, Reformed theologians also agreed that good works were 
not without relation of order and connection with eternal life. ' 
Thus, John Wesley was not out of line with John Calvin and the Reformed 
in attributing to the term "merit" the meaning of "deserving". There was 
agreement between them all that "good works" were not the "cause" of 
salvation and that there was no merit in man. 236 In holding that man in 
himself could produce no merit, they all differed from the Roman Catholics 
who ultimately assumed that the good works of the justified person, though 
God's gifts, were nevertheless In some sense his own good merits. 
In arguing for a "loose" sense of merit, John Wesley was, nonetheless, 
appropriating a conception which harks back to Roman Catholicism. This 
"loose" merit was not that which put God under obligation of payment for a 
good work. Rather, the merit was based upon a "certain fitness". Namely, a 
good work being done, the recipient's (God in this case) returning the 
kindness would only seem natural' 
John Calvin and the Reformed and John Wesley concurred that "good 
works" were necessary to salvation and were the road of approach, the way to 
salvation. Notwithstanding, the essential distinction between them and him 
was that for them good works were only necessary as a condition of 
confirmation of justification. But for John Wesley they were also a condition 
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RUDOLF BULTMANNS UNDERSTANDING 
OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH 
CHAPTER ONE 
PAULINE RIGHTEOUSNESS DESCRIBED 
BACKGROUND TO RIGHTEOUSNESS 
On Rudolf Bultmanri s way to setting forth the exposition of 
"righteousness" by Paul (righteousness' preeminent exponent according to 
Rudolf Bultmann) he gives a precursory overview of its usage prior to Paul. 
In the Old Testament, the Jewish concern of placating society's claims by 
upright and blameless conduct was focused in the ethical term 
"righteousness". ' It meant the respect one experienced in the sight of his 
fellows and in the sight of God, the King of justice? After most of the explicit 
Old Testament precepts of righteousness which are negative In character have 
been laid down, one finds they are not exhaustive or systematic. The Law, 
which could not embrace every conceivable contingency In daily life, did not 
claim man in his entirety. ' Therefore, the obedience which resulted was 
"formal rather than ý radical"' The prophets protested against scrupulous 
fulfillment of the law and preached that God demands radical obedience. ' 
Nevertheless, the Old Testament "righteousness" which sought to prove its 
worthiness before God " through the fulfillment of the Law failed to be radical 
obedience in which the whole man knew he was claimed by God in his 
entirety. 
While Rudolf Bultmann - (as well as . John - Wesley) does not set ' forth a 
complete, systematic, exegetical basis for his interpretation of "righteousness" 
in the Old Testament, one wishes for more of a foundation than he gives. " 
In respect to the meaning of "righteousness" in Jesus, Rudolf Bultmann 
asserts that he did not teach an ethic of "goods" or values nor did he speak of 
the essence of salvation as "the righteousness of God" .6 
Implicit in Jesus protests against Judaism 7s false righteousness is an 
understanding of what Paul calls "righteousness". Jesus opposed the 
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contemporary, Jewish legalism and its pride in its correctness. ' He rebuffed 
contemporary conventional piety's idea of obedience as personal achievement 
and called into question its lack of earnestness. ' As the prophets before him, 
he substituted radical obedience for the legalistic conception of man's relation 
to God. " However. Jesus connected this teaching with the "kingdom of God" 
whereas Paul expressed the teaching as "the righteousness of God". 
In regards to the "primitive church's" use of "righteousness". - Rudolf 
Bultmann is silent. One concludes that he does not find the term in use or 
important in this circle. Nonetheless, where it is employed in the Hellenistic 
churches, it is different from the-Pauline sense. He refers to I Corinthians 
6: 11, "you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified..:. as evidence 
that righteousness for the Hellenistic church is speaking not of justification by 
faith, but in the general Christian sense of the cancellation of sin. ` Namely, 
being made righteous is to be construed as being purified from ones sins 
which is the expected effect of baptism. " 
Before we delineate Rudolf Bultmanri s understanding of the Pauline 
conception of righteousness, let us note that the essential difference between 
Jesus and Paul regarding righteousness is not a conceptual distinction. The 
"righteousness of God" as "eschatological" is exactly the same for both as in 
Judaism. " As Rudolf Bultmann declares, "The concept which could be called 
the main theme of Paul's, preaching is eschatological -- the concept of the 
'righteousness of God'. of 'justification ( Auvertocruo 9e65 ) and this concept 
corresponds to the 'kingdom of God'" (Jesus' term for the concept). " More 
specifically, both Jesus and Paul have eschatölogical views. The difference is 
in the fact that while Jesus looks forward to the future coming of the 
Kingdom of God which is dawning now, Paul looks back to the fact that the 
turning point of the ages has already come in Jesus Christ. ý The distinction is 
in -what Paul affirms about the actualization of righteousness. The 
righteousness, the justification, is already. achieved and is now available 




In his preliminary remarks, Rudolf Bultmann relates Paul's teaching on 
righteousness to the analysis of man's existence prior to faith (as seen from 
the eye of faith) which he submits is an indirect pre-sketch of man's 
existence under faith. The man of pre-faith, who is under the power of death 
because he strives to live out of his own resources, loses himself. In contrast, 
the man under faith receives life by surrendering himself. This In short Is 
what Paul means by "righteousness". 's Rudolf Bultmann posits that 
"righteousness" according to Paul is both the condition and essence of 
salvation. In proclaiming "righteousness" as' the condition - for receiving 
salvation, Paul Is In harmony with- Jewish tradition. °Nevertheless, Paul 
differentiates himself from the Jewish tradition In the way he understands the 
possibility and actualization of righteousness. ý Therefore, as Abrahams 
righteousness (faith) was the presupposition to receiving the promise (Romans 
4: 13), likewise anyone who is now righteous by faith will receive life. " 
Furthermore; because the "connection between righteousness and salvation is 
so tight and Inevitable, -righteousness itself can "become the essence of 
salvation" (Romans 10: 10). '? ' "Righteousness" and "salvation" are used 
synonymously as is evidenced by Romans 10: 10 and also Romans 9: 30f. 18 
What do the terms "righteousness" and, especially, the "righteousness of 
God" mean? Rudolf Bultmann determines that the biblical word, c(tx acl1Y7 is 
just as ambiguous as its Hebrew counterpartUR-7 . 
19 He facilely dismisses 
any other meanings of r Orn v by simply saying we must disregard them 
[particularly the idea of "distributive justice" dealt by a Judge (Romans 9: 28)]. 
He wants to come quickly `to what he " estimates is the emphasis of both 
dkaIDJÜVr ("righteousness") and dür¢[c ("righteous"): they function in both an 
ethical (meaning "uprightness") and in a forensic sense. * 
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RIGHTEOUSNESS: A FORENSIC TERM 
When it signifies either the condition for or the essence of salvation, 
righteousness Is a forensic term ." When It behaves 
forensically, it Is a legal, 
courtroom term which describes something one does not have on his own but 
which one has in the verdict of the "forum". While the same word in either 
English or German, "forum" Is equated by Rudolf Bultmann with the "law 
court" In the sense of bringing something before the forum of public opinion'2 
On the grounds that righteousness Is what one has In the opinion of those to 
whom one is personally responsible ("verantwortlich")? ' he emphatically 
disavows that righteousness denotes the ethical quality of a person. Rather. 
it implies a relationship.. For the justified one to imagine that he possesses 
righteousness as his very own and not as something coming from God, is to 
make the 'righteousness of God' his own. This Is renewed self-deception and 
self-glorification ' 
Nevertheless, a man has or Is "righteous" when he is "rightwised"; that is. 
pronounced "righteous". In a legal action, the "righteous" one is the one who 
wins the case and is acquitted? e As the "innocent one, he is righteous not to 
the extent that he may be innocent, but to the extent that he is acknowledged 
innocent. As Rudolf Bultrnann maintains, "'righteousness' then is the 
'favorable standing' that a person has in the eyes of others, it is that 'right' 
which a man seeks to establish by process of law as 'his rights'. "" - Rudolf 
Bultmann cites a string of references in which he submits that the meaning 
"to reckon righteousness to... " evinces the forensic sense This parallels the 
forensic meaning of the Hebrew word "reckon", , which the LXX 
translates as I k_ ____ 
Herein we confront the crux of the issue of righteousness which in the 
wake of the Reformation became not only, the battle line for Protestants and 
Roman Catholics but also a later point of contention between Protestants. At 
stake are the questions of whether diWerf6w -means to "declare righteous" or 
to "make righteous", and whether . rülwa¢itl' refers to a relationship, a quality 
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of life. or both. 'Ö At this juncture. let it suffice to say that for Rudolf 
Bultmann the "rightwised" ("justified" d1taULW is the one who is judged by 
the 'forum' to be in favorable standing. This acquittal is not a comment on 
the state of his innocence regarding a crime or ethical behavior. The 
"rightwised" one is not declared to be righteous in the sense that he is now, 
in quality, ethically righteous. Having said this, however. the "rightwised" Is 
righteous in that he is in a favorable relationship with the 'forum'. We will 
rejoin this subject later where he discusses it further. 
Rudolf Bultmann's designation of "righteousness" as a "forensic" term is 
concurrent with the mainstream of mainly Protestant thought, including, as 
we have shown, John Wesley. Karl - Barth affirms that the righteousness of 
God has to do with a "declaring righteous" In which "the Judge pronounces 
His verdict according to the standard of His righteousness only. "" The 
Roman Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, contends that on the grounds of 
righteousness' usage in the Old Testament, the LXX, and the New Testament, 
c\Ik htJV is forensic. 32 
RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN ESCHATOLOGICAL TERM 
After establishing that "righteousness" is a forensic term, Rudolf Bultmann 
contends that "righteousness" becomes an "eschatological" term. The more 
Jewish piety expected God's rightwising verdict to come from his 
eschatological judgement, the more "the forensic term 'righteousness' became 
an eschatological term". According to Rudolf Buitmann, as-an exposition of 
Matthew 5: 6 indicates, the Jews were hungering and thirsting not for ethical 
perfection, but for God to pronounce His verdict over them as "righteous". 
They tried to fulfill the conditions (keeping the commandments of the Law) 
which they believed were the presuppositions for God's verdict. While there is 
a contrast between the Pauline and Jewish conception of righteousness, they 
both completely agree that "the formal meaning of is a 
forensic-eschatological term" 33 
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Rudolf Bultmann maintains that the eschatological significance of 
"righteousness" is as * "clear as day' in the passages (i. e. Galatians 5: 5, 
Romans 2: 13 "the doers of the law who will be justified") which tell of a future 
verdict of righteousness to come in the eschatological judgement. ' 
However, a characteristic of Pauline "righteousness" which contrasts with 
the Jewish expectation of a future verdict is that righteousness is "already 
imputed to a man (of faith) In the present". This is typically demonstrated in 
Romans 5: 1.9 in which It is said "we are now rightwised.... "' 
Therefore, Rudolf Bultmann concludes that the righteousness of God is 
now present and "is revealed" in the preaching of the gospel. He goes on to 
argue that this does not mean that the preached Gospel expounds some 
teaching about righteousness, but that through the Gospel righteousness 
becomes a possibility (a reality In faith) for the hearer of It-36 The term "be 
revealed", as well as "be manifested% when used eschatologically, means to 
"appear on the scene" or. in existential terminology, "become possibility" or 
operative. When I Corinthians 1: 7 speaks of the "revelation of the Lord Jesus 
Christ", it does not designate a communication that he will impart, but his 
appearing in person at the parousia. 97 The "appearing on the scene" or 
"becoming effective" is an event occurring to or for men -which "enables man 
to understand or perceive the event". 
Rudolf Bultmann shows his existentialist concern for avoiding' a conception 
of a "subject" viewing an "object" in time and space. He readily points out 
that the "appearing" Is not the perceiving of the event, but the event itself that 
is denoted by "being revealed". The "revealing" of God's wrath (Romans 1: 18) 
occurs even when those concerned are not even aware of It themselves. 
From the existentialist point of view, righteousness is "revealed" In the 
sense that the preaching of the gospel opens up to the hearer the possibility 
of Interpreting and understanding things In a new way. 9e As Rudolf Bultmann 
suggests, disclosure will take place not through proclamation but in the event 
itself. ' In other words, the proclamation does not impart some new 
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knowledge that can be grasped, but the hearer in interaction with the 
preaching is offered the possibility of bringing to it a fresh interpretation. 
Although Paul affirms that righteousness is a present reality. Rudolf 
Bultmann assures us that for Paul this does not negate its forensic- 
eschatological meaning. Paradoxically. the eschatological event is already 
present In that God already pronounces His eschatological verdict In the 
present over the man of faith. `° 
In order to grasp the meaning and basis for Rudolf - Bultmann's 
determination of the Pauline term "righteousness" as "eschatological", one 
must set righteousness into the context of his interpretation of the whole 
scenario of biblical history and its relationship to "eschatology". While this 
involves a nexus of difficulties whose serious treatment lies much beyond the 
scope of this dissertation and since Rudolf Bultmann's treatment of history 
and eschatology is the context within which righteousness and justification by 
faith (as well as "sin" and "the Law") is comprehended, we will very briefly 
present the outline of his thought being content in making only major 
observations and pointing in the direction of significant concerns. 
By the time biblical history and eschatological interpretation reaches its 
exemplary and radical form in Paul and John. Rudolf Bultmann assumes it 
had become a hybrid. Eschatological description had originated in a 
constantly developing, ancient, near-eastern myth which filtered through the 
Old Testament, "later Judaism", Jesus, and the "early Christian community" 
on its way to Paul and John who added to It their own twist. 
Defining eschatology as "the doctrine of the 'last things. or, more 
accurately, of the occurrences with which our known world comes to its end 
... ", Rudolf Bultmann believes he traces the origin of the 
Old and New 
Testaments'- apocalyptic presentation to a common, ancient myth about the 
end of the world 41 According to Rudolf Bultmann, this basic cyclical 
idea of the annual periodicity of nature went through constant development. 
Greek and Stoic Philosophy developed the idea of the world ending and the 
187 
Babylonian tradition "historicised" it by viewing humanity as passing through 
eras !2 The evolution of the myth received a significant modification when the 
idea of the eternal, cyclical movement of world-years was abandoned and the 
idea of the periodicity of the course of time was retained. The end of the old 
world-era is followed by a "new beginning" of a time of unending welfare. 
Here. according to Rudolf Bultmann. we meet eschatology in its real sense. " 
In the only Old Testament prophecy to do so. Daniel describes two epochs 
or times, the present and coming Aeon, which are opposed to one another. 
As the myth develops, the Old Testament rejects the idea of cyclical movement 
of world-ages but does utilize the imagery of this mythology. " Finally, later 
Judaism, like Daniel, develops the idea of two Aeons rather than the cyclical 
periods and eschatology becomes truly established " 
Though Rudolf Bultmann can be seen to give the impression - that Jesus 
picked up his eschatological preaching from the later Jewish apocalyptic 
writers, he does not necessarily commit Jesus to receiving his eschatological 
teaching from this later apocalyptic Judaism, for he leaves the Issue in 
limbo. 46 In tracing the development of the conception of eschatology which 
came to Paul. Rudolf Bultmann avouches that the "early Christian 
community" carried on the eschatological preaching of Jesus and enriched it 
by incorporating themes from the Jewish apocalyptics. 
In his exposition of early Christian history and eschatology. Rudolf 
Bultmann maintains that the "early Christian community understands itself 
not as a historical but as an eschatological phenomenon" -- they wait for 
God's Reign to shortly appear. " He reasons that the "problem of eschatology" 
grew out of the fact that their expected end of the world failed to materialize. 
While he differed from his mentor Johannes Weiss in arguing that Jesus 
did not claim to be the Messiah, he followed Johannes Weiss's thesis that 
Jesus proclaimed the imminence of a transcendental kingdom of God which 
failed to come. `e Rudolf Bultmann claimed, the 'Son of Man' did not come in 
the clouds of heaven. Consequently, the early Christian church faced the 
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paradox of those who viewed themselves as an eschatological community but 
at the same time had to recognize themselves as having become a historical 
phenomenon 5° Some of the premises and presuppositions behind Rudolf 
Bultmann's analysis should be very briefly examined because of the cruciaiity 
of this problem in calling forth the resultant. Pauline. eschatological 
exposition. 
Rudolf Bultmann's contention that the earliest Christian community did 
not understand itself as a "real phenomenon of history" is one of the premises 
which supports the thesis that an eschatological problem arose for early 
Christianity. This contention implies his assumption that the Christian 
community (Paul) did not identify the historical people of Israel as the 'chosen 
race' 51 
If Rudolf Bultmann can establish his premise. he is then free to draw his 
conclusion that the Christian community is God's people of the end-time 
which has no "real history". ' Here, Rudolf Bultmanri s concept of the "world" 
and "history" comes to the fore. He assumes a concept of history similar to 
the one he finds operating in the apocalyptics of "later Judaism"'' He 
interprets early Christianity as not viewing itself as a "real phenomenon of 
history" because "world-time" for it is finished, and the end is imminent. ' 
According to late Jewish apocalypticism, the end Is "really the end of the 
world and its history. This end of history no longer belongs to history as 
such". ' Moreover, this end of history Is not the arrival of historical 
progression to its goal but is a "breaking-off", the death of the "world", the 
"old age" "6 Since the Christian community views Itself as part of the new 
Aeon, it sees itself as taken out of the existing world. 
Rudolf Bultmann seems to be interchanging at will and without warning 
two conflicting concepts of "world" and "history". He avows in History and 
Eschatology that the Christian community had "no real history". " It did not 
understand itself as a "real phenomenon of history". In the context, he 
identifies "real history" as an event of history (i. e.. the exodus) such as that 
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upon which the Old Covenant was founded. Moreover, "real history" 
incorporates an understanding of "world-time" and "world-history" where 
chronology and events are dated It Is the sphere of "orders", of the tasks of 
society and state. " 
He maintains - the early- Christian community regarded Itself 
eschatologically. His portrayal of the New Testament's eschatological picture 
of the world presupposes an existential interpretation. As he enunciates, 
"world" is not really a "space" concept. It speaks of the manner of man's 
existence. of a "how", not the "what". of mans existence in which he stands 
as an object. "World" is the manner In which man relates to what is at his 
disposal. In its eschatological, existential sense it is the sphere which is 
estranged from God and theologically judged eD 
Therefore, if the early Christian community were not interested in "real 
history" but viewed themselves as an eschatological phenomenon, then they 
would-. not be interested In that which "real history" involved i. e.. signs, 
frightening events, disordered nature, and final catastrophe. But Rudolf 
Bultmann declares that the apocalyptics and the early Christian community 
were interested in these signs. " They ý expected "real history" to end by 
supranatural, cosmic catastrophe ' If this is also its view of the world and 
history, how can it be said that it views "world-time" as finished, and the "old 
age" as past, when clearly the world they anticipated ending had not yet 
ended? If, as Rudolf Bultmann avows, they had no interest in "real history" 
but regarded themselves as an eschatological phenomenon, why then did they 
look for an end to this "real history" and world with its chronology and 
orders? 
Therefore, if the early Christian community were a community which did 
not perceive itself from a real, historical perspective but viewed the "world" as 
a manner of existence which had "ended", how can Rudolf Bultmann still 
allege that the early community anticipated an imminent end of the natural, 
chronological world and became disillusioned when the end did not take 
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place? On the other hand, if they were looking for the destruction of nature 
and the cessation of human life and orders in a final catastrophe (which 
presumes an interest in real history), how can they conclude that it has 
already taken place when they know it has not? 
Rudolf Bultmann further asserts that when the end of "real history" failed 
to arrive, then the eschatological community recognized it was a historical 
phenomenon. Is this not inconsistent? If the community had regarded itself 
and the world eschatologically, then It would. not have - determined that the 
end of the natural world had failed to arrive. -Only the "world" eschatologically 
and existentially conceived would have been viewed as having ended. In this 
case, why would the new people of God have, suddenly begun recognizing 
themselves historically? His proposition that. the community now recognized 
its historical reality adds great force to the argument that - the New 
Testament -- from the earliest community onwards -- is always concerned 
with its historical reality and links itself in historical continuity with ancient 
Israel. 
Rudolf Bultmann's allowance of an early Christian community which 
capriciously reasons simultaneously in a hop-scotch manner between two 
contrasting views of the world and history seems a more contrived, arbitrary, 
and ambiguous portrayal than reason and the New Testament allow. 
Nevertheless, Rudolf Bultmann reasons that the early Christian community 
sets the stage with the problem of eschatology: the end fails to occur and the 
eschatological community is now, forced to recognize itself as a historical 
phenomenon. Therefore, it is left to Paul and John to begin to solve the 
problem. Paul shares the basic assumptions of the - apocalyptics and the 
early, eschatological community regarding A he world and history. The 
implication of Rudolf Bultmanri s arguments is that Paul's eschatological view 
of history is indebted to "later Judaism" rather than d to Jesus or the Old 
Testament. ' That Paul's eschatology was derived from "later Judaism" is a 
questionable thesis `' a 
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According to Rudolf Bultmann, Paul's unique contribution is to alter 
decisively the "apocalyptic view of history" by interpreting it on the basis of 
his anthropology, his view of man ' This basically means that Paul interprets 
history from an existential. conceptual framework. He does not view the 
history of Israel as a history of a 'nation which experiences a cycle of sin and 
forgiveness. He perceives the history of Israel as a whole unity, a unity of sin 
in which not only Jews but all of mankind is implicated. Paul does not 
understand it in terms of objective actions and events in time and space like 
a 'what' from which a meaning and a purpose may be extracted. On the 
contrary, he apprehends it as a manner of existence understood in terms of 
the individual's personal existence. The history of Israel Is the sinful 
existence in which each individual is bound and-which is the presupposition 
for the reception of grace. Rudolf Bultmann cites,, as evidence -Paul's 
presentation of history in the form of the autobiographical "I" in Romans 7: 7- 
25a67 
For Paul, the decisive eschatological event' has already taken place In the 
present in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ which for the believer 
has ended the old age and begun the new one. The parousia of Christ is one 
event interpreted in two ways: it has happened (and happens when the 
Gospel is preached) but will unfold in a cosmic drama with the imminent 
parousia of Christ ' However. the cosmic drama is only the completion and 
confirmation of the eschatological occurrence already begun. Rudolf 
Bultmann claims, "Paul has historized the Jewish apocalyptic 'speculation of 
an intermediate messianic reign preceding the new Aeon ' by conceiving the 
time of the Messiah's reign as the time between Christ's resurrection and 
parousia -- i. e. as the Now in which the proclamation ' is sounding 
forth (I 
Corinthians 15: 23-28)". ' 
In other words, Paul "historizes" the Messianic reign which the Jewish 
apocalyptics taught as occurring in the cosmic-natural realm of the temporal 
and spacial. That is, he applies it to the dimension of genuine occurrence in 
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man's actual life. 70 ' In short, he interprets it existentially. ý Rather than 
understanding the Pauline references to the "parousia" as two, literal, once- 
and-for-all historical events in time and space in the manner of classical 
Christianity, Rudolf Bultmann de-mythologizes this view by regarding the 
"parousia" in Paul's eyes to be, firstly, existentially present and, secondly, a 
future cosmic-natural event (which -is insignificant in Paul). 7' Understood 
existentially, the "parousia" is an occurrence which happens to a man in his 
individual existence when the salvation-occurrence is proclaimed in the word 
of preaching. ' The Messiah's intermediate reign is Now, which is also called 
the "time-between", the "interim7' and is the dialectical existence between the 
"no-longer" and the "not-yet". 1 1, k 
While for John the present time is also the "time-between", he radicalizes 
more "fully the conception of the eschatological event or, happening in the 
present giving up the expectation of future cosmic events (which Paul still 
retains). ' 
Rudolf Bultmann insists that this "time-between" for Paul has both 
"essential" and chronological meaning. According to him, the crucial question 
Is whether or not this meaning of the - "time-between". this dialectical 
understanding of the relation of history and eschatology could be retained in 
Christian understanding. "No, it could not, " he answers. Therefore, in the 
post-pauline literature of the 'developing church'. the "time-between" took on a 
"merely chronological meaning". ' 
Rudolf Bultmann s interpretation raises some concerns. If the Pauline 
understanding of history and eschatology presented the solution to the delay 
of the parousia of Christ, is it reasonable to think that the existential 
exposition of Paul, who, in Rudolf Bultmanri s words was "the founder of 
Christian theology', exerted such little influence over those who immediately 
received his Christian mantel and followed him that they failed to, adopt his 
solution? Why did the "developing Church" (whose views are represented in 
the New Testament) think In predominately "chronological" terms when their 
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model antecedents and teachers (apocalyptics, Jews, early Church, Paul, and 
John) thought eschatologically? Why did the post-Pauline, developing Church 
feel disappointment over the failure of the parousia of Christ to materialize as 
Rudolf Bultmann contends? If the early Christian community was gripped by 
disappointment when their expectation of the Son of Mari s appearing in the 
clouds failed to occur, why were they disillusioned that he "failed" to come 
when they never had a definite fixed day (Rudolf Bultmann's assumption) for 
his coming? 'e . 
From this brief examination, we gain a better appreciation, of - the 
background of Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of righteousness as 
"eschatological". As "eschatology" is essentially interpreted "existentially" by 
Paul, therefore, so is righteousness. In the past, Paul says, the Jews sought 
by obedience to the - law and by good works to earn God's adjudication of 
righteousness in the eschatological judgement. Paul declares that what was 
then seen as future is now declared as present. God pronounces His 
eschatological verdict in the present over the individual, existential existence 
of the man of faith. Therewith, one may observe that when Rudolf Bultmann 
is speaking of the eschatological significance of "righteousness", he Is not 
referring to a "chronological judgement", espoused by classical orthodoxy in 
which world-history will end at the last moment of time and even the already 
justified will give an account to God., However, in so far as he - identifies a 
future sense in righteousness, , Rudolf Bultmann Is - In accord - with the 
classical, orthodox view. Nevertheless, what distinguishes him from others Is 
his existential interpretation of this eschatological dimension of righteousness. 
RIGHTEOUSNESS AS "ALIEN" 
In, further characterizing "righteousness". Rudolf Bultmann consciously 
aligns himself with the Reformers' position in affirming that righteousness is 
"imputed" as aliena iustitia. It is not ones own possession but is reckoned to 
/4 V&- Ov 
him. " ý He is in harmony with Martin Luther who championed that God does 
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not want to save us by our own righteousness, but by the extraneous 
righteousness which originates from outside ourselves. Martin Luther taught 
that this righteousness is utterly external and foreign to us and comes to us 
from beyond ourselves, from heaven. "" However, though for a different reason 
than John Wesley, Rudolf Bultmann does, not assert either the Lutheran or 
Reformed (Barthian) conception that our righteousness consists in Christ's 
righteousness being reckoned to the believing sinner as "his" righteousness. 
Rudolf Bultrnann accepts that t fr tir1V is a "declaring righteous" but 
rejects the idea of a fiction. " "Righteousness" refers to a man's relationship 
to God. 80 -Man is 'really righteous -- "i. e. absolved, from his sin by God's 
verdict". "' It Is In this sense in which man is understood to be truly righteous 
that Rudolf Bultmann can make his assertion that righteousness is - the 
condition for salvation. For if man is righteous. then salvation, it would 
seem, is conditioned by no further necessity (such as ethical renewal). 
When "Rudolf Bultmann argues that interpreters go wrong by 
misunderstanding "righteousness" as an ethical quality rather ` than as a 
relationship to God, he seems to agree with Martin Luthers distinction 
between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" righteousness. Martin Luther urged that 
Christians are always "extrinsically" righteous In a way which comprehends 
how, they are before God and according to His reckoning. - Contrarily, the 
Christian is never "intrinsically" righteous in the sense that he possesses the 
quality of righteousness as if he is righteous In and from himself or by virtue 
of his works. ' 
Rudolf Bultmann, as John Wesley, - adamantly advocates the view that 
when God rightwises a sinner, -the sinner is righteous. One is not to suppose 
that the sinner is to be "regarded as if he were righteous. Rather, the 
"rightwised" are persons ' transplanted into -eschatological existence who have 
no further contact with sin. " 
In determining that "righteousness" which is not my own is accorded to 
me In justification as aliena Justitia, Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley 
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counter the historic. Catholic contention that God concomitantly declares one 
just as well as makes him just. In this Catholic view, righteousness in 
justification is imparted to the sinner in such a way that the sinner is not 
only declared just ý but is made just intrinsically in his heart and holy ' in 
himself. ` While they and the Catholic consent to the extent of agreeing that 
when God declares a man just he is righteous, he (and John Wesley as far as 
it touches" justification) quite dissents from conceiving this righteousness as 
an inner quality of ethical righteousness which becomes a part of man's 
nature. 
He agrees with Martin Luther's understanding of justification in which no 
distinction is made between it and sanctification. ' Further, the declaration of 
righteousness in justification is God's only requirement for salvation in 
contrast to John Wesley's affirmation that both a declaration of righteousness 
for present salvation and a "making righteous" for final salvation are 
necessary. ' 
In support of -his argument that man is righteous, Rudolf Bultmann 
reasons that In Romans 5: 19 Adamitic men were not regarded "as if" hey 
were sinners, but as really sinners. Likewise, then, to balance the parallelP, 
members of Christ are really righteous. "' 
He avows that this old debate over whether or not one is really righteous 
or is only regarded "as if" e is righteous lies on a misunderstanding. 
Interpreters go awry when they imagine that "righteousness" denotes the 
ethical quality of a man rather than his relation to God. This supposition Is 
elicited in the question which asks how Paul can place the truly righteous, 
"sinless" man under the ethical imperative. Rudolf Bultmann says his view 
disposes of this chronic problem. 
However, he warns, if one takes Paul's words as they stand and leaves off 
the "as if but fails to recognize righteousness' forensic-eschatological 
meaning, two wrong tracks result. Firstly, the "idealistic" error (of which he 
accuses F. C. Bauer) arises which sees "rightwising" as the taking into the 
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consciousness the principle of obedience to the idea of the good. Man is 
righteous since his will affirms the ethical law in its totality. Righteousness 
then means the "ideal" character of a man who is "striving toward not 
sinning". whose living tends toward the good. By endless progress toward the 
ideal of ethical uprightness. he can ' be deemed sub specie of the idea as 
righteous " 
Secondly, considering "righteousness" along ' the pattern of the Gnostics 
who deem it to be a divine "power" which flows into the initiate in the mystery 
of rebirth and drives out the demonic forces which reigned in him is a 
mistake " Rudolf Bultmann is unconvinced by this view with which R. 
Reitzenstein is associated. ' 
- Rudolf Bultmann -adds that the forensic-eschatological ' sense of 
righteousness is corroborated by and in parallel with the term "adoption to 
sonship" (ILDA T). As the salvation-occurrence happened "for our 
justification", It is also described as occurring for the purpose "that we might 
receive adoption as sons" (Galatians 4: 5). Also, "adoption" has the same 
double nature as "righteousness". It is both a thing of the future, a longed. 
for goal, and a thing of the present which is attested by the fact that in the 
Spirit we cry "Abba" 9O 
RIGHTEOUSNESS AS "GOD'S RIGHTEOUSNESS" 
In turning to a consideration of "righteousness" as "God's righteousness". 
Rudolf Bultmann focuses on Paul's polemic with. Judaism. As has already 
been-observed, the immediate contrast between Paul and Judaism concerning 
righteousness is that what was a matter of hope for the Jew is for Paul a 
present reality (as well as hope). -- 
A further antithesis between Paul and Judaism concerns the issue of the 
condition for God's acquitting decision. For the Jew, the condition is "keeping 
the Law"; for Paul. it is "sola Fide" -- "by faith alone". Paul enunciates his 
thesis that man Is justified by faith when he speaks of Abraham in Romans 
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chapter four and of Christ (the end of the law) in Romans 10: 4. Rudolf 
Bultmann states that Paul's proposition which is hammered out in debate 
with the Jew Is shown in two ways. Firstly, Paul directs attention to the 
negative aspect of his proposal: the condition of righteousness is "without 
works of the Law". Secondly, in juxtaposition to the negative aspect Paul 
places the thesis s positive aspect: righteousness is "by, or from faith". " In 
establishing the condition of justification, he as John Wesley proceeds in a 
traditional Protestant manner of emphasizing that it Is not by works or. even 
as the strict Calvinists maintain, by Christ's active righteousness, but by 
faith. 
Rudolf Bultmann further states the Pauline perspective of righteousness Is 
accorded to man by the pronouncement of the judge (God) and so means 
recognition in God's sight. Therefore, Paul sees the fundamental motivation of 
the Jews' striving as a "need for recognition" not just from men, but from the 
final court of appeal, God. Neither in the Old Testament nor in Judaism did 
the Jew conceive of righteousness in the Platonic sense of a quality which 
man has himself. : It is not a structure of the inner being like "cleverness", or 
artistic sense which is a property of the individual on his own account. One's 
righteousness is only that in relation to others. The judge's pronouncement 
establishes the righteousness ° of the accused so that the accused is given the 
"right" of it. He Is thereby -recognized in the structure ` of the, community. s' 
Rudolf Bultmann states, "The righteousness for which man strives, or rather. 
which God ascribes to him, is recognition of him, and the honouring of him . "93 
This striving for recognition is common' to all men regardless of whether it 
be manifested as a desire to set a record -or as a child's stupidity in desiring 
to achieve - distinction " This human quest is exemplified in its culturally 
distinct Jewish form as the struggle to . gain God's recognition through the 
Law. The tense Jewish zeal, the consistency and readiness to sacrifice, the 
performance. the "works" are all an attempt to establish one's own 
righteousness by the Law so that God is put under necessity to recognize the 
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Jew This endeavor to achieve by performance is what Paul calls striving "to 
establish their own (righteousness)" (Romans 10: 13). '5 
In compliance with this, Paul contests the Law, not on account of its 
contents which are God's unbreakable demands, but because the Jews use it 
to store up merit in God's sight and to boast in it. Contrarily, the Christian 
message of "justification by faith alone" rejects all self-glorying based on 
Individual achievements. God grants justification to man so that it is His gift 
alone which establishes maxis acceptability. " 
Rudolf Bultmann's Identification of the motivation of the Jewish striving as 
a "need for recognition" seems to stop short of viewing the "need for 
recognition" as the fundamental need for the pardoning "acceptance" and 
acquittal of God Himself as In traditional Protestant theologies; for example, 
John Wesley's. There is some ambiguity at this point because as Rudolf 
Bultmann stated elsewhere, to be "rightwised" Is to be In a favourable 
relationship with the 'forum'. While he states what favourable standing is not 
(not innocence regarding a crime or ethical behaviour), he does not amplify 
what favourable standing is. He uses the analogy of the law court which 
typically pictures a defendant before the law court which will render a 
judgment regarding his status: guilty or innocent. A judgment implies a 
verdict which seems to go beyond a mere acknowledgement of the "fact or or 
"status of". However, he seems to want to use "recognition" and "favourable 
standing" as terms which are not indicative of a defendant's acquittal from 
guilt. His other analogies of the drive for setting records or a child's stupidity 
reinforce the opinion that it Is simply "recognition" - the sense of "Here I am, 
acknowledge me. I'm important" or "I belong" - for which he believes the Jew 
strives. Since the term d[. t____ 4 is associated with a judge and a law court, 
it would seem that striving for righteousness is striving not just for 
recognition. but for the recognition which would pronounce or gain one the 
endorsement of being "in the right" or acceptable In the sense of being cleared 
from a charge by the authority determining acceptability. 
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Further, the tense striving of the Jews to fulfill the Law may in contrast to 
Rudolf Bultmann's explanation be well explained as their pursuit for that 
which would counteract or compensate for a subconscious or realized moral 
lack and guilt before the Almighty and Holy Yahweh. Rudolf Bultmann rsV, Aý 
describes the Jewish motivation simply as "recognition" to avoid entangling 
"righteousness" with religious guilt and morality. According to Rudolf 
Bultmann, the fundamental attitude of the Jew which is the essence of sin is 
"boasting". The radical giving up of "boasting" is faith's attitude. According to 
Paul, "faith is the absolute contrary of 'boasting' . Faith excludes "boasting" 
because righteousness cannot be won by human effort. Righteousness is 
"sheer gift". 
In so far as Rudolf Bultmann posits the view that the negative and 
positive aspects of Paul's thesis on the condition of righteousness arises out of 
his controversy with the Jews, he seems to follow Wilhem Bousset, Wilhem 
Wrede and Albert Schweitzers thesis. They regarded Paul's proposal of 
justification as "convenient polemic" which he created for the purpose of 
dealing with the controversial Judaizers. Similar to them, Rudolf Bultmann 
asserts that only when Paul is stemming the tide of the Jewish call for 
keeping the Law does he speak of righteousness by faith. " However, Rudolf 
Bultmann expands the category of opponents beyond the Judaizers to include 
Judaism as well. 
Furthermore, according to Rudolf Bultmann, Paul's antithesis seems to be 
more than the situational and convenient expedient it was for Wilhelm 
Bousset, Wilhelm Wrede and Albert Schweitzer. Rudolf Bultmann does not 
relegate righteousness by faith to a peripheral role in Paul as they do. 
Rather, he holds it to be the presupposition for receiving life as well as life 
itself. 99 Moreover, the doctrine of justification makes explicit what kind of new 
understanding of human existence is given In the saving event. 
In further contrast to "works", the "gift-character" of righteousness is 
exemplified in the fact that "grace" is also equated with "faith" as the basis of 
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"rightwising" (Rudolf Bultmann compares Romans 3: 22 "righteousness through 
faith", with Romans 3: 24 "justification by grace as a gift"). He states that 
"grace" like faith "can be placed in direct antithesis to 'works of the Law'". " 
The paradox in "grace" is that it specifically applies to the transgressor, the 
sinner. God is spoken of in Romans 4: 5 as the one "who justifies the 
ungodly". The term s, mercy, is basically synonymous with grace in 
Romans 11: 32. iº n5 takes on a more eschatological emphasis and is 
used by Paul in reflection on the history of salvation in Romans 9-11.101 
In an, effort to consolidate his' argument, Rudolf Bultmann challenges 
Mundle's essentially Catholic contention (also held by those of the "holy living" 
school, such as Bishop Bull) that in rejecting works, Paul is excluding ý only 
the "works" which are demanded by the Mosaic Law. 1°2 Rudolf Bultmann 
asserts that according to Paul, the man of faith is required to keep the Law 
with regards to the manner of fulfillment but not with regards to the content 
(Romans 13: 8-10). 10' Paul's protest is not aimed against the accomplishment 
of specific acts but against the attitude of the man who wants to prove 
himself before God. 
Rudolf Bultmann also characterizes "grace" as the being "graciously 
disposed toward another. " , God in his grace acts as the absolutely free God 
who is not brought into debt by any human claim. God's grace is not 
kindliness and goodness on His - part which causes Him to take man's 
weakness into account. On the contrary, rather than excusing an occasional 
mistake or forgiving sins, God's grace repudiates this because here is located 
the focus of mans sin, his arrogance. 1°4 
-- To summarize, righteousness is called "God's righteousness" because its 
"one and only foundation is God's grace". It Is God-given and God- 
adjudicated. The Jews were blind to the righteousness from God ý because 
they understood it as "their " own which they achieved through their exertion 
in fulfilling the "works of the law. " -- -1 
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Rudolf Bultmann asserts "'God's righteousness means the righteousness 
from God which is conferred upon him (man) as a gift by God's free grace 
alone". 105 The issue for him regarding the interpretation of the phrase 
"righteousness of God" centered in whether (1) the genitive 
GC-totý is 
subjective, in which sense the "righteousness of God" would refer to the 
attribute of God which belongs to Him and is revealed by the Gospel, or 
whether (2) the genitive 19C-61) is objective in which case the "righteousness 
of God" would denote the gift which God grants to the believer and by which 
God can proclaim the believer "right". 108 Rudolf Bultmann s ruling concern is 
to establish that "the righteousness of God" in Paul's predominate usage solely 
describes God's gift given to man in stark contrast to righteousness earned by 
"works of the Law". He harks back to Martin Luther and the tradition of the 
Reformation which had inherited St. Augustine 's interpretation. 107 Following 
in Martin Luther's and St. Augustine's wake, Rudolf Bultmann also conceived 
of the phrase anthropologically in a way which nicely harmonizes with his 
own understanding of Paul's whole theological approach as anthropological. 
Just as its polar counterpart "works of the law", the term "righteousness of 
God" describes what is applicable to man not God. 
The dialectic may be expressed in the following war., "the righteousness of 
God" Is man's righteousness but only in the sense that it is not man's but 
God's. The "righteousness of God" is ours only because it is given to us by 
God's bounty. To re-phrase St. Augustine, it is not ours as that which 
proceeds from our works, but only as that which precedes them. 108 
Notwithstanding this, it is worthwhile noticing that Martin Luther, while 
explaining Romans 1: 17 and 3: 25 in the manner stated above, makes it clear 
in his lecture on Romans 3: 5 that he does accept the opinion from other 
contexts that God is righteous in himself and that his righteousness is 
manifested when He punishes our unrighteousness. 108 
This conclusion Rudolf Bultmann wants to disavow. His concept of God 
as that infiniteness which is known when man realizes his finiteness cannot 
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endure an ascription that would characterize it as having or possessing a 
quality of righteousness which may be manifest. To assign a characteristic of 
"righteousness" to God would make God into an object, betray the existential- 
ontological approach to being, and simply be sin. "' 
After considering the term "righteousness". Rudolf Bultmann treats 
"reconciliation" (cognate verb k_2_ä___... and w=aAdqW as a synonym of 
"righteousness". Strictly speaking, since in Romans 5: 1 the phrase "we have 
peace with God" is a result of "rightwising", reconciliation is a consequence of 
"rightwising". However, the "we have peace with God" really only unfolds the 
meaning of "righteousness". The man of faith "receives" reconciliation just as 
"rightwising" is effected through Christ. (Romans 5: 11). Moreover, the 
"righteousness of God" is revealed through the Gospel which is also called 
"the message of reconciliation". "' 
"Reconciliation" denotes that a complete reversal of relation has occurred 
between God and man. The reversal takes place when men. who had hitherto 
been "enemies" of God, do not have their sins counted against them by God. 
Reconciliation is not a subjective process within man but an objective. 
factual situation brought about by God. It emphasizes even more clearly than 
"rightwising" mans radical dependence upon God's grace. Since, prior, to any 
effort on man's part. "God made an end of enmity". all man can do is "receive" 
the reconciliation. As far as any subjective alteration, the "ministryl of 
reconciliation" is given to men that they may accomplish it in themselves. 
Rudolf Bultmann s diagnosis is classically Protestant 'in that 
"reconciliation" communicates the fact that God Initiated and achieved the 
action leaving man only to "receive" it. In line with this, he recognizes Its 
objective nature in which reconciliation occurs without man. However, what 
does Rudolf Bultmann envisage to be the nature of this "objective, factual 
situation"? To what does it actually refer? - How does it make itself available 
to be "received"? In what way is it true to say "that a complete reversal of the 
relation between God and men" took place before any effort or knowledge on 
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men's part? The answers to these questions will be rationalized in Rudolf 
Bultmanri s explication of the "salvation-occurrence". 
In speaking of God's reconciliation as objective and man's' alteration in 
himself as subjective, Rudolf Bultmann leaves one with the impression that he 
intends these occurrences to be quite separate - and distinct movements 
immediately disassociated from one another. God makes his move on the 
chess board, then withdraws and leaves man to respond. How does the man, 
whom Rudolf Bultmann assumes was forced into the slavery of living 
"according to the flesh" but who must make the alteration himself, free 
himself for this activity? What is the relation, if any, between reconciliation 
and the subjective alteration? Moreover, if this is something man does, in 
what sense does it deserve a classification distinct from any other "work" of 
human effort done by the Jew to gain salvation? On another track, the query 
arises that- if God has already accomplished "reconciliation" prior to man's 
response, why is man's response required? We will wait to examine Rudolf 
Bultmann's teaching on the "salvation-occurrence" and "faith". '" 
Rudolf Bultmann completes his analysis of "righteousness" with an 
overview of the non-Pauline, "developing church's" conception of it. He 
concludes that, in general, "righteousness" in the Pauline sense is herein no 
longer found. Paul's thought of being "rightwised" appears in I Clement but 
elsewhere it is rarely used in its forensic-eschatological sense. In the 
"developing church". the terms _i"___ n, _ - and 
ik. ics assume a 
predominantly ethical sense of moral "uprightness". "' Rudolf Bultmann 
perceives this as an indication that an ideal of moralistic piety was beginning 
to replace an eschatological consciousness-115 
One must bear in mind that the sources from which he claims to derive 
the material for the "non-Pauline" and. "developing church" are books 
traditionally considered to be Pauline such as Ephesians. Colossians, and the 
Pastoral Epistles, except for Philemon and I Thessalonians. In addition, he 
aggregates these books with the remainder of the New Testament and 
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apocryphal books and grants them all equal authority. This is not the 
occasion to discuss authorship and canonicity, but, needless to say, Rudolf 
Bultmann's procedure influences what he comprehends as the boundary and 
content of authoritative Pauline theology. Moreover, 'the Implication is that 
what is not Pauline or Johannine in the New Testament is not to be treated 
with the same status accorded to them. It is not far from the truth to say 
that for Rudolf Bultmann the authoritative canon is whatever he considers to 
be Pauline or Johannine. 1e `ý. F 
SUMMARY Ir-- 
Rudolf Bultmann posits that Paul is the New Testament's spokesman on 
"righteousness". He argues that Paul as well as Jesus and Judaism retained 
the same "formal" concept of righteousness with its "forensic-eschatological" 
sense. However, they differed with, him only over the manner of the 
possibility and actualization of righteousness. He does not include as part of 
the Jewish formal concept of righteousness an ethical dimension which 
represents a dramatic re-appraisal of the Old Testament concept of 
righteousness. Since the Jew and Paul agree on the formal concept in Rudolf 
Bultmann's treatment, he, by denying that righteousness is also an ethical 
term, guards himself from having to deal seriously with this dimension in 
Paul. 
From where did Paul's unique forensic-eschatological interpretation of 
righteousness as explained by Rudolf Bultmann originate? If Paul as Jesus 
was involved in controversy with the Jews over Judaism s false righteousness 
(the upshot of Rudolf Bultmann's argumentation), why did Paul's and not 
Jesus controversy give 'rise to the particular understanding of "righteousness" 
advocated by Rudolf Bultmann? Something more than just controversy must 
have been operating to give rise to Paul's understanding. 
Rudolf Bultmann s "formal" analysis of New Testament "righteousness" 
readily coincides with the classical. Protestant Interpretation. "Righteousness" 
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is "forensic" in the sense that one is judged to be in 'favorable standing f, 
'right', by the legal 'forum'. However, Rudolf Bultmann does not fully digest 
this legal metaphor. He does not take into account the relationship between 
the transgression or religious or ethical guilt (or whatever prompts a court 
proceeding) and the 'forum's raison d'etre, nor of the relationship of the 
'forums verdict to the transgression or guilt. For an adequate legal analogy, 
certainly a verdict must directly relate to that which necessitated a judgement 
in the first place. Otherwise why is a judgement of the court necessary? 
Furthermore, for Rudolf Bultmann the "forensic" sense is controlled by the 
"eschatological" sense. The declared verdict of righteousness is viewed as that 
verdict which is rendered at the eschaton and not before. - Please see the 
further . comments regarding this In the Evaluation under 
"Forensic/ Eschatological". -, 
One may also observe that due to Rudolf Bultmanri s impersonal, 
philosophical concept of God, he must de-personalize the forensic metaphor 
which makes best sense in references- to personality. For a "judge", 
"judgement" and a "declaring" righteous in their proper reference are functions 
of personality. In Rudolf Bultmann s mind, there is no supernatural being 
which actually "judges" man. So, the New Testament references, such as "he 
justifies", which in their literal sense are taken to refer to a living, personal, 
deciding, and acting God, must be "de-mythologized" - stripped of 
"mythological" reference to a being, God, and viewed as descriptions of man's 
existence. What moral, or persuasive force and authority, is exerted on man 
when he realizes he is being "judged" by that which does not in fact have the 
unique ability of personality to discriminate and decide? By the same token, 
if the "judge" is de-mythologized then His "judgement" and "declaration" must 
be as well. What then. really is being done when man is said to be "declared 
righteous"? 
In accordance with St. Augustine and Martin Luther, Rudolf Bultmann 
construes "righteousness" as "extrinsic" and derived from God rather than 
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from man. Furthermore, righteousness is "imputed" to man in such a way 
that the sinner Is righteous. Rudolf Bultmann repudiates both the Protestant 
idea that the sinner is to be regarded "as if" he is righteous only in "fiction". 
and the Roman Catholic contention that the sinner is really made righteous in 
his heart and in himself. Part of the warp and woof of Rudolf Bultmann's 
existential-ontological interpretation of the New Testament concept of 
righteousness is to disallow consistently the element of an "ethical quality" in 
the texture of the terms. He is faithful to the Protestant stress on 
righteousness as "extrinsic" and "forensic" (deriving from Melanchthon). -John 
Wesley agrees with him insofar as he speaks of righteousness as it pertains to 
present justification. However, by dropping entirely the connection between 
morality, ethics, and righteousness he radicalizes Martin Luther and does not 
entertain John Wesley's delineation of justification and sanctification and its 
connection with an "ethical quality". 
Rudolf Bultmann's handling of "righteousness" Is conducive to a general 
existentialist tendency which is skeptical of established and traditional laws of 
ethics and morality which set out the general right and wrong. "' Man's 
"manner" of existence and 'how' he exists in his relation to God is the 
pervading interest of his theology. - Moreover, he like other existentialists, 
avoids approaching man as though he were an object to be studied in 
detachment like a scientific specimen. "" Hence, there is reluctance to apply 
the empirical method to man in a way that forces man to look at himself as 
though he stood against himself and discovered that he had an ethical quality 
about himself. Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Luther arrived at much the same 
conclusion, Rudolf Bultmann finding Martin Luther malleable to an existential 
concern. 
While Rudolf Bultmann confidently claims his interpretation disposes of 
the centuries-old, chronic, question of the relation between the ethical 
imperative and the sinner already declared righteous, the question remains: 
how can, if it can, "antinomianism" be avoided if righteousness is viewed as 
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"imputed" and ethical sin is seen as irrelevant to righteousness? Likewise, is 
there a direct and necessary correlation between being "declared righteous" 
and ethical and moral consequence? On the other hand, with sensitivity to 
Rudolf Bultmanri s concern, - can and how can "moralism" and "works 
righteousness" be averted if righteousness by faith is linked to moral and 
ethical sin? 
Following the Lutheran tradition, Rudolf Bultmann advocates rendering the 
phrasedIku &o in accordance with interpreting f? Gö as an "objective 
genitive". It is to be understood as a "gift" from God bestowed on man rather 
than as a characteristic of God. 
Rudolf Bultmann forks away from the classical Christian understanding of 
"righteousness", not in the fact that he sees it as "eschatological". but in how 
he perceives it as "eschatological". Interpreting it through existential- 
ontological spectacles. he "historizes" and individualizes to man's present. 
existential, individual existence what was traditionally conceived of as 
(literally) referring to the Last Judgement at the end of time and space. 
In connection with this, Rudolf Bultmanri s eschatological interpretation is 
beset by important, inconsistencies. If the early Christian community had no 
interest in "real history" ý but regarded itself eschatologically, why did it still 
look for an imminent end to "real history" with its chronology and orders and 
become disillusioned when it failed to occur? Therewith, regarding itself 
eschatologically. it would not have determined that the end of the world had 
failed to arrive. Moreover, if the "early Christian community" had no fixed 
"month or year" in which they expected the 'Son of Mans' coming; how and 
why could they be disillusioned, that He "failed" to come when they had not 
determined in the first instance when He was to come or that His coming was 
not still imminent? 
On the other hand, if they thought "chronologically" and were looking for 
the destruction of nature and the cessation of human life in a final 
catastrophe, how would they conclude that it had already taken place when 
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they knew it had not? Furthermore, if Paul presented ý the solution to the 
delay of the parousla of Christ, why was it not recognized as such by his 
followers? Similarly, if "the founder of Christian theology" thought 
"eschatologically". why did the immediately post-Pauline, developing Church 
think "chronologically"? Can we so readily conclude then that there was "the 
problem of eschatology" which Rudolf Bultmann claims called forth a "new 
understanding of eschatology"? 
While Rudolf Bultmann's forensic description of "righteousness" falls within 
the mainstream Protestant form, his unique departure had already occurred 
in setting "righteousness" against the background of a prior understanding of 
the existential-ontological analysis of man's existence prior to faith. The 
existential-ontological understanding of mans existence is further unfolded in 
its possibility for life in the present through Paul's understanding of 
righteousness In its "eschatological" sense. 
His "eschatological" understanding of "righteousness" is creative but 
speculative and not without its important inconsistencies. 
His approach to the New Testament history seems to apply, in tandem 
with an existential method, the Hegelian method of "thesis-antithesis- 
synthesis". in uncovering the developed understanding of the terms 
"eschatology" and "righteousness". Rudolf Bultrnann conceives the New 
Testament as though it is simply a consequential composite of mental` and 
intellectual jousting between rival and reacting parties and communities 
rather than the documents of a more united, spontaneous, rapidly spreading 
movement of substance whose words and expressions were chosen to 
communicate the content of real, objective events, actual occurrences, and life 
experiences in time and space. The somewhat mercurial and duplex 
interpretation of "history", "world", and "eschatology" which is attributed by 
Rudolf Bultmann to the first generation of the Christian movement resembles 
more a twentieth-century construction. 
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1. Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary 
Setting, trans. The Reverend R. H. Fuller (London: Thames and 
Hudson. 1983) pp. 48f. 
2. It also could be used in the specific sense of judicial impartiality. 
3. While these precepts of righteousness and morality are regarded as 
the commandments of God who requires righteousness and justice, 
they contain no general principles from which duties may be 
deduced. Common sense was an adequate guide regarding what 
was necessary to maintain the community welfare. 
4. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 49f. 
5. One wonders if this neglect evinces the tendency in him to play 
down at this point the Old Testament's importance in connection 
with Paul. 
6. Rudolf Buitmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone 
Smith and Errninie Huntress Lantern (New York: Charles Scribner 's 
Sons, 1958) pp. 110,119; Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 189. 




A-1; 1. While the word group appears 
in at least fifty. three references in the Gospels, only a very few of 
the relevant passages receive any comment or treatment from him. 
One may conjecture that Rudolf Bultmanri s rationale for this 
deletion would be the supposition that the authenticity of this word 
group in Jesus mouth is questionable. 
7. Bultmann, Jesus, p. 80; Bultmann. Primitive Christianity, p. 72. 
8. Bultmann, Jesus, p. 80. 
9. Bultrnann, Primitive Christianity. p. 72. In contrast to the 
prophets, Bultmann states that Jesus Is not concerned with social 
righteousness. 
10. Curiously. Bultmann is able to use I Corinthians 6: 11 as 
representing in one context the voice of the "Hellenistic church's" 
sentiments, and on other occasions the speech of Paul. Bultmann, 
Theology, vol. 1. pp. 72,85,136,271. 
11. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1. p. 136. 
12. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 232. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid.. pp. 232f. 
15. Bultmann. Theology, vol. 1, p. 270. 
16. See, Romans 11: 17; Galatians 3: 11. 
17. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 271. 
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18. Righteousness is wedded with other terms that also denote the 
state of salvation. such as "redemption" and "consecration" in I 
Corinthians 1: 30; Ibid. 
19. He leaves us equally enmeshed in mystery by not discussing 
further how and in what ways it is ambiguous. 
20. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1. p. 271. This is a curious statement by 
Rudolf Bultmann. After this statement, this (ethical) emphasis 
suddenly vanishes from his purview (except in connection with the 
wayward understanding of the "developing church"). The twofold 
emphasis that he does develop in his ensuing description is 
"forensic" and "eschatological". 
21. The German noun for righteousness is "Gerechtigkeit" which stems 
from the verb of court parlance, "rechfertigen", meaning "to justify". 
"to warrant". Collins, German-English; English-German Dictionary, 
1983. s. v. Gerechtigkeit and rechfertigen. Kendrick Grobel, the 
translator of Bultmann's Theology of the New Testament resurrects 
the Middle-English verb "rightwise" (which is the true English 
counterpart of the adjective "righteous" and noun "righteousness") 
in an attempt to circumvent the Latin cognates of "justify", Bultrna- 
nn, Theology, vol. 1. footnote p. 253. 
22. Collins, German-English; English-German Dictionary, s. v. "forum". 
23. Ibid., s. v. "verantwortlich". 
24. Bultmann, Essays, p. 64; Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 272. 
25. Bultmann, Essays. p. 64. 
26. The term ai to prevail -- provides the parallel thought. 
27. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 272. 
28. Romans 2: 13, Genesis 15: 6; 4: 3.5,22, and Galatians 3: 6. 
29. Leviticus 7: 18, II Samuel 19: 19. 
30. J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul: A Lin 
pp. 1 
niversity Press, 
31. Karl Barth, Church Doomatics, Vol. N. Part 1: The Doctrine of 
Reconciliation, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. trans. G. W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), p. 95.; Karl Barth, 
The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6th ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 93. 
32. As John Henry Newman attested, justification is a declaration of 
righteousness. . 
Hans King attributed Catholic exegetical aversion 
to this view to its close association with the Lutheran notion of a 
" purely" forensic pronouncement; King, Justification, pp. 208-10f. 
Emil Brunner basically concurs with Karl Barth when he explains, 
"God declares the sinner righteous: that is what justification 
means". He attests that Paul's word was taken from the language 
of the law courts in which a man who is accused is acquitted of 
guilt and declared innocent. Nevertheless, Emil Brunner clarifies 
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this by his perception that because 
d' stems from 
Hebrew thinking, the thought of "judge" ought to be subsumed 
under and included in the thought of "Lord" and "King". The 
thought of "judge" is the product of the will of God who wills as the 
Lord to assert his authority over the creation that is right. God as 
King creates what is right rather than as in the thought of "judge" 
who only finds and perceives what is just. Emil Brunner, Dog- 
matics, Lutterworth Library, vol. 37,3 vols., Vol. 3: The Christian 
Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and The Consummation, trans. 
David Cairns in collaboration with T. H. L. Parker (London: Lutter- 
worth Press, 1962). pp. 200,203. 
Norman Snaith argues that as the Hebrew picture did not generally 
involve a law court, the forensic and judicial sense ought to be 
abandoned as the primary sense. With Paul, the whole world of 
human affairs is the court; Norman Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of 
the Old Testament (London: The Epworth Press, 1944), p. 167. 
33. Bultmann, Theology, 1. p. 273. 
34. Though. as he admits, the future tenses in Romans 3: 20 and 3: 30 
are perhaps not genuine futures, they are gnomic (logical) futures. 
Likewise, the present tenses of Galatians 2: 16,3: 11. and 5: 4 are 
the timeless presents of a didactic statement which may apply to a 
decision of God in coming judgement in spite of the tense. 
While John Wesley agrees that Romans 2: 13 refers to an eschatolo- 
gical judgment, he does not accept as Rudolf Bultmann that this 
future event has already occurred in the present. 
35. Also. Bultmann affirms that Barth rightly interprets the phrase in 
Romans 8: 10 "your spirits are alive because of righteousness" as 
"because righteousness has been established". Further corrobora- 
tion is shown in Romans 8: 30,9: 30, and in I Corinthians 6: 11 
which states "you were rightwised": Bultmann. Theology. vol. 1. P. 
274. 
36. Bultmann, Theolo . vol. I. p. 274. 
37. As the meaning in I Corinthians 1: 7, so also In Romans 2: 5; 
Corinthians 3: 13; Romans 8: 18f; II Thessalonians 1: 7,2: 3,6,8; 
Peter 1: 5,7; 4: 13; 5: 1; Luke 17: 30. 
38. John Macquarrie, Existentialism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1985), pp. 128-132. 
39. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 
1, pp. 275f. 
40. Ibid., p. 276. Bultmann assures us that viewing righteousness 
from the forensic-eschatological sense guards one from 
misunderstanding righteousness as ethical perfection. 
41. Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, The Gifford Lectures. 
1955 (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1957), p. 23. This myth 
conceived of the course of the world in likeness to the annual 
periodicity of nature. Just as seasons go round and round, so all 
the events of the old year return again. 
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42. Greek and Stoic Philosophy developed the idea that the world 
would end by returning to Zeus. It would then begin again so that 
life, as it had been known (e. g. even Plato), would begin again. 
Further, the Babylonian tradition "historicised" cosmic mythology 
when it viewed humanity as passing through eras such as in 
Daniel where periods and empires in history like the natural 
process passed through seasons. Bultmann, History and Es- 
chatolo , pp. 24f. 
43. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, pp. 26f. 
44. Ibid.. p. 27f. 
45. Ibid., p. 29. Several observations are in order at this point. While 
Rudolf Bultmann assumes a more or less neat and tidy develop- 
ment of this myth of the periodicity of nature, caution is required 
in the assumption that the different "speculations" expressed in the 
different cultures are (1) the developments of this myth of the 
periodicity of nature (2) the result of "development" and borrowing 
as opposed to "speculations" which may have arisen quite indepen- 
dently of one another. Moreover, Rudolf Bultmann considers their 
differences within a presupposition that they are already similar. 
One assumes that he has been sufficiently convinced by the data, 
but the critic would want to fully evaluate the similarities against 
the distinctions before arriving at this conclusion. 
In line with this observation, because Rudolf Bultmann conceives of 
the "cosmic mythology" as having originated and developed in 
secular cultures, one must come to the conclusion that the Old 
Testament is ignorant of eschatology (except for Daniel- -Bultmanifs 
argument) so that Daniel and the New Testament's understanding 
harks back to a completely secular myth. Should Rudolf Bultmann 
credibly discount the eschatological content In such passages as 
Ezekiel chapters 38-39. Zechariah chapter 14, Isaiah chapters 
24,25,66, and Joel chapter 3? Is this not eschatology "in the true 
sense of a doctrine of the end of the world and a succeeding time 
of salvation"? Bultmann, History and Eschatology. p. 27. 
The dramatic proclamation of the Lord's destruction of the earth, In 
Isaiah 24: 1,3, etc. and consequent swallowing up of "death for ever" 
(Isaiah 25: 8) is hardly anything less than a teaching "of the end of 
the world and a succeeding time of salvation". Furthermore, Isaiah 
chapter 66 ends with a declaration of the "new heavens and the 
new earth". Passages in other books which refer to world 
catastrophe followed by the Lord's victory and salvation are seen in 
Ezekiel 38-39, Joel 3: 9-21, Zechariah 14. 
Rudolf Bultmann maintains that the Old Testament has predictions 
of doom but they are only related to Israel and its enemies and not 
the whole world: Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 28. Much 
to the contrary, a reading of most of these passages pellucidly 
testifies that it is an earth-wide catastrophe envisioned which in 
some description extends to cosmic proportions (e. g. Isaiah 24). 
The question of eschatology in the Old Testament is related to 
chronology. If other Old Testament books are included along with Daniel as books which present eschatology, then it is certainly a debateable point as to who influenced whom regarding eschatology. Did the Babylonians and Persians affect the Hebrews, or vice versa 
or both/ and or neither? 
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Furthermore, Rudolf Bultmann leans most heavily upon 4 Ezra as 
a resource for the strategic formulations of "later Judaism". One 
must keep in mind when he discusses "later Judaism" and "Jewish 
eschatology", he is discussing Jewish writings that post-date Jesus. 
These apocryphal books to which he refers such as 4 Ezra, 2 
Enoch, and Syriac Baruch are mongrel books written in the latter 
half of the first century of the Christian era. R. H. Charles, 
Religious Development Between the Old and The New Testament, 
Home University Library of Modern Knowledge. ed. Herbert Fisher 
et al. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1914), pp. 239-52. It must 
be admitted that these books are not without their difficulties. 
Bruce Metzger states the problems of composition and transmission 
in II Esdras (4 Ezra) are "extremely complicated". Moreover, it was 
not likely written until about the end of the first century A. D. 
Bruce Metzger, An Introduction to the Apocrypha (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 22. 
Even if, for the sake of argument, one grants Rudolf Bultmann his 
claim that Daniel is the only Old Testament book with true 
eschatology, Daniel was (even at a late dating) a recognized part of 
the Hebrew Scriptures two hundred years before 4 Ezra and 
Baruch were written. Therefore, Daniel would seem a not unlikely 
candidate for influencing later Jewish thought. 
46. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 87. Furthermore, one must be 
careful not to misread Rudolf Bultmann's tracing of apocalyptic 
development. One can easily be led to the impression that Jesus 
got his eschatological preaching from the "Jewish apocalyptic" 
writers or it was reckoned to him by his later disciples. Indeed, 
Rudolf Bultmann hesitates In drawing this conclusion for he lacks 
definitive evidence to do so. He shows how Jesus differs from the 
apocalyptics, yet also states that Jesus message "is connected" 
with the hope of these apocalyptic circles described in the literature 
of "later Judaism". By the same token, while it is as valid to say 
(even more so since Jesus' identity and concurrence with the Old 
Testament Hebrew Scriptures can be established) Jesus is 
connected with the hope of the Old Testament, he does not choose 
to make this point; Bultmann, Theology. vol. 1. p 4. 
In Rudolf Bultmanri s discussion of eschatology in his books, 
Primitive Christianity and History and Eschatolo º, chapters on 
what amounts to be eschatology in "later Judaism" precede 
chapters on the examination of Jesus teaching. In History and 
Eschatology, immediately following his presentation of "later 
Judaism s" formulations of eschatology. he introduces the section 
on the New Testament and Jesus' preaching by saying, "In the New 
Testament both the Old Testament view of history and the 
apocalyptic view are preserved but in such a way that the 
apocalyptic view prevails"; Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 
31. A casual reading might lead one to conclude that since the 
Old Testament as a whole, in Rudolf Bultmanri s opinion, does not 
have an apocalyptic view, the established apocalyptic view he is 
referring to must be the one of "later Judaism" of which he just 
finished describing. 
Farther. when he speaks of the apocalyptic view being "preserved" 
so that it "prevails" In the New Testament. one can easily interpret 
this as meaning the New Testament kept what was already in 
existence in the circles of later apocalyptic Judaism. Can the New 
Testament have kept something we do not know was even in fixed 
form till the latter part of the first century A. D.? His procedure is 
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not only open to misinterpretation, but it also begs the issue of 
whether and to what extent one can really speak of apocalyptic 
Judaism as being a fixed entity before Jesus preaching and the 
writing of the New Testament books. The misinterpretation of 
which we speak seems further perpetrated by the fact that his 
method is to compare Jesus' preaching with "later Judaism" rather 
than vice versa, implying that "later Judaism" is the established 
standard and trend setter; Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, pp. 86- 
93. 
47. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 248: Bultmann, History and 
Eschatology, p. 33. 
To assert that the "early Christian community" or Paul "took over" 
some of the themes and content of the pseudepigrapha which 
contained the apocalyptic motifs is questionable since this 
apocalyptic literature is not necessarily contemporaneous with the 
chief New Testament writings. Further, one must keep in mind 
that, according to R. H. Charles, such a book as Syriac Baruch 
was written to bolster the declining Judaistic faith and in part to 
counter the attacks of a growing and aggressive Christianity; 
Charles, Religious Development, p. 247. It is not unreasonable to 
argue that it was Christianity which had the aggressive. unique 
and thrusting message whose themes opponents were forced to 
grapple with and to imitate. 
48. Bultmann, Theolo y, vol. 1. p. 37; Bultmann, History and 
Eschatolorsy, p. 37. 
49. The Oxford Dictionary of The Christian Church, ed. F. L. Cross, 
2nd ed., rev. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), s. v. "Johannes Weiss". 
50. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 38. 
51. He offers several reasons for his argument. In contrasting the early 
Christian community with the Old Testament, he supports his 
argument by citing the lack or irrelevance of any genealogical 
connection between God's new people and old. Since Abraham is 
the father of all believers. Gentiles and Jews, the continuity is not 
a growing continuity but one created by God; Ibid., p. 35. 
There is ample New Testament evidence to contest this premise. 
Rudolf Bultmann does not include in his reckoning Matthew and 
Luke's belaboring of the tracing of Jesus Christ's genealogical 
lineage back through the Old Testament to Abraham and Adam 
(Matthew 2 and Luke 3). Moreover, not only did Jesus confine his 
ministry to the Jews, but he also claimed that "salvation is from 
the Jews" (John 4: 22). This example is continued by the apostles 
and disciples as they preached at first to the Jews and later found 
the concept of preaching to the Gentiles as almost 
incomprehensible (Acts 10, particularly w. 34-39, Acts 11: 1,19). 
While Rudolf Bultmann acknowledges Stephens and Paul's surveys 
of Israelite history In Acts chapters seven and thirteen, he will not 
allow that these reviews of history show historical continuity. This 
ignores Peters claim in Acts chapter two that the Holy Spirit's 
coming on the day of Pentecost is a realization in time and space of 
what was already known and spoken of in Joel's time and space. 
Peter says all the prophets from Samuel proclaimed "these days"; 
see Acts 3: 24. 
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If there were no conscious historical continuity intended, why did 
Peter and the apostles explicitly link their movement with one that 
was antithetical to their own? The favorable parallels drawn by the 
early community between themselves and "our fathers" convincingly 
cast doubts on Rudolf Bultmann's premise. Stephen argues to 
show how God's work in the present is related to His work among 
the Christians forefathers of the past. There are repeated 
references drawn by the Christian disciples which speak of a 
welcome consciousness of historical continuity and relationship 
with Israel. The disciples identify historical Israel's God as their 
own God. Peter said, The God of our fathers raised Jesus... "; see 
Acts 5: 30. They also see themselves as His children, descendants 
and continuing recipients of this same Old Testament God's 
speaking and acting in history, who once had spoken and acted on 
their fathers' behalf. In the speech which Rudolf Bultmann 
acknowledges, Stephen (and likewise Paul at Antioch) repeatedly 
refers to the Jews as "our fathers", "our race", and "brethren"; See. 
Acts 7: 1,12,15,19,38,39,44,45: Acts 13: 16f, 26,32f, 38. Again, in 
Romans chapter eleven, Paul identifies the Christian movement as 
the remnant of Israel, an ingrafting Into the original Jewish root. 
52. Bultmann,. History and Eschatology, p. 36. 
53. Ibid., p. 30. 
54. Ibid., p. 36. 
55. Ibid., p. 30. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid., p. 36. 
58. Ibid., pp. 36,38. 
59. Ibid., p. 36. 
60. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 255; see also, H. 0. Thomas, 
"Bultmanri s Understanding of Sin", p. 11. 
61. Ibid., p. 29. 
62. Ibid., p. 38. 
63. Bultmanni His or9 and Eschatoloäv, p. 37. 
64. Ibid., p. 41. 
65. W. D. Davies maintains that Paul belonged to the mainstream of 
first-century Judaism and that there is a great variance among 
scholars as to the extent to which the apocalyptic movement 
formed an integral part of rabbinic Judaism; W. D. Davies, Paul 
and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline 
Theolo (London: S. P. C. K., 1948), pp. 1,9f. 
66. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 41. 
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67. The question. arises that if "Paul no longer looks into the history of 
peoples and the world nor into a new history", and the early Chris- 
tian community did not trace the historical continuity with Israel, 
why is Paul (as Rudolf Bultmann allows) concerned to wrestle with 
the difficulty of the fulfillment of promises (in Romans 9-11) which 
were rooted and interwoven in the history of the Jewish people? 
Moreover, if the history of the nation and the world had lost 
interest for Paul. why does he continue to expect the cosmic drama 
to be acted out as portrayed in the apocalyptic picture of the 
future, of the parousia of Christ, et cetera? Ibid., pp. 41f. If Paul 
existentially interprets history past. present, and future in terms of 
the individual. why does he regress into viewing it again from a 
"worldly' perspective? Furthermore. Rudolf Bultmann. who in his 
research has a controlling interest in studying the sources for 
Paul's thought, does not investigate the derivation of Paul's 
anthropological view of apocalyptic history. 
68. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 306f; Bultmann, Existence and 
Faith, p. 254. 
69. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 307. 
70. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 302f. 
71. This requires Paul both at once to "historize" and to view literally 
the "parousia". While Rudolf Bultmann still allows that Paul 
maintains an apocalyptic picture of the future, for Paul it does not 
figure largely or significantly in his essential thought and is treated 
more or less as a useless appendage. The real bliss for Paul is 
righteousness which is already present. The New Aeon is already 
reality. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 42. 
72. Bultmann. Theology, vol. 1, p. 302. 
73. Bultmann. History and Eschatology. p. 49. 
74. Ibid., p. 47. 
75. Ibid., pp. 49f. 
76. Rudolf Bultmann's interpretation does not make unattractive or 
untenable the view that the "chronological" concept had always 
been the view of the community from the earliest days. He 
proposes that when the earliest Christian community's expectation 
of the 'Son of Man's' appearing in the clouds of heaven failed to 
occur, they were gripped by disappointment. In addition, he also 
supposes that "the parousia of Christ was never expected on a 
fixed day". If they had no definite time, no "month or year", in 
which they expected the "Son of Man's' coming, then they did not 
know exactly when he was coming. If they did not know when he 
was coming, how and why could they be disillusioned that he 
"failed" to come or that He would not still come? Ibid., pp. 38,51. 
It Is conceivable that there could have been impatience (disillusion- 
ment is too strong a word in light of New Testament evidence or lack of evidence) because He had not yet materialized, but not 
because he failed to appear. Was there then "the problem of 
eschatology" which Rudolf Bultmann claims demanded a "new 
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understanding of eschatology"? Then what elicited this new 
"eschatological" understanding of Paul and from where did it 
originate? Is It not at least as likely that Paul is to be interpreted 
presupposing a meaning of history and eschatology which is 
temporal and spacial and similar to those who preceded and 
followed him? One conclusion one can draw as a result of Rudolf 
Bultmann's findings Is that "chronological meaning" cannot be 
easily dismissed from the New Testament but, as he has shown, is 
very much a part of it. 
One issue that results from Rudolf Bultmanri s conception of the 
"developing church's" emphasis on "chronological meaning" is the 
redefined extent of salvation and justification. While Paul 
conceived of "the old man" as being freed from the power of sin in 
baptism, the "developing church" taught that only forgiveness is 
granted for the guilt incurred before baptism. Therefore, the time 
after baptism, the 'between' is now regarded as the limited time in 
which the Christian must prove himself in the face of the imminent 
judgement. Rather than obedience being the self-evident fruit of 
the gift of salvation or of justification and of freedom, it is action 
done with the intention of effecting future salvation. The believer 
still remains under the imperative, but the imperative no longer 
stands in the dialectic relation to the indicative. Where this 
occurs, the imperative means at the same time to stand under 
grace. Under the developing church's concept, salvation is a new 
opportunity gained in which man must fulfill the condition for 
justification in the future judgement by good works. One cannot 
necessarily conclude that Rudolf Bultmann does not see in Paul a 
teaching of on-going accountability after justification. However, the 
nature of the responsibility after justification is that which 
distinguishes Paul from the "developing church". Ibid.. p. 50. 
77. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 88; Bultmann, Essays. p. 63. 
78. Luther, Lectures on Romans, p. 4. 
79. Rudolf Bultmann wants also to avoid the supposition, such as 
Sanday and Headlam more recently entertained, in which the 
sinner is said to be "regarded as if" he were righteous when in fact 
he is not. Their argument states that the verb v means "to 
pronounce righteous" as in the manner of a judge. In so far as the 
person pronounced righteous is not in actuality righteous, righteo- 
usness has the meaning only of "amnesty" or "forgiveness". This 
state is referred to as a "fiction". The Reverend William Sanday 
and The Reverend Arthur C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, 5th ed., The Interna- 
tional Critical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures of the Old and 
New Testaments, ed. The Reverend Samuel Rolles Driver, The 
Reverend Alfred Plummer, and The Reverend Charles Augustus 
Briggs (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1907), p. 36. 
John Wesley, as Rudolf Bultmann, accepts that this "forgiveness" is 
actual righteousness. However, John Wesley also believes that a 
"real" moral righteousness is formed In man in sanctification rather 
than in justification as the Catholics conceive. 
Nevertheless, there Is agreement among the above that d LL 
does not comprehend the idea of "making righteous"; Sanday and 
Headlam, Romans, p. 30. 
80. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1. p. 277. 
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8 1. Ibid., p. 276. 
82. Ibid.. pp. 124,141. The Roman Catholic Hans Küng concurs that 
justification means an extrinsic non-imputation of sins, a declaring 
just. However, he submits, Martin Luther's exclusively nominalistic 
interpretation of justification as extrinsic is what was rightly con- 
demned by the Council of Trent; Küng, Justification, pp. 212,217f. 
Karl Barth comments that God's righteousness is always a strange 
righteousness, iustitia aliena, because it is first and essentially 
iustitia Christi. Only because it is Christ's righteousness can it be 
said to be "our" or "my" righteousness; Barth, Church Dogmatics, 
vol. N, part 1, p. 549. 
Emil Brunner assents to this position when he states that man can 
find security only in the righteousness which Is "outside of us and 
alien to us" -- in Christ Himself; Brunner, Dogmatics, vol. III, p. 
206. 
However. Rudolf Bultmann. to the likely consternation of 
Protestants and Catholics alike, certainly John Wesley, seems to 
radicalize Martin Luther by confidently arguing that the concern of 
an ethical quality of man or ethical sin does not relate and is 
irrelevant to righteousness. 
83. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 276; Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 
p. 88. 
84. Kling, Justification. pp. 213-18. 
85. McGrath. Iustitia Del, vol. 2, p. 13. 
86. Karl Barth arrives at the same conclusion that man is righteous. 
He asks to what extent justification is not a mere "as if". The 
answer depends on whether justification is genuine, that is, 
whether the right of God which gives right to men and the right of 
man given by God is a true and indisputable right. Karl Barth 
affirms that Jesus Christ offered himself as a sacrifice and became 
obedient. In this way. He was the righteous One. With the 
creation of this new man, God has vindicated Himself to us in 
pronouncing His verdict upon us. This man is righteous for us all 
and is our righteousness before God; Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 
IV, part 1, pp. 517f, 95. 
Karl Barth concurs with the Reformer's typical view that God looks 
upon and does not see our sin but Christ's righteousness. As 
Martin Luther expressed it, Christ's righteousness shines in the 
Christian; Luther, Romans, ed. Pauck, p. 5. 
Karl Barth insists that this righteousness has to do with a 
"declaring righteous". However, it is more than just a verbal 
action. It is a declaring righteous which can be called a making 
righteous. Man is righteous before God; Barth. Church Dogmatics, 
vol. IV, part 1, p. 95. 
John Wesley might ask Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth if man is 
really righteous, then in what sense, if any at all, is man under 
necessity to be ethically renewed and to produce the fruit of good 
works? 
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87. Furthermore, on the basis of the main clause in II Corinthians 
5: 21, he argues that it would be a mistake to think God treated the 
(ethically) sinless Christ "as if" he were a sinner. Rather, God 
made the sinless Christ to be a sinner (forensically) by letting him 
die as one accursed. 
88. Bultmann, Theology, 1, p. 277. 
89. Ibid., p. 278; Ernst Käsemann. New Testament Questions of Today, 
trans. W. J. Montague (Philadelphia: Fortress press, 1979), p. 175. 
90. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 278. 
91. See Romans 3: 21; 5: 1; 9: 30-32; 10: 4-6; Galatians 2: 16; 3: 6,8,11,24; 
5: 5; Phillipians 3: 9; Bultmann, Theo] otsy, vol. 1, pp. 279f. 
92. Bultmann, Essays, p. 42. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid., pp. 43f. 
95. Ibid., Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 225f, 240. 
96. Bultmann, Essays, p. 45. 
97. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 281. 
98. G. E. Ladd. A Theology of The New Testament (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975). p. 438; Davies, Paul and 
Rabbinic Judaism, p. 222; Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 
p. 278. 
If faith as the condition for rlghtwising did not arise until the 
Judaizing polemic, what prompted Paul's opposition to the 
Judaizers in the first place? Was not the faith upon which righteo- 
usness was conditioned already presupposed in the Pharisee Paul's 
conversion to Christ? In other words, the faith by which Paul 
became a Christian believer already put him into contrast with 
Judaism. 
99. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 270. 
100. See Romans 6: 19, Galatians 2: 21; 5: 4. The term "grace" is coupled 
with the word "faith" in contrast to the Law in Romans 4: 14-16. 
101. Bultrnann, Theolo y, vol. 1, pp. 281f. 
102. Rudolf Bultmann acknowledges that on the assumption that faith 
is an act of obedience. "There is always a certain measure of 
activity on mars own part assumed in it. " He argues that in 
Romans 4: 4f. Paul distinguishes between "grace" (or "gift") and 
"due" (or wage) in such a way that work is understood in the fun- 
damental sense -- "to earn claim to a reward". 
103. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 
283. 
104. Ibid., p. 284. 
105. Ibid.. p. 285; Bultmann, Existence and Faith. pp. 80-82. 
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106. C. H. Dodd, The Bible and The Greeks (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1935), p. 9: David Hill, Greek Words and Hebrew 
Meanings: Studies In the Semantics of Soteriological Terms, Society 
for New Testament Studies Monograph Series, vol. 5, gen. ed., 
Matthew Black (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1967), 
p. 155; Käsemann, New Testament Questions, p. 169. 
107. Using St. Augustine as his reference, Martin Luther insisted that 
the term "righteousness of God" in Romans 1: 17 and 3: 25 must not 
be understood as the righteousness by which God Is righteous in 
himself, but as the righteousness by which we are justified; Luther, 
Romans, ed. Pauck, pp. 18,109. 
108. Luther, Romans, ed. Pauck, pp. 18,109. 
109. Ibid., p. 66. 
110. In debate with Rudolf Bultmann, Ernst Käsemann suggests that 
understanding the "righteousness of God" exclusively as "gift" 
necessarily leads to viewing it as referring primarily to the 
individual and exclusively from the context of the doctrine of man; 
Käsemann, New Testament Questions, pp. 180f. 
Emil Brunner finds that Martin Luther's rendering of the "righte- 
ousness of God" as "righteousness that counts in God's sight" falls 
short. He is nevertheless sympathetic to Martin Luthers rejection 
of the traditional Latin conception of iustitia Dei as the righteo- 
usness of the judge who rewards and punishes. When the "righte- 
ousness of God" is understood from its Hebrew mind set, Emil 
Brunner takes it to mean "The will of God who wills to assert his 
authority over the Creation as the Lord, and to establish his 
Lordship. The product of this will and this action Is what is right. " 
On the one hand, the element of the righteousness of the judge 
who removes injustice and vindicates right is incorporated in the 
thought of God as judge. However. God's action is not to be con- 
ceived as a judge who finds and perceives what is just, but that of 
the King who creates what is just. Emil Brunner states, "The 
Divine action in Jesus Christ is the action through which alone 
God's purpose breaks through. " Through Christ, love is revealed as 
the will of God when man recognizes the lie of his own righteo- 
usness. The stress is laid not on judicial righteousness, but on the 
kingly righteousness, God's Lordship, which manifests itself in the 
act of pardon which has always been the King's privilege. So, in 
contrast to Rudolf Bultmann, Emil Brunner argues that the "righte- 
ousness of God" centralizes the purpose of God rather than the 
salvation of man: Brunner. Dogmatics, vol. III, p. 203f. 
For Karl Barth, the "righteousness of God" focuses upon God. This 
seems to be implied in his assertion that in God's maintaining a 
covenant with man, He distinguishes Himself as the One who does 
what is in the highest sense the right. That is, He does that in 
which He himself is right, which befits Him, and is worthy of Him 
as God. In the covenant. He reveals Himself as the One He is, the 
One who is bound to His own nature, and who is true to Himself; 
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. II, Part 1: The Doctrine of God, 
ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. T. H. L. Parker et al 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1957), p. 384. 
A third viewpoint tends to comprehend both the subjective and 
objective aspects. C. H. Dodd insists that the "righteousness of 
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God" is displayed in an objective revelation of God's activity in the 
life and death of Jesus Christ which justifies His people -- puts 
them in the right -- and delivers them from evil; The Rev. Professor 
James Moffatt. ed.. The Moffatt New Testament Commentary, C. H. 
Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to The Romans (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1937). pp. 10.12. 
Similarly, David Hill proffers that God's righteousness Is manifested 
In his action in Jesus Christ which shows that "he is righteous in 
himself" because He does right and puts others in the right who do 
not deserve it, Hill, Greek Words, pp. 156-58. 
111. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 285f. 
112. This can have either active ("hostile") or passive ("hated") meaning. 
As Romans 8: 7 Indicates, God's displeasure with man is a result of 
mans hostility to God. 
113. What about the "old" question of how God Is to be reconciled? 
Rudolf Bultmann alleges that the pagan notion that man must do 
something to propitiate God never occurrs to Paul. Instead, men 
need the reconciliation which God has conferred -- not by the 
removal of their subjective resentment toward Him, but by the 
removal of the objective state of enmity which existed between Him 
and men as a consequence of sins. Paul rarely speaks of the "for- 
giveness of sins", evidently because of its ambiguity. It intonates 
release from the guilt of former sins when what is important for 
Paul is the release from sinnin (from the power of sin): Bultmann. 
Theology, vol. 1, pp. 286f. 
The issues raised in this section -- such as the nature of the 
human, free will, the removal of the state of enmity between God 
and man and forgiveness of sins -- are discussed under the 
headings of the "salvation-occurrence" and "faith". 
114. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, p. 212,167; For the ethical sense, see 
also: for Barnabas, p. 163; for Hebrews, p. 167; for II Clement, p. 
170; for the Letter of Polycarp, p. 172; for Ignatius, p. 197. In I 
Peter, grace does have a specific. Pauline meaning but "rightwising" 
is not mentioned, p. 182. 
115. Ibid., p. 213. 
116. If he had included the traditionally held Pauline books in his 
defined Pauline corpus and given equal status to the other New 
Testament books, he would have had an even greater body of 
evidence challenging him to consider one dialectic from which he 
shrinks, that "righteousness" for Paul has both "forensic-eschatolo- 
gical" meaning and also moral and ethical meaning or, at least, 
moral and ethical implications. 
Furthermore. Rudolf Bultmann is intolerant of certain traditionally 
deemed Pauline books as Martin Luther was to the epistle of 
James. In Rudolf Bultmanri s case, he views the hallmark of Paul's 
theology as its unique. creative handling of the Christian polemic 
with the Jews. As Martin Luther discounted the book of James 
because it excluded the great doctrine of justification by faith, so 
there seems to be a correlation between Rudolf Bultmanri s failure 
to find Paul's signature on a book and its lack of a significant 
passage(s) lambasting the Jewish system of the Law and the Jews' 
striving to establish "their own righteousness". 
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117. Macquarrie, Existentialism, pp. 207,268f. 
118. Ibid.. pp. 1341T. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GRACE AS SALVATION-OCCURRENCE DESCRIBED 
INTRODUCTION 
After expounding the New Testament's conception of "righteousness". 
Rudolf Bultmann shifts his concern to the interrelated subject of "God's 
grace". ' Before advancing to Paul's representative description of grace, he 
presents a brief overview of Jesus' understanding. In his inquiry-into Jesus 
teaching on grace, he implicitly responds to traditional liberalism s assumption 
that Jesus taught - that grace is always available to man. In the style of 
dialectic theology, he argues that Jesus preached that grace can be promised 
to man only by God himself. 2 In Jesus' mind, the honest sinner knows only 
of his own despair because he is yet to know God's grace "for me". 
The cardinal interest for Rudolf Bultmann in regards to Jesus' preaching 
of grace is suggested in the term "promises". Firstly, Jesus promises "the 
forgiving grace of God" to all those who cry "God. be merciful to me a sinner! "3 
Secondly, Jesus - promise of grace is tied directly to 
his eschatological 
understanding of his calling and contrasts with Paul's preaching of grace. 
Jesus summoning men to repentance is the final proof that his coming is 
God's grace in the last hour of the world. To those who hear his word, God's 
salvation is now freely offered. ' 
Specifically, Jesus only promises what is imminent and future. He points 
his hearers to the coming grace and reign of God. In contrast, Paul proclaims 
the "Jesus Christ Is the forgiving word of God". While Jesus only looked 
forward, Paul looks backward and says that the turn of the age has occurred 
already in Christ. God's grace is bound to the person of Jesus in whom 
God's grace Is freely offered to all. ' - 
One observes that Rudolf Bultmanri s understanding of Jesus' and Paul's 
preaching of grace fits consistently into his eschatological schema that 
pertains to "righteousness". Jesus did not announce that he himself forgave. 
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nor granted pardon, nor saw in himself the occurrence of the turning of the 
age. He only announced what God was prepared to do in the coming, Reign of 
God. Paul. on the other hand, a arms that liberation and redemption from 
the old and corrupt course of the world has become a reality in Jesus Christ. 
With this in mind, we proceed to Rudolf Bultmann s general description of 
Paul's conception of grace. Firstly, Rudolf Bultmann in dialectical fashion 
discusses the nature of wrath in order to gain insight into grace. Wrath, 
most often referring to future judgement, is exemplified by the phrase "day of 
wrath", which speaks of a future day when God's righteous judgement will be 
revealed (Romans 2: 5; 5: 9). Nonetheless, it also describes judgement that is 
constantly taking place (Romans 1: 18-32). In another instance, when it is not 
used without temporal limitation still means divine punishment. 
He says that for Paul grace like righteousness is not a quality of God such 
as His timeless kindliness. The Gospel is not something which teaches us 
that God's nature which we once wrongly thought to be wrathful Is henceforth 
known to be gracious. Not a quality, an emotion, or wrathfulness as is 
commonly misunderstood, the wrath of God means an occurrence - the 
judgement of God. God's wrath is demonstrated factually in what takes place 
in 'the heathen world In that -men abandon themselves to lusts and 
dishonorable passions (Romans 1: 24). 6 From his observations on wrath, 
Rudolf Bultmann deduces two insights relevant to an understanding of grace. 
Firstly, God's grace is not a previously misconceived graciousness but is His 
now occurring act of grace., Secondly, in allusion to liberalism's assumption, 
he states , God's prior judgeship does not become obsolescent In the 
occurrence of the act of grace but is presupposed in it. The act of grace Is 
simply His gracious dealing precisely as Judge. He defines God's grace as His 
judicial act of grace in the following manner: "It Is not a mode of dealing 
which God has decided henceforth to adopt, but is a single deed which takes 
effect for everyone who recognizes it as such and acknowledges it (in faith) - 
'grace' in God's eschatological deed. "' This deed of grace consists in the fact 
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that God gave Christ up to die as a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of men. ' 
Having reviewed Rudolf Bultmann's attempt at accounting for grace in the 
light of wrath, let us set forth a synopsis of his word study of the term 
"grace". He states that the usual word for grace is but-Y--(i-D1Qff, (gift 
of grace) is also used. ' In whatever context Paul uses "grace". it always 
means the same deed of God; that is, the "deed of Christ". " " 
Even where "grace" does not signify the eschatological, occurrence, 
nevertheless it remains God's gracious deed or dealing which man experiences 
as a "gift". When, as in Paul's greetings, grace is put together with "peace", it 
denotes that which God does and confers upon man salvation. " 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the study of "grace" may be confirmed by a 
look at Paul's statements about, agape (love). He desires to demonstrate on 
the basis of Romans 5: 6-8; 8: 35 that this word "love" like "grace" refers to the 
salvation-occurrence (death and resurrection of Christ). 'Namely. he confirms 
that Paul "speaks of agape as it reveals, Itself In a deed, agape at work, In 
action". i2 
While Paul's affirmation in Romans 5: 8, that "God shows his love for us" 
Implies the sentiment of love. Paul speaks of it only as God "shows" it - by 
letting Christ die for us. He goes on to deduce that Paul identifies God's 
deed in Romans 8: 39 with Christ's deed. Therefore. God's deed of love Is the 
salvation which God accomplishes through Christ. In other words, love is 
Christ's "dying for all. "" 
In directing his attention, to the "developing Church". Rudolf Bultmann 
advances the thesis that the grace of God was no longer radically understood 
in the 'developing church'. This was because, - as was described in the 
previous discussion of righteousness, he saw the antithesis of "grace" and 
"works" to be presented rarely. " 
While dealing in an orderly but brief manner with the major nuances of 
the word and its similarity with another term 2. Rudolf 
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Bultmann's salient interest in the investigation of the term "grace" is to 
establish that grace is God's eschatological deed. "the salvation-occurrence". ` 
While one may agree that the event of Jesus Christ's death and resurrection, 
is the epitome and fountainhead of grace for man, not all (John Wesley 
included) would wish to follow Rudolf Bultmann in restricting, grace's 
description solely to Christ's deed per se. 16 ' l-aditionally, grace has also been 
understood as a disposition and a function of the transcendent source, God. "' 
In his nominalistic approach, Rudolf Bultmann rejects characterizing grace 
as an inherent quality (such as a habitus as in Roman Catholicism) or an 
attribute or a disposition of a transcendent. personal God as, though grace 
existed as a general category somewhere. Rather, it is a specific, concrete, 
"historic" event, the deed of Christ. '' 
Nevertheless, Rudolf Buitmanri s. denomination of grace as a "gift" is 
everywhere agreed. Further, we may observe that his identification of "grace" 
with "spirit", the "new situation" and "territory" in which the salvation-event 
places the believer is akin to other traditional determinations of grace. ' 
However, whereas Rudolf Bultmann interprets the "new, situation" in the 
manner of existential-ontological description, Roman Catholics and John 
Wesley view grace ("sanctifying grace") as actually beginning to transform the 
heart and human nature'D Rudolf Bultmann s discernment of grace as a 
power has support in spite of the fact that this concept of power is variously 
interpreted. '4--- 
In his consideration of grace, Rudolf Bultmann does not bring out, as is 
sometimes done, the nuance of grace as thankfulness and thanksgiving. ' Nor 
does he care to engage in reflection as John Calvin and Karl Barth on grace's 
relation to election and free will 2' 
Though Rudolf Bultmann s dialectical, theological approach protests 
against liberalism's optimistic identification of the workings of God's grace 
0 
with Western culture, nevertheless, his description, grace does not escape his 
own historical situation of a war-shattered world 24 Assuming his 
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predisposition to adhere exclusively to the "negative way" and to nominalism, 
he speaks of God as Judge not as He is in himself, but only as our 
circumstances show us what He is not. Traditional theologies such as John 
Wesley's, while perhaps recognizing the difficulty of stating positively who God 
is, would nonetheless affirm that God has disclosed who He is In, Himself. 
Moreover, rather than viewing God's grace and wrath as two contradictory 
dispositions or actions of God. Rudolf Bultmann sees them as two different 
understandings of the same historical occurrence. Also, implicit in his 
manner of argument is Martin Luther's teaching that the true knowledge of 
God and his saving activity is hidden in its opposite ' Martin Luther's style 
is demonstrated in Rudolf Bultmann s contention that God's judgement of the 
world could be observed from the ruin of civilization. We know that God Is 
Judge because we witness his judgment in our historical circumstances. On 
the other hand. that God bestows grace in this ruin is an affirmation that can 
also be made and known but only in faith. 
Without simply abandoning the aspect of wrath. Rudolf Bultmann gives a 
refreshing attempt at harmonizing wrath and grace which is not without 
truth. However, he leaves the sole interpretation of God's event with man. 
That God is not gracious does not necessarily follow from the fact that God's 
grace is veiled to the unbeliever. In addition, conservative theologians speak 
of his wrath and of his mercy as being aspects of his love, and liberal 
theologians emphasize his mercy and tend to leave his wrath and judgment to 
the Old Testament. 
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THE SALVATION-OCCURRENCE: PAUL'S THOUGHT-COMPLEXES 
In concentrating his interest on "the salvation-occurrence", Rudolf 
Bultmann sets forth that the"deed of divine grace", the "word of the cross", 
consists in the fact that God gave Jesus Christ up to die on the cross. 
Christ's death and resurrection are intertwined to form what Bultmann calls 
"the salvation-occurrence" (Romans 8: 34.2 Corinthians 5: 15,13: 4). Herein 
Rudolf Bultmann locates what Is decisively and solely important about the 
person of ' Jesus for Paul ' However. he does acknowledge (in a statement 
which must be decoded) that Paul was also interested in Jesus' incarnation 
and earthly life but only as it was germane to Jesus' being a concrete man 
who lived on the earth as a Jew. Beyond this. neither Jesus manner of life, 
ministry, personality, character. nor message plays any role in Paul's thought. 
Any "evaluation" of the historical person Jesus or of his cross by human 
norms according to human categories evaluates "kata sarka Christ". ' 
The question that leaps to the fore for Rudolf Bultmann Is one which is 
central to the concern of John Wesley as well as Martin Luther: how can the 
salvation-occurrence be recognized and experienced by man as the deed of 
grace? 28 Central to Martin Luther's thought was the teaching that the realities 
of grace and salvation were "hidden under the cross" from the natural man 
until faith revealed them to the believer. ' As we shall discover, Rudolf 
Bultmann accepts- this opinion and gives it an underlying, existential- 
ontological twist. According to Martin Luther, the meaning and realities of the 
cross were" always present from the time of the act, even though concealed 
from the natural man'0 However, for Rudolf Bultmann, no historical event in 
and of itself has objective meaning which endures every historical situation 
and each critical interpreter. 
Nonetheless, Martin Luther, John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann seem to 
agree to the form of the reply to the above decisive question: only when the 
deed of grace is recognized and experienced can it take effect as a compelling 
and transforming power. Rudolf Bultmann goes on to say that only when the 
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challenge to accept the deed of grace as salvation-occurrence thrusts the 
sinner into genuine decision and he understands it to be directed at him, 
reaching him, and happening to him can it touch him. 31 
In an effort to answer his question, Rudolf Bultmann recognizes that Paul 
portrays the significance of the salvation-occurrence in terms of a number of 
different thought-complexes. His discussion of ` these figures is mainly 
relegated to The Theolo" of the New Testament, and, even there, like John 
Wesley's treatment, is only relatively brief. Firstly, Paul understands Jesus' 
death in the manner of the Jewish sacrificial practice and the juristic thinking 
which controls it. This interpretation regarded his death as a propitiatory 
sacrifice by which forgiveness of sins is effected and the guilt contracted by 
sins is cancelled. His death is the "hilasterion in his blood", the means of 
reconciliation made effective through his blood. It is by this means that God, 
in order to prove that He is a righteous judge, made possible the "passing 
over of previously committed sins" (Bultmanri s translation of Romans 3: 250.32 
Rudolf Bultmann assumes that while Paul follows the tradition of both the 
"earliest" and the "Hellenistic" church in his above usage, because the term 
"blood" and the idea of divine righteousness demanding expiation for former 
sins are infrequently employed by him, they do not represent his 
"characteristic view" 3' 
Secondly, another term that characterizes the importance of the salvation- 
occurrence and Is related to the idea of propitiation is that of vicarious 
sacrifice. Also originating in cultic juristic thinking, the sense of vicarious 
sacrifice is conveyed notably In the expression (unýt6 V) , "for us". "For us" 
can mean "instead of us" or "in place of us" (Galatians 3: 13, II Corinthians 
5: 21). Ideas both of vicarious sacrifice and of propitiation merge in II 
Corinthians 5: 14f. The "therefore all have died" of verse 14b interprets the 
phrase In 14a "that one has died for all" as having vicarious meaning. In 
other words, in verse 14a the E yn7p 7räVTWV a --k 
A VEV could mean 
either "one died for the sake of all" or "one died taking the place of all'. 
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Rudolf Bultmann interprets the phrase "that one has died for all" as meaning 
he died "for the sake of all" 
Thirdly, the salvation-occurrence is depicted as the means by which men 
are "redeemed" (ransomed) from the "curse of the Law". They are redeemed 
from the punishment imposed upon sin (which Bultmann acknowledges is in 
this context of Galatians 3: 13 a transgression of the Law). This third view 
concurs with the concept of propitiatory sacrifice in which the sacrifice 
cancels the guilt or punishment for guilt. 
Having said this, Rudolf Bultmann reasons that the import of this 
"redeemed" view goes beyond the mere cancelation of guilt in a crucial way. 
Paul says in Galatians 1: 4 that the purpose of Christ's death was "to deliver 
us from the present evil age". Rudolf Bultmann contends that since the 
"present evil age" is subject to Law and, therefore, to the power of sin and 
death, the freedom bought by Christ's death is not only release from 
punishment but also liberation from "powers". In other words, there is 
freedom from the compulsion to sin and from the Law itself. " 
All told, the essential thing is that in this later motif the categories of 
cultic juristic thinking are broken through. Christ's death is not just looked 
upon as a sacrifice that cancels the guilt of sin, but it is "the means of 
release from the powers of this age: Law, Sin, and Death' 
Rudolf Bultrnann treats only briefly these explanations of Jesus' death. 
Indicative of his impatience with doctrinal "speculation", these thought- 
complexes are deemed to occupy little place in Paul compared to what he 
determines to be the greater significance of the salvation-occurrence. To the 
"figures" which have "controlling influence over Paul we now turn. 
In characterizing the salvation-occurrence and seeking further insight into 
how the event may be experienced. Rudolf Bultmann further considers how 
Christ's death can have the effect of releasing man from the powers of this 
age. He states that Paul answers the query when he describes Christ's death 
by the analogy of the death of a mystery religions divinity. This formulation. 
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once attached to the initiation-sacrament of baptism and to the Lord's Supper, 
is received out of Hellenistic tradition and given comprehensive meaning by 
Paul" In the Hellenistic formula, the initiate, the mystes, through 
participation in the fate of mystery-divinity by means of baptism and 
sacramental communion, share In the dying and reviving of the divinity. This 
participation delivers the mystes from death. 
The Hellenistic Church gave rise to this interpretation when it described 
Jesus fate in the concepts of the initiation-sacraments of the mystery 
religions. In addition, the Hellenistic Church conceived of Jesus as the basis 
for a cult whose celebration was viewed as sacramentally bringing the 
celebrant into a fellowship with the cult-divinity in such a way that the cult- 
divinity's fate avails for the former ' Paul's interpretation widens the benefits 
to encompass not only release from death but the simultaneous release from 
the power of sin. Moreover, what is true of baptism is also true of the Lord's 
Supper with the qualification that the Lord's Supper "proclaims" Christ's death 
(as well as grants a share in Christ's death) 99 
Lastly, in Paul's attempt to explain the salvation-occurrence. Rudolf 
Bultmann observes that Paul retains the above mystery idea and also weds it 
to his interpretation of Christ's death "in the categories of the Gnostic myth : 40 
In Itself, the Gnostic myth contained only the notion of the Redeemer's coming 
and going as his humiliation and exaltation. Moreover, the myth did not 
necessarily imply that his earth's departure was caused by violent death. 
Rudolf Bultmann postulates that the mystery religion's conception combined 
with the Gnostic Redeemer myth in certain Gnostic groups and was organized 
as a mystery cult. For example, the mystery-god Attis fused with the Gnostic 
Redeemer-figure and resulted in an alloy that appears in Paula" 
This essentially syncretistic. Gnostic composite conceived of the Gnostic 
Redeemer and men (Gnostics) as a unity, one substance, one soma (body). As 
the Redeemer himself is a cosmic figure and not an individual person, so his 
soma is a cosmic entity. Therefore, what happened to the Redeemer while in 
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human form (on earth) happens to all who belong to the soma. As the 
Redeemer suffered death, so do they. As he was raised from the dead, so are 
they. Further, they share release from the powers from which he was freed. 
In the light of this understanding. Paul interprets baptism as the union of the 
baptized with Christ into one soma. 
On account of the salvation-occurrence, the old aeon and its powers are 
stripped of might even though the life of the believer is not yet visible but 
concealed under the mask of death (2 Corinthians 4: 7-12)" As Adam 
ushered In the old mankind sealed in the transitory, so Christ through his 
obedience brought life and freedom from the powers (Romans 5: 12-19). 
In dialogical fashion, Rudolf Bultmann asks why Paul did not avail himself 
of the Jewish cultic and juristic thinking. He replies that in them the 
meaning of the resurrection had no chance to come into its rightful place. for 
Christ's death and resurrection are cosmic occurrences and not incidents 
happening in the historical past. Paul had recourse to the categories of the 
mysteries and the Gnostic myth because through them the salvation- 
occurrence could be seen as actually happening to and for and In man 43 
This proposal provokes the query as to why Paul viewed the salvation- 
occurrence as actually happening to and for and in man. What was there 
about the ordinary death of Jesus that suggested it could and should 
"happen" to others? For Rudolf Bultmann, this is an unimportant question. 
Perhaps the question should not be so easily dismissed. Implicit in his 
proposition is the fundamental, theological question "Why did Paul associate 
Jesus death and resurrection with a persons individual existence? " 
In Rudolf Bultmann's estimation, the mysteries and the Gnostic Redeemer 
myth are Paul's most characteristic and consequential thought forms for the 
salvation-occurrence. He adopts the general foundational assumptions of 
Wilhelm Bousset (whom he greatly esteemed) that primitive Christianity "grew 
into a cultic religion on the soil of Hellenistic syncretism, where under the 
influence of the mystery religions it acquired its sacramental piety, its 
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emphasis on the Spirit, its dualistic world view, its speculation and 
mythology"" While Rudolf Bultmann tacks on his own interpretation of "the 
cultic character of Pauline religion". he concurs with Wilhelm Bousset's 
assessment that Hellenistic Christianity is a new entity in relation to earlier 
Palestinian Christianity. Centring its religion In. the worship of the Kyrios 
cult, it belongs in the same class with the mystery religions and gnosis `s 
Because of the following reasons, I do not see a sufficiently significant and 
highly compelling correlation between the myths and the New Testament to 
warrant a conclusion that Paul's description was borrowed from Hellenism 
and Gnosticism: (1) the late dating of the documents of the - myths, (2) the 
subjective interpretations of the myths and of their comparison with, the New 
Testament, (3) the disparate form and content of the myths and New 
Testament, (4) the preconceived assumption that Paul must have borrowed a 
non-Hebraic conception to explain Jesus' dying and rising, (5) the rejection of 
the view that the salvation-occurrence produced its own meaning which was 
inherent in itself. 
- 
(6) the difficult question of why divine, mythological 
language was applied to the Jewish preacher Jesus. `e 
In turning attention -to Johns understanding of the salvation-occurrence, 
Rudolf Bultmann locates In his Gospel a distinction from the common 
Christian Interpretation. While for Paul. Jesus!, death is paramount and his 
incarnation secondary, for John one might say the reverse is true. 'In Paul 
the incarnation is a part of the total salvation-occurrence, but in John it is 
the decisive salvation-event. John sees Jesus' death as the accomplishment 
of the "work" which began with his incarnation and as the last demonstration 
of the obedience which governs his life., Jesus death takes on a twofold 
aspect of completion of his obedience as well as his release from his 
commisssion by which he can return to his previous glory. " In John He 
chooses death, rather than suffer death, as a passive object of a divine 
process of salvation as in the Synoptics. 
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Rudolf Bultrnann alleges that - Johns view is not determined by the 
common Christian interpretation of Jesus' death as the atonement for sins. 
He is curious as to why John employs certain expressions (such as "takes 
away" and the figure of the sacrificial lamb) from the Church's common 
theology. He attempts. to rationalize this by suggesting John regards this 
sacrifice as pertaining to Jesus' whole ministry rather than just his death. `' 
He rather unsatisfactorily leaves the issue ill-digested by concluding that, even 
if John admits into his writings the Church tradition of the atonement for sin, 
it is a foreign element in his work. 49 
After setting forth Paul's and Johns formulations of the significance of the 
salvation-occurrence, he `considers the matter of whether or not two acts of 
faith are necessary for belief in the saving significance of the Christ event. 
This leads him into a further discussion, of the nature of the salvation 
occurrence and how it impacts and is appropriated by Individual existence. 
Rudolf Bultmann poses a query crucial to his theological enterprise: must not 
the hearer have a preliminary conviction that Jesus Christ Is by nature the 
pre-existent Son who became a man and rose from the dead if he is to believe 
in the saving significance of these events? In order to discuss the question, 
he dissects "belief Into two strands which traditionally had been taken as one 
cord. He says that if one takes Paul's statements as they are, then "two acts 
of faith or belief must be distinguished". °O The first sense of "belief"' Is that 
which in the narrower popular usage means "willingness to consider true 
(believe) the facts reported of the pre-existent Son of God -- Incarnation, 
crucifixion, resurrection from the dead -- and to see in them a "demonstration 
of the grace of God . 51 The second sense. of belief is that which Is a "faith 
which is self-surrender to the grace' of God , and which signifies the utter 
reversal of a man's previous understanding- of himself -- specifically, the 
radical surrender of his human "boasting" 52 Nevertheless, a- homogeneous 
concept of faith-belief would be feasible if the two questions turned out to be 
one and the same question -- which, in Rudolf Bultmann s mind, they are In 
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the real intention of Paul. He comes to the same conclusion as traditional 
Christian thought but on different grounds. 
He maintains that when Paul speaks of Christ as the Son of God who died 
for him, he speaks only as the Paul who has relinquished his own 
righteousness and yielded up himself to die. He knows of Christ only by 
knowing himself anew. He understood the proclamation of Christ as the Son 
of God when it reached him as the demand to give up his former life. Rudolf 
Bultmann seems to be saying that when Paul encountered the proclamation of 
Jesus as the pre-existent Son of God, the description was not taken to be a 
statement regarding the actual, objective nature of Jesus, but only as a 
demand to give up his life. Citing Romans, he submits that Paul does not 
present to the previously unknown congregation the - salvation-occurrence 
whose credibility would first have to be acknowledged. " 
Nonetheless, Rudolf Bultmann asserts that Paul wanted to expose 
mankind's plight (as though its credibility did not also require 
acknowledgement) so that the proclamation of God's salvation-deed became a 
question of decision. Therefore, he concludes that the proclamation of the 
salvation-occurrence is not a preparatory instruction which precedes the 
actual demand for faith but is in itself the call for faith. Rather than the 
presentation of the salvation - occurrence being that which the credibility has 
first to be acknowledged, the preaching of Jesus was an arresting question 
regarding his Messiahship. M 
Rudolf Bultmann explains that as Christian existence proceeds through 
judgement to grace, so Christ is the crucified and the risen. The cross could 
not be said to be the fulfillment of a tragic destiny, nor a cosmic drama, nor a 
spectacle for reflective observation. The cross is truly seen only when one 
understands that God's judgement on all self-righteousness has been given in 
it. ' Only by resolve did Paul recognize the crucified Jesus as the Messiah. 
Son of God and Lord. When the community proclaimed him, Paul was 
confronted with the question as to whether or not he was the Messiah. Let 
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us leave the issue until farther in the paper with the recognition that for 
Rudolf Bultmann faith-belief is a homogeneous concept when - the Son's pre-11 
existence is regarded as the demand for faith. ' 
The subject of Paul's "resolve" to recognize. Jesus as the Messiah raises 
another question of great paramountcy according to Rudolf Bultmann. How 
did Paul achieve a "resolve" to recognize Jesus as the Lord, the Son of God? 
He replies that Paul says he acquired knowledge by a "revelation". He is clear 
that this "revelation" cannot be a supernatural communication of information 
because one does not acquire this kind of knowledge about the Messiah. One 
must either acknowledge him or repudiate . 
him. He states, "The 
acknowledgement of Jesus as the Messiah Is the substantive content of the 
'revelation: it means that henceforth Paul understands Jesus as the Messiah 
.... To understand another person as Lord correspondingly means to have a 
new understanding of oneself .... ". 
REVELATION AND PRE-UNDERSTANDING 
Exploring more thoroughly Rudolf Bultmann's conception of how Paul 
acquired by "revelation" the knowledge he needed to confess Jesus as the Lord 
is at this point pertinent to Rudolf Bultmanri s understanding of the salvation- 
occurrence. While he directs us to the New Testament to clarify the meaning 
of "revelation", he insists that the pre-understanding of "revelation" must first 
be set forth 57 This entails reviewing the existential-ontological. philosophical 
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framework (to which he Is greatly Indebted to Martin Heidegger) which Is the 
presupposition of "revelation". - 
Rudolf Bultmann tells us in approaching the New Testament that what we 
assume "revelation" to mean is "the disclosure of what is veiled, the opening 
up of what is hidden". Under this definition are subsumed two sub- 
definitions: One, revelation is the "communication of knowledge by the word" 
which is the disclosure of information previously unknown; two, revelation 
is "an occurrence that puts me in a new situation as self, such as when an 
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act of friendship "reveals" one person to another person. 
Rudolf Bultmanri s very definition of revelation. "the disclosure of what is 
veiled" (which he says we accept). Is indicative of his indebtedness to Martin 
Heidegger's phenomenological method of philosophic description. ' In this 
understanding, revealing is letting a phenomenon which'has been covered-up 
(by "idle talk", etc. ) exhibit Itself as it shows itself in itself. Rudolf Bultmann 
accepts that man, before he achieves a "resolve" by "revelation" to accept 
Jesus. assumes the "general talk" and talks in an "average way" like one of 
the crowd. This gives man only an average understanding of the entity being 
discussed rather than allowing him to comprehend the entity's innermost 
structure. In § fact, his talk closes him off from the essential meaning of the 
entity being discussed " Rather, than covering over something with prior 
assumptions and projecting a prior understanding on to facts, he says we 
must go "to the things themselves". and "let things appear as they are" ®0 
However, has not Rudolf Bultmann described revelation in terms which 
reflect his own phenomenological pre-understanding of what he thinks 
revelation is? Whether or, not he articulates what is the general concept of 
revelation is debatable. Certainly. - within the Christian tradition when one 
speaks of a typical understanding of revelation one must include the sense 
that it is a disclosure by a, divine, supernatural, agency. This idea, is even 
central to common speech reflected in dictionaries. " Further, -"revelation" 
often implies a disclosure that could not be previously known by man. - In 
assuming a Heideggerian background, Rudolf Bultmann - does not consider 
and, in fact, discounts out of hand the - possibility of persons having a first 
encounter with :a term in the New Testament whose meaning is completely 
unknown to them. ` - Nonetheless, he states that we must inquire 
into the 
New Testament to determine which of the above two concepts of revelation is 
right. 
But before we can do this, Rudolf Bultmann explains, we must have the 
nature of our pre-understanding further elucidated. He characterizes our pre- 
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understanding in such a way that leads us necessarily to have to accept the 
second of his above sub-definitions before we even arrive at the New 
Testament's position. Namely, he places qualifications on what our definition 
can and cannot be. In describing the nature of our pre-understanding which 
he claims we have through tradition, his description of its nature goes far 
beyond what persons may recognize as their pre-understanding. In fact, he 
already interprets the pre-understanding of "revelation" in terms of what he 
wants and claims to find in the New Testament Itself. That Is, he lays down 
conditions for what should and should not be expected of "revelation" in the 
New Testament. In interpreting the pre-understanding, he disallows (just 
because it is wrong) that this pre-understanding could be Interpreted in the 
manner which was crystallized and developed in the philosophical tradition of 
classical, "subject-object" Greek ontology. The reason for this Is that 
"revelation" pertains to man. 
In the manner of S, dren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, Rudolf 
Bultmann assumes the fundamental, existential proposition that what 
pertains to man can be understood only when man knows it firsthand in his 
own personal existence. Understanding must begin with man and his 
existence, and then proceed from there. Whereas "things" (not man) can be 
grasped by means of objective, general concepts, any given object being 
classed as a particular example of the "general", human existence can be 
seized directly only as an individual subject' As it pertains to revelation. 
Rudolf Bultmann states, we "know about revelation because it belongs to our 
life". We cannot know "revelation" from a "subject-object" ontology as a 
concept as though it were something apart from our actual life. " To try to do 
so is to only know a concept of "revelation" and not "revelation" Itself. Rather, 
one cannot know the concep t without first knowing "revelation" itself. 
"Revelation" must begin with the "concrete man" himself and his existence 
before it becomes a matter for the understanding and rational process ' 
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Proceeding onward, Rudolf Bultmann raises the question of how 
"revelation" belongs to the individual man's life. He answers that it belongs in 
the sense that to know "revelation" is to know ourselves as those who are 
dependent on "revelation". That is, the meaning of "revelation" consists in its 
being the means by which we achieve our authenticity which we cannot 
achieve by our own resources. When we know that our, authenticity comes 
through "revelation", we likewise know that we are dependent on other than 
our own resources. We know that we are limited. Therefore, he concludes, to 
know "revelation" and authenticity, is to know our liinitation. 66 This is not 
perceptual knowledge, but what is experienced by actual living. Because we 
continually rebel against this limitation, it must constantly be brought to 
consciousness anew. "Revelation" arises in connection with the very fact of 
our limitation 67 
Rudolf Bultmann similarly employs "revelation" as Martin Heidegger uses 
"conscience" (Gewissen) which Martin Heidegger asserts offers no information 
about events, but comes from the self and "gives" man to understand his 
existential guilt, i. e. his "lack". his "limitation". " To Rudolf Bultmann, 
"revelation" lights up mari s "limitation". 
Rudolf Bultmann asserts that though unbelieving man knows of 
"revelation", he does not know it either because he can know of it only as he 
knows of himself and of his limitation and, thus, "always only anew and 
differently". ' When one inquires into the concept of "revelation" in the New 
Testament, one does not ask on the basis of certain knowledge of oneself that 
one possesses, but on the basis of a peculiarly "not knowing knowledge*. " If 
one might put it this way, he knows of himself, of his limitation, but 
ignorantly. -- 
Rudolf Bultmann gives us the parameters for a New Testament inquiry. In 
the first place, genuine inquiry occurs only if the questioner is willing to let 
the understanding of his limitation, his "not-knowing knowledge", be 
"radicalized" by the New Testament. He must be willing to let the New 
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Testament speak to him. He cannot expect to find in the New Testament a 
mere opinion which he can classify. 
Rudolf Bultmann argues that what the New Testament says about 
"limitation" can be understood only if one is himself motivated by the question 
of "limitation". Moreover, what is said about limitation by the New Testament 
can be affirmed or denied only in resolve. "' He proposes that unless one 
consistently follows through the self-understanding which he claims the New 
Testaments descriptive statements express, the interpretation will remain 
bound to the pre-understanding the reader brings with him. 
Before moving to the next stage of the argument, let me make several 
comments. If "revelation" is "an occurrence that puts me in a new situation 
as self. how can I have a prior pre-understanding of "revelation" until I have 
been put in a new situation? This is an example of the "hermeneutical 
circle" which we meet in Rudolf Bultmanri s theology and Martin Heideggers 
philosophy. Rudolf Bultmann can only presuppose a priori that man at least 
has some knowledge of himself, a "not-knowing knowledge" and, hence of 
"revelation". If what actually Is changed in the formula is only ones self- 
understanding, how does one really know that the content and self- 
understanding identified with it in the term "revelation" prior to examination 
of the New Testament correspond with the same content and self- 
understanding that the New Testament asserts? What effect would a change 
of content have on the self-understanding? Rudolf Bultmann's argument Is 
deductive . assuming a sort of existential "idealism" In that it presupposes an 
a priori system of truth in which the enquirer, man, already knows. albeit 
hidden, veiled and inchoate, what may be known. 
Rudolf Bultmann bequeathed to modern theology the methodology which 
rightly asserts that all inquirers approach the New Testament with a pre- 
understanding. Moreover, his point is well taken that a correct understanding 
hinges on whether one naively holds to his pre-understanding or lets it be 
"put in question". To "put in question" means to him that man's self- 
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understanding is "put, in question". That is, mar's understanding of himself 
"must always be laid hold of anew in resolve". Has Rudolf Bultmann let his 
pre-understanding be put in question? One notices that the ° content of 
"revelation" is never spoken of by him as being put in question. By not doing 
so, to this student's mind, he has not followed radically enough his own 
excellent exhortation to put the pre-understanding in question. 
Rudolf Bultmann s consciously philosophical approach to "revelation" 
illuminates a certain aspect of revelation. However, can we assume. 
particularly in our global, secular and pluralistic context that all who 
encounter a New Testament term for the first time already have a prior 
intellectual knowledge of the term? Is a self-understanding of our "limitation" 
the only knowledge disclosed in "revelation"? 
Nonetheless, his philosophical analysis specifically addresses the situation 
which the Kierkegaardian critique had in mind: those who have an "average" 
understanding of the New Testament, who take what they know for granted, 
and who have not reflected deeply with interior passion upon the true 
meaning of faith. 
As we proceed to a discuss the "what" of "revelation" in the New 
Testament, Rudolf Bultmann says we must first of all ask how maws 
limitation is understood there. According to him, the New Testament teaches 
that "man is limited by death 
Let us bear in mind this thesis of Martin Heideggers which is 
presupposed by Rudolf Bultmann. Martin Heidegger posits that man lives 
ahead (fore-structure, fore-throw) of himself in "projection" in which the 
possibilities of his "thrown" being are brought before himself. " "Dasein" (man) 
realizes that as long as he is, he has a "not-yet" (death) which is pending out 
in front of him and towards which "Dasein" "comports itself. "" It is not a 
death in general which concerns him but his own death which he alone must 
bear. " Martin Heidegger predicates further that death is not just the 
termination of the process of life, the final limit, but that which limits the 
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process of man's life by permeating the whole of it through and through. 7e 
Rudolf Bultmann reechoes Martin Heidegger when he affirms, 
"Death, therefore, is plainly looked upon as constituting the limit of man's 
existence and, to be sure, not simply in the sense that with it life comes 
to an end, but rather in the sense that it constitutes a disturbance of the 
whole of life. "" 
Rudolf Bultmann further declares in agreement with Martin Heidegger that 
"man rebels against death and knows that as one who is fallen under it he is 
not in his authenticity". " 
Certainly Christian theologians, traditional and otherwise, would agree 
with Rudolf Bultmann that the New Testament views death as man's 
limitation. However, classical theologians would probably take issue with this 
capital, existential assumption that death Is the final limit. A theologian like 
John Wesley would probably interpret the New Testament as declaring eternal 
death and eternal judgment the ultimate limit rather than death. 7e Since 
Rudolf Bultmann, and also Martin Heidegger, reject eternity per se and "old- 
style" metaphysics", the prospect of an eternal death as the limit to man's 
destiny would be inadmissable to them. 8° Nonetheless, while Ignoring eternity, 
Martin Heideggers sober calling of man to reckon now with his ultimate 
destiny resembles Christian teaching. 
In reflecting on their stimulating proposal that death as "limit" concerns 
man as he projects himself forward, one wonders if the factor of the 
uncertainty of knowing whether or not in fact death is the limit of existence 
should equally be considered as a concern for man eL Further. one may fairly 
ask how the existentialist knows that death is the limit of man's existence. 
How do we know that after death man does not erupt into a new, unlimited 
and unfettered form of existence? Can the existentialist avoid backing into 
the duplicitous position of speaking as though he has sat on the other side of 
death and pronounced the verdict in the similar manner as those whom the 
existentialist condemns for trying to stand outside and above history in an 
effort to make generalizations about man? " 
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THE "WHAT' OF "REVELATION" 
We recall that Rudolf Bultmann began to inquire into how Paul achieved a 
"resolve" to recognize Jesus by acquiring knowledge by "revelation". This led 
us first to consider his proposition that prior to acquiring this knowledge it 
must be assumed there already exists to some extent a "preunderstanding", a 
"not knowing knowledge" of "revelation". We elucidated this pre- 
understanding and discovered that "revelation" belongs to man's life in that 
when we come to know that we are limited, more particularly limited by 
death, we know "revelation". 
Now, with this in mind, we finally advance -to Rudolf Bultmann's 
interpretation of the New Testament's concept of "revelation". the' "what" of 
IIL revelation". The meaning of the New Testament term "reveal". "revelation" 
. c, roý gzPk 
k&V_ S begins to be unfurled in, collaboration with its 
synonyms and the words which translate it. According to Rudolf Bultmann, 
"revelation" (eLfewhaRuAt ) means - "occurrence" or "event" which are rendered 
in German as "Ereignis" or "Geschehen". " More specifically, ' Christ is spoken 
of as "revelation", in which case, so are his "words" (Worte) and "works" 
(Werke). In fact, "deed" or act (Tat) and "word" (Wort) are not only equivalent 
but Identical with *revelation". "- "Proclamation" (Verkundigung). k gq-, is 
"summons" (from "aufrufen", "to call to") and also may be "revelation". ' 
In setting out Paul's concept of "revelation", it is not unfair or facetious to 
say that Rudolf Bultmann discerns that Paul's view is expounded in harmony 
with what is today referred to as an existential-ontological analysis. Indeed, 
Rudolf Bultmann acknowledges that "all of the basic Christian concepts have 
a content that can be determined ontologically prior to faith". " Therefore. - for 
Paul, "revelation is primarily an event" 87 Negatively, this means, that 
revelation is not something which is defined and known from the perspective 
of the "subject-object" relationship. According to Rudolf Bultmann. 
"revelation" for Paul is not a communication of knowledge such as doctrine or 
dogma, whether supernatural or otherwise. " Neither is "revelation" to be 
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construed as a cosmic process that occurs outside us " Christ, the word, is 
revelation not because any timeless content or idea or truth is disclosed 90 
Naturally, this contests the classical, Christian contention which is implicit in 
John Wesley that the revelation to which Paul refers in Galatians 1: 12 is a 
direct communication from the once-dead-now-alive and ascended Jesus of 
Nazareth. " Moreover, the traditional, liberal perspective of revelation Is 
prohibited also by Rudolf Bultmann's maintenance that revelation does not 
mediate a world-view which one grasps, possesses, and applies 82 "Revelation" 
is not a new insight or fresh perspective that enriches one's world-view. 
Rudolf Bultmann rejects these views on the basis of the exdstentialist- 
ontological critique which discerns in these positions the presupposition which 
regards man as something simply given who is to be examined and classified 
as though he were just another datum or digit in the universe. Accordingly, 
man fails to understand himselfe3 
What positively does Rudolf Buitmann mean in advancing the proposition 
that revelation is "event" in which the "how" of the salvation-occurrence is 
made visible'? Firstly, while in the context of such passages as Romans 2: 5; 
8: 18f and 1 Corinthians 1: 7; 3: 13 revelation may be used to refer to a future. 
eschatological event, an eschatological event of the present is also described in 
the same terms in Romans 1: 17f and Galatians 3: 23. 's Through revelation 
and. more specifically, what is proclaimed in the message of Christ. man has 
the possibility of coming into his present, of belonging to the new aeon, the 
'now' 96 God's revelation does not designate any knowledge communicated but 
the event . which puts the man in a new situation and enables him to 
understanding himself anew. " As "event" (occurrence or divine act), 
"revelation" is that which happens to man of which he can become aware. 
More specifically, it is something of which man necessarily becomes aware 
under certain circumstances (e. g.. the - Last Judgement). It is the opening up 
(the "unveiling") through God's act of the possibility of having faith (Galatians 
3: 23) and Is effected even when no one is aware of It (Romans 1: 1810. This 
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means that the "revelation" of faith would be revealed (in the sense of 
Galatians 4: 4) even if nobody believed " 
Rudolf Bultmann finds that this same conception of "revelation" is 
corroborated with Paul's use of the term "manifest" (( VGA- °5 cw in 
Romans 3: 21 and 2 Corinthians 4: 10f. When Paul writes, "Always carrying in 
the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested 
in our bodies" he is speaking of an event. 
In what seems to allude both to the classical, Christian concept of 
prevenient grace and the presupposition of Heideggers philosophical 
"hermeneutical circle". Rudolf Bultmann states. that "the possibility of being 
understood is inherent in the eventC. " He affirms that the possibility of 
understanding is based on the operation of the divine act (through 
proclamation) because "self understanding belongs to human being as 
such". 100 Furthermore, he assumes that the Gospel has clarity by nature and 
is understandable precisely because it is the Gospel of life. "' 
Rudolf Bultmann is once again calling upon Martin - Heidegger's 
assumption upon which he founds his delineation of existence and Being in 
his book Sein Und Zeit. As we found this assumption operating in regards to 
"revelation" and the "pre-understanding". we encounter it here again in 
reference to "revelation" in the New Testament. According to Martin 
Heideggers analysis, the very fact that man asks the question of "what is 
'Being'? " Implies that he already in his existence has a certain, inchoate 
understanding of 'Being'. ý What makes man (Dasein) distinct from other 
entities and is part and parcel with his, human existence is that he not only 
raises the question of Being but'also seeks to understand it. 102 
Similarly, to Rudolf Bultmann's way of thinking, because the Gospel of life 
is implied in self understanding, the Gospel of life is presupposed in man's 
pre-understanding. As he declares, the Gospel "is understandable precisely 
because it is the Gospel of life". 109 Man can understand it because it speaks 
of man's existence. This compares in general with what Christian, expositors 
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have driven home, mainly, that the Bible and the Gospel are grasped because 
they speak to mari s real life. "' The idea that man's most fundamental quest 
finds fulfillment in the Gospel finds its locus classicus in St. Augustine 's 
prayer, "Our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee". los 
However, what seems to be unique about Rudolf Bultmann's viewpoint is 
that the Gospel of life which the human understanding grasps is portrayed in 
existential-ontological terms. Namely, the human understanding which grasps 
the Gospel of life must also be an existential-ontological understanding. In 
other words, man has the Inherent ability to understand the existential- 
ontological proclamation because he already has an existential-ontological pre- 
understanding. 
- Does man in fact seek and hear the Gospel with this pre-understanding? 
Even if we assume its validity as a broad, naked assertion, we must consider 
Its full-orbed meaning in the light of Rudolf Bultmanri s enlarged already- 
discussed delineation of man's pre-understanding of revelation. Further, has 
Rudolf Bultmann's analysis grasped the reality which answers man's 
fundamental quest? The Gospel may be understandable because it is the 
Gospel of life, but by the same token, inauthentic existence Is also 
understandable and also seems to speak to this life. How does man know 
that "authentic existence" is authentic and "inauthentic existence" is 
inauthentic? Consistent with the above, he would probably consider this an a 
priori. 
An implication of Rudolf BuItrnann's exposition is that the Gospel adds 
nothing new to the finite human equation: that is, it adds no new truth or 
communication or supernatural spiritual power which had been previously 
absent in man. Indeed, in answer to his rhetorical question about what 
revelation reveals he replies, "Nothing at all, so far as the question concerning 
revelation asks for doctrines ... or 
for mysteries that become known once and 
for all as soon as they are communicated.... ""' Is he espousing "humanism"? 
If so, what kind? The answer Is difficult neatly to determine. If one narrowly 
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restricted "humanism" to mean the preoccupation with the interests and 
meaning of man to the exclusion of a personal, living, Being -- God -- who 
from a transcendent realm of reality perforates the visible world and transmits 
to man unique reality, then Rudolf, Bultmann could be considered a 
"humanist". He does not accept as -John Wesley that revelation is a 
disclosure of eternal truth from a supernatural realm. However, if one looks 
broadly at the concept of God and understands "humanism" as an interest in 
man which disavows a god then Rudolf Bultmann would not. strictly 
speaking, be a humanist. "" 
With this background, Rudolf Bultmann discloses New Testament 
"revelation" in its definitive conception. "Christ is revelation, " he says. "" 
Indeed, "the revelation in Christ is not the first" revelation. "' but. as Paul 
expresses it, Jesus is the "last Adam" (1 Corinthians 15: 211) in whom the new 
aeon begins. "' In Johns formulation, "Jesus is the krisis" who is sent as the 
revealer. "' His coming is the turn of the age so that whoever believes in him 
passes from death to life. "' Jesus emphasized that the fact of his person was 
decisive since he claimed to be "the bearer of the definitive word of God in the 
last hour". "' 
As has been already pointed out, when Rudolf Bultmann speaks of Jesus 
being "the word", he may equally interchange "definitive word" with "decisive 
event" or "saving act of God". "4 This is a significant equation in his 
interpretation. From his study of John's teaching, he concludes that because 
the "doing of signs" (John 12: 37; 20: 30) and "miracles" is secondary in 
importance to Jesus' "words", his works (or work as a whole) are his words 
(John 5: 36; 8: 28,14: 10)"s 
In positing that "word" equals "work", Rudolf Bultmann claims he is 
harking back to the Old Testament conception of "word" which the New 
Testament now assumes. "' Firstly, he of firms that in the Old Testament "God 
speaks to man in the events of nature". '" Whether or not "the word of God" 
was viewed at one time as being audible, divine speech is uncertain. 
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Nevertheless, God's speaking eventually came to be conceived as God speaking 
through events in nature. Man mythologized events, understanding himself 
as being addressed by God. The manifestation was understood as God's word 
not in the sense that it communicated content, or eternal truth, or logical 
judgement, but in the fact that it was an event in time, a direct address, a 
word speaking to man. 18 In the might of nature, man is not only told that he 
is a dependent creature but he lets it say something to him. "' 
Secondly, God's Word can also be thought of In the ordinary sense of a 
word spoken in human speech which gives authoritative direction to man (i. e. 
as the word of a prophet). 32° 
The common ground between these two meanings is this: God's word Is 
present in the fact that "God's Word is always his sovereign command". '2' Put 
another way. "God's Word Is God in so far as he calls man into being, limits 
him, and enigmatically encompasses him". " 
The concept of "word" which Rudolf Bultmann utilizes here to build his 
case seems to draw upon the research of those who attempted to describe 
rather than explain the primitive religious consciousness of man. In his 
essay. "The Significance of Dialectical Theology For the Scientific Study of The 
New Testament" (1928). Rudolf Bultmann ý propounds that the concept of 
power. mana or orenda, is found in "primitive" religions. 12' This concept of 
"mana" was linked by the English anthropologist Robert Ranulph Marett to 
religious consciousness. ' Coming from the Pacific regions, the word 'mana' 
represented a type of religious experience widespread among primitive peoples. 
Mana is "a force altogether distinct from physical power. which acts in all 
kinds of ways for good and evil". " This force Is believed to be attached to a 
wide range of natural objects, even, for that matter, persons. Whatever 
possesses mana is tabu and Is not to be approached lightly. Correspondingly, 
he determines that the mood of "awe" which has essential constituents is the 
fundamental religious feeling. 121 
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Rudolf Bultmann's description of the word of power as mana which speaks 
to man that he is limited and dependent also has the' flavour of 
Schleiermachers "feeling of absolute dependence" or Rudolph Otto's 
"numinous" experience In which one experiences 'creature-feeling' -- the 
feeling of the nothingness of finite being". " Notwithstanding, Rudolf 
Bultmann takes issue with the concept of mana from the standpoint that it 
has been understood from a scientific viewpoint of nature rather than from 
the conception of existence. ' He argues that while the concept of "mans" 
can be transmitted by science, it can be understood only according to the 
degree that the interpreter himself understands the eeriness of existence. 12' In 
a parallel fashion to the way in which the mood of Angst ("anxiety". ' "dread") 
in Martin Heideggers existential-ontological analysis discloses the structure of 
man's existence, his limitation and finitude, 130 the - "uncanniness" of the 
"mans"-laden Word of God is seen by Rudolf Bultmann to unveil man's 
finitude and limitation. 
He' argues that this concept of the occult-power-possessing word is not 
only influential in the Old Testament, but also in later Judaism and in Jesus. 
In later Judaism, the word of -God is the law which is God's command 
confronting the community as a summons requiring obedience. "' Jesus 
remains within this Old Testament tradition in that His Word is also 
"summons", a call to decision. 132 
Rudolf Bultmann determines that the Old Testament concept of theword 
of -God is definitive for the New Testament with one exception. The New 
Testament does not speak of the word (except on occasion) as a force acting 
in natural events. Almost exclusively the word is described as being spoken 
in human speech to man. ' How does one recognize the word of God from 
other words? It is differentiated from other words in that it does not originate 
in human considerations and human intentions. It is not distinguished by a 
psychic experience, or as stemming from a certain condition of the soul or 
from what appears to be a supernatural cause. 134 In fact, there is no way to 
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discover from the outside what in human speech is God's Word. "God's Word 
is always summons and is understood as God's Word only when the 
summons is understood and heard in the real sense of the word, " says Rudolf 
Bulhnann. '35 
Therefore, It is in the light of the concept, of "word" as power and word's 
synonymity with "act" that the communication of Jesus can best be grasped. 
Rudolf Bultmann states in the Gospel of John that Jesus' words are 
construed as words of life not because they, communicate definable content, 
but because of whose words they are -- the words of God. ' Jesus' words are 
only special In and by the act of being uttered. For this reason, his doing is 
speaking and his saying is doing. As manifested In John's Gospel, practically 
all the words of Jesus are assertions about himself and do not present 
christological information or teaching of a° metaphysical - quality about his 
person. 13' In the "It is I" expressions, which Rudolf Bultmann interprets to 
mean "all that I say is I". Jesus presents himself as "the one for whom the 
world is waiting". ` 
Therefore, as the Revealer of God, Jesus "reveals nothing but that he Is the 
Revealer". He brings in his person that for which man yearns: life and 
truth. " In Jesus Christ, one is called to understand oneself anew as limited 
and as judged and as given the gift of life through which death is overcome. 
"Revelation consists in nothing other than the fact of Jesus Christ. His 
coming as such is designated as the revelation. Because he was sent, life 
was revealed...; he 'appeared', " says Rudolf Bultmann. 14O Death is the limit of 
man's existence. "Man rebels against death and knows that as one fallen 
under it he is not in his authenticity" states Rudolf Bultmann. Death 
concerns man and he knows he, from his own resources, cannot be lord over 
it. However, - "revelation" is an occurrence that abolishes death. Jesus Christ 
is this specific occurrence. "' 
Having established that Jesus Is the Revealer, Rudolf Bultmann poses the 
consequent, crucial question: How Is Jesus the Revealer and how does he 
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bring life and truth? The answer comes: In no other way than that Jesus 
says that he is It and says that he brings it. John in his Gospel presents 
only the fact ("das Dass" -- literally, "the that") of the Revelation without 
describing its content ("ihr Was" -- literally, "its what") In a rational or 
speculative way. 142 John may adopt the Gnostic mythology which speculates 
about cosmogony and soteriology, but the bare fact of the Revelation is the 
decisive thing. '43 "Revelation" is represented as the shattering and negating 
of all human self-assertion, norms, and evaluations. '" Because of this very 
fact, A he Revelation is the affirmation of the human longing for life, true 
reality. 
This can be exemplified only by the faith that overcomes the "offense" of 
shattered rationality and subjects itself to the negation. The man called to 
have such faith can ask for no credentials, no legitimation, no "testimony" to 
the validity of the word. Because God testifies to Jesus through Jesus' works 
(which are Identical to his words), the testimony Is Identical with that which 
is to be substantiated. 
Therefore. Jesus cannot legitimate himself and cannot present a 
"testimony" In the sense demanded by the world. Espousing this In 
conformity with his philosophic pre-understanding, Rudolf Bultmann discerns 
that the word of Jesus does not find Its substantiation by a backward 
movement from the attesting word to the thing attested. This would entail the 
thing itself being confirmable irrespective of the word. This cannot be. In 
contrast, however, he avows that the word of Jesus finds Its substantiation 
only In a faith-prompted acceptance of the word. Only in faith Is the attested 
matter seen and the witness recognized as genuine. '" Indeed, the object of 
faith makes Itself accessible to nothing but faith. 14" 
Rudolf Bultmann carries further this issue of how the historical fact, the 
event of Jesus Christ, Is related to "summons". This also brings us back to 
the issue raised earlier of how Paul achieved a "resolve" to recognize Jesus as 
the Lord. Specifically, the issue involves how the event of the past is related 
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to the summons of the present moment. "' It must be recounted that Jesus 
presented no teaching about his person but claimed to be the bearer of the 
definitive word of God in the last hour. It was not "what" he says but "that" 
he says it which puts all who hear him Into a new and decisive situation. 
The primitive community by resolve saw in "Jesus the One to whom God had 
assigned the office of Messiah and the One who will come again to be the 
judge and to bring salvation". "' The community proclaimed him as such and 
thereby confronted Paul with the question of whether or not he would 
acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah. Paul testifies that Jesus was made 
known to him as the Messiah by "revelation" which means that he either had 
to acknowledge or reject him by the obedience of faith. 1" Acknowledging him, 
the primitive community and Paul viewed the historic person of Jesus as the 
decisive saving act of God. While the primitive community implicitly affirmed 
that the crucified Jesus was coming as the Messiah, Paul explicitly avowed 
that the new age had begun in the historic Jesus-10 
Rudolf Bultmann affirms that "a call to decision in the light of his person 
Implies a christology". - This christology is not theoretical speculation but can 
only be the interpretation of the answer given in the decision for him. As we 
will later discuss, ascriptions to the nature of the Messiah proceed from faith 
and are not properties that may be observed prior to faith. 
Rudolf Bultmann submits that the primitive community's resolve to 
confess Jesus as Messiah shows that Jesus' word, that fact of his speaking 
and not its content, is understood as the decisive act of God. "" A crucial 
corner is turned at this juncture. The further transmission of Jesus' 
proclamation became not a simple reproduction of Jesus ideas, but "Christ 
the proclaimer had to become the proclaimed". " Hence, this means that the 
proclamation of Christ itself became the summons, the question of whether or 
not one would affirm the historical, crucified Jesus as Messiah and the 
decisive saving act of God. ' Thus, as " Rudolf Bultmann confidently 
concludes, the "great enigma of New Testament theology". "how the proclaimer 
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became the proclaimed", is solved in the realization that what is decisive is 
"that he proclaimed". " 
Paul was asked whether he would acknowledge, in the ambiguous 
historical fact of the cross, the judgement of God upon mans prior self 
understanding as a historical fact. " On the one hand, the cross of Christ Is 
an objective fact of the world perceived by observation. On the other hand, 
the saving act of God is a fact of salvation in the sense that it is not an 
objective fact in the world which can be perceived by observation. "" That the 
word declares the cross to be the saving fact is the "folly" of the cross. The 
proclamation is not a mere factual communication given once and for all. It 
is preached continually again and again. "For in the communication of the 
fact of salvation there is a summons, a question to be decided, an Invitation; 
says Rudolf Bultmann. 's' As Jesus' person and speaking, in virtue of the fact 
that they were proclamation, called the primitive community to decision, so 
now even the proclamation (the death and resurrection is the "saving act of 
God") calls persons in every "now" to decision. In other words, what Jesus 
himself and his proclamation was to the primitive community, the preaching 
is to persons in the here and now. 
Moreover, since "the that", the "here and now", the factuality of Jesus 
person constitutes the revelation, the kerygma is his that, his here and now 
which becomes contemporary in ' the address itself. ' As Jesus did not 
proclaim historical teaching or information about himself, neither does the 
kerygma, the preaching. Further, Rudolf Bultmann warns us of the 
illegitimacy of trying to go' behind the kerygma In an effort to reconstruct a 
"historical Jesus". The historical Jesus is not the Lord but Jesus Christ, the 
Christ preached, who is the Lord. "' 
The Christ event is further consummated In the preaching of the Word. 
The apostle Paul's preaching of it is itself "event" and calls persons to a 
decision. In the apostle's preaching (2 Corinthians 5: 20), Christ himself 
summons men. As Rudolf Bultmann concisely summarizes, "Christ becomes 
254 
contemporary in the preaching. "1e0 Therefore, Paul terms the preaching of the 
Gospel, just as he does the death and resurrection of Jesus, the "saving act of 
God". " The eschatological now of the death and resurrection of Jesus is not 
a past instant in vanishing time but is the eschatological now, expressly by 
being always contemporary whenever the preaching trumpets. '" If the Christ 
event ends the old aeon and begins the new, so does Paul's preaching. For 
the "Word" proclaims that an act of God has already been done and is being 
done again now as the word is being spoken to us. As Rudolf Bultmann 
remarks, "That this word is said, the fact of the saying, makes the new age 
present .... We meet our present moment as those to whom forgiveness has 
already been accorded in the cross and resurrection. "" 
Not mere communication of knowledge to which one may return, the 
occurrence of the proclamation as event is itself part of the revelation. In 
fact, the preaching apostle is part of the Gospel. "He actually speaks for 
Christ', so that God himself is 'appealing' through him. "'" Rudolf Bultmann 
writes that "revelation is effected precisely in the proclamation". It is 
addressed not to the interest or curiosity of others, but to their consciences. 
(2 Corinthians 4: 2). ' Because Paul preaches and it is in human words that 
the event occurs, Paul becomes Christ for his hearers. " Indeed, access to 
Jesus is only in the preaching. " 
"In the proclamation", explains Rudolf Bultmann, "Jesus is, so to speak, 
duplicated. He comes again, he is always coming again". 168 
Let me pause to reflect briefly upon Rudolf Bultmann's formulation. The 
obvious question facing any Christian theology in the aftermath of Jesus' 
death is how and in what way the event is relevant to individuals in 
subsequent generations. Traditional. Christian teaching such as John 
Wesley's has affirmed from the New Testament onwards that the 
supernaturally. resurrected Jesus through the Holy Spirit continued in every 
new generation to live and work and bring to bear upon the life of every 
individual. believer the effects of His life, death, and resurrection. 
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For Rudolf Bultmann, such a metaphysical explanation is unacceptable 
and untenable in the modem world. Moreover, the salvation-occurrence can 
neither be present as a "reminiscent" historical account which acts upon us 
by "moving" us. Nor is it present "in the after-effect of a significant fact of 
world-history". " In addition to the conceptual framework and understanding 
already elucidated, Rudolf Bultmann assumes in arguing for the recurrence of 
the salvation-occurrence the modern, historical thought of such persons as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Dilthey, and Collingwood. Common among these is a 
rejection of the traditional Christian understanding of history as a linear 
progression of causes and effects marching toward the transcendent God's 
ultimate goal. More compatible with them is a concept of history which is 
relativistic and cyclical. By way of example, Nietzsche propounded the theory 
of "eternal recurrence" in which he held that all events eternally recur. "' 
Also, Martin Heidegger set down the idea of "repetition" (wiederholbar) in 
which he held that one goes back into the past in such a manner as to regain 
the possibility which it contains making this possibility present In ones own 
existence today. 171 Likewise, Rudolf Bultmann argues that the salvation. 
occurrence may recur in the Individual's life today just as it occurred in 
Paul's. He assumes "the that" becomes contemporary, it Is duplicated. 
whenever the proclamation is preached. The individual today may allow the 
preaching to become for him a challenge in every "now" to accept the crucified 
Jesus as the Messiah just as Paul. Indeed, the "that" of Christ. "revelation" 
will once again be disclosed when the contemporary individual submits 
himself to the proclamation. 
One appreciates Rudolf Bultmann s desire to argue that there is continuity 
in human experience from generation to generation and era to -era. Even 
though we are of different eras with different world-views, we share a common 
humanness which transcends these and remains ever relevant and able to be 
recaptured. Rudolf Bultmann, as the "historical school", achieves his 
conclusions by assuming that history is without ultimate goal, purpose, 
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universal value, or eternal meaning. However, Rudolf Bultmann assumes that 
in every age to every hearer the proclamation is "summons" which reveals to 
everyone who submits to it a new self-understanding and the knowledge that 
Jesus is God's saving Word. Does not he assume that the proclamation has 
a constant meaning or effect? What guarantees that every or any hearer in 
every generation will understand the proclamation as Rudolf Bultmann 
describes It? In addition, how do we understand Christian experience and 
testimony prior to Rudolf Bultmann? 
True to his anthropological approach, Rudolf Bultmann seems to invert the 
guardian of meaning when he wrenches Its hold from the transcendent, 
personal Being God and gives it to constant, human existence. John Wesley 
assumed that Jesus' death and resurrection appearance were objective, 
historical events which were filled with objective meaning such that 
concomitant with the events an actual change in status between God and 
humankind occurred (distinct from maxis response) once and for all. Of 
course, such an idea is ostensibly alien to Rudolf Bultmann's premises and he 
would deny it as metaphysical speculation which man cannot validate. While 
Rudolf Bultmann accepts that Jesus death on Golgotha was an objective, 
historical event, he denies that it carries objective, eternal meaning for and 
effect on the cosmos and humankind in general. He does argue that it has a 
constantly repeating, subjective effect (to which classical Christian thought 
would also agree). In any regards, given the choice, Rudolf Bultmann is more 
ready to venture that the trustee of meaning Is Dasein rather than a personal. 
transcendent, Deity. 
In rounding out the discussion of Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of 
grace. expressly Jesus Christ as the saving act of God (the salvation- 
occurrence), we draw attention to the issue of how the New Testament 
christological affirmations relate to the proclamation. We may begin by saying 
that Rudolf Bultmann readily assures us that statements about Christ's pre- 
existence and incarnation are neither to be seen as "speculative theory about 
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a divine being" nor as cosmological mythology which does not have the 
character of direct challenge. 172 The New Testament knows nothing of a Jesus 
viewed as an object or world phenomenon among other objects of the world 
who may be explained, e. g., in terms of human development and personality. 
The historical Jesus does not make any demand on us. '" 
Rudolf Bultmanri s thesis refers back to his philosophic pre-understanding 
which underlies his criticism of former historical research of the New 
Testament. According to his appraisal. when it studied Christ it made the 
unconscious assumption that the New Testament shared its philosophy. "' 
The New Testaments statements about Christ where accepted as statements 
about a world phenomenon whose nature could be correctly described. In 
other words, modern research measured the New Testament by a modern 
scientific Weltanschauung. Consequently, the New Testaments teaching 
appeared to historical research to consist of borrowed mythologies which were 
applied to the concrete, historical figure Jesus. "s Demonstrating the 
presupposition of Feuerbach's analysis, Rudolf Bultmann argues the historical 
figure Jesus became the occasion for believing the "old wishes" and "hopes" to 
be reality. These "fantastic dreams" were superimposed upon him to the form 
of the mythologies. Consequently. his individual features were almost 
completely concealed and christology was turned into mythology. "' 
Therefore, Rudolf Bultmann asserts that New Testament statements about 
Jesus are not to be taken as ascriptions of his nature (mythological or 
otherwise) in the mode of a neutral observer. Consequently, he affirms that 
the historical Jesus of the synoptics does not summon us to "believe in" his 
person. " 
Trying to read the New Testament christological affirmations as statements 
of the objective, manifest nature of the historical figure Jesus is to perceive 
"Christ after the flesh". For this offense, "liberalism" as well as "rationalism" 
and "pietism" may be tried and convicted by him. "' Rudolf Bultmann 
confesses point-blank that it is impossible to see what more was done by the 
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historical Jesus who goes to his death in obedient love than was done by all 
those who, for example, in the World War took the same road, also in 
obedient love". "' He pungently adds, "I have done him no wrong and he has 
nothing to forgive me". 'e° Indeed, according to him, "Christ after the flesh" is 
no concern of ours. "' 
After having argued negatively that from a scientific world-view the 
christological New Testament sayings are mythological and are not to be 
examined as propositions regarding the historical Jesus' objective nature, 
Rudolf Bultmann sets down positively the manner in which they are to be 
beheld. Though historical research's study of Jesus failed. nonetheless, he 
finds that this research reopened the christological road from "teaching about 
Christ" to "faith in Christ". " 
For the first time, the real significance of the teaching about Jesus is 
shown to be not in the mythological content of the statements but in the 
multiple expressions as one conviction of faith. '' More particularly, 
christology is the expression of a new self-understanding. 
Let us follow Rudolf Bultmann s analysis of the emergence of this new 
discovery. He seeks to carry forward what he deemed as the praiseworthy 
work of Johannes Weiss and Wilhelm Bousset. While recognizing the great 
merit of Wilhelm Bousset's conclusion, he corrects Wilhelm Bousset by 
positing that christology is not "simply the expression of the cultic piety" of 
Hellenisitic Chrisitianity. 184 Rather, christology is "proclamation" or 
"summons". '' Rudolf Bultmann claims, "Jesus presented no teaching about 
his person" but rather stressed that "the fact of his person" was decisive since 
he was "the bearer of the definitive word of God". "' This call to decision, to 
acknowledge him, implies a christology and not theoretical speculation. The 
christology which was implicit in Jesus became explicit in the primitive 
community in that christology "can only be the interpretation of the answer 
given in the decision for him .... »187 
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As far as it goes, Paul's christology (basically John's as well) was ý the 
verbal response of his new self-understanding. '" As for faith, the response to 
the summons is given expression in words. - "the, verbal response is 
christology". "' Said another way, Pauline christology is nothing "other than 
the proclamation of the saving act of God which took place in Christ". 
Therefore, Rudolf Bultmann discerns that the incarnation of the pre-existent 
Son has a "cosmic" dimension; that Is, `a "historic (geschichtliche) 
dimension". 180 In other words, the incarnation has an existential dimension. 
It is encountered in the Christian proclamation. The existence, of a 
proclamation from God is expressed mythologically in what is said of the pre- 
existent Christ. What the hearer affirms when he believes the pre-existent 
Christ is not facts about the historical Jesus, but " that -he has been 
encountered by the word of God. 19' 
Rudolf Bultmann's guide for evaluating Paul's christological statements is 
found in two, closely interwoven 'conclusions: one, christology is the 
proclamation of the Christ event as direct summons; two, it is likewise 
theological explanation of the new self-understanding of the believer, as 
indirect summons. Regarding the latter, Paul's historical situation demanded 
a "critical-polemic" explanation using contemporary mythological conceptions 
which were meaningful to his particular generation. 192 Because the 
conceptions change over time, he asserts that Paul must be critically 
examined at this point. In any case, all the images say one thing: the 
historical fact of the cross is God's saving act. 193 
TWO FAITHS 
Implicit in the discussion of Jesus Christ's relation to the proclamation, 
another issue for investigation and evaluation considers whether a hearer 
must respond to the salvation-occurrence with two acts of faith. Must the 
hearer of the proclamation have both (1) a conviction that Jesus Christ is by 
nature the pre-existent Son of God who became man, died, and was raised. 
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and (2) a belief in the saving significance of these-events? ' Rudolf Bultmann 
avers that if one takes Paul's statements literally on face value, then not only 
"two acts of faith" but also "two concepts of belief must be differentiated. '" 
The first conception of belief means the "willingness to consider true (believe) 
the facts reported of the pre-existent Son of God -- incarnation, crucifixion, 
resurrection from the dead -- and to see in them a demonstration of the grace 
of God". "" In defining the second type of faith he states, "The second is a 
faith which is self-surrender to the grace of God and which signifies the utter 
reversal of a man's previous understanding of himself .:. " He maintains that 
for the concept of faith-belief to be homogeneous and the decisive act of faith- 
belief to be one, the decision-question of whether or not a man gives up his 
old self-understanding and understands himself from the grace of God must 
be one and the same question as the question of whether, or not he, will 
acknowledge Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Lord. To Rudolf Bultmanri s 
mind, this is exactly Paul's Intention. '" 
Rudolf Bultmanri s'method follows Kierkegaard's regarding how the act of 
faith is connected with its object. Kierkegaard reversed the traditional Roman 
Catholic order (which John Wesley essentially accepted, though with some 
flexibility and-with his ' own qualifications) of the two types of faith. Roman 
Catholicism had held that unformed faith (fides informis), the prior "faith" 
which. accepts prescribed doctrines, becomes true faith when love (caritas) is 
subsequently added to the equation. " Thus, the interior aspect of faith 
succeeded the intellectual assent to the content of faith. In contradistinction, 
Kierkegaard urged that the "how" (the qua -- the interiority of faith, the 
decision to believe) comes prior to the "what" (the guae -- the content of 
faith). '' Indeed, he argued that the certainty of objective, historical 
statements regarding Jesus could never be so sure as to provide a basis for 
belief in him. ' Only faith, which originates from the inner self, can attain 
the object 2O0 
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While Rudolf Bultmann is to be distinguished from Kierkegaard in that 
Rudolf Bultmann has formed a definite and certain understanding of the 
nature of the christological statements, nevertheless, he definitely concurs that 
the evidence that Jesus Christ is the pre-existent Son of God and resurrected 
Lord can be visible only to those who have faith 2O1 That God's revelation is in 
Jesus Christ cannot be demonstrated to the neutral observer. 202 Neither can 
Christ be recognized In his divine quality in order to progress to faith' To 
try to do so is to try-to remove the very stumbling block of the Gospel that 
confronts natural man. The very question before man Is: Will he believe that 
God's forgiving grace is in this human figure Jesus? ' Will he accept in faith 
that the crucified Jesus 'is the Messiah? Without-the offense, there is no 
revelation ' It is through the judgement of the cross, the "stumbling block", 
that human pride -- human "wisdom", human ideals, and Weltanschauunge -- 
is broken ' 
How the Church in the Easter faith surmounted the cross's scandal is 
unimportant to Rudolf Bultmann. 2O' To try to go back behind the belief and 
discover the resurrection of Jesus as a historical objective event or to search 
behind the kerygma to reconstruct a historical Jesus is to ruin the paradox of 
"the Word was flesh". ' It is not the historical Jesus who is the Lord, but it 
is Jesus Christ, the Christ preached who is the Lord ' 
Furthermore, Rudolf Bultmann buttresses himself against the challenge for 
prior evidence that the man Jesus Is the, Messiah and risen Christ by saying 
that the very counter-question already demonstrates a rejection of the 
proclamation. To question the proclaimer s right to its claim means that the 
claim is already rejected 21° To consider answering the question "Why this 
specific man? " is to elicit Rudolf Bultrnann s thunderous warning: "That is a 
question that must not, may not, be answered -- for to do so would destroy 
the offense which belongs ineradicably to the Revelation. "211 
Rudolf Bultmanri s concern over the "two acts of faith" is this: Are 
Protestants consistent in claiming that man is saved alone by faith sola fide 
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which trusts in the atoning death and resurrection of Jesus Christ while also 
holding that assent to certain truths (e. g. Jesus Deity) Is necessary? If faith 
alone is necessary for salvation, how can anything else be required of man? 
His critical engagement with this issue is contested on two flanks: (1) If a 
confession of doctrinal truth is required prior to faith, has not then a work of 
man been made necessary for salvation? (2) Is not mere assent to correct 
doctrines the prescription for an impersonal, stultifying, rational orthodoxy? 
He shared this concern with his Marburg teacher Wilhelm Herrmann who 
protested against this emphasis in the German Protestant Church? " In 
keeping with Martin Luthers reaction to the Roman Catholic Insistence that 
formal confession was the way to salvation, Rudolf Bultmann assumes 
Wilhelm Herrmann's point that Martin Luther "would not allow that a 'work' 
of reasoned and determined assent to doctrines and narratives is real faith". "' 
Moreover, Rudolf Bultmann is likely uneasy about the intellectual suffocation 
and opprobrium that he believes an uncritical acceptance of questionable 
doctrines forces upon thinking Christians In the contemporary age. 
Rudolf Bultmann's heedful attention is rightfully directed to these matters. 
It may very well be that no answer is entirely adequate to resolve the issue. 
Protestants in the spirit of the Reformation would be sympathetic to his desire 
to insure that faith alone and not "works" is the condition for salvation. John 
Wesley shares his concern for avoiding a Christian faith that is reduced to a 
rational affirmation of propositions. Moreover. there is hopefully a widespread 
desire for intellectual integrity. 
- Of course, central to the controversy is how faith (and works) is defined. 
It may be argued in compliance with Rudolf Bultrnann that, indeed, neither 
the knowledge (notitia of propositional of irmations regarding the nature of 
Jesus person nor the mental agreement (assensus) to them saves? " 
However, while both Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley agree at this point, it 
is also precisely here that they disagree. According to Rudolf Bultmann, the 
above proposition can be valid only if one does not view literally the New 
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Testament affirmations of Jesus. John Wesley and those of the classical, 
theological position would hold that the christological affirmations and Jesus 
nature are correlative. Albeit agreement to them does not save, agreement is, 
nonetheless, a necessary condition. 
As has been observed, one of the interests of Protestants is to protect the 
notion of sola fide. While Protestants agree on this, they are at odds with 
each other as to what constitutes a "work". Protestants would seem to be 
agreed with Wilhelm Herrmann that notitia, knowledge. "is certainly a 
necessary condition for faith". "' One might fairly say this knowledge which 
both he and Rudolf Bultmann accept is the hearing of the fact of the 
Christian faith 21" 
However, the subject of assensus scatters opinion. Rudolf Bultmann, also. 
Wilhelm Herrmann, , insists on by-passing assensus because required 
confession of doctrine previous to fiducia is defined by him as a human effort. 
In considering their point, the nature of "confession" must be distinguished. 
Does "confession" mean that one views this assent to doctrine as containing 
the salvic power of salvation? Or, is it the acknowledgement of the fact which 
is only the condition that puts them in the range of the fiducia (faith) which 
saves? Moreover, the distinction between assenting to doctrine and to the 
"facts" of Scripture must be made. However, then the argument centers upon 
what is not only to be considered doctrine and teaching as opposed to 
historical and Scriptural "fact" but also the nature of each. 
Indeed, the description of the nature of a "work" can become contrived. If 
"work" is defined so narrowly as to Include any involvement of a person, then 
the inner action of perception, thought, or will, or any outward bodily action 
involves the person "doing something". A person could be saved only without 
his free will. This suits neither Rudolf Bultrmnn nor John Wesley. Should 
we press Paul further than he intends to go? In Paul's description of "works", 
it is doubtful that he had in mind that a mental affirmation to the literally 
pre-existent Jesus' death and resurrection for salvation was a boast of self 
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confidence. 
Rudolf Bultmann and Wilhelm Herrmann tend to stereotype any persons 
who speak of the acceptance of christologlcal affirmations as a condition of 
faith according to the Roman Catholic teaching of assensus. The assent to 
scriptural, christological statements may be distinguished from a recital of all 
the church's credal affirmations. Indeed, Rudolf Bultmann, just as John 
Wesley, does recognize the useful contradistinction between the doctrines and 
teachings of the church and the "fact(s)" of Scriptural assertion. 
However, the definition and nature of these "facts" would be debated. A 
further distinction may be made between "facts" of Scripture in general and 
the "facts" immediately relevant as conditional to the realization of saving 
faith. That is, it may be that certain, essential christological attributes of 
Jesus Christ taken together form the immediate object of faith. To winnow 
the christological affirmations from "the facts" that "he lived and died" may be 
substituting one object of faith for a different one. Rudolf Bultmann would 
not likely accept this for he would not accept that sifting the christological 
baggage from "the facts" has altered the object of faith. His assumption is 
that the christological statements have no objective correlation in historical 
reality to the historical man Jesus. Therefore, their presence or absence does 
not alter the object of faith. In contrast, one like John Wesley who assumes 
that the christological affirmations are indigenous to Jesus' nature would 
maintain that their absence significantly alters the object of faith. "? 
Rudolf Bultmann by dropping any concept of "assensus" prior to faith goes 
beyond Martin Luther, historic Protestantism, and John Wesley. There is 
agreement between Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Luther in the assertion that 
one must find redemption in Jesus before truly understanding him. 
Notwithstanding this, Martin Luther is distinguished from Rudolf Bultmann in 
that, for Martin Luther, finding redemption leads the believer into the true 
knowledge of the literal Deity of Jesus Christ as the eternal, transcendent 
God. For Rudolf Bultmann. finding redemption leads to no such thing. 
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Redemption results in an affirmation which only expresses ones self 
understanding, not an objective, transcendent reality. Presumably, Martin 
Luther would hold if "the believer" did not come to acknowledge Jesus as 
literal God, then his redemption would not be authentic. By severing "Jesus" 
from the ascriptions regarding him, Rudolf Bultrnanri sfaith lacks a 
commanding and convincing locus which keeps Christian faith moored and 
tethered. 
Though Wilhelm Herrmann admits Martin Luther still clings to the idea of 
assensus (albeit modified), Rudolf Bultmann s design is to make a case for a 
Christian faith which may circumvent the whirlpool issue of the historical 
Jesus. 218 Inasmuch as the traditional ascriptions of the person of Jesus are 
made part and parcel with accepting Hirn as the crucified and risen Messiah, 
Rudolf Bultmann would consider Christian faith not possible. According to 
him, we shall never know what to believe about Jesus because his person Is 
so veiled in ambiguity and mystery. 
Nonetheless. Rudolf Bultmann's proposal does not appear to eliminate, 
ameliorate, or overcome the ambiguity. The objectively ambiguous person 
Jesus remains just as objectively ambiguous after faith as before faith. No 
amount of post-faith appended, mythological accretions can change this. At 
some point in time before, during, or after faith and in harmony with proper 
Christian faith, a believer must be allowed sober, rational reflection upon the 
proposition: a person makes a life-changing decision involving a radically new 
self-understanding on the sole basis of a historically remote man about whom 
extremely little of any material importance is known. Rather than Rudolf 
Bultmann's faith proposal really overcoming the ambiguity of Jesus has it not 
remained moored to it? The ambiguity remains: Why this man? Why does 
this particular person Jesus become "the that"? What makes the preaching of 
Jesus' death as the saving act of God become in turn "the that"? Why we 
should be compelled to accept that the word of God was revealed in Jesus in 
any way differently from any other person is ambiguous. Why should we 
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consider that our self-understanding is tied to the death of this man and not 
to the death of another messiah such as Theudas (Acts 5: 36)? If Rudolf 
Bultmann accepts that not knowing what to believe about Jesus because of 
his ambiguity is enough to thwart traditional faith in the traditional Jesus, 
then of what advantage is his proposal which remains ambiguous? 
Has Rudolf Bultmanri s formulations made the salvation-occurrence and 
the Christian faith less absurd than traditional formulations? Though not his 
desire, nonetheless. does he not end up unintentionally ridiculing faith in the 
salvation-occurrence by mating it such a farcical proposal? Can it really be 
maintained that the decision of faith called for by him is any less a 
sacrificium intellectus than, say, the consideration that the New Testament 
testifies that Jesus' bodily resurrection appearance was as an objective 
event? "' 
Rudolf Bultmann argues that to insist on objective teachings which 
attempt to demonstrate Jesus' person is to rob the cross of its "scandal". 
From another perspective, these ascriptions which attempt to set forth Jesus 
only heighten and fully define the "scandal". The assertions that the eternal, 
supernatural God has. become man, was crucified, and literally rose from the 
dead certainly do not make faith easier! As some may argue, it is only upon 
this basis that Christian faith is properly exercised. Moreover, may it be 
precisely because such a faith is so scandalous that Rudolf Bultmann has 
embarked upon a new theological interpretation? 
SUMMARY 
To summarize, grace like righteousness is not a quality of God's, such as 
timeless kindliness, but is an "occurrence". In a dialectical, theological 
fashion, Rudolf Bultmann proposes that grace is apprehended from the 
contrasting perspective of God's judgement. While indebted to Martin Luthers 
form of arguing that grace is veiled in its opposite, Rudolf Bultmann departed 
from him by conceiving that grace was a new understanding which arises 
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from out of human existence rather than that which is given to man by the 
transcendent God. Satisfied with main conclusions regarding the New 
Testament term "grace". Rudolf Bultmanri s overriding interest is to 
demonstrate that grace is fundamentally God's eschatological deed, the 
salvation-occurrence, Jesus Christ's death and resurrection. He accords with 
classical Christian interpretations in focusing grace in the specific act of 
Christ while differing from them in denying its validity as a general category 
or description of a transcendent, personal God's character. 
The quest central to Rudolf Bultmanri s investigation of the salvation- 
occurrence is how the salvation-occurrence can be recognized and experienced 
by man as the "deed of grace". Because it has no objective meaning in and of 
itself, the historical event of Jesus' death is the "deed of grace" only when it is 
so recognized. Rudolf Bultmann s `illumination of the thought-complexes 
which Paul harnesses to explain the significance of the event leads us toward 
the unfolding of his answer. 
Several figures appear in Paul's writings but are dwarfed by the 
importance that Paul accords to the figures of the mystery religion divinity 
and the Gnostic myth. Drawing upon Wilhelm Bousset's research, Rudolf 
Bultrnann claims Paul alloyed the idea of initiates sharing in the fate of the 
mystery religion's divinity with the humiliation and exaltation of the Gnostic 
"Redeemer myth". This was done in order to portray that the Christian 
believer may likewise share in the freedom from the powers achieved by the 
salvation-occurrence. While Rudolf Bultmann deems it irrelevant, to the critic 
the question as to why Paul in the first place should desire to link Jesus 
common death to the individual's personal experience is irrepressible. 
The comparison of the "Redeemer-myths" with the New Testament 
proclamation show, rather than tight correlation, significant disparity in form, 
content and motif. Moreover, a favourable comparison depends upon the 
construction one puts upon the highly figurative myths as well as upon the 
New Testament. The question as to why the ordinary, historical Jesus of 
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Nazareth elicited such bombastic language regarding himself and why it was 
determined he should be construed, In, terms of mythology - remains 
unsatisfactorily explained. - 
Rudolf Bultmann straight forwardly asserts that Paul acquired by 
"revelation" the knowledge he needed to confess Jesus. En route to this 
understanding of "revelation". he unveils the presence of a prior pre- 
understanding of "revelation" which he describes in phenomenological, 
Heideggerian terms as an "opening-up" of ourselves. This pre-understanding 
indicates we already have some understanding of the New Testament idea of 
"revelation" by having a "not knowing knowledge" in which we realize that we 
are "limited" by death. We pointed out that this argument assumes: (1) that 
the natural man already has familiarity with the content of the New 
Testament (2) that the content of the New Testament term "revelation" is 
completely continuous with the term's content in a non-Christian setting. 
Further, one may doubt Rudolf Bultmann's account lives up to its own 
exhortation to "put in question" one's pre-understanding by not really allowing 
the existential-ontological pre-understanding to be "put in question" by the 
New Testament. While the existential approach to "revelation" finds the speck 
in the eye of "old-style" Christian metaphysics and would chastise it for 
holding that eternal death is the ultimate limit on man, it does not 
acknowledge the particle in its own eye when, as though it also had news 
from the other side of the grave, it asserts that human death is the final limit 
on man. 
For Rudolf Bultmann. "revelation" in the New Testament is an "event", an 
"occurrence". It is not a communication of knowledge which could be known 
from the perspective of the subject-object relationship but is an eschatological 
event which happens to man in the present of which he can become aware. 
As Christians all along have maintained, the Gospel of life as revelation can 
be understood because the Gospel is presupposed in mats understanding. 
However, for Rudolf Bultmann this means that man has the inherent ability 
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to understand the existential-ontological proclamation because he already has 
an existential-ontological pre-understanding. Because he disavows any 
introduction from the "outside" of a new communication or, transcendent, 
preternatural power which bestows the new understanding, he seems to open 
himself to the charge of Pelagianism. 
The definitive revelation is Jesus Christ, the "Word". Harking back to the 
Old Testament and the concept of mana, Jesus' word in the New Testament is 
perceived in accordance with primitive religious consciousness as possessing a 
power which discloses man's finitude and limitations and confronts him as 
"summons" to accept Jesus as the Lord who unveils to man a new, self- 
understanding. 
How does Jesus the Revealer bring life and truth? In no other way than 
that he says that he does. Jesus does not try to authenticate himself but is 
only substantiated in a faith-prompted acceptance of his word. He does not 
offer "what" -- discoursive teaching -- but only "that" he is God's word. 
Because his proclamation is only "that", it is something that can only be 
accepted or rejected, but not examined. 
Christology developed in the church's response to its acceptance of Jesus 
summons. Likewise, in the manner of Jesus, it proclaimed a christology 
which did not stress content but only the fact "that" Jesus proclaimed he was 
the saving act of God. This "that" which once confronted Paul, also confronts 
others contemporaneously in the preaching. For in the preaching, Jesus is 
"duplicated" and Christ becomes contemporary. In fact, it is true to say that 
Paul, any preacher for that matter, becomes Christ for his hearers in a way 
that the "that" once again summons the hearer. Hence, the truth in the 
humorous quip that "when Bultmann enters the pulpit, God speaks". 
Rudolf Bultmann may be recognized as arguing what traditional, Christian 
teaching has all along espoused: namely, that the salvation event may become 
contemporary in the present. The contradistinction between he and the 
Christian past is that he argues from a historically relativistic and cyclical 
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perspective which, 'nevertheless, assumes that human experience and 
understanding are constant and perpetual. While previous Christian thought, 
both liberal and conservative, presumes that Christian experience is perpetual, 
conservative thought does so only in connection with the assumption that a 
supernatural God who is both transcendent and immanent continues to reveal 
Himself in human experience. At bottom, Rudolf Bültmann would rather 
entrust the perpetuity of meaning to human understanding than to a 
personal, supernatural God. 
In determining how the christological affirmations of Jesus relate to the 
proclamation, Rudolf Bultmann ascertains that christology is not to be 
interpreted as a description of the objective nature of a divine being or, 
similarly. In the manner of modern critical research, as mythologies applied to 
the historical Jesus which likewise speak of his nature. 
From out of the ashes of destructive modern research, Rudolf Bultmann 
arrives at his understanding of christology as the expression of a new self. 
understanding. More specifically, Paul's (and Johns) christology was the 
verbal response of a new self understanding which had resulted from their 
decision for Christ. Indeed, mythological constructs were used but only to 
communicate one thing: that the historical fact of the cross is God's saving 
act. 
In the manner of Martin Luther and particularly Sylren Kierkegaard, Rudolf 
Bultmann reversed the accustomed Roman Catholic order of faith by asserting 
that the "willingness to consider true" follows upon the heels of prior self 
surrender. To proceed otherwise is to destroy the "stumbling block" of the 
cross and automatically repudiate the claim. 
Fiducia's precedence over assensus is promoted as avoiding the 
jeopardizing of the tenet of sola fide, as prohibiting a static doctrinal 
confessionalism, and as a guard against intellectual suffocation. Rudolf 
Bultmann interprets required assent to ascriptions to Jesus prior to faith 
(except the ascription that Jesus "lived and died") as demanding human effort 
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and, therefore, as a form of "works righteousness". John Wesley and classical 
Protestants would view the acceptance of the Scriptural. christological 
ascriptions, including his death, as the necessary groundwork and condition 
for the faith which saves. If the ascriptions are, as Rudolf Bultmann 
suggests, expressions of faith not correlative to the historical Jesus, then one 
may appreciate his contention that the necessary acceptance of these are of 
the nature of a "work". However, if, as John Wesley assumed, the ascriptions 
are to be taken together as integral correlatives of the object of faith, then 
assumed acceptance of them does not conflict but allows soles fide. 
While Rudolf Bultmann's proposed understanding of the salvation- 
occurrence aims at providing an object of faith which has by-passed the 
"ambiguity" about Jesus' person, nevertheless, it remains enshrouded in the 
ambiguity of why and upon what rational basis the saving Word of God and 
recurring new, self- understanding should be linked with this man's death 
and its proclamation. 
Mindful of this, there is irony in the fact that Rudolf Bultmanri s project 
seeks to remove intellectual leprosy from the Christian Gospel all the while 
maintaining that self-surrender and radical authentic self-understanding are 
necessarily connected to the death of a historically, remote man about whom 
very little of any material importance is really known and about whom the 
question "Why this specific man? " Is forbidden to be answered. 
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215. Herrmann, Communion With God, p. 225. 
216. Rudolf Bultmann states that persons must hear the proclamation 
and know that the historical man Jesus died. 
217. To believe in Jesus as my Saviour is to trust that He who was 
incarnated, died, and is now alive is the One through whose 
incarnation, death, and resurrection I am offered forgiveness, 
declared righteous, and given eternal life. The attributes and 
ascriptions of Jesus only point to the entity from whom faith is 
promised and through whom it is given. Integral to the claim that 
Jesus died for me are the concomitant ascriptions (e. g., the pre- 
existent Son of God who rose from the dead) which must all be taken together as a united whole leading the believer to Him whom faith grasps. 
218. Herrmann, Communion With God, pp. 222ff. 
219. Let us venture several additional comments. Is it likely that the 
first century Gentiles with a Greek world view who heard the 
testimony to Jesus under the tutelage of Paul would have 
understood the ascriptions of Jesus to be anything other than 
informational statements? If they did so understand them, why do 
we not find in the New Testament specific Pauline letters aimed at 
counteracting and correcting their misunderstanding? Moreover, in 
light of the Greek predisposition, why do we not find In the biblical 
texts any Pauline dialogue or explanation Insuring the clarity of his 
understanding against the Greek ontic framework? Further, 
assuming Rudolf Bultmann s argument, if the Christians wanted to 
proclaim these ascriptions of Jesus as objective truth (even if it be 
argued this Is an unauthentic approach to man), how else would 





In the preface to his characterization of the full structure and meaning of 
faith in the New Testament, Rudolf Bultmann recalls in his Theoloor of the 
New Testament that "faith" was already introduced in the discussion on "God's 
righteousness". Moreover, faith's nature was clarified in the investigation of 
"grace". ' We may also bear in mind that the presentation of man's existence 
prior to faith already anticipates and provides a pre-sketch of man's existence 
under faith. ' Therefore, his theological analysis of human existence is 
brought to consummation in his explication of faith. 
Rudolf Bultmann's most concentrated and thorough lingulstlcal and 
exegetical account of faith -- perhaps of any biblical word considered by him 
- is presented in his article on "faith" in Gerhard Kittel's Theologishes 
Wörterbuch Zum Neuen Testament' For background and comparison, he 
traces the word "faith in its use and meaning in classical Greek, Hellenism, 
the Old Testament, Judaism, Philo, and the Septuagint. As far as Christian 
usage is concerned, he differentiates between "formal". "common" and 
"specific" Christian usages as well as sets forth Paul's. John's, and the 
"developing church's" use of the term. 
While Rudolf Bultmann concludes that Jesus' use of the term "faith" is not 
prominent in the New Testament, the substance of what Paul calls "faith" is 
present in Jesus radical idea of obedience. If one considers the body of Rudolf 
Bultmanri s discussions of faith as a whole, one discovers that his overriding 
interest is in John's and, more especially, in Paul's understanding of faith 
which he finds is, for the most part, consonant with each others. Since these 
two are the plumb line for the authentic conception of New Testament faith, 
only very brief mention can be made of other relevant discussions. 
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JESUS' USE OF "FAITH" 
In setting out the New Testament meaning of faith, Rudolf Bultmann 
discovers that Jesus' use of the word "faith" is not prominent in, nor 
fundamental to, the New Testament conception. ` 
Rudolf Bultmann does acknowledge in Jesus and The Word that faith is 
characteristic of Jesus' thought of Gods According to Rudolf Bultmann, 
Jesus uses the word "faith" for belief in miracles and in prayer, but it does 
not mean for him as for Paul and John "the obedience of men under God's 
redeeming revelation". " Faith for him is neither theoretical belief that God 
exists nor the final cause of all occurrences. It is not a belief in God which is 
a part of a world-view which stands in opposition to another world-view. ' 
Faith Is the assertion that God Is the power which determines man in his 
concrete reality, in his present life. 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus' use of the word "faith" is not 
predominate. However, the germinal understanding of what Paul later 
characterizes as "faith", "obedience", is certainly recognizable and present in 
Rudolf Bultmann s Jesus. This is manifested in his consideration of Jesus' 
"ethic of obedience" which he explains in his book Jesus and The Word. 
While exactly like the Jewish ethic of obedience of later Judaism, Jesus' ethic 
is fundamentally distinct from theirs in that he conceived radically the idea of 
obedience. ' Jesus looks at man's conduct from the position of the obedience 
which man owes to God. 
More specifically, by the time of later Judaism, the old, Jewish, national 
regulations had lost their original meaning but Judaism blindly continued to 
obey them simply because they were commanded. ' However. while accepting 
the absolute authority of Scripture, Jesus diverges from Judaism by 
examining the content of a Scriptural word and differentiating between those 
biblical words which were God's command and those that were not. '* He sets 
the demand of the law over against the demand of God. " By this Rudolf 
Bultmann means that Jesus demonstrates that he rejects the Old Testament 
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as viewed in the scribal manner as an external, formal, legal authority which 
supposedly states God's will. God's will is not stated by an eternal authority 
but is known by man's insight. Jesus shows that God does not bind man by 
formal authority but leaves to him the insight to recognize what is demanded 
by God. Rudolf Bultmann establishes that "man is trusted and expected to 
see for himself what God commands" and demands. " 
Rudolf Bultmann s argument makes several assumptions. First, he 
assumes that the canonical, Scriptural commands expressly stated as issuing 
from God are not to be uncritically accepted as such. Man, such as Jesus, is 
called upon to determine which are to be taken truly as God's commands. 
Second, God's will is not expressed by an external authority, but is known 
w 
only by/ýman's insight. Third, he seems to put extra--canonical Jewish 
commentary on par with Scripture. This is exemplified in Rudolf Bultmann's 
assumption that when Jesus weighed the Pharisaic traditions and 
misconstructions against canonical Scripture (cf. Mark 10: 2-9), that is, when 
the Pharisaic "unwritten law" was judged and found wanting by the written, 
Scriptural law, Jesus was contradicting the command of God. Rudolf 
Bultmann contends that when Jesus sifts the Scripture to determine for 
himself what are God's commands, "the idea of obedience is first radically 
conceived" in that obedience now becomes subjection to an authority which 
man understands (that is, one which is reasonable). " Rudolf Bultmann 
implies a rejection on Jesus part of the understanding current in rabbinical 
thought that all written Scriptural laws were to be taken as God's laws 
irregardless of the fact that God gave reasons for some while for others He did 
not. 14 
Rudolf Bultmann goes on to explain the nature of true obedience for 
Jesus. True obedience only happens when the Word concerns "me" and is 
not indifferent to "me". Rather than "doing something obediently", the whole 
man must stand behind and in what he does. ls 
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Further, Jesus obedience frees man from dependence upon formal 
authority and gives him an easy obedience which depends on his judgement 
and responsibility. " Nonetheless, this responsibility is difficult in the sense 
that man is to see himself as called to decision -- decision between good and 
evil, decision for God's will or for his own will. " 
It Is this decision, this "crisis of decision" in which man stands before 
God, from which the demands of God come. Explaining the nature `of Jesus 
obedience, he says, "The crisis of decision is the situation in which all 
observation is excluded, for which Now alone has meaning, which is absorbed, 
wholly in the present moment". 18 The "crisis of decision" is the Now in which 
man must know what to do and what to leave undone. He is insecure before 
what confronts him. In this moment of decision he has no past standard, no 
principle, no ethical theory which he can call upon to decide. Neither can he 
control beforehand the possibilities upon which he must act. Every moment 
of decision Is new. He stands on no firm base but stands alone In empty 
space. When this is the case, he knows the requirement of the good to be the 
actual demand of God. '' 
Rudolf Bultmann explains that this being which is lived in specific, 
decisive moments in the present is what constitutes essential being for Jesus. 
In this actual life lived in specific, decisive moments, man Is confronted and 
claimed by a "Thou" (God who meets man with His claim over whom man can 
have no control). In fact, it is only this claim which gives him this life as 
self. ' When he knows himself claimed by a "Thou". this "coming to himself", 
he knows God. 
Therefore, according to Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus says that God claims man 
and constrains him to decision In the present moment and requires from him 
obedience. " When the requirement of obedience is grasped, then the thought 
of grace and forgiveness can be fully understood. ' 
As Rudolf Bultmann proceeds In his exposition, he seems to Indicate that 
man recognizes the demand of God when he is confronted and is thrust into a 
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crisis of decision. This makes him insecure as he realizes he stands alone in 
the universe without any standard or rational principal whatsoever. 
Rudolf Bultmann's thesis regarding the relationship of "the demand of 
God" to the "crisis of decision" seems to be this; "the demands of God" come 
from the "crisis of decision" while the "crisis of decision" arises from "the 
demands of God". One can argue from a logical perspective that this is self- 
contradictory. Rudolf Bultmann would hold that his thesis is set within the 
context of a radically different philosophical understanding. The "crisis of 
decision" and "the demands of God" are not to be viewed as separate objects 
which mutually exclude one another. The object of historical understanding 
("the demands of God") is not a thing in itself In isolation from the mind 
which contemplates It. That is, a word of God is not a demand or command 
of God In objective existence independent of the one who interacts with it. As 
one reflects on a "word of God" and feels his responsibility for the future from 
which the question of meaning arises, he must be ready to hear the claim of 
this word. whether or not it Is the "demand of God". The subject and the 
object do not exist independently of one another. The one examining past 
historical thoughts must re-live and re-enact these past thoughts in his own 
mind. It is this sort of interaction between subject and object that Rudolf 
Bultmann has in mind regarding the "demands of God" and "the crisis of 
decision" of Jesus' obedience. 
FAITH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT BACKGROUND 
Though the presupposition for Paul's theology of faith is Hellenistic 
Christianity rather than the Old Testament, classical Greek, or the "oldest 
Church", nonetheless, Rudolf Bultmanri s controlling assumption is that New 
Testament Christianity was a syncretistic phenomenon. Therefore, he sets 
Paul into context by providing comparative uses of faith. 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the classical Greek, Old Testament, and 
Septuagint meaning of 7TI Q'TG- IJEIV. "to trust" or "to put trust in". 
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overlap one another. ' However, the Old Testament concept of faith is richer 
in content because the meaning "to obey", to renounce self-confidence and to 
obey God's demands, is often the predominate one 24 
While Judaism echoes the leading Old Testament motifs, Judaism diverges 
from it by letting faithful obedience to the law become obedience to the letter 
of the law which counts commandments fulfilled as merit' 
In the Septuagint, the Hebrew derivatives of are generally translated 
by 7T/o-TEUtIV which means "faith" and -never by 7t'W70r6 u7( which 
means "trust". Therefore, he concludes that the Septuagint wants to keep 
"faith" and "trust" separate? e 
Hellenistic Christianity. according to Rudolf Bultmann the "historical 
presupposition for Paul's theology". understood 7T1(PTIS ("faith" and *belief l 
and 7T/ETC-[61V ("believing") to mean "acceptance of the Message" 
(Romans 10: 14-17). In this understanding, the Hellenistic concept of faith 
achieved a unique meaning which It had not had In the Old Testament or 
other ancient religions' Furthermore, the expression "believe in him" 
(Eis aür'öº"t is to be rendered "believe that" and does not convey a personal 
relation to Christ'' 
In a complicated and debateable chain ' of reasoning, Rudolf Bultmann 
concludes that the New Testament's "formal" use of faith views 
? ILTFVýry E? S with its unique meaning of "believe on" means in 
substance "believe that". ZT/Q'TFVE/V 077 . 
29 Further. the term 
7TI7TEÜEIV P-115 is derived fror n- -/V with the dative 
meaning "to consider credible" rather than "to trustw90 
THE COMMON CHRISTIAN USAGE OF FAITH 
Rudolf Bultmann -shifts his gaze from the "formal" New Testament use to 
the common Christian use of "faith". He breaks down this common Christian 
usage into "primitive Christianity" and what he calls the "specifically 
Christian" usage of "faith". " 
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"Primitive Christianity" largely highlights the 
., 
Judaistic heritage of 7777775 (mir 1e/V. 77 
Christianity". 7T/o'-r7 S became the leading term 
God because faith in the Old Testament and in 
important term for the religious relationship ' 
Old Testament and the 
/0-/057). In "primitive 
for the relation of man to 
Judaism was already an 
In setting forth the "specifically Christian usage" of 7I%7'T/5 
Rudolf Bultmann posits that 7l%o"T/5 E/S Is the vehicle which conveys 
a unique meaning distinct from others. To quote him. 77/O =/-T here 
is "the acceptance of the Christian kerygma and consequently of the saving 
faith which recognizes and appropriates God's work of salvation brought about 
by Christ". 3' Its principal Implication Is "giving credence" although the 
elements of obedience, trust, hope. and loyalty can also be included in it " 
In Romans 10: 9, Paul gives the content of the Christian faith. The terms 
and n rTt-U -IV , equivalents in synonymous 
parallelism, indicate that the Christian faith consists in acknowledging Jesus 
as Lord. 
The question which Rudolf Bultmann says arises is whether or not the 
phrase, ? I2aTG0cui C-, -5 . scan 
take on a special sense; 
that is, can it also be used to denote a personal relationship to Christ with 
the same significance as a relationship with God? ' Though according to him 
Ma'rri iy Eis practically never in the New Testament denotes a 
relationship to God and Is ambiguous In its use In reference to Jesus, Rudolf 
Bultmann discerns that 77/oT 6Q: 1Vr cS77/ with the dative denotes a 
relationship with God and with Jesus. 38 
Hence 7MTc 1V 6S XD1CT. t/ NO-02V does in fact entail a personal 
relation to Christ analogous to the relation to God, though different from it. 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the contrast is manifested in the fact that in 
the Old Testament when the relationship with God is called "faith in God". 
this faith as "obedience" and "loyalty" is regarded as being directed to the God 
whose existence is already always taken for granted. In the New Testament. 
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faith is not obedience to the Lord who ' has' always been known, but it is 
laying hold of the conviction that for the believer this Lord Jesus Christ 
exists 3' Therefore, says Rudolf Bultmann, "This Lord first meets him only in 
the kerygma. "' In the Old Testament, God was already assumed to exist on 
the basis of the past. "Belief in him" was not an affirmation of His existence 
but a matter of loyalty to what was already known. On the other hand, in 
the New Testament, God's deed in Jesus Christ must first be affirmed to exist 
for the believer. 
FAITH IN PAUL 
According to Rudolf Bultmanris Kittel article on "Faith". the common 
Christian usage is essential for that of Paul's usage of faith99 After surveying 
the formal and common Christian usage of "faith", Rudolf Bullmann is in 
position to set forth Paul's understanding of 7'1'10'x15 which he considers to 
be the key and controlling witness of New Testament faith. Further, the 
concept of 7f I C-1 ºS is central to Paul's theology. "Faith" is the condition 
for the receipt of "righteousness" which takes the place of "works". ' Faith is 
neither a spiritual nor human attitude of mind nor a feeling of confidence in 
God but, preeminently, "the acceptance of the kerygma" " 
As "the acceptance of the kerygma" (Romans 10: 17), Paul's conception of 
faith can be variously expressed: it is response to the proclaimed word; the 
"submission to the way of salvation determined by God and made accessible 
in Christ"; or "the subjection of oneself to the act of God that is proclaimed 
and realized in the word". " As Romans 10: 9 evinces, 'T1CSTI S is also 
simultaneously ("confession"). Rudolf Bultmann sets forth 
., 
i U 
that for Paul T1 ! TTtS is always "faith in ... "; that is, faith always refers 
to its object which is the "preaching' or, more specifically. the "occurrence". 
God's saving deed in Christ. 
"' The object of faith or belief is expressed by a 
C/ 
OT[ clause. as in Romans 10: 9, I Thessalonians and Romans 6: 8. 
Equivalent to the (ST I clause are the locutions "believe in" or "faith in" 
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EIS In Galatians 2: 16; Romans 10: 14; Philippians 1: 29; Irp 
Philemon 5; LV. Galatians 3: 26; and C-VL , Romans 9: 33; 10: 11). An 
objective genitive such as in Galatians 2: 16,3: 22 is an abbreviating 
I 
substitute. " Rudolf Bultmann states. "In the oO, the believer 
turns himself away from himself and confesses Jesus Christ as his Lord". " 
This Is at the same time a confession that he owes all that he is and has to 
what God has done in Christ. For example. it is only as an act of confession 
effective as action that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is effective for 
salvation. 46 
"Faith" is confession but not in the sense of a single act done once for all, 
such as a declaration of church membership. Rudolf Bultmann explains, "It 
is a placing of one's self at God's disposal, for the act to which God summons 
a man at any given moment. ""' Faith in the cross and resurrection is not the 
acceptance of some irrational mythological doctrine but rather primarily 
submission to the judgement of God, the renunciation of all boasting 4e 
Absent from Paul, as the other New Testament writers, is any description 
of "the psychological process involved in the development of faith". Rudolf 
Bultmann maintains this on the strength of Galatians 3: 23-26 which he 
interprets as only a story of salvation, not the beginning of faith in the 
individual. According to Paul, the salvation effected in history is realized not 
in an individual's religious experience but in baptism (Galatians 3: 27-29)'e 
Just as little is faith a mystical experience, mood or emotion S0 
i 
In accordance with Rudolf Bultmann, Paul proclaims that 7TSO 'i 5 is 
simultaneously 0nrrrcO Rudolf Bultmann throughout his work 
consistently drives home the point that "Paul understands faith primarily as 
obedience" 5' He establishes that this faith is the "simple surrender to God's 
grace in renunciation of the desire for recognition". ' He analyzes the nature 
of this faith which is "obedience" in the following way. 
Faith presupposes unbelieving existence. Herein, the Jews "in boasting" 
(which summarizes the essence of the Jewish sin and the "real sin of men") of 
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their works and the Greeks "in boasting" in their wisdom seek the satisfaction 
of their urge to be recognized by God. ' The one who "boasts" seeks self- 
glorification in that he seeks to gain a recognition in God's sight that God 
cannot withhold from him by virtue of his achievements. "Boasting" (self- 
glorification) is a desire "for recognition by one's own strength and 
achievement". It is thinking one can extract recognition through what he 
does, thereby making himself secure for himself and in the presence of God' 
The Jews try "to establish 'their own righteousness" when they desire to 
establish the legal grounds by which to prove themselves to God ' The 
Gentiles, by adopting a world view (even a theistic one), by conceiving of the 
world without considering the question of their own existence and seeing 
themselves as objects, strive for wisdom by making speaking "from God" an 
understanding "of ours" and, consequently, sin ' Both alike, as well as all 
men, seek to have acknowledged the justice of their position which will 
confirm them over against all the lack of self-assurance. " 
However, God's grace is revealed In Christ crucified which frees man from 
the illusion that man can win recognition In his own strength in the sight of 
God. -' Pure surrender to this grace redeems man from the frantic struggling 
of the urge for recognition; for in "obedience", man's pride is broken " 
Contrarily, man does not wish to throw off the conflict of the urge for 
recognition because he thinks he will be lost if he surrenders himself. 
However, it is precisely in losing himself in surrender that he will find himself 
for the first time; for obedience is subjection of oneself to the act of God that 
is proclaimed and realized in the word (Romans 1: 15,10: 3). It Is the act of 
genuine obedience in which man radically renounces his own existence and 
gives glory to God. 60 Therefore, "obedience" is faith because it Is an 
abandonment of pride, a letting go of oneself, a surrendering of oneself to 
God's graces' is "the acceptance of the divine grace". ' 
kö is this because the divine act of grace means that man with 
his sins and his striving for righteousness or wisdom is judged by Christ's 
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cross. Therefore, faith is the obedient acceptance of the divine verdict on his 
previous self-understanding. `'3 
Rudolf Bultmann submits a number of Scriptural passages in support of 
his contention that for Paul faith is "obedience" and "obedience" is faith. " For 
example, he maintains that Paul combines Romans 1: 8 ("because your faith Is 
proclaimed in all the world") and Romans 16: 19 (For while your obedience is 
known to all") to express the purpose of apostleship -- "to bring about the 
obedience which faith Is" (Romans 1: 5). ' In Romans 11: 30-32, the Jews 
refusal of faith is denoted by "disobey". ' 
Rudolf Bultmann further discovers that Paul's concept of faith entails a 
close relation between obedience and trust. 7T n- T, s as "trust" (in 
general terms) appears infrequently in Paul. 87 What Rudolf Bultmann has in 
mind here Is the shade of trust which is confidence that God will help me 
here and now, in this and that. It is the trusting that God will carry out his 
promises or the putting trust in his power to work miracles. This nuance 
gives way to Paul's primary sense of "trust" as radical surrender to God's 
will. ' In Paul's primary sense, "trust" is the trust in God that arises when, in 
the believer's eyes, only darkness and death are in sight. "Trust" presupposes 
the obedience that Is willing to surrender everything of one's own to death' 
In fact, Rudolf Bultmann concludes that at the deepest level "obedience" and 
"trust" are one thing. For "trust in" or "confidence In" God is the obedience of 
faith. 70 This Is proven by the fact that Paul never uses 7T/ TTC 0 IV with 
the dative (except in Galatians 3: 6 and Romans 4: 3) to gain the simple sense 
of "trust". Rather, he distinguishes between the trust aspect and obedience 
aspect of faith by using 7lf'1TO(19cVct1 or 7T 7TO(&7Y15 . Only once in 
II Corinthians 1: 9 (perhaps twice, in Philippians 3: 31) does 7T6770( 
EVat 
refer to the obedience aspect of faith of "complete surrender of one's own care 
and strength to God". 71 Rudolf Bultmann categorically rules out the 
possibility of a relation of trust to Jesus. As a Thou, a fellow, he has 
vanished as every Thou does when he dies. ' 
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In further characterizing faith, Rudolf Bultmann clarifies how faith may be 
spoken of as a "leap in the dark". Faith is not the standing at the crossroads 
without a signpost, a blind risk, or a random groping. It is not venturing out 
In a direction and risking arriving at one's goal. 73 Faith is not being 
convinced of the truth of the proclamation of God's forgiving love but rather 
letting one's concrete "now" be determined by it. If the proclamation is really 
valid for me and for my concrete life situation, it is only understandable in 
the situation. One cannot believe in general, alongside of, or behind one's 
other relationships. One must believe here and now. If one does not let pyL; `s 
concrete present be qualified by the word, then one has not believed it. Only 
when one's situation is understood in terms of the word and when one sees 
his neighbor in the other person who encounters him, has he believed. " 
Rudolf Bultmann maintains that for Paul faith arises from what Is heard 
and contains a knowing as well as giving rise to knowledge. 's A pre- 
understanding of faith is given in the old existence and old self- 
understanding. Faith is not learning any new truths or Information that were 
not present before faith. Neither is it a proposition one can have ready at 
hand. " Belief is not a scientific theory, mere knowledge, or dogma. " Neither 
is faith a grasp of the work of Christ7e The word is "understood" only when 
the cross is seen as "grace" and "love". Because the proclamation is 
"understood", it is assumed that those addressed,! hear the proclamation. 
"Understanding" does not mean the ability to deduce from the proclamation 
an explanation which can be classified according to one's - Weltanschauung. 
It means rather that the individual under the impact of hearing learns to 
understand himself anew. ' This new, self-understanding of, faith, the 
"existentiell" understanding or "believing" existence, arises, out of the old self- 
understanding and "unbelieving" existence. 
In further characterization of the nature of faith In Paul, Rudolf Bultmann 
states that besides 7T/C-115 indicating the act of becoming a. believer, it 
also describes the state of being a believer., This is manifested in the use of 
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^3-'ý, 
ýIVal and FQT1iwL! 6y To -M) In such texts as Romans 14: 22 and I 
Corinthians 16: 13.80 Having stated this, he quickly moves to dispel any 
notion that being a believer is a static condition. He affirms, "Faith is not an 
act which can be performed once for all, an act by which justification is 
achieved. "8' Faith is not the once for all resolve to join the Christian religion 
or "a once accepted world-view". "Rather", he enjoins, "it has reality only as 
the obedience of faith that is always new. "e2 Faith may begin with an initial 
resolve and confession, but faith's existence is certainly not a simple state 
that is begun or the natural development that now gets under way. If this 
were the case, the act of faith would be turned into a process in the past and 
would be regarded as a "work". ' Christian faith is never a possession, 
whether a conviction or a state of feeling of my "inner life" at which I could 
look away at my tasks and duties, exigencies and temptations. Rather, faith 
must be constantly won, laid hold of and realized anew in the decision of the 
moment. ` Uncanniness which Is based in sin remains a constant threat and 
constantly overcomes the rightwised sinner as soon as he tries to lead his life 
by and for himself. The man of faith is constantly tempted and constantly 
experiences God's wrath so must constantly take refuge in God's grace " The 
past has not been blotted out but is present as something which is to be 
continually conquered " 
What Rudolf Bultmann means by "state" in this context may be well 
illustrated by his allusion to Romans -11: 20. He translates it "you have won 
your position through faith". He interprets this to mean that "to be a 
Christian is to be constantly relating oneself to God's act of salvation". The 
term "state" herein seems to mean "constant relating to God's act"; that Is, 
"the being constantly under the demand of God". Indeed, along with faith 
there can be a state of consciousness. { However, as long as it is a state of 
consciousness, it cannot be faith 87 
To speak of the faith of men is to accept the full paradox of asserting that 
which cannot be affirmed of any visible man " Faith is opposed to sight. 89 
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The faith of men refers to something unverifiable as a spiritual situation and 
which must never be identified with any situation 80 Rudolf Bultmann 
recognizes the ramifications of this understanding when he says, "From this 
concept of faith arises the polemic against all 'religion of experience, against 
piety, sense of sin, and inspiration. ""' The justified man Is believed in faith. 
One cannot trust experience. As he expresses it, "I can never so relate myself 
to my experience that I can put my trust in it. I can trust only the promises 
of God. "' 
While the state of being might seem to contradict the aspect of faith as 
single decisive action, Paul, according to Rudolf Bultmann, mentions degrees 
and possibilities of ZTj ITT. IS for Individuals. There are "deficiencies in faith" 
(I Thessalonians 3: 10); growth in faith (II Corinthians 10: 15); fullness of faith 
(Romans 4: 21): and weakness in faith (Romans 14: 1). " Rudolf Bultmann 
links the being "weak in faith" in Romans 14: 1f to being weak in conscience 
in I Corinthians 8: 7-12 In which he deduces Paul's principle: believers stand 
in the same faith, their decisions about what to do and their practices diverge 
because their, ZM77EV 6l V has to be worked out in the conduct of each 
one. 94 
AN ANALYSIS OF PAUL'S UNDERSTANDING OF FAITH 
From Rudolf Bultmann s perspective, "the precursor and presupposition for 
Paul's Theology of faith is Hellenistic Christianity rather than the Old 
Testament, classical Greek, or the "oldest Church". Nevertheless, one who 
expects him to trace the lineage of influence upon Paul's theology of faith 
coursing back In one single stream to some point "A" will be frustrated. One 
must be cognizant of Rudolf Bultmanns controlling proposition that primitive 
Christianity was a syncretistic phenomenon. According to his research, the 
theological milieu which preceded Paul was one of dynamic flux In which 
theological splintering was the order of the day as Christianity pressed beyond 
its Palestinian bounds 95 
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The primitive Christian gospel was preached in terms intelligible to 
Hellenistic audiences who in turn interpreted the message in their own way in 
the light of their own spiritual needs " Even within Hellenistic Christianity, 
various theological mutations occurred so that Hellenistic Christianity was no 
unitary phenomenon B7 Therefore, Paul, more or less in the fashion of the 
twentieth-century historical critic, selected from Hellenistic Christianity (and 
other strands) what suited his theological needs and purposes. If we bring 
this fact to bear upon the topic of faith, we observe that Paul in the main 
ignores the Old Testament, the Septuagint, and the classical Greek view and 
adopts for his own Hellenistic Christianity's conception of faith as "acceptance 
of the kerygma". One must comment that throughout Rudolf Bultmann s step 
by step linguistic treatment of "faith" in its various historical contexts, the 
concept of "faith" with its overlapping meanings remains sufficiently 
ambiguous, fluid, and ambidextrous at each stage for any definite tendency to 
emerge as a result of a response to a particular historical circumstance. 
Rudolf Bultmanri s view of the development of Paul's theology of faith 
assumes two opposing propositions. On the one hand, he assumes that pre- 
converted Paul did not know what he needed before the outside authority, the 
proclaimed Gospel, summoned him to life. If he had already known what he 
needed, he would have had no need to respond to that which judged his self- 
understanding and called him to faith. On the other hand, if one insists that 
he accepted the salvation-occurrence because he, in the manner of a 
historical critic, knew what he needed. then would it be accurate to say he 
submitted himself to the proclamation's radical judgement of himself "- his 
past way of thinking and his previous self-understanding? It is maintained 
that Paul selected what he needed from the various strands of current 
thought in Palestinian Christianity from the Old Testament Jewish tradition or 
from Hellenistic Christianity. Rudolf Bultmann presumes Paul would know 
what he wanted and what would suit his needs. Is not Rudolf Bultmann 
implicitly asserting that Paul held two mutually exclusive attitudes in 
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equipoise? The authoritative word, the gospel preached, whose judgement he 
radically accepts is at the same time also submitted to his own judgement. 
What or who is the controlling criteria here? On the one hand, there is 
radical acceptance of a word; and on the other hand, a simultaneously radical 
questioning of a word. In other words, why is one preached word accepted 
without question and another preached word questioned without acceptance? 
If. as Rudolf Bultmann contends. every hearer of the Gospel Interprets the 
proclaimed message in his own way, then we may well conclude that the 
meaning it has for any one hearer will be different from the meaning it has 
for the next hearer. " Assuming this is the way the Gospel is heard and 
transmitted, is it ' likely that we would find in the New Testament any one 
transmission referred to as "the Gospel or "the kerygma"? Why should we 
expect to find a fixed affirmation with a fixed syntactical pattern of words that 
endures intact through every historical situation if at every communication 
what is said and heard is rewritten and reshaped according to one's own 
particular needs? 
/t 
Rudolf Bultmann contends that 7TIELIS Is b776[ )I- and 
is "711 CTS. He argues that they are one and the same thing. 
It is clear that he is arguing In the first instance that obedience is not an 
element of faith or that faith is not an element of obedience but that they are 
simultaneously one and the same. He assumes that because he finds the two 
words "faith" and "obedience" related in Romans 1: 5 ("the obedience of faith"). 
they are equated elsewhere when each is used separately. " The logical 
connection between Romans 1: 8 and Romans 1 16: 19 and Romans 1: 5 Is as 
follows: whereas, the Romans faith or obedience is known to the world; and, 
whereas, the purpose of apostleship Is to bring about "the obedience of faith" 
among all the nations, therefore, because their "faith" and their "obedience" is 
known in all the world, then "faith" and "obedience" are synonymous. 
However, It does not follow that because their "faith" Is known in the world 
and their "obedience" is also reported among all that the separate terms have 
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one and the same meaning. 
Are we to conclude that because the Colossians "faith in Christ Jesus" 
and their love "for all the saints" had been spread abroad, then "faith" and 
"love" or even "faith", "love". and "obedience" were all synonymous? " While 
there is certainly agreement among scholars that "obedience" is involved in 
"faith", Rudolf Bultmanri s proposal that the two are synonymous is 
unconvincing. " Further, if "faith" and "obedience" are equated, then in their 
fundamental sense there is no difference in the meaning of the two words. In 
equating "faith" and "obedience", he in reality dwarfs the traditional sense of 
"faith" as "trust" and "reliance" and allows it to be overshadowed by the 
traditional meaning of "obedience" as willingness to be subject to an 
authority. 102 This is exemplified further by the fact that his general way of 
expressing the relation is to put "obedience" in the predicate and make it the 
larger term. That is not to say that he does not equally express the converse 
(obedience of faith) in order to denote their complete synonymity. For their 
fundamental usage in Paul. Rudolf Bultmann has planed away the 
distinctiveness of the two words "faith" and "obedience". The meaning of 
"faith" and "obedience" is fundamentally reduced to the one meaning of 
surrender and subjection to the Word of God. John Wesley's understanding 
of faith as a divine, Inner conviction, of course. Is given no consideration. 103 
Rudolf Bultmann's description of faith as "the acceptance of the kerygma" 
captures prominent features of Paul's concept of "faith". The element of faith 
which may be labeled man's "response" (denoted by Rudolf Bultmann as 
"acceptance" or "decision") is recognized by scholars to be a vital aspect of 
faith. 104 
Furthermore, Rudolf Bultmann's point that mars response of faith is a 
response to the "kerygma" likewise meets with consensus. 105 However, the 
debate is enjoined with him over the nature of this "kerygma", the object of 
faith. For him, the object of faith is the "preaching" itself. that is, the 
occurrence of "the now" In which "preaching" as the demand of God judges 
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man and calls him to decision. The object, the "preaching", does not refer 
back to some objective content. More especially. when Paul names the object 
"Jesus Christ", Rudolf Bultmann holds that Paul is not referring to the dead, 
historical man Jesus or a supernatural person but the salvation-occurrence. "' 
Contrarily, as has been pointed out, John Wesley and classical theologians 
would take issue with Rudolf Bultmanri s thesis and assert that Jesus Christ, 
the living, supernatural God-man, is the ultimate object of faith and the 
content of the kerygma. Certainly, orthodox theologians would allow that the 
term "Jesus Christ" may comprehend in a particular context Christ's saving 
act . However, when they refer to 
Christ's saving work, they are referring 
back to the person Jesus Christ Himself who performed it in the past and 
who now actually lives to make it efficacious in the present. " 
Rudolf Buitmann maintains that only the kerygma communicates the 
knowledge of salvation. Other traditional commentators make the distinction 
in Romans 10: 14 that it is the person Christ Himself who died upon the cross 
and rose again who is speaking the message. 108 
The manner in which Rudolf Bultmann understands the nature of the 
object of faith may possibly interlock with and explain, partially at least, the 
reason why he translates "faith in" as "faith that". Moreover, it probably also 
indicates why he fails to find the traditional sense of "trust" or "reliance in" 
the Almighty, personal God important to "faith". Further, it illumines also 
why he cannot speak of "faith In Christ" as a relationship with Jesus Christ 
in the sense of a relation of confident trust In the person Jesus. For Rudolf 
Bultmann. Jesus like any other person when he dies can no longer be a 
"Thou" to another. It would be ironic indeed if an existentialist attempted to 
argue that a believer could have a trusting, personal relationship to a 
proclamation, to an impersonal kerygma which originated, as far as could be 
ascertained, from an impersonal God. In summary, Rudolf Bultmann 
advocates that faith is submission to a proclamation whereas John Wesley 
views it as subjection to the Person, Jesus Christ. 
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Rudolf Bultmann claims that rather than use 7770T6UEIV with the dative 
to gain the simple sense of "trust", Paul uses 7TE1TOI96V(ff or 
7T __ i harts . 
If we compare Rudolf Bultmann s previous comparisons 'of 
these terms we find this pattern: the Septuagint kept 7rICTTi)iý/ quite 
separate from 7r. - nni © i5 ;' Hellenistic Christianity, to whom Paul's letters 
ostensibly are in debt, interchanged the two terms. Paul, on the other hand, 
as we have noted, kept them separate -- almost. Rudolf Bultmann 
acknowledges that Paul uses 7T1C f6UC1V with the dative to mean "trust" 
in Galatians 3: 6 and Romans 4: 3. That the lines of ' demarcation between 
771rr r'&i y and ; rszrc'G its can be drawn as sharply, ° as Rudolf 
Bultmann would like -- especially since they were interchanged in Hellenistic 
Christianity and even, as he admits, in Paul -- leaves one slightly skeptical. 
One relevant word study which one would like to have seen addressed in 
Rudolf Bultmann's philological discussions is a treatment of the terms 
cC 
ýLkoý f"obedience") and U7l(tkOUt ("to obey"). These are terms 
that Arndt and Gingrich's lexicon consistently translate as "obedience". 10° 
Because "obedience" is such a strategic term for Rudolf Bultmann -and, 
whereas he was meticulous in setting forth the -distinctions of the use of 
the- 7MEM- //, ) word group and their relation with ZTEi9,. i . an 
Inclusion of a thorough discussion of UTmQ'kol and its relation to "faith" 
may be important. It would perhaps clarify why Paul more frequently employs 
the terms rrw ans 'ei v and ro-r, s for "obedience" rather than the 
available term ____- tco» 
Rudolf Bultmanri s assessment of the nature of the relationship to God In 
Jesus Christ in the New Testament does not allow for the obvious, favourable 
parallel which John Wesley finds that Paul sketches between Abraham's 
believing reliance upon the personal God and that faith of Abraham's New 
Testament sons (Galatians 3: 6 and Romans 4: 3). "0 
305 
PAULINE FAITH IN CONTRAST TO JUDAISM 
For Rudolf Bultmann. Paul's concept of faith ("man under faith") is further 
illustrated in its contrast to Judaism and Gnosticism. Paul agrees with 
Judaism that the authenticity which man seeks is "righteousness". "' The 
totally unique quality of the relationship of man to God (represented by Paul's 
regard for i ! (7ris as the acceptance of God's saving act which involves 
continual reference to it) is expressed by Paul's firmly consistent attachment 
i 
of salvation's blessings to 7r a r: s While in both Judaism and in 
Paul the blessings are termed [J1Ecalnrr6yh , Paul firstly diverges from 
Judaism by holding that God's eschatological sentence of judgement has 
already been passed in the salvation-occurrence. '" To be "in Christ" means 
to stand within a new history which is not world history and not history of 
sin but is eschatological event. "` Secondly, Rudolf Bultmann states Paul is 
distinguished from Judaism by holding that d(k i QrTUVA_ is bestowed as a 
gift rather than by fulfillment of the law by works. "' The whole letter to the 
Galatians is an offensive attack against the misunderstanding which can still 
arise, mainly, that 71'1rrt 5 must be supplemented by the performance 
of works. Rudolf Bultmann says this makes it clear that 7T ITT 15 is 
complete surrender of man to God which man cannot decide to make of his 
own accord. 1° 
Paul states that the law is disqualified as a means of winning acceptance 
In God's sight by mans achievements. "" Faith sees the Old Testament 
history as a history of failure. Nonetheless, it is a history of promise in that 
faith's understanding of the way of salvation is only understood by those who 
know the false way in the law. "' When Paul demands the believer to fulfill 
the law, the sý d VouO1U are not rejected for their contents but for the 
manner in which they were carried out. He rejects EpYd Vouou as a 
way of salvation because man wishes to use them as a basis for his self- 
confidence and his boasting, to make a claim on God. "' 
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Rudolf Bultmann considers more closely the nature of the relationship 
between "faith" and "works' and how they are distinguished from one another. 
Indeed, "obedience" is present in performing 'works' as well as it is in faith. 
Notwithstanding this, "works" are man's achievement which he has to fulfill in 
his own strength. 12O In a "work", Rudolf, Bultmann urges. I remain the man I 
am. I not only place my work outside of me, but I also go beside it in a way 
that I can assess it. 
Herein, Rudolf Bultmann is criticizing "work" on the grounds of the 
existentialist concern that a "work" is what is done without my involvement, 
without me. It is done without my involvement through the performance of 
"works" because in a "work" man does not make a "decision", an "act". 
"Decision" is the essence of true, human existence. '' Though "faith" is a 
motion of the will, it is not a "work". It is not the motion of the will 12er se 
that may qualify ?ir 0"TI S as a "work", but the particular motion of the will. 
Namely, 7T1 o-T is is not to be considered a "work" because the motion of 
the will involved in it is the negation of the will. In the performance of a 
"work" a "merely formal renunciation" occurs In that the will lets the content 
of its accomplishment be dictated by an external authority. In so doing, the 
will thinks it has a right to be proud. "2 
In differentiating between "faith", and "works", Rudolf Bultmann steams 
toward the Scylla and Charybdis of grace and free will. He states that faith 
can only be understood and realized in tandem with God's act of salvation. It 
is not a general reliance on God, that is possible at all times and in all 
places. " Faith is a gift which is God-wrought. 12` The saving event creates 
the historical possibility of faith. ' The Jewish way of works of the Law in 
the Old Testament was a failure because true faith is possible only through 
God's gracious act in Christ. 126 
Salvation becomes a reality whenever this saving act of God Is grasped In 
the "resolve" to act. "Precisely this resolve is faith, " affirms Rudolf 
Bultmann. 12' Faith as response to the proclaimed word of God's gracious act 
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is itself part of the salvation-occurrence. ' While faith is said to "come" and 
"to be revealed", It, nevertheless, still has the decision character that belongs 
to its nature as "obedience". " The word spoken by God is a must which is 
directed at us and confronts us and is wholly outside our control. 130 Rudolf 
Bultmann declares, "Since the believer experiences the possibility of the faith- 
decision as grace, it is only as a gift of grace that he can understand his 
decision -- his own decisionl"1" Faith is only the affirmation of God's action 
upon us and the answer to his Word directed to us. " He who has made the 
decision of faith can understand his faith decision only as that which God's 
"prevenient grace" made possible. ' In other words, after (or in) the faith- 
decision, one views it as God-given. 
Furthermore, the decision to believe is normally different from other 
decisions. In other decisions, one comes to his decision on the basis of 
considerations which remain outside of the sphere of decision. In the 
decision to believe, all considerations which usually contribute to decision 
making are "uprooted". They are called in question and called to decision. 
Therefore, man Is entirely free so that he stands In the open. Belief comes to 
pass in the abandonment of all security. It is just this which distinguishes 
belief from "works". 14 The act of belief is not to be understood as an 
established work of mat's own purposeful activity but simply as a God-given 
free act. 
Rudolf Bultmann insists that faith Is an act "in the highest sense" and at 
the same time the opposite of every "work". every achievement. This is so 
because in this act man denies all that he does to establish existence. 1-` 7be 
acceptance of the message in faith is an act of obedience because the 
message demands man to surrender his previous self-understanding. "Faith's 
obedience" is genuine obedience which God's Law demanded rather than the 
Jewish obedience to the Law which men sought to use in order to establish 
their own righteousness. ' 
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Faith may be the condition for the reception of grace but not in the way 
that the believer may think he has fulfilled a condition or may lay claim to 
grace. Rudolf Bultmann says, "Faith is a genuine act precisely in its 
consciousness that nothing is owed to itself, but everything to the grace which 
comes into contact with it. «137 
Faith is also a "free act" in a more philosophical sense. Rudolf Bultmann 
explains that only in the "free act" does one become something for the ' first 
time. It is the primary act in which we become certain of ourselves. ' In an 
assumption particularly favoured by ' the existentialist and herein applied to 
the interpretation of faith. Rudolf Bultmann presupposes the proposition that 
to exist is to decide. Thus, in faith I know I exist because to decide is to 
exist. 3 Rudolf Bultinann states, "Faith Is only faith in so far as it Is decision 
.... "1O In the act of 
faith, I am aware that my being is in the act. Real belief 
in God always grows'out of the realization that being is an "unknown quality" 
of which one is always becoming conscious in the "moment" of living. 14' As In 
the analogy of human friendship, the act of love is genuine if I am really in 
the doing of it and do not stand alongside it. 142 Hence, faith is not to be 
found anywhere objectively present except in action. "' Faith is always 
uncertain when we reason about it, observe it from the outside, or talk about 
it. Only in, act is it sure. "' 
"How is it possible to have a free act and an awareness of being chosen at 
one and the same time? " asks Rudolf Bultmann. He replies that it is they 
who see from the outside that ask such a question. It is impossible to 
consider both simultaneously if one thinks of "being chosen" as a literal. 
speculative phrase about God's predestination. When a free decision for God 
is made, there is awareness that God is allowed to act on it. In other words, 
awareness of being chosen exists only in so far as there is faith. Therefore, it 
may be said that "election" occurs only In faith --not before or after. No one 
can speculate outside of faith about whether or not he is chosen. '45 
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Rudolf Bultmann interprets the unity of grace and freedom as analogous 
to personal friendship. In the situation with an employee. one fulfills certain 
conditions and gets "rights" or a claim. Contrarily, in friendship all that one 
does for a friend has a purpose of revealing oneself to his friend. One does 
not seek to earn love. If one's love is returned and it comes to the free act of 
surrender, then one knows that his own surrender is the gift of the other. 
One knows that he is "chosen" and actually exists and has his being from the 
other party. One Is transformed and has a new being as a result of this 
genuine friendship. One can say that the new being oNa receives from ö4--'S 
friend is a gift. "" 
AN ANALYSIS OF PAULINE FAITH IN CONTRAST TO JUDAISM 
While drawing on the formal statements of Paul for the dichotomy of 
"faith" and "works", Rudolf Bultmann rationalizes the distinction In the light of 
existentialist concern. The assumptions and reasons given in this Pauline 
context to explain the distinction between "faith" and "works" closely parallel 
those given to explain the distinction between radical obedience in Jesus and 
obedience in Judaism. 
In focusing upon the definition of "works". John Wesley would accept 
Rudolf Bultmann's description of "works" as man's achievements which he 
seeks to fulfill in his own strength to make a claim on God. 
The other characteristics of "works" that Rudolf Bultmann gives 
demonstrate his existential penchant. For instance. he states a "work" Is that 
in which I remain the man I am. He means by a man remaining the same as 
he is that the man continues to view his activities from the "subject-object" 
perspective of the old Greek ontology. When this is the case, the automatic 
existential-ontological assumption is that the activity is done without the 
Involvement of the man. 
John Wesley who was not an existentialist would, nevertheless, share the 
concern that man ought to be Involved in what he does. Indeed, the 
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existentialist shares a classical concern which, engaged Jesus as he preached 
that love for God was a matter of the heart and inner man and not merely the 
perfunctory performance of good deeds. However, John Wesley would disagree 
with Rudolf Bultmann's assumption that the perspective of the "old ontology" 
preempts a man from having true faith and being involved in his acts. 
Rudolf Bultmann also emphasizes that in a "work", the content of the 
will's accomplishment is dictated by an external authority. Here again is the 
existentialist reaction to "outside authority" and "formal" law which tries to 
establish true law. 
Moreover, Rudolf Bultmann also assumes that the man remains the man 
he is in a "work" because in a "work" he does not make a "decision". Firstly, 
"faith" is a gift which is solely brought about by the saving event of Jesus 
Christ. The distinction between the "decision" of faith and decisions of 
"works" is that the "decision" of faith is specifically the decision made in 
response to God's gracious act in Christ. Further, Rudolf Bultmann locates 
the uniqueness of the faith-decision In the fact that all considerations -- 
which form the bases of every other decision -- are abandoned in this 
decision. This is tantamount to saying that the old ontological framework 
must be discarded in this decision. John Wesley's view does not 
categorically expel the use of reason or the "old ontology" in the faith-decision. 
Furthermore, the distinction between the "decision" of faith and every other 
decision in "works" turns finally upon what "faith" is conceived to be. 
In the context of "faith" and "works", Rudolf Bultmann, as John Wesley, 
Intentionally desires to strike a medium between God's sovereign grace and 
human free will. On the one hand, God is viewed as initiating the "summons" 
and creating the opportunity for man's decision. On the other hand, man has 
the freedom in which to decide and respond to the offer of grace -- either to 
accept or reject it. On the surface, this is not an affirmation to which John 
Wesley (or a Catholic) would be opposed. Classical Protestants -- whether 
John Wesley or predestinarian -- would depart from Rudolf Bultmann by 
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holding that while salvation may not be realized in personal existence until a 
personal response to the salvation act had occurred, nevertheless. the 
salvation of mankind had been effected quite apart from man in Jesus' death 
and resurrection before individual persons had responded. This assertion 
would be repudiated by Rudolf Bultniann on the grounds that salvation is not 
a fact in general but only a specific situation. 
Furthermore. though Rudolf Bultmann declares that God brings into being 
the possibility of faith, John Wesley might argue that Rudolf Bultmann 
assumes that mans will has its own innate power and ability in and of itself 
to turn from sin and to choose righteousness. John Wesley, and classical 
Protestants such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, would hold that, 
although God provided the possibility for faith, man's own natural will is 
hopelessly bound in sin and has no innate power to choose Jesus Christ 
without God's direct, supernatural empowerment of the will. On the basis of 
Rudolf Bultmann's view, would John Wesley classify him as an advocate of 
"works" righteousness? 
Therewith, Rudolf Bultmanri s argument that "election" only occurs in the 
act of faith would be contested by John Wesley. Side stepping the issue of 
who had been elected, classical theologians would agree at least that "election" 
had already occurred in the counsel of God "before the foundation of the 
world". Rudolf Bultrnann would reject this "general" proposition as invalid. 
Nonetheless, John Wesley would concur with Rudolf Bultmann that personal 
awareness of "election" only occurs in faith. Rudolf Bultmanri s apt reminder 
that speculation about personal election is not a possibility is a caution 
against fatalism; yet, John Wesley would not want to go as far as the 
implications of Rudolf Bultmann's thinking take us. Rudolf Bultmann will not 
allow that a man of faith may have a state of consciousness that he is chosen 
of God and saved. Neither, we infer, will he allow that man may have a state 
of awareness that he is not chosen even where there is conscious refusal to 
believe. Thus, for Rudolf Bultmann there can never be any self-conscious or 
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empirical distinction between believers and non-believers and no awareness in 
man or God that a man's destiny is in harmony or discord with God's eternal 
purpose or plan. His proposition not only renders meaningless the New 
Testament distinction between "Christian" and "pagan" but also the 
appellation "Christian". Would anyone know to whom the term "Christian" 
applies, even in a specific situation? Be , that as it may, the question is 
relevant: if one neglects this gospel, what Is lost? If one accepts it, what is 
gained? 
PAULINE FAITH IN CONTRAST TO GNOSTICISM 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, Paul does not as fully explicate the 
meaning of faith in contrast to Gnosticism as in contrast to Judaism; 
nonetheless, the eschatological attitude of 111(TTI S is not left in doubt. "' 
Rudolf Bultmann states that if faith as the Christian state of existence 
means the "no longer" in contrast to Judaism, then, in contrast to 
Gnosticism. faith describes the "not yet". "a The justified man Is constantly 
striving for fulfillment rather than having reached it as in Gnostic 
V1422-1 S. Because faith's knowledge about the new life Is concerned 
with the future, 
&M S stands beside 77't(rTI S _'"s Existence in 
faith as described in Philippians 3: 12-14 is a paradoxical existence within the 
historical life which is movement between the "no longer" and the "not yet". It 
is "no longer" in the sense that the decision of faith has discarded the past of 
self-confidence. Still. faith remembers that the past is always with us and 
constantly threatens us. The decision of faith does not remove man from 
historical existence. The decision must be continually worked out afresh and 
made again and again. Paul's "forgetting" does not mean putting the past out 
of ones mind. Rather, the past Is ever present in the state of having been 
vanquished and must be held down so that one does not let one's self be 
caught by it again. 130 
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Rudolf Buitmann explains that Paul is aware that Christians still struggle 
against the flesh (Romans 8: 12 f). Although the flesh is crucified. it is 
constantly living and must be constantly mortified. Paul knows of the conflict 
of the old and new man which Martin Luther describes by the formula "sirnul 
Justus, simul peccator". For man always remains a sinner and Is always 
justified. Here, says Rudolf Bultrnann, it is necessary to speak of "walking on 
a knife edge". "' The formula does not mean that the sin cancelled out 
through belief continually needs to be overcome. It means that the 
righteousness is not my own but is reckoned as allena Justitia. I the sinner 
stand in God's presence precisely as I have emerged from my past. ' The 
new being has overcome the old existence only in such a manner that It still 
imports the old into every conceivable present situation. Therefore. one is 
never holy -- even when one ceases to transgress any commandments. As 
Rudolf Bultmann says, "I live always and only by forgiving grace". ' 
i is also the "not yet" in that it is not an exchange of an old 
possession (old existence) for a new possession at one's own disposal. In a 
comment which is equally applicable to Paul's debate with the Jews over 
righteousness by faith, Rudolf Bultmann affirms that 77-I C-T 1S for the 
Christian is a sure hope and man's awareness that he is under divine grace. 
This is not in the Gnostic sense a divine 
d"VIS 
which 
is poured into man demonstrably transforming his nature and Imbuing him 
with special qualities. " Faith is "not yet" in just the sense that it surrenders 
the self-security which imagines it can control its own existence. "s For in 
actual fact, the giving up of a supposed security-producing possession 
precludes the taking of a new possession. The change from the former to the 
present means to renounce every desire to possess in utter devotion to the 
grace of God. "Not yet" refers to man in his historical life on earth where It 
cannot be said that he "has apprehended". "Nevertheless already" speaks of 
man, in so far as it is true for him, as having "been apprehended by Christ 
Jesus". '5' 
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LIFE IN THE SPIRIT 
Leaving now the subject -of "faith" in the relation to Judaism and 
Gnosticism, we turn to Rudolf Bultmann's treatment of Paul's description of 
the new life in relation to the "Spirit". Antithetical to the "flesh" (the 
determination of life by what is on hand and the condition In which man can 
become an object), the "Spirit" is the determination of life not by what is on 
hand and disposable but by what is invisible. According to Rudolf Bultmann, 
Paul takes over the current, popular image of the Spirit with Its Idea of 
"miracle" as a power that determines man's existence. "' Paul "radicalizes" 
this image by showing that phenomena of the "miraculous" sphere of the "on- 
hand" (cf. Heidegger's "present at-hand") are ambiguous. In contrast, the 
genuine miracle is that which transforms man In his entire existence and 
attests itself in the concrete expressions of a believer's life. Therefore, the 
Spirit is the "how", the determination of the new life. On the one hand. Paul 
speaks of the Spirit as the gift of the last days given to the man of faith. On 
the other hand, he says it must be laid hold of In faith and must prove itself 
in the concrete way one leads his life. ' Rudolf Bultmann says that the Spirit 
is the determination of heart and conscience, of walking and striving, of joy 
and of love (e. g. Romans 5: 5; Galatians 4: 6). '° 
How can those who believe be certain that In their action and In their 
refraining from action the Spirit is made manifest? This cannot be 
determined through the "gifts" Q present in the community 
because there is no usable criterion to determine their divine character. The 
only possible way one in the community may know himself to be a believer Is 
the way of life called love. 160 
Since faith is the laying hold of the Spirit, Paul does not refer faith to the 
Spirit's activity but, conversely, the reception of the Spirit to faith or baptism. 
Rudolf Bultmann says, "In so far, however, as the resolve of faith must 
maintain itself as the determination of one's entire life, a life In the Spirit and 
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a life in faith are one and the same. ""' Communion with the Lord is nothing 
other than being determined by the Spirit, for both denote the new 
eschatological mode of existence in which the faithful stand. 
Furthermore, both designate the "freedom" of the faithful (e. g. II 
Corinthians 3: 17). "Freedom from sin" (Romans 6: 18) does not indicate a 
sinless state but the freedom for God's claim which Is opened up through 
forgiveness. "Freedom" Is also "freedom from the law" (e. g. Galatians 2: 4; 
Romans 6: 14). "freedom from men" and their standards (e. g. I Corinthians 
7a; 21,9: 1) and, lastly, "freedom from death" (Romans 8: 2). 1 
Faith sees in the struggle between the Spirit and the flesh that the Spirit 
is the victor in spite of man's defeat. " The believer who puts his hope In 
God is lifted above even life and death themselves. '` However, he can never 
boast that he has salvation as a possession but can only boast of the cross of 
Christ and of his own nothingness. In proving to Judaism that faith has 
righteousness because it has life, it is not a state in which dying or weakness 
has ceased. These only make the believer aware that all is provisional and he 
has freedom in being at God's disposal. However, his freedom should not be 
used to indulge his whims because that would force him back Into slavery. 
If everything worldly is for the believer radically indifferent, this 
indifference immediately disappears before the question of the Individual's 
concrete responsibility (e. g. I Corinthians 6: 12: 8: 1ü). Faith does not make 
the faithful unfit for life or tear him out of his relations with his fellows. He 
rejoices with those who rejoice and weeps with those who weep. He has a 
part in the world's life though in the peculiar distance of "as though not" and 
without being inwardly bound to anything that is passing away (I Corinthians 
7: 29-31). 1f5 
In all of the faithful's conduct within the world he Is guided by "love". 
That man is a kCC(V) ttT10"(S and has eschatological existence Is 
manifested by the fact that belief is effective in love. " His self-surrender to 
God's forgiving grace means that the man who no longer wills to be for 
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himself exists for others. The liberating love of God has been opened up to 
him in the cross and therefore the love of Christ compels him to serve his 
fellow men. " Service to Christ realizes itself in actual life as service to the 
neighbor. Such service is the fulfillment of the "law of Christ". It is "love", 
the fulfillment of the law (Galatians 5: 14; Romans 13: 8ü). This love Is that 
in which faith manifests itself as the determination of one's life (Galatians 5: 6) 
and in which knowledge has the criterion of its genuineness (I Corinthians 
8: 1m. 'ß The decision of love is not a second decision alongside faith, but it Is 
faith. "' It is the love that is higher than all the other Spirit-wrought 
phenomena (I Corinthians 13: 1f1); the love which in the new creation becomes 
a reality and, consequently, which never ends (I Corinthians 13: 81). 
Rudolf Bultmann avows that for one who stands in love an "ethic" is no 
longer necessary, even though Paul directs believers to their responsibility and 
to what they have to do. 10 Love is not an ethical or timeless principle which 
gives specific answers to the question "what should I do? ""' 
This life in freedom and love in the Spirit is rooted in faith and is only 
understandable to those for whom the "glory of God" is the final motive and 
the final goal. 12 
Rudolf Bultmann summarizes Paul's account of man's existence under 
faith in the following way. Faith in the salvation act means that God accepts 
the believer as he is. In accepting him as he is. God accepts him as the new 
person he is. Thusly, Paul knows contrary to Judaism " that the believer as a 
result of God's unmerited grace Is "righteous" , not merely treated as if he 
were. 173 
Faith Is genuine "trust", the complete surrender of oneself to God. Albeit, 
it is also "knowledge", it is not speculation but the believer understanding 
himself anew as one who has been placed in a new situation. 
As a unity of obedience, confession and hope, of fear and trust, faith in 
its new self-understanding is not "the once for all resolve to join the Christian 
religion or a once accepted world-view". Faith may begin with a foundational 
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resolve and confession, but faithful existence is not the establishment of a 
simple state or the natural development which is begun. Faith can only be 
the "obedience of faith that is always new". " Then, faith "abides" (I 
Corinthians 13: 13) In the sense that the Christian can imagine no future In 
which his self-understanding is not based in God's saving act. To be "in 
Christ" means a life-long crucifixion with him such that his life and sufferings 
are at work in the ministry and sufferings of the man of faith. "' Since there 
are various levels of faith, this communion is never completed but is a 
constant striving forward. No longer controlled by the will to be oneself, this 
communion Is the determination of a life that is free from the past and open 
for the future. 171 
In calling attention to faith's nature as both an act of believing as well as 
a "state" of being a believer, Rudolf Bultmann shows himself to be in harmony 
with John Wesley and Martin Luther. Moreover, he is not at odds with John 
7ý'Aý%Nq r'/7C? 
Wesley or Martin Luther in /1--View that the state of being a believer is not a 
static condition. Rudolf Buitmann does diverge, however, from John Wesley 
and Martin Luther regarding the nature of this state. When Rudolf Bultmann 
states that faith is not an act done once for all, John Wesley -- most 
Protestants at their best -- would certainly concur that faith is not something 
done in a moment which may slip to the background and be forgotten, or be 
put aside, or upon which one may live indefinitely into the future with no 
further involvement. Nonetheless, John Wesley departs from Rudolf Bultmann 
in insisting that the initial act of believing does have the character of an "act 
done once for all". The faith-decision is a decisive. conscious turning-point in 
time which begins and ends in that moment. The faith-decision is the 
threshold of a permanent beginning of the end of the old existence and the 
commencement of an entirely new existence, the "new creation". However, he 
Rudor+* VulfinnNnr 
does not shy away from speaking of the old and new existence. /A agrees 
with Martin Luther that new existence does not produce a real, qualitative 
change in man's nature (his "image") as John Wesley held. However. Martin 
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Luther in contrast to Rudolf Bultmann did hold that the initial moment of 
faith introduced man into a new existence which by God's power and working 
would progress toward God's goal of the mortification of the "old man". '", 
Rudolf Bultmann assumes that the idea of the Holy, Spirit being poured 
into a man and transforming him is In the first instance a Gnostic teaching 
rather than an originally Pauline, one. "" This contradicts John Wesley's 
teaching that faith is a state that is begun in which development toward a 
goal occurs. Rudolf BuItmann would argue that assertion viewed faith from 
the perspective of sinful man, from the, perspective of traditional Greek 
ontology. According to Rudolf Bultmanri s historical and philosophical 
presuppositions, history and, therefore, man's personal existence, is not 
progressing toward a goal. In order for man to know this to be the case, ° he 
would have to - step outside his own existence and already know the end of 
history. 'Twinned with this assumption Is Rudolf Bultmann's denial that a 
personal, transcendent and immanent God is orchestrating such progress in 
history which is marching toward His revealed goal. 
Be that as it may, John Wesley would not concede that his understanding 
of the state of faith excludes Rudolf Bultmann s legitimate, formal emphasis 
that faith must be constantly laid hold of and realized anew. Albeit, John 
Wesley did not teach that a decision of faith. like the original decision to 
accept the proclamation, was made anew in every moment. He. nonetheless. 
like Rudolf Bultmann, emphasized the immediate currency of faith in linking 
acceptance with God in the present "now with now believing in Christ with a 
loving and obedient heart. 1e 
Rudolf Bultmann asserts that faith cannot be affirmed of any man and is 
unverifiable jhl the man of faith. Not even the man of faith himself, so to 
speak, nor those who observe him know whether or not he has faith. 
On the. one hand, he asserts that there is no qualitative change or 
characteristic about a man of faith that signifies him to be a man of faith. 
This assertion is quite antithetical to John Wesley who vigorously maintained 
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the state of justification brought particular, immediate "fruits" and "marks" 
which necessarily would be "felt". 18° Contrarily, for Rudolf Bultmann faith can 
never be identified with any spiritual situation. Similarly, he says he resists 
identifying faith with any human experience in order to avoid bringing 
Christianity under attack. One must continually doubt his experience rather 
than put his trust in it. Repeating Karl Barth who quoted Martin Luther, 
Rudolf Bultmann affirms, "We only believe that we believe. ""' 
Rudolf Bultmann would reject John Wesley's affirmation that the 
supernatural, personal God through the Holy Spirit testifies directly to the 
believer's justification in the man's inner being. What seems especially to 
repel Rudolf Bultmann is not the notion of faith being an experience of God 
but the kind of God and experience to which the classical theologian refers. 
Rudolf Bultmann s understanding of faith seems to comprehend some kind of 
personal experience. 182 Though finding Rudolf Otto's analysis of religious 
consciousness somewhat analogous to his formulation, he seems to talk all 
around the word "experience" In speaking of the "crisis of decision" and the 
being encountered by judgement and grace in which man knows that he is 
confronted by the outside authority. While Rudolf Bultmann seems reluctant 
to declare it, one is drawn to conclude that he is referring to some kind of 
individual personal experience. ' Nevertheless, Rudolf Bultmann does make it 
clear that we are continually to doubt our experience and not to put our trust 
in it. 
Rudolf Bultmann's thesis will not allow one to assert a positive, causal 
relationship between faith and a personal, moral transformation and societal 
renovation. According to his thesis, it Is unfounded to expect a man to be a 
"better" man or a "better" neighbour because he has faith. He prefers to say 
that it will make him no worse. ' In the end, there is no ethical or moral 
criterion -- except everyday norms accepted In a culture at a particular time -- 
by which to judge if Christian faith does for man what Rudolf Bultmann 
claims it does -- that is, making man no less fit for life than his peers. In the 
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final analysis, what does faith add to the human equation? If the criterion for 
being fit for life is formed on the basis of what can be expected of everyday, 
"average" people. is not the existentialist ethos of overcoming the "everyday" in 
its concrete life defeated by allowing its concrete life to be brought to the bar 
of the "everyday"? 
One may well query how much practical value a faith has which can only 
be doubted by the man who "experiences" it and which cannot be known to 
have a commendable, observable effect on the believer and on the society in 
which he lives. " 
The ambiguity into which Rudolf Bultmann plunges "love" Is perhaps a 
testimony to his own reluctance to completely let go of the traditional teaching 
of faith and love in pursuing the implications of his radical program of "faith". 
He explains there is no visible, empirical manifestation of faith which may be 
causally linked with faith. Love cannot be considered a "mark" or a "sign" of 
faith as it is for John Wesley. 
Nonetheless, Rudolf Bultmann alarms that the man prior to faith who 
once existed for himself now in faith exists for others. In fact, the love of 
Christ compels him to serve his fellow men. Rudolf Buitmann is stating that 
when faith occurs, love occurs. He says they occur together and are not 
causally related. They are, in fact, one and the same thing; yet, on the other 
hand, he explicates their relation in terms which denote causal relations. He 
says "belief is affective in love" (He does not refrain from giving the impression 
, 
that faith Is logically prior to love. ). ' 
As Martin Luther before him, Rudolf Bultmann equates faith and love. The 
implication is that love is the obverse of faith. In other words, faith Is one 
side of the coin in which man no longer wills for himself while love Is the 
other side of the coin In which man now exists for others. Is "existing for 
others" necessarily the same as loving and serving our fellow man? Further, 
does not Rudolf Bultmann's "existing for others" presuppose the ethical 
principle "love your neighbor"? 
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On the one hand, Rudolf Bultmann talks in terms of faith allowing man a 
possibility of love which was not available to him prior to faith. He states 
that the man outside of faith does know about love and fulfills the demand of 
love here and there. 18" The difference is that in the man of faith love is the 
"dominant and sustaining force of his life". 'a Thus, the difference between 
the man prior to faith and the man under faith is a matter of the "how" and 
manner of love rather than the kind of love. Nevertheless. even if there is 
only a difference in the "how" of love, one would expect this to enhance one's 
life In a manifest way (if only to the man himself). 
How Is love the "sustaining force of his life" according to Rudolf 
Bultmann? One must be careful in unpacking his meaning. Assuming an 
existential ethos, he is suggesting that the man of faith is totally involved in 
his love whereas the man prior to faith cannot be. He is not without a 
valuable point here. Nevertheless, Rudolf Bultmann accepts that the man 
outside of faith can fulfill the demand of love. If this is the case, in order to 
fulfill the demand of love, man must be fulfilling it in the existential manner 
(being totally involved in his love), or how else can he be referred to as 
fulfilling the demand of love? But how can the man outside of faith fulfill the 
demand of love until he has the existentiell "experience" of faith? Rudolf 
Bultmann is vague as to the real difference faith makes in the expression of 
love. 
Because the content of love is the same prior to faith as in faith, Rudolf 
Bultmann Is consistent in saying that love in faith is in no sense Indicative of 
the reality of faith. For love is love, whether prior to faith or in faith. Alas, 
how do we recognize love anyway -- outside or in faith? He states we do not 
need to know how to recognize it. He says everybody knows what love Is and 
what is required In any given situation. Therefore. loves meaning seems to 
be whatever anyone determines it means for him in any given situation. This 
is the reason everyone knows what it means. If it is true that everyone 
knows what love is to them in any given situation, it may also be true that no 
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one knows what love is to another in any given situation. Rudolf Bultmann 
throughout his theological enterprise is careful to rescue the meaning of the 
terms he employs from the "everydayness" of the "they". When it comes to 
the term "love", does he not seem content to let the common, everyday usage 
suffice? 
This means there is no standard, common-denominator criterion without 
whose presence, in a given situation at least, love could be judged to be a 
reality. Thus, there is no way for one to determine whether or not Rudolf 
Buitmann's thesis that faith releases love is sound. '' 
Finally, if faith is, as Rudolf Bultmann makes it out to be, a fleeting, 
momentary event which must be doubted time and time again, no-one can 
assuredly know and claim to have faith. If none know they have faith, does 
anyone -- the theologian himself -- really know if the reflections being 
presented as theological reflections (which by definition must originate in 
faith) are indeed theological reflections of faith? Is Rudolf Bultmann's 
assertive and pronunciative theologizing, which everywhere presents itself as 
being certain of itself (e. g.. that God cannot be... ), commensurate with such a 
tentative faith? " 
Since faith is strictly personal in its ramifications and its justification is 
utterly transcendent, Rudolf Bultmann allows no criteria to authenticate his 
claim. 
"BELIEVE" IN JOHN 
Rudolf Bultmann gives heedful attention to the profile of faith in the 
Johannine documents. According to him, John was neither of the Pauline 
school nor influenced by him. Nevertheless, he was an original writer In 
whom there is a "deep relatedness in substance that exists between John and 
Paul". "' By Inference we may conclude that while neither Jesus, Paul, nor 
John were influenced by one another, they all bore close similarity to one 
another in their basic thought. 
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The demand to believe is a constant theme throughout the whole 
Johannine corpus. Rather than using the noun ? TICT'TlS , John 
frequently utilizes the verb ill 6'TEUG- tV, particularly in the common 
Christian sense of acceptance of the Christian message concerning Jesus. 192 
The object of faith can be designated by any of the terms in the 'three-term 
equation: Jesus = his word = his "works". All three are identical. "Believe 
him" (simple dative) and "believe in him" are synonymous for John. '' Jesus 
goes beyond the Synoptics and unites the preacher with what is being 
proclaimed. As was said in the chapter on grace, the proclaimer became the 
proclaimed. As Paul recognized, Jesus wants to demonstrate that in the 
kerygma the Proclaimer who is being preached is Himself encountered. 
present, and acting (speaking). '" As Rudolf Bultmann says, "What the 
kerygma preaches as something that has happened -- God's action -- itself 
possesses the nature of the word. "'as Both "to hear" the Word and "to see" 
Jesus' works are equated with "to believe" in that each verb refers to 
recognizing Jesus as God's saving deed. " 
Rudolf Bultmann also points out that John (similar to his conclusion 
regarding Paul) links "sight" with "knowin ". Whereas yº VüJ -r Ic EIU 
appears to spring front rl (7TýuE IV at times, and whereas 
I[/ OMFl ,y sometimes from VIV 
ü) 
as kre LV, therefore, Rudolf 
Bultmann concludes "faith" and "knowing" cannot be distinguished as two 
different acts or stages such that one must first recognize Jesus and then 
believe. "' Faith is inseparable from knowledge so that it is only faith itself 
that knows. ' - 
While John, as Paul, knows that faith which is directed to Jesus' word (or 
Himself) is the only way to salvation, he does not engage the Jews in a 
polemic over "works of the Law". He focuses on the right conception of 
salvation rather than the way of salvation as Paul. Paul characterizes the 
way of salvation as 
dtk, T I OCFUV h while John describes salvation's 
i 
conception as _ ___ 
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While there is apparent agreement between the Christian preaching of 
"life" and the world's desire for "life" as its salvation, Johri s purpose is to 
expose the real difference. Contrary to the Jews Paul faced, the world would 
believe that Jesus is the Son of God if John forwarded evidence of his 
authenticity according to Its criteria(6: 30). ' 
In accordance with Rudolf Bultmann, John claims that the world has no 
idea of true "life". In fact, the demand of faith demands that the world 
surrender its previous understanding with its standards and opinions and 
discard its whole structure of presumptuous security. This demand of faith, 
which is in inner unity with Paul's concept of faith, basically means to 
renounce the world; i. e., to surrender oneself and live by the strength of the 
invisible and uncontrollable . 
0° 
"Believing" which means "renunciation" is not an activity of this world but 
a happening rooted In the 'Beyond'. It is an act or gift of God himself. 201 The 
faith which Is "renunciation" has as Its object something incredible to the 
intelligence of the world. Faith Is "the overcoming of the offense" that life and 
salvation encounter man -only in the human word of Jesus addressed to 
him. 2O2 
Furthermore, faith as "removal out of this world" is not a dualistic world- 
view, a philosophy of life which arises from renouncing the world and which 
flies into speculative thought or devout silence. Since faith understands that 
God's working takes place only in faith, its acceptance of the testimony is to 
itself the proof of its own assurance. Rudolf Bultmann qualifies assurance by 
stating that it is not any sort of guarantee or experience within this world'D' 
Hence, the revelation that "the light came into the world" is the scandal. The 
invisible becomes the visible which, 'according to the world's standards, it 
neither could nor should become. 2Q4 Rudolf Bultmann says, "Faith is not 
flight from the world nor asceticism, but desecularization in the sense of a 
smashing of all human standards and evaluations. "' 
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John's conception of "removal out of the world" is not the being taken out 
of the world but renouncing evil. "World" for John is not, as in Gnosticism, a 
natural, foreign entity encircling man with the compulsion of fate ' Rather 
it is the "... historical power constituted by man who has rebelled against 
God". "' Revelation is the scandal because it calls the world into question. 
Rudolf Bultmann states, "As an overcoming of the offense and as a decision 
against the world faith is desecularization, transition into eschatological 
existence. " The believer is still "in the world" but no longer "of the world". ' 
The "glory" which believers possess consists of "knowledge" and "freedom". 
"To know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ" is only a believing 
knowledge in which the possessor allows himself to be determined by what he 
knows. The "freedom" promised to the possessor of faith is freedom from the 
world, freedom from sham "reality" (16: 33), and seductiveness. 
Freedom from the world is also "freedom from sin". "Freedom from sin" is 
not the endowment of a new nature to which sinlessness belongs (Perhaps an 
allusion to Wesleyan teaching? ). Faith is the overcoming of the world which 
must be done over and over again. ' 
How does John's concept of faith compare to Paul's concept? According to 
Rudolf Bultmann, both hold faith is the surrender of reliance on one's own 
power which means that righteousness is not attained by one's own strength. 
Both concur that faith is not a good work nor unbelief an evil one, for both 
are decisions. Indeed, they are in agreement that faith has the quality of 
obedience. "' 
While Paul appreciates the problem of the "indicative and imperative and 
their relation to each other and to Christian conduct", he does not treat it in 
connection with the sinning of believers which factually takes place again and 
again. He expects the rapidly approaching end of the world. Rudolf 
Bultmann affirms John distinguishes himself in that "to him eschatology as a 
time-perspective has dropped out because he has radically transposed 
eschatological occurrence into the present-. 21' John sees the "paradoxical 
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tension" between the declaration of not sinning (1 John 3: 9) and the 
confession of sin (1 John 1: 8). "' 
A further distinction between John and Paul appears when one turns to 
the anti-gnostic character of Johns concept of faith. In Johns mind the Jews 
are not prevented from believing' because they rely on the law of Moses and 
their works as Paul maintains, but because they are 
EFc 
TOD tfOO pi OU , 
Gnosticism which is trying to reside within Christianity is a particular 
expression of this worldliness. While Rudolf Bultmann asserts Gnosticism 
knows John's terminology and even largely Influenced John's language. he 
says it is wrong to interpret John according to Gnostic meaning. John 
engages himself with Gnosticism in order to distinguish himself from It. 21 
The anti-Gnostic bias In John's concept° of faith is illustrated in his 
exposition of the relation of the "Already of faith to its Not yet". Rudolf 
Bultmann Insists that for John, faith, which is complete renunciation, has life 
"already", but not as a possession or quality as in Gnosticism. Believers 
must not imagine themselves removed from life in this, world but must 
maintain their, connection with the word. "God's revelation is present in the 
world 'only' as the word which challenges the world, " states Rudolf Bultmann. 
Because of this, faith is temporary by nature. '", 
--,. Rudolf Bultmann claims that, according to John, the believer cannot 
realize the possibility of his being removed out of the world in such a manner 
as to make it actual to himself as condition. However, removal out of ' the 
world can be manifested in conduct which is generally called, "keeping the 
commandments" or keeping the word given by Jesus. The unity of believing 
and acting is In harmony with the substance of the commandments in as 
much as the action which they require is nothing else than love (John 13: 34, 
15: 12)? 's In genuine faith, the foundation for all one's future conduct (which 
is to be conduct In love) Is provided. 16 
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JOHANNINE FAITH AS ESCHATOLOGICAL EXISTENCE 
Rudolf Bultmann submits that John portrays eschatological existence by 
saying that believers "are in the Revealer or he in them. """ The statement in 
John 15: 4. "Abide in me, and I (shall abide) in you", is not spealdng of a 
realistic parousia of Jesus or a direct or mystical relationship to Him but the 
believer's eschatological existence withdrawn from the world. 
Rudolf Bultmann affirms that John characterizes eschatological existence 
by various traditional terms. E, Vhr-- means "well-being". Of 
"joy", Is different from every other joy of this world. Neither "well-being" nor 
"joy" are realized in the external conditions of life or in some state of mind 218 
Faith Is true faith only when it "abides". when it constantly brings about 
desecularization. As far as a relationship to God Is mediated to the 
believer by the Revealer, the relationship is one of "player". Prayer denotes 
both that the believer is united with God and is separated from him. It does 
not signify the mythological notion of Jesus as an intercessor. From I John 
5: 15, Rudolf Bultmann concludes regarding prayer requests and their answers 
that "no matter what may happen, that which does happen Is God's answer to 
the prayer'. 229 
Rudolf Bultmann concludes that the final criterion of eschatological 
existence for John is the "possession of the Spirit" (I John 3: 34). For John, 
the Spirit is neither the power that causes their miracles nor the power or 
norm of Christian conduct. "It is the power within the Church which brings 
forth both knowledge and the proclamation of the Word", affirms Rudolf 
Bultmann. ' The Scripture John 15: 26 means the knowledge given by the 
spirit is to have its activity in the proclamation, In preaching. In and through 
the preaching, the eschatological occurrence which happened in Jesus' coming 
and going is to continue to take place In preaching. " 
One may conclude after having reviewed Rudolf BuItmann s presentation of 
Jesus'. Paul's, and John's understanding of "faith" that he discovers 
substantial agreement between the three. Insofar as this is true, Rudolf 
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Bultmann upholds the traditional, Christian conclusion. Although Paul 
designates faith "obedience", and John denotes it "renunciation". they both 
understand the demand of faith essentially in the same way. ' Since there 
is basic agreement between Paul and John regarding "faith". my critique and 
evaluation of Rudolf Bultmann's formulation of "faith" in Paul may be allowed 
essentially to apply also to John. 
FAITH IN THE DEVELOPING CHURCH 
In considering "the developing Church's" understanding of faith, Rudolf 
Bultmann concludes that its literature (which includes the pastoral epistles 
and Hebrews) adds nothing constructive to the concept of faith. It actually 
represents the beginning of its corruption. Lacking the controlling criteria of 
Pauline authorship, the polemic of justification by faith, he argues "the 
developing Church's" literature cannot mean by 77-16T IS (7nQ: reUEIV 
"obedience". Rather, faith acquires the meaning of "right belief, "right 
doctrine". 2 
CRISIS IN BELIEF 
Rudolf Bultmann takes up several concerns that affect belief and will 
complete the discussion of faith. One issue concerns belief in the 
supramundane reality, the transcendent, when the transcendent has been 
called into question Z' He is particularly interested in his claim that scientific 
observation (differentiated from natural science) induces a crisis in belief. ' 
He readily qualifies his assertion by explaining that belief "never" has to 
struggle against scientific findings to understand the purpose of "being" only 
against natural science's possible claims as a Weltanschauung. Natural 
science and, for that matter, "science of history" (which is the science that 
deals critically with the New Testament) confronts a person with the question 
of whether or not he wants to view existence in the light of the reality 
available to sensual observation or in the light of the reality of the "moment" 
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with its demands. ' Regardless of its results, man is told that God has acted 
such that the word of divine judgement and forgiveness which now confronts 
the man is authenticated. "Science of history" cannot confirm or reject this 
claim because the claim is beyond the sphere of historical observation. 
Thus, the "science of history" becomes beliefs "crisis" by virtue only of this 
stumbling-block, that the word of the Christian message asserts that it is the 
authentic Word of God. Belief enters a "crisis" also when it is confused with 
a Weltanschauung or with a religious frame of mind (such as mysticism). 
Herein, man demands verification by criteria which do not exist. Thus, man 
demonstrates that his belief in himself holds sway and, therefore, it means a 
crisis for belief in God. " In describing the "crisis of belief". Rudolf Bultmann 
tries to remove belief from the crisis In which he perceives many In our 
scientific culture find it; specifically, that beliefs object is threatened by 
sciences findings and results. One appreciates Rudolf Bultmann s robust 
appeal for a science whose understanding does not automatically preclude 
theology. Moreover, one welcomes his affirmation that theology does not fear 
sciences results. However, in trying to dispel the crisis of belief, has not he 
consequently put the historical scientist in a dilemma? The scientist, when 
confronted by the proclamation, is asked to abandon what is by nature his 
obligation; namely, to submit what he encounters to critical evaluation. Is not 
Rudolf Bultmann suggesting that the scientist do what he himself says a 
scientist may not do when Involved in critical thinking: passively "surrender to 
the spell of another 's mind"? ' 
For a more in depth discussion of the related subject of the relation 
between "knowledge" (philosophy) and "faith" (theology), "unbelieving" and 
"believing" existence, please see the Appendix. 
TWO FAITHS 
Clarifying the relation between the "faith" which is believed" (fides quae 
creditur and the "faith by which one believes" (fides qua creditur) is another 
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issue important to Rudolf Buitmann's concept of faith. He finds previous 
formulations inadequate and offers - his solution. He states, In "genuine 
orthodoxy', theology was the science of faith in that the faith which one 
believes was a rationally systematized body of revealed "truths" derived from 
Scriptural ideas presented for acceptance to the "faith by which one believes". 
Because these rational "truths" which describe not God but doctrines about 
him are contrary to reason, therefore, the "faith by which one believes" would 
relate to doctrines and be impossible 
While Rudolf Bultmann appreciates the theological reaction to this above 
orthodox formulation, he explains that theology, since Schleiermacher, went to 
the opposite, absurd extreme of holding that "religious faith precedes theology 
and produces it" (Wendlands words). In contrast to orthodoxy, he asserts 
that this new theology investigates the "faith by which one believes" and by 
separating it from theology loses the "faith which is believed"0 This renders 
theological reflection meaningless. In this new theology, faith is accepted 
beforehand and its reality demonstrated before the question of truth is ever 
raised and considered. As he aptly summarizes it, liberalism loses what faith 
believes In and orthodoxy loses the faith by which one believes. "' 
- Rudolf Bultmann desires to correct the imbalance by contending that the 
"faith by which one believes" Is what it is only in relation to its object. "the 
faith which is believed". ' He encapsulates his position when he states, 
"What God Is cannot be understood unless what faith is is also understood 
and conversely. Theology, therefore, is the science of God in that It is at the 
same time the science of faith -- and conversely. - Thus, the object of theology 
is faith itself in unity with what - it believes in. " Since faith includes 
theology, theology Is -the scientific elaboration of what is already present in 
simple faith' 
In the issues of the "crisis - of , belief and the relation between the two 
kinds of faith, Rudolf Bultmann's existential-ontological presupposition is the 
hinge upon which his qualification of faith ' turns. According to him, the 
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scientist. the orthodox, and even the "new theology" theologians go wrong in 
their assumption of the Greek "subject-object" ontology which tries to study 
doctrine from a neutral observer's standpoint. Whether Scriptural assertions 
or religious faith. these researchers according to Rudolf Bultmann see these 
as historical manifestations In this visible world which In someway reveal the 
object of faith. ' Rudolf Bultmann argues that God is not within man's 
control so that man cannot control the impulse of faith from which theological 
thinking derives. ' Although he agrees with "new theology" In Its assertion 
that theological thinking follows faith, he argues "new theology" loses "the 
faith which Is believed" because it does not regard Scripture as the proclaimed 
Word which demands "faith's obedience". "New theology" neglects the truth 
that the proclamation presents Jesus as a historical fact through which our 
own historical existence is decisively conditioned. In other words. religious 
faith does not arise without being mediated through and grounded in its 
object, the Word of proclamation. 97 
SUMMARY WITH COMMENTS 
For Rudolf Bultmann, faith is the hinge upon which turns the reality of 
true, human existence and the new self-understanding. It is the crux of 
genuine, knowledge of God-and presupposition for the formulation of theology. 
Without faith, even the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ has no 
meaning or importance. 
In deriving his understanding of faith from the New Testament, Rudolf 
Bultmann accepts Herrmann Gunkel's characterization of Christianity as a 
syncretistic religion 28 In keeping with this, Rudolf Bultmann analyzes the 
New Testament with a relativistic, historical-critical, existential-ontological 
philosophy which likewise assumes that the writers and composers of the New 
Testament documents were historical critics themselves. These writers took 
from a received message that which suited their own particular needs and 
wrenched it into a new message which they desired to communicate. Rudolf 
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Bultmann's methodological assumption has an essential influence on his 
findings regarding faith. ' 
Rudolf Bultmanri s methodological assumption poses several concerns. 
Why did a New Testament writer have to try to twist the Gospel "message" 
Into terms which were intellectually intelligible to certain cultural audiences 
with their particular mental outlook when Rudolf Bultmann maintains that 
the Gospel message does not convey an intellectual communication but a 
demand which makes a man insecure? Why do they so carefully craft their 
intellectual form, choosing certain words rather than other words, when it Is 
not the meaning of the individual words per se which is intended to be 
conveyed but a "demand"? Further. why must certain thought complexes and 
conceptions be chosen in order to convey "demand" rather than others? If 
particular words must be chosen as opposed to other words. then does not 
one assume that there is interest in the particular content which an 
individual word has to convey and not just Its communication of "demand"? 
However. I cannot see that he addresses adequately or resolves the uneasy 
tension between assuming at once that particular words convey a common, 
objective meaning which correlate to the reality to which they refer and that 
particular words are empty vehicles given a suitable meaning by a particular 
hearer. Rudolf Bultmann assumes the particular Christian "message" Is given 
a meaning out of the common, existentiell understanding (one from existence 
qualified by faith's "resolve") of each writer. What endures every changeable 
situation is a common. existential understanding of man. The common, 
existential understanding of man uses words in particular circumstances to 
express the existentiell understanding 290 
While there is truth to the proposition that meaning Is projected onto a 
"message" by the hearer, Rudolf Bultmann's radical adherence to his 
philosophy has the effect of shutting man off from any possibility of receiving 
meaning from an outside, objective message, much less a revelatory 
communication from a supernatural and immanent personal God. For many, 
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Rudolf Bultmann's formulation could easily degenerate into anything from a 
fanatical and arrogant. Nietzschian bigotry to a highly subjective self-delusion. 
Rudolf Bultmann's assumption -transfers any permanent meaning - from 
outside man to man himself. - Mari s existential understanding is the 
permanent fixture in a world of flux. Whereas in classical Christian faith, 
permanent meaning is ultimately theocentric and fixed in eternity in the 
personal God; with Rudolf Bultmann, permanent meaning is denied a 
personal God and made anthropocentric by residing in mari s' existential 
understanding. One may interpret Rudolf Bultmann as betraying his 
relativistic assumption by giving man an "eternal" -meaning by means of a 
relative, philosophical construct which arose out of a particular, historical 
situation. He argues as one who acknowledges he has a philosophical 
presupposition and then promptly forgets the fact. His presupposition ceases 
to be a presupposition in his mind and soon becomes what is. One must 
conclude that this philosophy was the more elemental, permanent, and 
controlling truth to the hearers and interpreters than the truth of the good 
news of, Jesus ; Christ. This contradicts the claims of the New Testament 
writers taken in their literal sense. 
The distinctions which Rudolf Bultmann draws between the various 
phrases of TT! CT TEO61V with and without prepositions seems forced and 
overwrought. Through his "history of religions" spectacles, he reads each 
variation as having a particular use and meaning for each religious 
respondent. One has difficulty in understanding why one should think that 
"%TI QTEUEI U Ei 5 ("believe in") Is the unique New Testament term for faith 
when Rudolf Bultmann asserts that what the New Testament really wants to 
communicate by 71'0,116-061 VE1S Is 7 '! i' o ;W on I ("believe 
that"). If the New Testament wanted to accent the meaning "believe that". It 
certainly had at its disposal the most likely candidate 7ri a'T (J -1 V OT(- 
to convey such a meaning. Moreover, to construe 615 as "that is" is out 




Rudolf Bultmanns interpretation of TrI rTEL)JV CtS as "believe 
that" seems controlled by his conception of the object which is believed. 
Though the object may be variously expressed as "the Gospel" or "Jesus 
Christ". the latter must be Interpreted in the light of the former rather than 
vice versa. In Rudolf Bultmanri s mind, the object cannot refer to the person 
Jesus Christ because such a person no longer exists. Since he no longer 
exists as a Thou, we can only conceive of a reference to "Jesus Christ" as a 
reference to the proclamation about him. Hence, one cannot construe a 
personal relationship to Christ in the New Testament to mean a relationship 
of trust between the person Jesus Christ and his disciple. 
Martin Luther, John Wesley, and Karl Barth would protest that without 
the living and present person Jesus Christ there could be no proclamation in 
the Now. Not only does the proclamation refer to Him, but it Is also spoken 
and made valid and effective by Him. 
In connection with this Idea of a personal relationship, one observes that 
Rudolf Buitmann's existentialist approach which desires to personalize man 
interprets faith in a way that actually may de-personalize him. In Rudolf 
Bultmanri s description, the man of faith is still alone in the universe and is 
disconnected from any personal ties to a personal, living Creator -- Father 
and Redeemer. The ultimate relation of man as portrayed In Rudolf 
Bultmann's formulation of faith is one in which man "relates" to some 
anonymous, impersonal "God" of which precious little can be known. 
Consequently, the relationship of faith which is maws most crucial and 
fundamental relationship is robbed of Its character of personality and 
"humanness" when it is removed from its reference to Its personal origins. 
Rudolf Bultmann may answer that the existential understanding actually 
personalizes man because it removes man from the illusion that he is related 
to a greater Thou and restores him to himself. Certainly, in the final 
analysis, the existential conception of the relationship to God speaks of man 
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being referred back to himself. One may find it hard to appreciate the view 
that the Scriptural, Christian solution for the situation of an already alienated 
man, who is radically befuddled by his aloneness in the universe, lies 
ultimately in the individual man relating to himself. 
The Idea that "obedience" Is linked with "faith Is agreed. However. Rudolf 
Bultmann's evidence for arguing "obedience" is primarily "faith% and "faith" is 
"obedience", is weak and unconvincing. In Interpreting "faith" as "obedience". 
he divests 7T1Q'TEUEIV of its traditionally understood New Testament 
meaning of "trust"; in its place, he fills it with the content usually associated 
c 
lexically with the word OMI k& . Why were the cognates of 
711(fl 6 GI (1 seized upon to express "obedience" when the other terms, 
principally, t'rrFCt fnÄ (in both the Septuagint and the New Testament), 
but also 1 OnIQ_ cand ? t5 i A/r. EW - were the readily available 
Greek words with the dominate and established meaning of "obedience"? " 
Rudolf Bultmann s theology of faith implicitly communicates with Martin 
Luther's. Rudolf Bultmann depicts faith in the same form as Martin Luther 
In holding that faith is an act of believing in a moment as well as a state of 
being. For both, faith is hearing the proclamation. Further. both understand 
that when faith occurs, love occurs. However, the construction they each 
place upon faith's arrangement differs as widely as the vantage point of each. 
Martin Luthers theology Is rooted In the so-called Western. Greek ontological 
tradition and Rudolf Bultmanri s presupposes the existential-ontological 
analysis. While Martin Luther sees faith in Its primary sense as personal, 
trusting reliance in the living person, Jesus Christ, and his work, Rudolf 
Bultmann sees it as submission to an ; outside, overmastering. authority. In 
the moment of faith, both - agree , that man Is "righteous". Rudolf Bultmann 
repudiates that a consequent, qualitative change occurs in man while Martin 
Luther's position is ambiguous. Martin Luther conceives of this momentary 
act as the birth of a state in which a regenerating, linear development in man 
progresses toward a goal of perfection in God. ! Consistent with this 
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conception is Martin Luthers teaching that empirical "signs" (fruit) which are 
manifested as the battle against sin, such as "good works" and love, are 
causally linked to faith. Since for Rudolf Bultmann justification is only 
present in the 'Beyond'. there can be no causal relation between faith and 
following occurrences in this visible world. Nevertheless, Rudolf Bultmann is 
unwilling to follow the logical extension of this proposition that faith may just 
as readily lead to wickedness as uprightness. One feels that Rudolf Bultmann 
cannot entirely escape from the moorings of historical Christianity when he 
concedes that faith makes a man no worse than his fellow. ' 
Finally, Rudolf Bultmann claims that there are no visible indications of 
love. He insists that everybody knows already what love is. If this Is true. 
then it is also true no one knows what love is to another in any given 
situation. Of course, since Rudolf Bultmann admits no empirical criteria of 
the presence or absence of love, his assertion that everybody knows what love 
is cannot be determined. Rudolf Bultmann's argument will hardly allow for a 
love that is pitched any higher than whatever Is its lowest common 
denominator. Throughout his theological enterprise, Rudolf Bultmann is at 
pains to redeem the meaning of the terms he employs from the "everydayness" 
of the "they". When it comes to the term "love". he seems content to let the 
common everyday usage suffice. In contrast, while classical Christianity can 
offer no assured proofs of the presence of love. it does claim criteria which at 
least show up its absence. 
In Rudolf Bultmann's discussion of the issue of science and belief, he 
affirms that any field of study must reckon firstly with its pre-scientific 
relation to human existence. « Though he does not greatly enlarge upon it. 
he extends this exhortation to include also natural science. Although he 
touches on the subject of empirical science and theology in his essay 
"Theology as Science" (1941), he does not adequately work out a reconciliation 
between his existential assumption and the scientific, empirical method which 
assumes the "old-styled" ontological philosophy. '"' He urges that it is not the 
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results but scientific observation itself which provokes a crisis in belief. Can 
we separate the results from the method? If the framework of scientific 
observation in its traditional understanding were altered in its philosophy to 
accommodate the existential concern. could we still legitimately speak of it as 
empirical science? Would we still obtain the same results as before? Rudolf 
Bultmann accepts the results of New Testament scholars who achieved their 
results through the Weltanschauung of scientific observation. If a 
philosophical and methodological framework stands condemned, how can we 
be sure that the results it achieves should not also be condemned? Moreover, 
does he not consistently condemn the faulty results and conclusions wrought 
in a theology derived from the vantage point of scientific observation? 
For Rudolf Bultmann. faith is said to arise from out of a pre- 
understanding of philosophy and the scientific understanding. that is, If both 
are understood in terms compatible with existential-ontological analysis. In 
order for one to accept Rudolf Bultmanns argument, one must firstly have 
faith In "scientific", existential-ontological analysis before one can have faith in 
the Gospel. Unfortunately, Rudolf Bultmann falls to avoid falling victim to 
holding "two faiths" -- a fault for which he roundly castigates traditional 
theology. In fact, in the light of his factual teaching, we may conclude that 
"faith alone" in the proclamation --without the existential pre-understanding 
Is insufficient for "justification". 
Finally, Rudolf Bultmanri s ultimate "reason" for asserting the absolute 
necessity of the acceptance of the proclamation boils down to this: this 
syntactical arrangement of words called the "proclamation" is incumbent upon 
man for absolutely no reason at all, save these words say so to the person 
who hears them. The "proclamation" neither corresponds to an imperatively 
authoritative. personal. referent -- human or super-human -- nor does it claim 
to justify itself on the basis of any philosophical, scientific. logical. 
psychological. spiritual, or practical reason. 
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Rudolf Bultmann affirms that radical obedience exists when the whole 
man stands behind what he does. Man is to eschew the blind, formal 
obedience which offers no reason for the obedience but that the authority 
says to obey. Is not Rudolf Bultmann calling for the very obedience which 
he rebuffs? Can the whole man be said to stand behind what a man does 
when his mind (reason) is excluded from participation? Does he not 
contradict himself by asserting that man must obey and accept a 
proclamation simply on the basis that it says so? 
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p. 324. 
94. Bultmann and Weiser. Faith p. 90; Bultrnann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 
220. 
95. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, pp. 275-277. 
96. Ibid., p. 176. 
97. Ibid., p. 177; Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 63. 
98. Bultmann. Primitive Christianity, p. 176. 
99. For instance, he relates Romans 15: 18 and I Thessalonians 1: 8 and 
also insists that Romans 1: 8 and Romans 16: 19 are united here in 
Romans 1: 5. 
100. The report of a congregation's faith or obedience in the world as 
expressed in Romans 1: 18 and Romans 16: 9 does not express the 
purpose of apostleship per se. The purpose of apostleship Is 
fulfilled when those in the world have faith and are obedient. 
Just the same, Cranfield and Whiteley acknowledge these verses 
demonstrate the parallel (Cranfield says "equivalence") between 
"faith" and "obedience". C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, The International 
Critical Commentary, gen. eds. J. A. Emerton and C. E. B. Cran- 
field, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985) vol. 1, p. 66; D. E. H. 
Whiteley, The Theolo of St. Paul (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). 
p. 162. 
101. Whiteley remarks that the evidence Bultmann adduces hardly 
justifies such a sweeping assertion. Whiteley, Theology of Paul, p. 
162. For comments on faith and obedience In Romans 1: 5, see: 
John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to 
the Romans, trans. and ed., The Revd. John Owen (Edinburgh: 
Printed for Calvin Translation Society, 1849), p. 8; Barrett. Romans, 
p. 21; Cranßeld, Romans, vol. 1. p. 66f. 
102. See: Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, s. v. "obedifnce" "obey"; 
Arndt 
' 
and Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon, s. v. " and 
103. Interestingly, Catholics will agree with Bultmann inasmuch as he 
maintains that the faith by which we are justified is "obedience": 
John Henry Newman proffers that by our obedience we are 
acceptable to God. Of course, serious differences surface between 
the two when one probes into the meaning of obedience for each. 
John Henry Newman 's characterization of obedience as our being 
enabled to fulfill the Law for our justification diametrically opposes 
Rudolf Bultmann's conception of obedience as renunciation of the 
Law and mar's old self-understanding. John Henry Newman would 
hold that obedience is subjection to the commandments of God and 
Rudolf Bultmann would urge that it is subjection to the demand of 
God. John Henry Newman, Lectures on Justification, 2nd ed. 
(London: J. G. F. & J. Rivington, 1840), pp. 36,38,59. 
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104. John Calvin calls faith maxis answer to God's call of the Gospel; 
Martin Luther held that justification was received by faith which is 
an effectual hearing of the word of God. Karl Barth states that the 
Gospel demands decision and is the submissive acceptance of 
Jesus Christ; Hans King states that the one who believes is the 
one who submits to the justification of God; William Sanday and 
Arthur Headlam see it as the act of assent which appropriates the 
Gospel. C. K. Barrett states man believes when he accepts the 
power of God at work In the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus; 
Cranfield calls it maxis appropriate response to the message. 
Michel views it as the reception of the Christian proclamation and 
saving faith. Calvin, Romans, p. 8; Cranfield, Romans, vol. 1, p. 
89: Barrett, Romans, p. 28; Barth, Romans, p. 39 and Kung, 
Justification, pp. 85,252.259; Althaus. Martin Luther, p. 232; 
Luther, Commentary to Galatians, p. 185; The New International 
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Beyreuther, and Hans Bietenhard, 3 vols. (Exeter: Paternoster 
Press, 1975), vol. 1, s. v. "Faith" by 0. Michel, pp. 599,601; Sanday 
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105. Ibid. 
106. The contemporary commentator Michel seems to be sympathetic to 
Rudolf Bultmann's view that faith relates simply to the Christian 
proclamation. New International Dictionary, s. v. "Faith" by 0. 
Michel, pp. 599,601. 
107. See Warfield's remark in Warfield, Biblical Foundations, p. 330. 
Martin Luther would speak for John Wesley in avowing that not 
only was Christ the "object" of faith but he is himself present in 
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faith or works, himself or false teachers, but Christ or no Christ. 
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e Li¢ht of the Old and 
New Testaments. trans. A. M. Woodruff III (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1971), p. 66; Cranfield, Romans, vol. 1, pp. 
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Bultmann and Weiser. Faith, p. 91. 
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130. BuItmann. Faith and Understanding I, p. 62. 
131. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1. p. 
329. 
132. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 63. 
133. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 
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Essays, p. 175. 
347 
139. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, pp. 62f, Bultxnann Essas. 
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chosen. "; Bultmann, Essays. pp. 175f. 
146. Ibid.. pp. 178f. 
147. Faith as an eschatological attitude Is not as in Philo a disposition 
(an attitude of mind, a r(ýýAEO'is of the soul (an 
a virtue) or a perfected State of the soul as the 
reward for the contest itself. Neither is M=-Ls a mysticism 
in which the soul can free itself from the world. Mysticism seeks 
God beyond the given. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 1, p. 316; 
Bultmann and Weiser, Faith. pp. 53,94; Bultmann, Existence and 
Faith, p. 87; Bultmann, Es says, p. 9; Bultmann, Faith and 
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and Faith, p. 87. 
155. "Fear", a constitutive element in faith's structure like "hope", is the 
believer's knowledge of his own insignificance. "Fear" destroys false 
security; Bultmann, Theology. vol. 1, p. 321; Bultmann and Weiser. 
Faith, pp. 95f. 
156. Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 97; Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 1, p. 322. 
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158. Ibid. 
159. Ibid. 
160. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 79. 
348 
161. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 144. 
162. Ibid. 
163. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 74. 
164. Ibid., pp. 144f. 
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166. Bultmann, Essays, p. 112. 
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168. Ibid., p. 145. 
169. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 181. Count Zinzendorf 
also claims that faith is love in his Nine Lectures, p. 34. 
170. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, p. 145. 
171. Ibid., p. 222. 
172. Ibid., p. 146. 
173. Ibid., p. 138. 
174. Paul expresses this when he exhorts his. hearers to examine 
themselves and stand fast In faith (e. g. I Corinthians 10: 12). Paul 
also states that faith can be weak or strong and that the man of 
faith still stands in a life In which it is necessary to judge and act 
(e. g. Romans 14: 1f: 15: 131). 
175. Bultmann, Existence and Faith. p. 142. 
176. Ibid., p. 143. 
177. Martin Luther's classic dictum states that man is simul iustus et 
peccator. By this Martin Luther meant that man by faith enters a 
condition which lasts throughout his life in which man is at once a 
righteous man and a sinner. He is in a state of tension in which 
he as a man of faith has Christ working against him as a sinner. 
This struggle continues throughout the life of the man of faith as 
the old man is progressively crucified. Althaus, Martin Luther, pp. 
236,242-45. 
178. Rudolf Bultmann rejects Luthers point that sin and forgiveness 
alternate in human life. Ibid., pp. 242-45: Bultmann, Faith and 
Understanding I, p. 51. 
179. Martin Luther held that the Christian daily renews his surrender of 
himself in faith to God's totally merciful judgement of life and death 
as a daily new reception of Judgement and of the grace of 
justification. In fact, Rudolf Bultmann s emphasis has overtones of 
Martin Luthers view which Rudolf Bultmann has adapted to his 
existentialist understanding of history and personal existence. 
Althaus, Martin Luther, p. 244; Wesley, Letters, vol. 5, p. 263. 
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180. See above. Chapter Four: "Saving Faith as a Gift/Decision and as a 
State" in the Section One. Martin Luther's view which fairly 
represents classical Protestantism, held that there is a basis upon 
which one can determine whether genuine faith is present or not. 
The hallmark of the certainty of our genuine faith for us and others 
is the conflict against sin (the "work of the new obedience"). 
Companion signs to the conflict against sin are the signs of "good 
works" and love: Althaus, Martin Luther, p. 246f. 
181. As Rudolf Bultmann says. "The 'new man is always the man of the 
'Beyond', whose identity with the man of this world can only be 
believed in faith. " Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p. 51. 
182. He seems to find some analogy between Rudolf Otto's idea of the 
inner relatedness of the moments of dread and fascination and his 
assertion that the nature of faith encompasses both despair and 
awareness of God, judgement and grace. Rudolf Bultmann 
pinpoints despair as the realization of fleeing from God and grace 
as the awareness of God when flight has ended. He states they are 
not two successive experiences. Although he states they both 
belong together, he does not go further to say they are one 
"experience". At the same time, he does not explicitly deny that 
they are an "experience". 
183. John Kent likens it to Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute 
dependence". John H. S. Kent. Tutorial, University of Bristol. May 
1986. 
184. Perhaps the implication is that even this is an advancement over 
the results of some former old-styled formulations of faith. 
Moreover, it is an acknowledgement that we cannot expect a man 
of faith to be anything different from any other human being. 
Rudolf Bultmann would perhaps think Christian faith does as 
much for man's existence as any other religious, ethical or 
humanitarian endeavor. 
185. Certainly, Rudolf Bultmann's conception of faith would make for a 
body of believers who would be hesitant to judge and discipline one 
another. However, this effect might be lost on a body of "believers" 
who could not determine whether or not, or to what degree they 
were a body of "believers". An ambiguity which pastors recognize 
has some truth. Since no individual would be sure if they were a 
Christian because they could not be sure if they had faith, and 
since the presence of charismatic "fruit" and "good works" would be 
irrelevant, a situation would prevail in which few if any dare call 
themselves Christians (a situation which Kierkegaard would 
welcome). Nevertheless. those who did could do so without any 
challenge from others. This would leave a situation in which none 
or all can be Christians and no one can determine which is the 
case. Contrarily, Paul in the verses of Romans to which Rudolf 
Bultmann has referred (Romans 1: 8; 16: 19) recognizes the presence 
of faith and obedience in the believers of the Roman church (Paul 
even mentions the names of individuals in Romans 16). Not only 
does he recognize it. but also acknowledges that it is known in all 
the world. 
186. Bultmann. Essas, p. 112. Faith does not make the faithful unfit 
in his relations with others; love is that in which faith manifests 
itself. 
187. Ibid., p. 303. 
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188. Ibid. 
189. Jesus, when speaking of love, said, By this all men will know that 
you are my disciples. if you have love for one another.... " (John 
13: 35). According to him, his love is demonstrative and when 
exercised by men manifests its identity with Jesus. 
Since Paul, as Rudolf Bultmann tells us, is in basic agreement with 
Jesus, there is no reason to expect him to diverge from Jesus at 
this point. The logic of the "If ... then" clause which Jesus 
proposes to his disciples --"If you love me, you will keep my 
commandments" -- demands that if love be present, then his 
commandments must necessarily be kept. 
190. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, p. 63. 
191. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, p. 9. 
192. The coi}tent of the message is variously communicated; that is, by 
an j. LT. t__T_" _clause ("to believe that ... "); by Inal6(JEIt/ Eis ("believe in... "); or just 
iO TEIJ IV used absolutely. Acpording to Rudolf Bultmann, It 
is peculiar to John that 7710ITFL1 IV with the dative 
(translated "believe him" noj "believe in him" (5: 38) can be used 
interchangeably with 7TRTTE 61V FIS . Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 97f; Bultmann, Theology. vol. 2, p. B. 
193. Rudolf Bultmann explains that it is not as though one first had to 
believe and trust Jesus in order that one might believe in him. He 
states one "ought to believe him, and in so trusting him is In fact 
believing in him; one can do neither without doing both". 
Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, p. 71. 
194. In Theology, vol. 2, p. 71; Bultmann leaves "himself" (in reference 
to Jesus) in small case. However, in his monograph Faith, p. 98, 
he capitalizes "Himself". Perhaps this Is a difference in the 
translator's preference. Bultmann, Theolo . vol. 2. p. 71; Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 98. 
195. Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 98. 
196. Johns description of Jesus as the "Logos" manifests the conception 
that God's word and action are unity. Since God's action is His 
word, "hearing" in the sense of "hearing-and-keeping" is equated 
with rr1 Car 1) 6- iV . Furthermore, Just as 
"hear" and "believe" can 
be united, so also "see" and "believe" can be joined. "Seeing" refers 
to the "sight", the inner perception, which recognizes the Son of 
God in the Incarnate One. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2. pp. 71f; 
Bultmann and Weiser. Faith, p. 98. 
197. Bultmann. Theolo , vol. 2, pp. 73f; Bultmann and Weiser. Faith, 
p. 108. 
198. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, p. 74. 
199. 
, 
Ibid., p. 75: Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, pp. 99f. 
200. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, p. 75: Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 
100; Bultmann Existence and Faith, p. 255. 
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201. Rudolf Bultmann, The Johannine Epistles: A Commentary on the 
Johannine Epistles, trans. R. Philip O'Hara with Lane C. McGaughy 
and Robert W. Funk, ed. Robert W. Funk (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1973) s. v. "6: 45". 
202. Buitmann. Theolo . vol. 2, p. 75; Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 102. 
203. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, pp. 77f. 
204. This is apparent in the ascriptions to Jesus, of which the following 
are samples: God's son came in the flesh whose parents are 
known; He is the One who breaks the law, who declares himself 
equal with God, et cetera. 
205. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, p. 76, See also, Bultmann and Weiser, 
Faith, p. 103. 
206. Bultmann and Weiser, Faith. p. 104. 
207. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, p. 76. Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 
104. 
208. Buitmann, Theolo , vol. 2. p. 78. 
209. Ibid., pp. 78f. 
210. Bultmann and Weiser, Faith, p. 104. 
211. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, p. 79. 
212. Ibid., p. 79f. 
213. Bultmann and Weiser. Faith, pp. 105f. 
214. Ibid., pp. 106f. Rudolf Bultmann aMrms that for John the act of 
believing does not introduce the believer into the state of being 
removed from the world but is an act of removal from the world 
which must be accomplished constantly anew. "Believing must 
become a continuing in his word, " he urges. 
215. Ibid., p. 109; Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2.80f. 
216. John sets forth the logical relationship between divine love and the 
believer's love. Faith knows Jesus as the revealer of divine love. 
To believe is to receive his love from which loving feelings now. 
Because of the love Jesus has shown his own, the believer is under 
obligation to "love one another" (John 15: 11-17). Bultmann and 
Weiser, Faith, pp. 109f; Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, p. 81. 
217. Bultmann, Theolo , vol. 2, pp. 
84f. 
218. Buhmann, Theolo , vol. 2,82f. 
219. Ibid., p 87. 
220. Ibid., p. 88. 
221. Ibid., p. 90. 
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222. However, it is of interest that he arrives at this conclusion from the 
not-so-traditional assumptions of a relativistic, historical critic and 
a Hegelian philosophy of "thesis/ antithesis/ synthesis". 
223. Bultmann, Theology, vol. 2, pp. 135,183,211. 
224. Bultmann, Essays, p. 1. 
225. Ibid., pp. 16f. 
226. Ibid., p. 17. 
227. Ibid., pp. 18ff. 
228. Bultmann. History and Eschatology. p. 144. 
229. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, pp. 117f. 
230. Ibid., p. 118. 
231. Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic 
Writings, selected, edited. and translated by Schubert M. Ogden 
(London: SCM Press, 1984), p. 53. 
232. Bultrnann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 119. 
233. Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, p. 54. See also, 
Bultmann, Faith and Understanding 1, p. 120. 
234. Buitmann, Faith and Understanding I, p. 120. 
235. Ibid., p. 122. 
236. Ibid., pp. 121f. 
237. Ibid., pp. 137f. 
238. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 230 
239. This method was evidenced in Jesus use of the Old Testament to 
teach radical obedience; in the three-stage development of faith in 
Hellenism from an idea of faith as "fides qua creditus" to that of 
simply "Christianity"; in Paul's polemic with the Jews regarding 
works of the law; and in John addressing himself to the world's 
concept of "life". 
240. This is why Jesus', Paul's, and John's words regarding faith's 
understanding could differ but their understanding was 
substantially the same. 
241. Arndt and Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon, s. v. "-E1 '. By 
the fact that the New Testaipent pairs fI/o7rsu61v with 
other prepositions such as EV ("in") and Fni ("upon") 
which indicate the meaning "in" or "on" ý give strength 
to the 
position that the New Testament uses i. iS to mean "in" or 
"into". 
242. New Bible Dictionary, s. v. "Obedience" by J. I. Packer. 
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243. As there is a correlation for Martin Luther between faith and love 
in the heart and outward life, he held that only in faith can man 
genuinely fulfill the commandments and the law of love. Rudolf 
Bultmann contends that persons outside of faith may fulfill the 
demand of God but only those in faith make love the "sustaining 
force" of their life. 
244. Bultmann, New Testament and Mytholofdy. p. 49. 






THE PLACE OF JUSTIFICATION 
No Christian doctrine was more foundational and integral to both John 
Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann s theological proposals than the doctrine of 
"justification by faith". Both Identify the doctrine and their explanation of it 
as originating with the Apostle Paul. ' Thus, they show themselves conscious 
and appreciative debtors to the Reformation tradition? Justification was for 
both the pivotal "gate" or "presupposition" of salvation' 
However. their contrasting. formal understandings of justification and 
salvation are indicative of substantial differences in their theologies. For 
Rudolf Bultmann, as for Martin Luther, justification ("rightwising") is not only 
the "presupposition" of salvation but is also, in essence, salvation. ' 
Justification for both Martin Luther and Rudolf Buitmann is the apex of 
religion in this life. 
Though John Wesley claimed that no doctrine was superior to justification, 
he. as John Calvin, distinguished it from sanctification, asserting that the 
doctrine of sanctification had equal place with justifications Therefore, 
"salvation". encompassing both "justification" and resulting "sanctification". 
was full salvation. Though John Wesley. as commentators observe. held that 
love was the "end" for which faith was the "means". he with remarkable 
consistency throughout his life, insisted on both side by side, "faith working 
by (thru) love". On the face of it, his balance is hard to deny. While 
retaining a Protestant framework, It may redress an imbalance of solifidianism 
of which Catholics as well as many modern Protestants would accuse historic 
Protestantism. ' Suffice it to say, the fact that John Wesley promotes such an 
emphasis and Rudolf Buitmann rejects it expresses well the value and 
significance each attaches to the soteriological effects of justification. 
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Nevertheless, although John Wesley in his emphasis on both justification 
and sanctification was not unlike historical Protestant tributaries such as 
German Pietism and English Arminian-Calvinist Puritanism, Rudolf Bultmann, 
without a doubt. embodies the unqualified Protestantism of Martin Luther in 
the supreme place he gives to justification by faith. 
The two theologians have an all-controlling, theological preoccupation with 
"present" salvation, or existence in the "now". For them salvation was not an 
indifferent matter which had relevancy only to another life which -could be 
conveniently postponed indefinitely and relegated to some undecided future. 
Salvation was an urgent matter of the utmost relevancy for the immediate 
now of man's existence. 
Of course, for John Wesley, "present salvation" was set into the context of 
the Divine, magisterial scheme for man and the cosmos for all the ages. 
God's architectonic plan was not myth but was being realized in "world- 
history"' In man's realm and the "what" of nature and chronological events. 
Beginning with the creation and the literal Fall of Man, God's plan of 
salvation unfolded in the "exodus" and the giving of the Law, reached a 
climaxed in the Cross and Resurrection, proceeded in the salvation of 
individuals and society, and anticipated consummation in the final, 
eschatological redemption. Thus, the salvation which man experienced In the 
present was set into a context causally and historically related to that which 
preceded and that which would follow. The progression of salvation in the 
individual's life tended to mirror this history of salvation. " 
In contrast, for Rudolf Bultmann present salvation is the only salvation. 
Present salvation is the eschatological, future salvation already come now in 
the present in mans individual. existential existence which puts an end to 
and overcomes his past "world history". Therefore, for Rudolf Bultmann 
present salvation is not an event of "world history" which could be one event 
among others in a procession of causally connected, world-historical events. 
Present salvation, which was outside of world-history and which, contrary to 
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ý. 
John Wesley's understanding, was not one specific example or movement in 
an over-arching cosmic schema of salvation, was a possibility of human 
existence in any "now". 
THE GROUND OF JUSIFICA'IZON 
GRACE 
In evaluating John Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann s understandings of 
"justification", let us first consider justification's "ground" or "causes". The 
Council of Trent and seventeenth-century English Puritans such as John 
Goodwin and Richard Baxter followed Thomas Aquinas' form by dividing 
justification's cause into numerous sub-causes. John Wesley was essentially 
interested only In the two-fold division of "meritorious" and "formal" causes. 
He shows he was not without Pietist and Latitudinarian influences In that he 
was interested In intellectual formulations only as they were deemed to have 
Immediate relevance to practical religious matters (salvation of the individual's 
soul). 
Although Rudolf Bultrnann Is diffident toward the scholastic terms which 
John Wesley uses, he accepts in essence that the two "causes" or conditions, 
"grace" ("meritorious") and "faith". ° are necessary -for justification. - Yet, - 
occasionally John Wesley traced the cause back to the "free love" or "tender 
mercy" ("efficient" cause) inherent in the Divine - Being, God Himself. For 
Rudolf Bultmann, the cause of justification could not be located in God or in 
His inner motivation. - Justification could not-be set forth in rational 
propositions which could connect it in a chain of causation from God to this 
visible world. If he appears even more than John Wesley to eschew this kind 
of theological intellectualizing, it is mainly theological ratiocinating in reference 
to "the Beyond" which-uses the method and terms of the "old ontology" of 
"this world" that he rejects. II 
The achievement of justification is attributed to the "grace of God" by both 
John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann ° Both relate this grace to Jesus' death on 
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the cross. Both commonly use extra-biblical interpretive phrases ("the merits 
of Christ" (John Wesley) and "the salvation-occurrence" (Rudolf Bultmann)) to 
signify Jesus Christ's death as grace. 
CHRISPOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY 
John Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann s conception of the historical person 
Jesus is very relevant to how they interpret the nature of this grace as the 
ground for justification. Neither John Wesley nor Rudolf Bultmann is 
interested in studying christology for its own sake. but they deal with it as it 
touches soteriological interest. " Juxtaposing their views pits the once 
dominant. classical. Christian conception of Jesus represented by John Wesley 
against the radical. critical. skeptical view of Jesus held by Rudolf Bultmann. 
Though built on formulations once deemed heterodox and heretical, on the 
strength of research and new, modern theories developed in the nineteenth 
century and after. Rudolf Bultmann s view had by his day been received by 
many into the Christian, scholarly world. " 
For John Wesley the ground of justification was truly christocentric. It 
was attributable not simply to an event but supremely to the Person Jesus 
Christ who gave the event its significance. Taking the Scriptural attestations 
to Jesus in a literal fashion, John Wesley would have found it inconceivable 
to divorce the literal Person Jesus Christ, in His exalted reality, from His 
death on the cross. The ground of justification lay not only In an impersonal, 
outward event but also In the Person Jesus Christ who had provided the 
particular event and invested it with its meaning and efficacy. It was as a 
result of His atoning death on Golgotha that Jesus Himself, the bodily 
resurrected, transcendent and immanent Son of God, the Lord of Lords, 
mediated His immediate, personal. saving presence and power to recipients. '2 
Quite to the contrary, based upon the assumption that Paul was 
uninterested In the person of Jesus except In the naked facts that He lived 
and died, Rudolf Bultmann rejects the relevancy of the historical person Jesus 
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and the facts of His ministry, message, personality, or character to the 
salvation-occurrence. The Scriptural ascriptions and attestations to Jesus of 
Nazareth were problematic and, in any case, were not to be read as John 
Wesley read them: as objective, analytical propositions setting forth the nature 
of the historical Jesus as He was in Himself. The descriptive phrases did not 
convey literal meaning but the Christian community's existential-ontological 
understanding which was seen as a "summons" to decision. 
'Iahe question of the nature of Jesus Christ and His relation to the 
salvation occurrence is one which has concerned modern critics of Rudolf 
Bultmann's theology. Karl Barth. who represents the viewpoint which is 
essentially compatible with what I believe Is John Wesley's understanding 
sketched above. epitomized the issue by asking whether Rudolf Bultmann 
meant to emphasize the Christ event as "the Christ event" or "the Christ 
event". Karl Barth contended that the christological nature of Jesus Christ is 
important to the salvation occurrence and must have independent significance 
In and of itself and be prior to soteriological concerns which are derivatives of 
it. 
Schubert Ogden is concerned that critics have failed to understand rightly 
that Rudolf Bultmann does argue for the necessity of the historical Jesus for 
eadstentiell faith. However. he does, concede that critics such as Karl Barth 
are right in their determination that Rudolf Bultmann does -not adequately 
state the "objective" reality of the event of Jesus Christ. " 
-r Though Schubert Ogden is right to correct critics 
false notions regarding 
Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of the place of the historical Jesus for faith, 
nevertheless, the point remains that the full-orbed, historical, pre-existent and 
glorified person of Jesus Christ as John Wesley and classical Christianity 
conceived Him was to Rudolf Bultmann irrelevant to the salvation occurrence. 
Certainly, for hire Christ as God's act precedes faith, but only, iIn the sense 
that one is addressed by the proclamation. Theological explication of Christ 
(christology) must follow faith. " 
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Consequently. the Jesus John Wesley claimed to know was radically 
divergent from the Jesus Rudolf Bultmann could not know. For John Wesley. 
part and parcel with faith in Christ's merits was faith in Jesus Christ's 
person. That Jesus ever demanded such faith Rudolf Bultmann makes a 
point of refuting. 
For John Wesley, one of the two-pronged conditions that had to be met for 
the effecting of justification was the completely obedient and sinless life of 
Jesus. Of course, for Rudolf Bultmann that Jesus lived such a sinless life 
could never be established. In John Wesley's reckoning, if Jesus did not live 
such a sinless life, then the very atonement itself was jeopardized. For Rudolf 
Bultmann, Jesus did not say he forgave sin or granted pardon and did not 
see in himself the occurrence"; that Is, as Johannes Weiss had asserted. 
Jesus was not actually the coming, visible Messiah in chronological-historical 
terms. 
Contrarily, John Wesley assumes that Jesus is the visible, historical 
Messiah; that He came into this world expressly for the purpose of forgiving 
sins; and that pardon was made effectual through His death. 
Though the whole issue of christology and the larger issue of biblical 
criticism are complex and beyond the scope of this the simple pre- 
conceptions of these two theologians are hugely indicative of their 
fundamental differences. Rudolf Bultmann. though living through a 
groundbreaking epoch in biblical studies and theology and in spite of the 
discoveries of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, when all is sifted and 
weighed. does not have at his disposal such indisputable scientific data as to 
necessitate a scholar having to concede Rudolf Bultmann s position. Rudolf 
Bultmann approaches the Scriptures with a fundamental pre-conception of 
doubt that the descriptions of this Jesus could be rational, propositional 
descriptions which attest literal truths. John Wesley. on the other hand, 
approaches the Scriptures with implicit readiness to believe that the 
testimonies to Jesus literally refer to Him. " 
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Nevertheless, one must point out that for Rudolf Bultmann the salvation- 
occurrence is based on the objective death of Jesus and no one else's death. 
Schubert Ogden has urged taking account of this point. But why his death? 
Why should the death of an everyday, Jewish man of whom very little is 
known be the controlling focus of a contemporary theologian's philosophical 
and theological system and of his lifetime vocation? Somehow there seems to 
be an inner, logical imbalance in a system which catapults to such significant 
heights a death which could only be of inconsequential import because of its 
association with a local man of questionable real importance. 
Critics of Rudolf Buitmanri s theology from the "right" (Karl Barth) and 
from the "left" (Fritz Buri and Schubert Ogden) seem also to agree for different 
reasons that the emphasis he places on the centrality and indispensability of 
the event Jesus Christ is not in accordance with the existential interpretation 
he gives to this event. "' 
His emphasis on the death of Jesus is evidence of his desire to return to 
the Reformation. ' Both be and John Wesley in Reformation fashion in 
stressing Jesus death appropriately sought to reassert and to recover for their 
own theologically "wayward" day the pith of the evangelical. Gospel. " I agree 
with Karl Barth that Rudolf Bultmann's emphasis is right, but that his 
interpretation of the event of Jesus Christ seems to undermine his emphasis. " 
Is it unfair to wonder if Rudolf Bultmann's fundamental, subjective 
assumptions about the Scriptural testimony to Jesus Christ have. to a great 
extent, dictated his method and approach, which in turn rationalize and 
corroborate his, pre-conceptions in terms of a complicated, scholarly analysis 
which proves what it has already determined to find and what it has already 
assumed? "' 
'Rudolf Bultmanri s contribution is that he forces us back to an. original 
primordial judgment' which every generation, regardless of era, must make. 
Regardless of exhaustive, scholarly investigation pursued as far as it 
legitimately can go, the researcher, whether in the eighteenth or in the 
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twentieth century. must still form a judgment of Scripture on the basis of 
unsolvable. unprovable and irretrievable historical events and on testimony to 
phenomena which is empirically unverifiable. Rudolf Bultmann assumed his 
radical. theological predecessors predisposition of scepticism toward Jesus, 
concluding that Jesus was unimportant to the real issue of salvation in the 
New Testament. 
However, he may actually lead us to the opposite conclusion: that the 
historical person Jesus is vital to salvation. He tends to demonstrate that the 
sceptic who has a preconceived, fundamental distrust of the New Testament 
documents and their testimony can very probably never expect to have his 
mind quelled or be convinced because of the nature of his own presupposition 
and the dearth of data and corroborating evidence which is desirable for 
scientific proof. All the hypotheses in the world cannot make up for the lack 
of data that are adequate to give the historical scientist what he desires -- 
sufficient evidence to corroborate or discredit the New Testament claims and 
the various hypotheses put forward to account for them. 
Rudolf Bullmanns theology can be seen, from one point of view, to sow 
the seeds of Christian theological self-destruction. One admires the 
fearlessness with which he pursues his theology in spite of the possibility of 
this kind of criticism. Nonetheless, the length to which he takes his criticism 
arouses the question of whether or not he brings Christianity to its breaking 
point. If Christianity's 'meson d'e"tre" Is Jesus Christ, and He is declared 
irrelevant and unimportant to the real interest of Christian faith, does not 
CHRIS Ianity then dissolve? Why consider a body of documents which 
presuppose and unequivocally set forth Him If He is found to be irrelevant? 
Thus, we arrive at the very antithesis of Christianity and the view of a Celsus. 
Likewise. Karl Barth thought Rudolf Bultmann's christological conclusions 
unavoidably followed from methodological presuppositions which he affirmed 
would "mean the overthrow of theology". He went so far as to regard the 
christological conclusions as "'heretical'". ' 
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Consequently. Rudolf Bultmann's importance may not be so much in his 
attempt to formulate a viable salvation without the historical person Jesus 
Christ, but rather in ironically and unintentionally demonstrating its opposite: 
that the historical, person Jesus Christ is of vital necessity to Christian 
salvation and theology if it is to remain CHRISTian theology. Hence. Rudolf 
Buitmann's descendants have to correct him and say that faith must have 
"support in the historical Jesus himself' 2' 
THE ATONEMENT 
Neither John Wesley nor Rudolf Bultmann wrote at great length on the 
subject of the atonement. Both use biblical types which have been 
historically identified with certain theories. More specifically, John Wesley 
stresses Jesus dying "for us" all and uses particularly the "satisfaction" and 
"penal" descriptions. ' 
Rudolf Bultmann uses the "Christus victor" image of Christ's deliverance of 
us from this ages evil interpreted according to the mystery-religions and the 
Gnostic " Redeemer myth as elucidated by William Bousset. " 
John Wesley's- and Rudolf Bultmann's explanations of the meaning of 
Jesus death are stereotypically consistent with and integral to their 
philosophical assumptions and their understandings of justification. Although 
one might characterize the essential distinction between their views as a 
difference between theological epochs, the difference in kind between John 
Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann was the difference which John Wesley already 
had encountered in Faustus Socinus view. They all agreed that Jesus death 
in Jerusalem was an objective, visible event in world history. However, Rudolf 
Bultmann, as Faustus Socinus before him, rejected the proposition that there 
was an essential, causal, ontological linkage between God's inner will to 
forgive sin and deliver man from the evil powers and Jesus' historical death. 
For them, Jesus death was not a requirement that must be met to satisfy 
God's inner nature in order that He might release His pardoning grace. 
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According to John Wesley, this must be so. He assumed that there was an 
eternal meaning which transcended subjective, human signification and which 
necessarily corresponded to the crucifixion event. 
Rudolf Bultmann consistently assumed that this event, as any other 
historical event, contained no meaning in and of itself but was subject to the 
interpreter's understanding. ` However, one may query Rudolf Bultmann as to 
what the constant, controlling factor is which enables every individual 
interpreter to achieve the same consistent meaning which Rudolf Bultmann 
attaches to it. Nevertheless, he is reminiscent of Protestant evangelicalism (as 
is John Wesley) in that the absolute centrality and necessity of Christ's death 
to the authentic possibility of existence is everywhere asserted in his theology 
(in opposition to Fritz Buri's and Schubert Ogden's objection). 
Whereas John Wesley's description seeks to account for the relation 
between God and the Cross and the consequent effects, Rudolf Bultmann does 
not address himself to this matter. Indeed, the issue is irrelevant to Rudolf 
Bultmann because God is such that He cannot be subjected to this kind of 
rationalization. Moreover, he summarily assumes that the New Testament 
shares only his "subjective" interest In how the event can be seen to be 
actually happening in the existence of man. 
John Wesley's understanding of the atonement, in which Jesus bore the 
punishment for our sins and was a sufficient, off-setting satisfaction for the 
immensity of humankind's offense against the sovereign God, Interlocks with 
his conception of a justification with moral implications. Rudolf Bultmann 
dismisses the idea of vicarious, propitiatory sacrifice for sin because he says it 
was not really a useful image to Paul, and consequently he does not conceive 
of a justification with moral implications. In contrast to John Wesley, he does 
not view mans fundamental problem as one In which man offends against the 
Divine Being. 
The Issue of limited versus unlimited atonement. once fervently embraced 
by John Wesley, was for Rudolf Bultmann a non-issue. The spirit of Rudolf 
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Bultmann's theological proposal is that of Siren Kierkegaard and Martin 
Heidegger who protest against "the many". "the they", and the category of 
general abstraction. Rather, in nominalistic fashion, Rudolf Bultmann 
pinpoints true existence in the single man. "Dasein". However, he does not 
affirm the doctrinaire teaching of "election". 
As we shall say later, the great strength of his proposal is its earnest bias 
toward and preferment for the individual who in modern, Western, 
industrialized and technological society was increasingly viewed as being de- 
personalized and lost in the lonely crowd. 
He is content not to make an appeal for or to stress that the salvation 
occurrence is directed toward "all". as John Wesley insistently wanted to do. 
Perhaps to do so might have been construed as taking away from the urgent 
appeal for the endangered individual. 
Consistently with the above, Rudolf Bultmann's doctrine of sin is 
characterized by the individual's seeking existence according to the world and 
"everyday' conventions of "the mass". In contrast, the doctrine of justification 
portrays authentic existence as the individual's radical resolution against the 
world. 
Does the inference that the salvation-occurrence for Rudolf Bultmann 
tends toward exclusiveness concern him? Is he concerned that it appears to 
be predisposed toward a few individuals against "the many"? 
Rudolf Bultmann s position shows up in contrast when compared with 
John Wesley's life-long, insistent appeal for the "whoever" and the "for all". As 
Rudolf Bultmann, John Wesley, though in a different way, was repelled by the 
mediocrity of "the many". Nevertheless, though Christians were viewed as 
distinct from the world, he maintained that the wholly, qualitatively distinct, 
saving grace was made available democratically by the cross to "all" who 
would receive it. 
A theological affirmation which moves away from exclusiveness is in 
keeping with the current philosophic-political-theological mood of Western, 
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social democracies and Third-World liberation movements. However, some 
may argue that John Wesley unconsciously taught an exclusivism in that 
salvation was limited to those who had undergone a particular faith 
experience. Moreover, though his preaching might have been directed to all, 
he not only held certain theological assumptions but took certain steps in 
regards to his societies that made Methodists more exclusive than inclusive. 
THE DESCRIPTION OF JUSTIFICATION 
In turning to the term "justification" or "righteousness" itself, we find that 
neither John Wesley nor Rudolf Bultmann give in depth biblical exegetical 
support for their formulations on "justification". Though their conversation 
with the Old Testament is limited. the judgments they make regarding the 
form of justification in the Old Testament is in agreement with each one's New 
Testament understanding. 
Essentially. Rudolf Bultrnann posits that the Jew and Jesus conceive of 
the "form" of righteousness in the same manner as the apostle Paul; that is, 
as "obedience". Contrary to the "federal" theologians, John Wesley also states 
that the acceptance of God is on the same basis in the Old Testament as in 
the New Testament. However, divergent from Rudolf Bultmann, he asserts 
that only Adam was under the covenant of obedience. After Adam, the Jew's 
and Gentile's acceptance of God alike was "pardon" through the grace of God. 
FORENSIC/ ESCHATOLOGICAL 
When we compare their'understandings of New Testament "righteousness". 
we find they both view "righteousness" forensically as a legal, courtroom term 
in the Melanchthonian sense. Rudolf Bultmann pictures the verdict being 
returned by the "forum" of public opinion and those to whom one Is 
responsible. In this forensic description, he is somewhat ambiguous. In so 
far as the forensic dimension goes, he does not see the need to fulfill the 




Rudolf Bultmann probably avoids using the "judge" image in the forensic 
sense because he wants to view God as "judge" In reference only to 
righteousness' "eschatological" sense. God, who was conceived of by the Jews 
as coming In the eschaton with a future verdict, Is seen by Paul as now being 
realized in the present. Rudolf Bultmann cannot allow the forensic sense to 
comprehend a judge's judgment because that would entail God returning two 
distinct verdicts, one prior to and one In His predicted Last Judgment yet to 
be realized. In other words, the image of the "judge" is not involved in the 
forensic sense but associated only with the eschatological judgment at the end 
of time. 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the "rightwising" verdict of being "declared 
just" was assumed by the Jew and Paul alike to be a reckoning rendered by 
the judge" in the final eschatological judgment. However, Paul interpreted 
this eschatological judgment as now being realized in the present. Therefore, 
Rudolf Bultmann telescopes all prophecies, judgment verdicts, and references 
to the Messiah into one parousia. Contrary to John Wesley, he will not allow 
that the "rightwising" declaration is a present verdict which is pronounced 
now in individual lives between Jesus advent and the verdict of the final, Last 
Judgment still to come. 
Rudolf Bultmann seems to have recognized that the typical Protestant way 
of handling this problem was unsatisfactory. How could it be asserted that 
the believer was judged inviolably righteous now and to eternity and still face 
another judgment in the future? 
Though his interpretation might rid Protestantism of this problem, his 
attempted, distinction between justification as "forensic" and "eschatological" 
seems strained. Among other things, if one accepts his argument, one then is 
left with trying to account for how and why Paul "historizes" (essentially, views 
existentially) the predicted cosmic-natural, apocalyptic event and views it as 
having occurred in Jesus while concomitantly viewing the same event as a 
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cosmic-natural, apocalyptic event which is unfulfilled and waiting to occur at 
the end of chronological time? 
John Wesley does not view the differentiation between the forensic and the 
eschatological in terms of two various images of one act of "rightwising", but 
rather in terms of two temporally separate pronouncements of the one Judge, 
each with its own signification 2' 
The two theologians interpretations are coloured by their assumptions 
regarding the nature of God, their conceptions of the identity of Jesus and the 
nature of His mission, and what the Scriptural testimony could be in light of 
their own philosophies about the nature of history. 
At stake in Rudolf Bultmann's particular interpretation is the 
understanding that at justification the Christian conceives of world-time as 
having ended. This interpretation precludes justification from having any 
effective. causal relation to this visible, temporal world. His conception 
regarding the eschatological image of present justification is in keeping with 
his acceptance of the notion that the coming eschaton which Jesus preached 
but did not see fulfilled was. in retrospect, seen by Paul as being fulfilled in 
Jesus. 
EXTRINSIC 
For both theologians, the righteousness adjudicated to the sinner in 
justification is an "extrinsic" righteousness and not a quality relating to the 
essence of human nature. Justification speaks about one's favourable 
standing in relation to the court (judge) as one who Is acknowledged Innocent. 
It is not a comment on the righteous, ethical quality of the person. Moreover, 
neither theologian accepts justification as a pronouncement that the person is 
actually clear of ethical wrong-doing or is actually ethically just. 27 Both are 
thoroughly Protestant at this point. 
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ACQUITTAL 
Furthermore, for both theologians justification is, as it was for Augustine, 
a negative rather than a positive righteousness. It is acquittal rather than, as 
it was for Martin Luther. Reformed orthodoxy. and Count vori Zinzendorf, the 
imputation and transference of Christ's perfect obedience and righteousness to 
the sinner for his perfect righteousness. 
However, in contrast to Rudolf Bultmann. John Wesley, did hold that the 
righteousness of Christ was imputed in some sense; namely, that the "merits 
of Christ" were imputed for forgiveness ' 'For Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and 
his death could not be linked ontologically and causally to a verdict of pardon 
on the grounds of Jesus death. Either side of the argument of the "imputed 
righteousness of Christ" which engulfed the protagonists of the Evangelical 
Awakening was obsolescent to Rudolf Bultmann because of the reason just 
stated above. Ironically, those disputants who saw themselves so divided over 
this issue were bedfellows from Rudolf Bultmanri s perspective. 
The issue per se of whether the genitive in the phrase "the righteousness 
of God" Is "subjective" or "objective" does not engage John Wesley. In his 
Explanatory Notes Upon The New Testament, he agrees with Rudolf Bultmann 
in his comment on Romans 3: 21 that the phrase "the righteousness of God" 
refers to the righteousness applicable to the believer. However, Rudolf 
Bultmann manifests a quite exceeding departure from the traditional 
understanding of the nature of God by not allowing, as Martin Luther and 
John Wesley do, the genitive to refer also to God's being. 
Rudolf Bultmann does not accept, as John Wesley does, that acquittal 
includes more than the "passive" sense of a change in relation. He does not 
find that Paul is interested in any "active" sense of release from the guilt of 
former sins but only release from sinning. When Rudolf Bultmann speaks of 
the sinner being "absolved" from sin or God's not counting man's sin against 
him, this does not mean, as it does for John Wesley, "pardon" or forgiveness, 
but just discharge from the power of sin. According to Rudolf Bultmann, the 
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guilt of wrong against God is not that for which a sinner must be forgiven as 
it is for John Wesley. 
Herein, while John Wesley is aligned with Martin Luther on this 
explanation, Rudolf Bultmann diverges from them both ' He accepts the 
"passive" sense of a change in mans relation without accepting that this 
change entails also actual pardon for sin. For John Wesley, the need for 
justification rests upon a spiritual and moral condition: man has rebelled and 
transgressed against God. For Rudolf Bultmann, the need for justification lies 
in a mans existential alienation from himself. He does not need a granting of 
"pardon" but rather to find himself. At the risk of oversimplifying it, for John 
Wesley justification answers a truly theo-logical problem; for Rudolf Bultnmann, 
it answers an anthrono-logical problem. 
Both are amenable to negative righteousness for different reasons: Rudolf 
Bultmann because there is no Jesus Christ with perfect obedience and 
righteousness to transfer, John Wesley because he deemed the Lutheran and 
Reformed understanding of "imputation" antithetical to the need and duty to 
become intrinsically righteous. In any case, both John Wesley and Rudolf 
Bultmann reject any Idea of justification being a "legal fiction" but rather, In 
concurrence with their acceptance of negative righteousness, assert that the 
believer is actually righteous. 
ETHICAL 
Unlike John Wesley and John Calvin, Rudolf Bultmann Is in harmony 
with Martin Luther in not distinguishing between justification and 
sanctification., In fact, for Rudolf Bultmann an ethical righteousness has no 
place In the Pauline understanding, whether connected with justification or 
sanctification. Ethical righteousness Is a corruption Introduced by the 
"developing Church". The decoupling of ethical and moral righteousness from 
salvation Is one of the more profound differences between him and John 
Wesley. Rudolf Bultmanri s conclusion is Integral to and consistent with the 
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warp and woof of his existential-ontological interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the two agree that there is an ethical sense of moral 
uprightness identified with righteousness in the New Testament. However, 
using a form of argument not unlike Martin Luthers in discarding the book of 
James. Rudolf Bultmann identifies the biblical books such as Ephesians. 
Colossians, and the "pastoral epistles" as "non-Pauline" and also inauthentic 
because they do not demonstrate an eschatological consciousness. This is a 
subjective conclusion built upon an already specious assumption of 
"eschatological" consciousness being the criterion of what is Pauline. 
In any case. Rudolf Bultmann differs from many theological perspectives, 
including Martin Luthers. John Calvin's. John Wesley's, and that of the 
Roman Catholic in holding that the person reckoned actually righteous and 
absolved from sin by God's verdict is under no further necessity to produce 
ethical righteousness or moral renewal. He attempts to circumvent the Old 
Testaments ethical stress by claiming that such an ethical stress represented 
only one stream of Hebrew thought and not the authentic one of the Prophets. 
Jesus and Paul. 
However, the Old Testament's emphasis on ethical righteousness from 
beginning to end seems too consistent and pervasive to make this theory 
attractive. The Old and New Testaments' religious consciousness is founded 
upon the perception that the transcendent, personal God jealously claims the 
spiritual, moral and ethical sphere of this visible, temporal world as His realm 
of concern and involvement. Rudolf Bultmann s reinterpretation seems to set 
forth less the Judeo-Christian understanding than the Greek, Hellenistic 
understanding with its impersonal, transcendent Deity removed from 
involvement in this world (which he desires to overcome) 90 Whether or not 
this seemingly un-Jewish interpretation owes to anything more conscious than 
the assumption of a dialectical critique and existential rebellion against 
Judeo-Christian norms in the Nietzschian tradition is difficult to say. 
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THE "UNGODLY" JUSTIFIED 
In answering the question of who may be "rightwised", both theologians in 
loyal Protestant fashion agree on the form of the answer: the "ungodly". 9' 
Their proclamations of this ancient truth were spoken afresh in each one's 
particular context as they cut across the grain of the prevailing "everyday" 
theological and ecclesiastical understandings. 
Their answers represent a volte-face from the prior understandings In 
which each had been tutored. In John Wesley's case, his radical proposal, 
which was clothed in spiritual and moral, biblical understanding, rejected 
every and all so-called grounds of justification based on the "good" in a 
person. whether virtuous disposition or any antecedent "righteousness" or 
"good works". This was deemed an offensive departure from the "holy living" 
school, to which he formerly adhered, and the general, accepted 
understanding prevalent in the Church of England; that is, that faith plus 
good works were the requirements for justification. 
In Rudolf Bultmann s situation, the radicalness of his proposal seems to 
come not so much in his suggestion that "the sinner" is the recipient of 
justification, but rather in his portrayal of this "sinner" in predominantly 
philosophical, existential terms in which the sinner was identified with 
modern culture and theological "waywardness". particularly German culture 
and theological "liberalism" (out of which he had come). 
Besides identifying "the sinner" as the recipient of justification, each sees 
this "sinner" being qualified in a particular way. in order to be justification's 
ready recipient. For both theologians, the "sinner", the receiver of faith, must 
be qualified in such a way that he becomes a "sinner" who is conscious of his 
sin. John Wesley construes this inner consciousness in accordance with 
biblical categories which he experimentalizes; that is, he construes them as 
being known in the individual's inner experience. This is a possibility since 
such relevant terms as "guilt" and "the fear" (of punishment and wrath of 
God), "the spirit of bondage into fear", and evil tempers have a pyscho- 
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spiritual orientation. Which aspects of a stylized Methodist description of 
conviction" may be generalized is a more difficult matter. 
The sinners sinfulness as registered within him by God has its meaning 
and force for John Wesley only In reference to a personal, divine, being, God 
who is holy, morally righteous and who expects His creatures to be so. In his 
theology, the holy, divine, personal Being who judges sin is the referent who 
ultimately creates the experiential crisis of "conviction". He usually "convicts" 
(convinces of sin) the sinner by some "awful providence", but more ordinarily 
by the law through the Spirit. ' 
Several relevant points which distinguish John Wesley from Rudolf 
Bultmann at this point may be brought to the fore. Rudolf Bultmann asserts 
that the particular Jewish legal enactments (Law of Moses) in the Old 
Testament are not the eternal will of God codified. They are only temporary, 
historically conditioned expressions relevant to the Jews, which, Paul says, 
are abolished for the Christian. One inference from this is these laws 
(including the "moral law") which pertain to the Jews are not to be generalized 
as eternally applicable to all persons in every age. Therefore, they are not 
"written in the hearts" of those who are not Jews. 
John Wesley's interpretation of the -law as the divine, eternal transcript of 
virtue. wisdom, truth and good in visible form which made sin appear to be 
sin. not only for the Old Testament Jew but universally for any person in any 
age, is rejected by Rudolf Bultmann. According to him, the law as John 
Wesley envisaged it is not God's abiding means which assaults the sinner's 
conscience and brings him to "conviction". The consciousness of the sinner 
as sinner does not consist in the recognition of himself as a transgressor of 
the Law. Neither is "conviction" a despair that comes from futilely trying to 
perform the law or the failure to fulfill its expectations due to transgressions. - 
For John Wesley, as for Martin Luther and the Reformed, the sinful 
condition or living "according to the flesh" of which the sinner becomes 
conscious is defined and primarily revealed by the content of the Law. For 
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Rudolf Bultmann, the content of the legal code does not constitute the sinful 
condition of which the sinner becomes conscious. Performance or lack of 
performance of the legal code is merely indicative of what is sin; namely. 
rejection of God's demand. In arguing this way, Rudolf Bultmann avoids 
making the legal code into a god above God as John Wesley's heavy accent on 
the law gives the impression of doing. 
John Wesley does not wish to distinguish God's will (consequently. His 
law) from God Himself. He says "the will of God Is God himself: It Is God 
considered as willing thus and thus*. ' While the sinful condition is 
recognized as helpless bondage to transgressing the law, this transgressing is 
also seen by him as a transgression ultimately against God Himself. Precisely 
in teaching him that he is not able to keep the law and be righteous, the law 
shows him he is without God and devoid of His power and grace. 
Often the stronger impression In John Wesley is that of the sinner's 
consciousness lying in his being a transgressor of an impersonal law. Though 
Rudolf Bultmann s insistence on the fundamental, sinful condition as a 
rejection of God's demand still does not overcome the dichotomy between 
God's imperative and God Himself; nevertheless. his desire to stress the 
fundamental, sinful condition behind the legal requirements brings a clarity 
and emphasis from which John Wesley's theology could benefit. 
Nonetheless, like Rudolf Bultmann, John Wesley does view disobedience to 
the Law as an indicator of a life devoid of God. Many modern scholars would 
have difficulty with John Wesley's argument because it equates God's eternal 
will with what are judged to be contextually determined prescriptions. 
On the other hand, while Rudolf Bultmann avoids deifying the law, he 
eviscerates it of moral content and severs the connection between 
consciousness of sin and consciousness of having transgressed against the 
personal, moral will of a holy, personal God. This is a re-reading of millennia 
of Judeo-Christian interpretation. 
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John Wesley asserted the continuing role of the law as the ordinary 
method in bringing Jew and non-Jew alike in every age to conviction. Rudolf 
Bultmann declared that what the law did for the Jew (brought him to 
recognize the demand of God for complete obedience) occurs for the Gentile 
without the law. The law is not currently a means to bring the everyday 
sinner to encounter God's demand. 
John Wesley does not dispute that the Gentile or Jew may be convinced of 
sin without the law. However, the sinner, regardless of who he or she may 
be, is shown according to John Wesley to be the sinner he or she is by the 
contrasting will of God as expressed in the biblical commandments. For 
Rudolf Bultmann the law has been just one means among others which light 
up the sinner's consciousness of sin. 
THE "UNGODLY" QUALIFIED 
While Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley take the New Testament as their 
primary sourcebook, Rudolf Buitmann, nonetheless avows that In order to 
understand in what way the sinner who may be justified Is qualified, one 
must first explicate this content according to a rational and "scientific" 
philosophical analysis of man; specifically, one must ý appropriate the 
existential-ontological anlysis which accomplishes this. 
Therefore, Rudolf Bultmann in his description of the sinner who is 
qualified and challenged to believe draws, though not in a slavish fashion, 
upon Martin Heideggers analysis. Truly. for Rudolf Bultmann the sinner's 
religious consciousness is qualified according to philosophical, existential- 
ontological categories. " In agreement with Martin Heidegger and other 
existentialists, Rudolf Bultmann accepts that man finds himself in the world 
in the basic state of mind of anxiety. 5 In the face of his own insecurity. man 
turns from God, perverting his existence. (Martin Heidegger does not speak of 
turning from God but that man does not seize his authentic possibility for 
being. ) What Martin Heidegger calls "falling". -Rudolf Bultmann calls "sin" or 
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"life according to the flesh", placing a Scripturally negative judgment upon 
Martin Heidegger's neutral possibility. ' For Rudolf Bultmann, "sin" describes 
the condition of all persons and is, therefore, more than just a possibility of 
man as it is for Martin Heidegger. 37 
In turning away from God, he turns to creation and himself. He puts his 
confidence in worldly values and accomplishments and becomes lost to the 
world. ' The sin of man is his claim to seek "to exist in his own right, to be 
his own master, and to take his life into his own hands. "' Seeking to 
implement this claim drives man up against his limitations and makes him 
conscious of them. This leaves the sinner insecure and leads him to the 
point of self-surrender. 
In this event of the individual having his limitations unveiled to him. we 
approach the sense in which Rudolf Bultrnann holds that a sinner Is qualified 
prior to faith. 
However, he says, the sinner's condition is not radical enough at this 
point for Christian faith without "the confession of sin". 40 This means that 
man must not only acknowledge his finitude and that his claim was 
false, but 
also that he has become "guilty" in the self-will that so far ruled his life. " 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, the sinner, if he is in earnest, has more than 
a negative recognition that he is finite. He also has the complementing, 
positive recognition of the claims of the "thou", the power, that makes him 
finite. 42 
In bringing in and exalting "guilt's" necessity for Christian , faith. Rudolf 
Bultmann's ambiguity regarding guilt appears toi 
jeyArdt6an attempt for a 
strong, unified formulation. For when speaking of the atonement, he relegates 
to insignificance Paul's image of Christ's death as the propitiatory sacrifice 
that cancels guilt which is the essential, salvic nexus in John Wesley's 
theology. 43 By so doing, he discounts a connecting link between what the 
New Testament views as man's problem of guilt and its " solution. Moreover, 
when defining "rightwising", he does not accepts that for Paul acquittal is 
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release from the guilt of past wrong. He says freedom from sin is not 
understood in its depth if it is viewed only ° as the cancellation of guilt. " 
However. in other places, he argues by way of an analogy to human love that 
the situation necessary for faith to arise is one in which the person under 
judgment takes seriously his "guilt". `s 
Sometimes it seems Rudolf Bultmann uses "guilt" or the implication of it 
as a concept integral to the unity of his argument. On other occasions, he 
eschews the relevance of "guilt". Certainly, he wishes to avoid any 
interpretation which suggests Christ's death was a necessary sacrifice to 
forgive sin's guilt; yet, he argues that there is "guilt" which needs the word of 
"forgiveness". Does he not miss the opportunity which the New Testament 
provides him in connecting guilt and forgiveness with the Cross? 
Rudolf Bultmann wants to avoid identifying "guilt" with moral or legal 
transgression. and. therefore, a legal code that produces It. This voices a 
concern which is shared by many today who accept that modern man's 
problem is no longer addressed by a "guilt" identified with a contextually 
derived legal code. 
Nevertheless, in arguing as he does that a person becomes guilty when he 
refuses the love of another person, the inference that a moral wrong has been 
committed seems unavoidable 4e An affront to another person and a refusal of 
an "ought" has been committed" 
In my judgment. his explanation of how an acknowledgement of finitude 
must be linked with a sense of "guilt" is weak. Why should every unveiling of 
finitude be linked to "guilt"? If the term "guilt" is to have meaning, it needs 
to be that which occurs in a context which ultimately Is inter-personal or is 
believed to be such. If it is not. particularly in the relation between man and 
an impersonal "Beyond". then the "guilt" of the Individual is reduced finally to 
the individual's own interpretation which he places upon his - own self- 
consciousness. In that case, why should the individual call - his own 
subjective understanding "guilt"? "Guilt" would seem to imply incurring a 
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debt or wrong against another person who has the potential of knowing it to 
be such. One can commit something which one could possibly label a 
"wrong" -- for instance, reject the saving proclamation. Why should this be 
thought "wrong" if the individual who committed it is in reality the final 
arbiter and interpreter of his own action and state? Of course, Rudolf 
Bultmann desires to overcome this kind of nihilist conclusion. I am not 
satisfied that he does. " 
KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY FOR FAITH 
We need to analyze how John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann further qualify 
the guilty sinner's pre-understanding requisite for faith. This becomes 
elucidated in the discussion on the knowledge necessary for faith. 
In dealing with the question of who is a candidate for justification and 
upon what condition the guilty ungodly are justified, we find both 
theologians resounding proponents of the Protestant answer: the guilty 
ungodly are "rightwised" through faith alone. In delving into the nature of 
this faith as each conceives It, their differences over faith's starting point may 
not be as clear-cut as they seem. 
John Wesley In Roman Catholic scholastical and Protestant tradition 
allows that faith presupposes "assent" (assensus). 49 However. Rudolf 
Bultmann dissents from this tradition and argues in the Anselmian tradition 
that the faith which believes (_qua - the "how") must precede the faith which Is 
believed uae - the "what"). He is convinced among other things that Jesus 
Christ's divine nature cannot be recognized prior to faith. In fact, he goes so 
far as to say that considering the question of Jesus' authenticity and the 
claims about him actually destroys the offensive paradox necessary to 
authentic faith. Has not the would-be-believer who comes to faith assuming 
that Jesus Christ's divine nature is unrecognizable already considered the 
claims of Jesus and made a certain decision regarding Jesus authenticity? 
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In accordance with this, it would seem that the would-be-believer has 
already made a negative, non-assenting assent if he has committed himself to 
construing the ascriptions to Jesus Christ in the manner which Rudolf 
Bultmann presupposes are necessary for a valid formulation of faith. That he 
deemed the question of Jesus' authenticity inappropriate prior to faith did not 
deter him from making Jesus authenticity a point of concern in regards to 
faith and "rightwising". 
Further; he rejects "assent" for at least two other reasons. Firstly, "assent" 
for him is synonymous with the demands of an inauthentic, sinful religion. 
Secondly, having to confess doctrine prior to faith would make a work of man 
necessary for justification. 
Indeed, both he and John Wesley were repelled by what each understood 
In his own way as the vulgarizing of faith by the orthodoxies of their day. 
Both considered the orthodox proposals and "every confession of faith" which 
reduced faith (thereby- religion) to "right opinion" or "assent to one, or to ten 
thousand truths" - to be an "illusion" and the ý vainest of "all ' religious 
dreams-. ' 
"I3ving" or "authentic" faith was not an intellectual assent to a rational, 
theological proposition. "' Each saw-his theological proposals as proposals 
capable of overcoming the languishing theological situations of their day and 
returning persons to the faith of the primitive Church. 
Notwithstanding this. in disallowing "assent" any role in faith. Rudolf 
Buitmann asserted a radically divergent view not only from John Wesley but 
also from Roman Catholicism and classical Protestantism. His affirmation is 
underpinned by assumptions foundational to his philosophical theology. 
These we will comment on further as we proceed. As a result, he takes a hard 
and fast position which sets up a false alternative; that is, he assumes 
"assent" prior to faith or as a part of faith is to -"speak about God" rather than 
from God: via, inauthentically and sinfully. 
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John Wesley's understanding permits variable possibilities. Though, 
according to John Wesley, faith was not merely bare "assent". "living faith" 
might and did include within it "assent". He accepted that the understanding 
and rational conviction had something to do with faith and religion. ' 
On the other hand, he refrained from declaring that even clear conceptions 
of capital doctrines and assent to them were an absolutely necessary 
prerequisite to "living faith". He was accused by Bishop Warburton of 
separating "reason from grace". 
Unlike Rudolf Bultmann, his view in this regard was not motivated by a 
desire to overcome doctrines considered to be obtrusive banes to philosophical 
and intellectual integrity. Rather, it was an acknowledgement that people who 
were of varying degrees of theological ignorance. sophistication, and mental 
capability did not have to be endowed with or attain to a certain level of 
rational understanding before they "may cleave to God through the Son of his 
love. " 
He shared with Rudolf Bultmann a corrective desire to rescue faith from 
an over-Intellectualizing tendency. Both showed a desire to boil the Christian 
message down to its necessary minimum. M For neither theologian was the 
human, religious impulse considered to be essentially noetic. Religion 
pervaded the whole of man. For John Wesley. genuine religion was seated 
primarily in the heart and inner experience; for Rudolf Bultmann it was in 
existentiell self-understanding and the will' 
John Wesley's formulation attempted to avoid an elitist or unsympathetic 
tendency which consciously or unconsciously presupposed religion to be of the 
domain of those who had the natural, intellectual endowment or the 
educational or instructional background to make the rational theological 
convictions necessary for faith. 5 
On the other hand, Rudolf Bultmann s proposal is one which is written 
with the educated in mind. His conception commends itself as one which 
does not require rational, theological affirmations prior to faith. If one accepts 
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his interpretation in its distilled essence at face value, it can be simple. 
However. his conception of justification by faith presupposes the acceptance of 
a fairly rigorous philosophy and theology which demands more than just an 
average level of thought and intellectual affirmation. 
Rudolf Bultmann alleged that if any theological affirmations were 
prescribed prior to faith, these afrirmations would make a work of man 
necessary for faith. ' Thus, he resists these ostensibly to protect sola fide. 
Nonetheless, the problem of "assent" raises the whole question of reason's 
role in relation to faith and what pre-faith knowledge and understanding, if 
any. are prerequisite for justification by faith. Particularly at this point, a 
foundational, pervading. epistemological difference between each theology 
noticeably shows itself at this point. John Wesley in the Thomist philosophic 
tradition accepts that phenomena in the intelligible, objective world and 
supra-world imprint their meaning upon the human mind or soul. The mind 
may then assent to the message it has received as true. 
On the other hand, Rudolf Bultmann in the existential. Heideggerian 
tradition accepts that the existing human person projects meaning onto the 
objective. meaning-neutral world, thereby making it intelligible. 
Taking the guilty sinner who hears the saving proclamation as an 
example. John Wesley accepts that the hearer is presented with meaning- 
laden statements carrying even the most rudimentary essence of the salvation 
offer which have first to be apprehended notitla and then consented to 
assensus by the mental faculty. For him. a mental transaction occurs and 
the understanding, regardless of how simple the level, is engaged, acting in 
agreement with the message en route to proper, living faith. He defended 
himself to Bishop Warburton by saying that he did not so much as "insinuate 
that the understanding has nothing to do in the work" (of God) 57 
Nonetheless, though theological rationality was not unrelated to saving 
faith. Rudolf Bultmann and he were agreed in so far as John Wesley 
accepted that generally the first movement of religion is not noetic per se. 
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Whereas for Rudolf Bultmann God addressed the "will", for John Wesley God 
addressed the "heart. John Wesley seemed to assume that regardless of 
the lack or degree of pre-faith Christian notional understanding, there were 
movements that people felt within their hearts that were "intuitively" through 
the sense of "faith' (not saving faith) correlated to God. He stated, "Men 
usually feel desires to please God before they know how to please Him. "' He 
does not elaborate on how one knows these feelings are related to God. 
However. he seems to have assumed that a constitutive essence of man 
created by God was an investiture by God of an Inner sense, "faith", the 
avenue of knowledge of the "invisible world". of Him .° In any case, the heart 
stirrings within prompted him to ask "What must I do to be saved? ". While 
rational knowledge was not so much considered the presupposition for saving 
faith, nevertheless, rational understanding was channeled through faith's 
inner sense and was part and parcel with it. Thus. an assent to supra- 
rational. supra-objective data would be part of the "pre-understanding" of 
saving faith. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, when a hearer is addressed by the proclamation of 
Jesus as the Son of God. he apprehends the statement not as a statement 
which tells him about Jesus objective (or supra-objective) nature or transmits 
an objective message, but only as a demand to accept or to reject. He allows 
there is a notitia of sorts. a mental apprehension which is involved in faith. 
However. It is the mind laying hold of what is not objective, information-laden 
data whose credibility must be acknowledged before proceeding to faith. For 
him, the reasoning and judging features of rationality are uninvolved in faith. 
The saving proclamation is an address to the will which assents by acting. 
Several comments may be made. Each theologian wants a faith which will 
fully engage the whole man and which will avoid an and rationalism. For 
Rudolf Bultmann, having the whole man involved is a question of "how" man 
is engaged rather than "how much" of man is engaged. If his will is engaged, 
he is fully engaged. Rudolf Bultmanri s argument that the whole self is 
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involved even when the inner man and experience are absent is in keeping 
with his existentialism. Moreover, it is reminiscent--though to my mind 
Rudolf Bultmann seems to go beyond him--of Martin Luther's assertions that 
earthly reason and outward. sense experience are insufficient and dull to the 
faith which transcends them. " Though the contrast is held by John Wesley, 
he seems to soften it in some sense because he did not attack reason to 
Martin Luthers degree. 
For John Wesley, both "how" and "how much" of man are relevant. If a 
man's heart is touched, then the man is "serious". Nonetheless, if his heart 
is touched and he is "serious". then his reason and will will not be 
unengaged. 62 
Several queries arise. Can Rudolf Bultmann s formulation be expected to 
"work". among any but initiates? Will the communication between 
proclamation and hearer be as he describes if the hearer is wholly ignorant of 
any of the traditional, rational propositions regarding Jesus Christ and the 
New Testament? Are the analysis of human nature and the epistemological 
assumptions adequate which assumes that uninitiated rational people will 
respond aiTirmatively to a bald. uninformative command? -Do we know - with 
what- certainty and why -- that the hearers will interpret this biblical 
"statement"--which appears to be just that--to be in reality a "demand"? 
Some of the same questions may just as well be asked of John Wesley. 
Does not the message of justification by faith as preached by him assume a 
pre-understanding of a Christian world-view and the acceptance of such; that 
is. a context where some prior knowledge and acceptance of the basic 
assumptions of Christianity exist in order that it may be received? Can John 
Wesley's message be efficacious - without a hearer's prior acceptance of the 
existence of a supernatural God? = Will modern, rational people who hear the 
proclamation such as John Wesley's assume with him that the content refers 
to supernatural "objective" reality rather than mythology? 
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These questions lead to a further assessment of the philosophical 
conception of faith's pre-understanding. Rudolf Bultmann vigorously rejects 
assensus as a pre-condition to faith on the grounds that it would require "two 
faiths" for justification. Nevertheless, he himself cannot avoid assuming two 
understandings necessary for justification. Moreover, though he rejects 
rational assent prior to faith, his system is not without its own demand for 
rational assent prior to faith. Just as it can be argued against the classical, 
Christian description, so the philosophical analysis of human existence is a 
rational formulation which must be intellectually examined and rationally 
accepted as the one which explains human existence before one assents in 
faith to the proclamation. 
Rudolf Bultmann assumes that the proclamation conceived in existential- 
ontological terms can be grasped by man because man has a corresponding 
existential-ontological pre-understanding through which he conceives of 
himself and the world. Both he and John Wesley are arguing in similar 
fashion that man already has as a given the manner of thinking about 
existence that is necessary to apprehend the proclamation. Rudolf Bultmann 
employs Thomas Aquinas manner of arguing in stating that the philosophical. 
existential-ontological analysis is not something which gives to the man new 
information that was unknown to the man prior to his hearing it formulated. 
Rather, the proclamation is the event which unveils for the man the 
existential understanding that is the a priori human understanding which is 
covered up until the event. 
Why has it been covered up? Because of sin. Namely, every person is 
already guided by a false understanding of human existence and everyone 
attempts to secure his existence by means of what he establishes. 
Essentially, this false understanding means viewing the world from the 
traditional. philosophical "subject-object" ontology. 
Why are people at once capable of knowing themselves and the world with 
an eldstential-ontological self-understanding but rather, always irresistibly, 
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inevitably. miss this understanding and conceive of the world from the 
traditional "subject-object" perspective assumed by John Wesley? How can 
this affirmation be squared with existential philosophers who do not see 
themselves and the world from the "subject-object" ontology but who, 
nevertheless, are considered to be unbelievers (because they do not know the 
specific possibility)? One wants clarification as to how an existential 
philosopher who views the world from an existential ontology but who does 
not resolve to know the specific possibility in God's saving act in Jesus Christ 
must still be a sinner. and if a sinner, one who views the world from a 
"subject-object" ontology. ' 
In any case, the myth of the Fall for Rudolf Bultmann does not give an 
ontological explanation of why everyone inevitably misses the understanding 
but is simply a figurative way of acknowledging that sin is. This raises a 
concern for his proposal at this point. He is asserting the case for 
something - everyone has an existential-ontological pre-understanding - for 
which he does not have corresponding objective, human experience to which 
to point. Of course. John Wesley asserted the case for an understanding in 
which it too would be disputed whether he had objective, human experience. 
At any rate. human experience, as Rudolf Bultmann admits., makes a 
convincing case for the philosophical viewpoint he rejects. We do not know 
that man in fact has an a priori knowledge of historical, existential existence 
since actual human experience. as Rudolf, Bultmann argues, points to a 
different understanding of- existence: In order to assert- that natural, 
unbelieving man knows -of "historical existence", one must already have 
assented to the existential philosophical analysis of man. 
Rudolf Bultmann gives no "scientific" reason behind the figurative image 
why man inevitably views the world from the "subject-object" ontology when 
an existential pre-understanding belongs to his life. He does not address the 
concern of how or why the sinful man, whose existential understanding is 
covered up and who views the world through the eyes of a , sinful ontology. 
386 
does not understand the saving preaching as information-laden 
communication. Moreover, why does this natural man rationally 
discriminate "" assuming. as Rudolf Bultmann does, that the claim of the 
proclamation is not a rational proposition --between certain elements of the 
saving message ("Jesus lived and died") as statements understood in terms of 
"subject-object" ontology and other elements of the proclamation ("Jesus is the 
pre-existent Son of God") as understood in terms of an existential conception? 
Therefore, he has not satisfactorily demonstrated that man in fact has the 
existential-ontological pre-understanding that he asserts. Whether or not we 
view the saving proclamation as an existential proclamation to be assented to 
by existential faith depends upon whether or not we are beforehand willing to 
assent to the existential-ontological philosophical analysis of human existence 
in whose terms faith and the proclamation are conceived. 
Therefore, Rudolf Bultmann does not avoid asserting "two faiths" and has 
not overcome John Wesley's view which he repudiates. In summary, one 
must decide intellectually whether or not the philosophical proposal Rudolf 
Bultmann offers is in fact the human pre-understanding which correlates with 
actual human experience before one can be willing to entertain the notion of 
faith which presupposes this understanding. In other words, there must be a 
prior acceptance of what Rudolf Bultmann claims the proclamation is 
claiming. ` Rudolf Bultmann Is right to be concerned about turning faith into 
a work where mental agreement to rational propositions may be required prior 
to faith. However, he takes the concern to an unrealistic degree and goes 
beyond the point of the apostle Paul's concern`5 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 
John Wesley was unaware of Rudolf Bultmanns contemporary contention 
that a biblical and theological understanding of faith presupposes the 
presence of a prior perspective and "life-situation". the interpreters prior 
relation to his subject at hand which is a relation grounded in the 
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interpreter's actual life-context in which he stands ' This relation is a real 
one only when the subject matter engages the interpreter by being a concern 
and problem for him. namely. when one has had one's own existentiell 
encounter. 
The idea of " pre-understanding" s' and "life-context" are more specifically 
expressed in the consideration of the relation between philosophy and 
theology. Rudolf Bultmann argues that faith's noetic understanding does not 
differ from unbeliefs understanding. Unbelieving philosophy knows 
conceptually wholly what believing theology knows. Philosophy which knows 
human `historical existence" understands theology because theology is 
concerned with human existence. Stating this another way., Karl - Barth and 
Schubert Ogden find that he holds that the New Testament expresses the self- 
understanding that is the same understanding of human life that modern 
philosophers have called "the historicity of man" or that Martin Heidegger has 
described in his existential-ontological analysis " These philosophical 
concepts are accepted as expressing the Christian faith in completely 
adequate terms" However. God's revelation in Jesus Christ is the "specific" 
determination of the human existence which philosophy sees only as a 
possibility. 7° 
Thus. Rudolf Bultmann collapses the intellectual content of theology into 
the scope of philosophy. unbelieving existence, by de-objectifying and de- 
supernaturalizing theology. " Indeed. John Wesley followed in the tradition of 
Thomas Aquinas and John Locke in assuming that philosophy's knowledge 
may overlap with theology and we may have a certain, natural knowledge of 
theology in so far as finite things point beyond themselves. But the assertion 
that unbelieving thought could have complete knowledge of theological 
thought would be considered by John Wesley a false claim to be rejected. To 
grant Rudolf Bultmann this claim that theological content was established by 
an unbelieving pre-understanding would be to grant him his -philosophical 
assumptions and conceptual framework. John Wesley's epistemology assumed 
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that man was a tabula rasa and that man received information and meaning - 
both natural and supernatural - from outside himself. " To grant Rudolf 
Bultmann his assertions would preclude the possibility of man receiving 
supranatural truth from beyond himself. This John Wesley was not prepared 
to do because, among other reasons, it would undermine his concept of faith 
and the saving grace of God. " 
As has been stated, Rudolf Bultmann accepts that philosophy and 
theology are completely harmonious in regards to their "scientific", rational 
content. " However, when it comes to religious or existentiell consciousness, 
he accepts that there is an irreconcilable gap. 's 
Similarly, John Wesley also acknowledges a gulf between philosophy and 
theology in regard to saving faith's religious perception. However. though he 
accepts that philosophy and theology share. common intellectual ground, he 
diverges from Rudolf Bultmann by maintaining there is a divide between the 
two in rationality as well as in religious-consciousness. 78 John Wesley 
assumed that there is an invisible. eternal realm for which unaided, natural 
reason could not account and natural understanding could not penetrate. 
Natural, philosophical reason could not perceive what reason graced-by-faith 
sees. "Faith" Is "sense" of the supra-sensual world which conveys religious 
consciousness as well as intellectual, rational perception. " 
John Wesley as well as Thomas Aquinas would agree with Martin Luther 
who stated, for example. that knowledge of the Trinity comes only from 
"inside" knowledge of God channeled through faith. "' 
For either theologian to allow at this point the other's foundational 
theological and philosophical assumptions would be to undermine the other's 
theology. This was the stalemate in which Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth 
found themselves. Karl Barth felt that Rudolf Bultmann put the New 
Testament in a "strait jacket" by forcing it into the understanding of a prior 
criterion and by measuring it by an "alien canon"? He argued that if we 
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wanted to understand any given text, "the provisional clue to its 
understanding must be sought from the text itself. and moreover from its 
spirit, content and aim. "' Karl Barth asserted that the New Testament text 
ought to be respected and that the criterion for understanding it ought to be 
derived from its spirit. content and aim. 81 Moreover, we should seek to 
understand ourselves as we find ourselves understood in the text. 82 
Rudolf Bultmann argued that in approaching the text the question 
philosophy asks it is what it says about human being as my being. ° This 
question is the true question to ask because it is the question that human 
being as being asks. As he said to Karl Barth, understanding the text in the 
framework of our self-understanding is "precisely the way toward 
understanding ourselves as we find ourselves understood in the text" &' 
Several queries come to mind. If unbelieving existence knows rationally 
and intellectually in full what believing existence knows rationally and 
Intellectually, why do we find that an existentiell encounter insures that only 
believing existence drafts theological affirmations that are peculiar to itself, 
even though unbelieving existence knows the afhrmatiori s meaning? 
Further, why should we think that the unbeliever knows what the believer 
knows when what the believer affirms in theology is not what the unbeliever 
knows to affirm? I am not convinced that this is less contrived than the 
philosophic or theological scholasticism of such as John Wesley in which It is 
held that unbelieving existence does not know the full meaning of the 
affirmations of believing existence. 
Rudolf Bultmann's disclosure and elucidation for theology of the 
hermeneutic of taking into consideration the relation between the interpreters 
affirmations and his prior "life-context" have made such a substantial mark 
upon theology that theology since then is not usually conducted without 
assuming the validity of this insight. Moreover, it is a formidable insight 
which Is difficult to challenge effectively. Such contemporary theologies as 
black, feminist, and liberation theologies no doubt were enabled to arise as a 
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result of Rudolf Bultmann's seminal methodological approach. 
Perhaps many who have applauded his weighty proposal have not fully 
appreciated how closely. perhaps inextricably, his hermeneutic and its 
explication are bound to the basic assumptions of the existential-ontological 
analysis. " For the content and meaning of any particular historical or 
theological proposition is axiomatically taken as deriving solely from the 
individual and his reflection upon his involvement with the subject rather 
than as objective content deriving from outside of man. Though this 
significant proposition accords with the inclination of strong currents of 
modern intellectual thought. it may. though not easily, be challenged as not 
necessarily being the case. 
For John Wesley, in the classical tradition of Thomas Aquinas. faith 
supplements and clarifies philosophy -a point which Rudolf Bultmann denies. 
John Wesley. in the vein of Martin Luther and in modern times Karl Barth, 
was wary of philosophy and gave theology the ascendant role over it. 
Rudolf Bultmann turned this relation upside down by making the content 
of theology dependent upon and subservient to philosophy. The philosophical 
description of the structure of existence is the content that fills the biblical 
and theological images rather than these images carrying content intrinsic to 
themselves. 
Karl Barth corroborates this criticism when he charged Rudolf Bultmann 
of "surrendering theology to philosophy". ' Schubert Ogden acknowledges the 
same point when he states that Rudolf Bultmann goes a "considerable 
distance toward conceding philosophy's claim . 87 Does the secret of theology 
lie in the discovery of a new philosophy. asks Karl Barth? Must we, he 
rhetorically queries in a tone of sarcasm, learn Chinese in order to get to the 
real Paul? " 
Though Karl Barth admits that an element of philosophy is in all 
theological language, one may wonder if Karl Barth granted Rudolf Bultmann's 
point as relevant to the discussion of the relation of philosophy and theology; 
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that is. every attempt to formulate theology presupposes a prior 
understanding. While Rudolf Bultmann did not discover this truism, he 
brought it to full awareness and clarity for theology. Moreover. It seems to 
have been an insight which has since set the methodological course of 
theology. 
If we accept his postulate. the question arises: must we therefore also 
accept his explication of it. namely. that our understanding goes beyond the 
theological terms and images of the biblical text in " that they represent little 
more than the understanding which we have brought to them? Or ought we 
to respect the theological terms and images as representing substance in their 
own right which may and/or may not reflect our own understanding but 
which may even clarify and correct our prior pre-understanding? 
One must conclude that Rudolf Bultmanri s interpretation which is in 
keeping with the post-Enlightenment shows a lack of confidence in the 
intellectual prowess, ability, and status of theology in comparison with 
modern philosophical and scientific disciplines. The modern context in which 
he lived would not have discouraged him in this attitude. In order to try to 
protect theology from what he saw as its annihilation at the hands of modern 
scientific atheism. Rudolf Bultmann sacrificed theology's claim to be a viable, 
independent intellectual alternative in -the intellectual marketplace. Perhaps, 
one may argue, he could not give up what the intellectual marketplace had 
been already conceded. 
Evidently known by his Methodist friends as "Wesley contra mundum", 
John Wesley and his theological stance contrasts more sharply with the 
world-context of his day. " He viewed theology as a check to natural reason's 
arrogant proclivity to claim superiority and omniscience. Nevertheless, his 
theological assumptions arouse the consternation of natural reason. They 
cordon off a preserve from which unbelieving. critical reason is kept. Hence, 
unbelieving reason cannot verify or deny the assertions made by faith's 
reason. This has been interpreted with suspicion as a bastion for superstition 
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and a convenient escape from critical scrutiny. 
Both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann make a case for two realms of 
reality: the natural, empirical realm and the 'supernatural" (Wesley). 
"transcendent" (Bultmann) realm. As a result of Immanuel Kant's philosophy, 
two distinctive realms of reality were delineated. With the rise of scientific 
empiricism, the phenomenal realm has been considered by Western culture to 
be the credible realm which offers the trustworthy account of existent reality. 
However, though they differ dramatically as to their understandings of the 
nature of the transcendent realm and its relation with the natural realm, 
nonetheless, they both seek to be proponents of it. 
THE NATURE OF MAN 
John Wesley's understanding of faith is dependent on a conception of 
man's nature which harks back to Scripture but was philosophically 
explicated by Thomas Aquinas and basically reasserted by John Locke. In 
accepting that man is a self-conscious subject, he affirmed that man is a 
composite of two mutually exclusive entities or qualities: soul and matter 90 
The soul is the inner. spiritual entity of thinking, feeling, willing and the 
faculty communicative with God. " The soul itself may be considered the "I", 
the self, because it is distinct from the body and may exist separately from it, 
living on beyond bodily death. However. in the present state of existence, 
John Wesley held that the MT undoubtedly consisted both of soul and body"' 
In consideration of this, his statement that man is an embodied spirit shows 
a likeness to Thomas Aquinas view. 
This kind of distinction between "soul" and "body" Rudolf Bultmann 
disputes. not only in principle, but also because it is the result of conceiving 
of the world in terms of the "subject-object" relation. According to Rudolf 
Bultmann, the nature of man does not consist of a conscious subject of 
thinking and willing incorporeality. The "self is not isolatable, rational, self- 
possessed thoughts distinct from the body. Man is not two parts consisting of 
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inner and outer essences causally related. " The "self". the "I". is "body", 
soma. 
Rudolf Bultmann s view parallels Arthur Schopenhauers conception of 
man as one phenomenon with "soul" and 'body", "inner' and "outer", being 
various ways of expressing the one phenomenon. Likewise, for Rudolf 
Bultmann, mari s essential being is will. An "I" is a willing self who wills to 
live. to be authentic. ` In the tradition of Arthur Schopenhauer. he holds that 
the action of the body is the act of the will objectified. Stated another way, 
the whole body is nothing but objectified will. ' 
This means that subject and object are conceived as one. Arguing In this 
fashion seems to identify him as a philosophical materialist (in the vein of the 
'identity theory") °e Therefore, his proposition which disavows any distinctive 
inner self or soul disallows the presence of a faculty which could 
communicate with an external, transmitting supernatural Source. Allowing 
this causes John Wesley's concept of faith which depends on an inner faculty 
sensitive to supernatural stimuli to fall. A wider implication of Rudolf 
Bultmanri s philosophy is that the aspect of "personality" must be inextricably 
linked to "body". Further. the God which John Wesley knows, who is without 
body. cannot have "personality" or be "spirit". 
Although Rudolf Bultmann s position is more fashionable than the more 
traditional "dualist" view of John Wesley's. neither view enjoys indisputable 
scientific confirmation. By assuming the philosophical theories they do, 
neither theologian is free from metaphysics. Arthur Schopenhauer 
acknowledged that the source of the knowledge of the will came from within 
man and not from the observable. 7 
Nonetheless, both theologians are sure their view is the correct one. Well 
they must, for each one's assumptions are necessary for the success of his 
concept of faith. John Wesley's understanding accents the uniqueness of man 
as a spirit corporealised who may have intercourse with the transcendent 
being God. Rudolf Bultmann s formulation stresses willful action in the 
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human concrete situation. His understanding is agreeable to a scientific 
community which finds "dualism" too problematic and inhibiting to its 
pursuit. 
However. that Rudolf Bultmann can assert a philosophic materialism on 
behalf of Scripture results from an imaginative re-interpretation which is 
doubtful. Moreover. there is some irony in the fact that he seeks to make a 
case for man's utter uniqueness while assuming a philosophic theory which 
taken to its logical conclusion would see man as a simple animal. 





In their descriptions of faith. the two theologians claim the Apostle Paul as 
the authority and standard. Though the book of Romans Is strategic for both 
Rudolf Bultmann and John Wesley, both theologians can also draw from 
John. However, John Wesley appropriates other New Testament books 
(particularly Ephesians and Hebrews) as important sources for his 
authoritative understanding of faith. 
Rudolf Bultmann set forth a thorough, exegetical study of the cognates of 
"faith" 711 T1S in the New Testament. John Wesley, though he was 
familiar with the Greek New Testament, never does. Both also draw from 
other historical sources. Although, Rudolf Bultmann alludes to Martin 
Luther. Wilhelm Herrmann. Karl Barth, and Martin Heidegger, his formulation 
of faith Is reliant upon these only in so far as they enable him to arrive at his 
own independent, interpretive synthesis. 
For his understanding of faith, John Wesley readily consults and Is more 
closely dependent upon various authorities' than' Rudolf Bultmann. " He 
learned from the Moravians, especially Peter Böhler, from the Church's 
Articles and Homilies, from the English Puritans and divines such as Richard 
Baxter and John Goodwin. whom he accepted as articulating accurately the 
Apostles Gospel. Though John Wesley's formulation Is not without his own 
contribution, his is by no means as original as Rudolf Bultmann s. 
The essence of Rudolf Bultmann s conception of faith remained constant at 
least' from the point where his publishing activity In -the latter 1920's begins 
to show some attention to "faith". " However, though for John Wesley the 
essential constituent ingredients of faith are present from 1738, the 
interpretation of the various species or gradations of faith ("saving faith", "the 
assurance of faith", et cetera) shifted over his lifetime. In contrast, though 
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Rudolf Bultmann mentions in passing that faith has "degrees" of strength, 
"faith" is simple and monolithic for him. 
For John Wesley. "faith" Is essentially an inner "conviction". a "testimony 
of God's Spirit% a "revelation of Christ" to the individual's soul " 
THE RELATION OF FAMi TO TTS OBJECT 
Faith asserts a condition of direct, inter-personal relations between the 
believer and the supernatural, personal Being God in Jesus Christ who 
initiates these relations. The "testimony of God's Spirit" or the "revelation of 
Christ" Is the transcendent God personally "speaking" or conveying His saving 
message to men. " 
For John Wesley, the object of faith is not merely the saving event or 
proclamation per se, but the actual Person, the living Jesus Christ and His 
atoning benefits. '°' The object of faith is God's saving deed in Jesus Christ as 
it is the event which actually brings the bodily risen Jesus Christ in all His 
reality and His attending benefits to the individual believer in time-space. 
Rudolf Bultmann rejects this as being inconceivable. "Faith" for him 
cannot be a direct or "mystical" relationship to Jesus because the Jesus of 
Nazareth of the apostles Paul and John is dead. In spite of Rudolf 
Bultmann's involved explanation of why "believe in" should not be interpreted 
literally but as "believe that". one ought to consider this assumption of a dead 
Jesus central to his choice of interpretation. The object of faith is not a 
person but a proclamation. the eschatological act of God in Christ. "Jesus 
Christ" is only a metonym for the proclamation. More specifically, the object 
of faith Is not the flat proclamation but the proclamation which becomes the 
eschatological act of God when man Is summoned by the proclamation and 
man resolves to accept it as God's saving word. Hence the definition of faith 
which Is common to the various stages of New Testament development is not 
trust in a dead man Jesus but to "consider" credible, or "the acceptance of 
the kerygma". 
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Each theologian's understanding of the object of faith and the nature of 
the believer's relation to it provides an interesting study. Existentialists such 
as Rudolf Bultmann are critical of the cultural, ontological world-view (such 
as John Wesley is deemed to assume) which they maintain depersonalizes 
man and treats him as another object among objects. Existentialists make a 
fundamental distinction between how a person understands and relates 
practically to his everyday world of objects and how a person should 
understand and relate to himself and others. How Rudolf Bultmann conceives 
this relation is reflected in his conception of faith's relation to its object. Let 
us briefly put Rudolf Bultmann s formulation in perspective. 
In his notable construct (to which Rudolf Bultrnann alludes), Martin Buber 
identifies this existential dichotomy of relating as the "I-It" and "I-Thou" 
relations. Similarly. Martin Heidegger Identifies the former relation as 
Besorgen (practical concern) and the latter one as Fürsorge (personal 
concern). '02 In trying to determine the characteristics constitutive of an 
existentialist, personal relation. Martin Buber offers some clues. He states 
that the "I Thou" relation is an authentic and personal relation because it 
Incorporates the following characteristics: firstly. one who has an "I-Thou" 
relation relates with his whole being and totally in wholeness and openness; 
secondly, the relation is dialogical in that there is a willingness to listen as 
well as to speak. The "I-Thou" relationship speaks mainly of the relationship 
between selves, though It does not preclude such a relationship between a 
person and nature. However, to speak of "relationship" seems to be confined 
to that between persons. "' 
Do John Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann s accounts of faith prescribe a 
fundamental encounter of existence which is personal? When Rudolf 
Bultmann discounts the possibility of a faith relation between a person and a 
God who Is Person, he precludes a faith relation which would include all the 
components noted above of personal relation. Indeed, he does stress that the 
relation involves the whole being. However, he also assumes that the believer 
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relates to an enigmatic 'mans"-laden statement rather than a Self. This, to 
my mind. devalues the believers "relation" to the transcendent to something 
less personal than the relation between two humans which is truly 
interpersonal. Moreover. the transcendent relation could be dialogical only in 
a metaphorical sense and not in a real sense as in the human relation. It 
could not consist of a developing chain of mutual, personal interaction such 
as can exist between two persons. 
Rudolf Bultmann appears to guard himself from such a criticism by 
claiming the Word is not from this world. Moreover. the Word has the 
character of 'being-there-with-me' (though it cannot be considered another 
world-object within the world, it has the character of being a personal co- 
eldstent with me). Nevertheless, accepting that the Word is not of the world, 
he repudiates any claim that this Word Is constituted of the qualities 
identified with personhood. He does not describe a relationship capable of 
authentic interpersonal relations between a person and the transcendent 
because this would be to speak mythologically. Personalisation also includes 
the consideration one person gives another person in viewing him or her in 
particular as special and standing out from the surrounding crowd, other 
objects and things. 
In the encounter of faith proposed by Rudolf Bultmann, man is 
"challenged" and "judged" by an incomprehensible, non-personal authority 
with no personality, personal will, rational thought, or "heart". Being 
confronted by a personal tyrant or a mythological Person might seem a relief - 
at least one would have a "face" with whom to associate the command. 
Certainly, Rudolf Bultmanri s formulation does not envisage any exchange of 
love between the transcendent and the believer. His formulation forfeits the 
historic Judeo-Christian identity of the people of God as in fact the children of 
the personal God. His interpretation of the faith relationship -- even if it be 
rationalized as not from this world --falls to be as inspiring as other genuine 
relationships available in "this world". 
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John Wesley's affirmation promises man that the primary ontological 
relationship of existence is truly a personal one. Beyond the seemingly lonely 
and terrifying impersonal void, man might be assured of ultimate, personal 
connectedness with the transcendent person God. Man should enter into this 
relationship with his whole being and expect a dialogical communication with 
God. Nonetheless. John Wesley is not an existentialist after the model of 
Martin Buber. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, the above description is an example of the dream he 
is trying to overcome. Man must face the fact that he is alone. By shattering 
the illusion that he is not alone, man may answer the problem of his isolation 
and be personalized. He rejects the historic Christian claim that faith entails 
a personal relationship with God. He might have wondered how a 
"relationship" could be described as "personal" when the qualities and 
dynamics of such a relationship were absent and the believer was speaking to 
the Beyond in a monologue. 
However, from the classical, Christian viewpoint, by depriving faith of its 
personal relation with God, the existentialist ironically depersonalizes not only 
mans encounter with the transcendent but mari s entire existence. 
FAITH: HUMAN/DIVINE 
Though John Wesley allows for the necessity of free will in saving faith, 
nonetheless, his account of saving faith as an inner. God-wrought 
consciousness places the accent of faith on man as having something done 
for, to, and in him. Contrariwise, allowing that Rudolf Bultmann accepts that 
faith is a gift in that the proclamation gives one the opportunity to decide, 
nevertheless, his account of faith as deciding for the saving proclamation 
emphasises man's doing and willing something rather than God's bestowal of 
something on man. 
For John Wesley, man's reception is the complement of God's activity. For 
Rudolf Bultmann. God's demand is the complement of man's response. For 
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John Wesley. reception implies God's absolutely necessary, sovereign initiative 
and dispensing activity and man's corresponding active passivity. For Rudolf 
Bultmann. response implies a passive activity in which man wills to act and 
to respond to a demand in order to establish that a divine encounter has 
occurred. In this case, faith is man achieving a new self-understanding 
through his own selfprojected action upon the proclamation which enables 
him to see himself in a new way as being encountered by God. However, 
while John Wesley accepts that faith brings a new self-understanding, faith 
involves God returning from out of Himself the verdict of an actual, new, 
objective state of reconciliation which exists between the believer and Himself. 
Indeed, according to Rudolf Bultmann, God in Christ has taken the 
initiative by making salvation accessible by calling man into question by the 
Word. The occurrence of faith involves a prior demand placed upon man by 
an authoritatively confrontational God. Nonetheless, the actual burden of 
weight is placed upon man as the "man called into question" rather than 
upon the God who calls into question. God's "gift" Is merely God's calling 
man into question, thereby placing the primary burden of action on man, 
forcing him to act for his salvation. Faith for Rudolf Bultmann is devoid of 
any in-coming, outside rational influence laden with informational content to 
transfer to man or any intelligent, energetic power capable of interacting 
with, acting upon or within man. 
Contrariwise. John Wesley's account assumes this. Faith for John Wesley 
is God offering and presenting to the individual the ontological gift of His own 
personal, salvic love released through Jesus Christ's atoning death. God's 
desire, His capacity, and His real, present readiness to bestow gracious favour 
upon the individual logically and temporally antedate the believer's awareness 
and reception of His atoning love. In other words, for John Wesley God is 
actually offering "me" the grace that can be known as grace before I receive 
and recognize that it Is grace. John Wesley's account of faith stresses the 
Giver and literal, supernatural gift -" that which is transferred and is out- 
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going from a giving-out God and is received and in-going to in-receiving 
man. 1oa 
For Rudolf Bultmann. such an ontological divine gift cannot exist prior to 
faith. There is no personal God offering man an intentional invitation to 
personal reconciliation which man can receive as he would an offer of 
friendship from a neighbour. Faith is not a transaction carried out by God 
which man fulfills by an actual reception. Faith is essentially mans will to 
decide to interpret the proclamation in a certain way. In summary, for John 
Wesley the principal agent (though indeed man is not uninvolved) in faith is 
the supranatural God. For Rudolf Bultmann. It is man (though the 
transcendent God is involved). 
The analysis just expressed is corroborated by Karl Barth's judgment. He 
queries how far the kerygma as conceived by Rudolf Bultmann really speaks, 
as it is intended to speak, of an act of God. He wonders if it does not rather 
speak, strictly speaking, of an act of man in which man moves from the "old" 
determination to the new determination by the achievement of his own 
obedience (though he is suppose to be incapable of it). Does he mean more 
than that the content of the kerygma should be accepted by us as "the law of 
our decision'? 106 Fritz Burt criticizes Rudolf Bultmann s interpretation in 
much the same way. He states that the manner in which Rudolf Bultmann 
interprets the kerygma of God's saving event in Christ threatens to dissolve it 
into "a mere human self-understanding". "" 
One sees here again in microcosm their two epistemological approaches: 
John Wesley's approach which assumes that an outside stimulus conveys 
meaning to the subject is again the one explicated by Thomas Aquinas and 
John Locke; Rudolf Bultmann's approach accepts that outside sensation is 
devoid of meaning until man transforms it by his interpretation. This method 
harks back to Immanuel Kant. '*' 
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FAIIii: MYSIiCAL EXPERIENCE? 
Moving to another issue, Rudolf Bultmann repudiates teaching which 
allowed faith to be a religious or mystical experience. Perhaps in contending 
for this he wants to disavow the parallel between the faith he promotes and 
other commonly described religious and mystical experiences. Faith for him 
cannot be "an of ect. " or a "religious process" because it is not an emotional 
state or disposition of body or mind. 108 Faith is not having an elevated 
religious feeling or a consciousness associated with some claimed intercourse 
with God (as in Gnosticism). "* Not only is it not a present reality within (any 
circumstance of) human existence, the "Beyond" does not impinge upon the 
believer. Having faith cannot be affirmed of any man. 
Rudolf Bultmann s proposal of the encounter of faith does disclaim 
"mysticism" as viewed as a union with the transcendent which carries with it 
the inner sense of God's presence. Nonetheless. one may describe his concept 
of faith as touching mysticism at least at a particular point. Namely. his 
concept is not dissimilar to a type of mysticism which has been called 
'mystery-mysticism" by John Tinsley. who finds it elucidated in Paul Tillich's 
concept of the process of revelation. "o 
Rudolf Buitmann asserts that there is a real historical happening, or a 
concrete situation ("the sign-event ). in which man is encountered by the 
Word's demand. This "sign-event" or concrete occurrence is perceived as a 
sign as a result of "ecstasy". Paul Tillich states that this "ecstasy" is more 
than mere experience or a realization of some truth which could be reached 
by discursive reason. Rather. it is a "special turn of mind, having its own 
coercive character". "' In Rudolf Buitmanri s case, this concrete happening is 
interpreted as a sign as a result of man's decision to view it this way. 
Moreover. recalling Martin Luthers conception, faith for Rudolf Bultmann 
is not common experience of the visible world in the sense of the individual 
passing through an event which affects him on the inside or in which a 
sensation from without comes to him. Notwithstanding this, one may still 
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suggest labeling it 'experience" In that it is an event which the individual 
passes through and in which he recognizes that he has been qualified. 112 
While for Martin Luther. this "experience" of "authentic" faith was not an 
experience of the common, sense experience variety, nevertheless he did 
understand this faith to be an 'experience" of a new dimension. "3 
Rather. he. with Martin Luther's conscious explicitness. distinguishes it 
from the Inner spiritual "feeling% the inward impression on the soul deriving 
from the supernatural grace of Jesus Christ. However. John Wesley does not 
emphasize the dialectical opposition between natural sense experience and 
spiritual experience as do Martin Luther and Rudolf Bultmann but rather he 
emphasizes their similarities. Indeed. formulating a positive description of the 
religious impression is not easy for any to make. John Wesley could only 
describe it by analogy to sense experience. Stating laconically the differences 
between the two, he assumes as the others do that it authenticates itself to 
the believer. 
In any case, John Wesley contrary to Rudolf Bultmann Is not afraid to 
assert that saving faith is an inner experience of spiritual consciousness. "` 
Uke the Catholic mystics, the Puritans and the German Pietists before him, 
this understanding is suggestive of a type of mysticism in which it is 
maintained the believer has an unmediated. ý direct experience of God in Jesus 
Christ. ` It would seem to be differentiated from Rudolf Bultmanri s 
mysticism In that Rudolf Bultmann's "experience" was connected necessarily 
with a particular 'sign-event'. a concrete situation -- one's encounter with the 
proclamation -- whereas John Wesley's was not. 
"' However, though both 
theologians denounce "mysticism". they both resemble, each in his own way, a 
certain type of "mysticism" in that they accept that a disclosure of God is 
made to faith in the individual's "experience". 
Rudolf Bultmann dismisses the kind of religious experience which John 
Wesley proposes none the least on the ground that there is no supra-objective 
reality, e. g. the Triune God, who is said to reveal Himself in man or history. 
404 
Even if there were such an entity, finite man has no criteria by which to 
judge the Infinite's presence. 
John Wesley claims we have criteria: Holy Scripture, reason and the 
Inner. supra-sensuous faculty. the soul. Rudolf Bultmann's assumption that 
finite man cannot rationally know the Infinite is philosophically logical but is 
itself based upon the unverified supposition that there Is in fact no Infinite, 
Person God who has Invested the creation with a quality or qualities which 
reflect His eternity and divinity or provided the human faculties with 
capabilities, capacities, or structures for perceiving His transcendent Being. 
He assumes that there is no God who Is able and active in communicating 
some rational understanding of His Infinite Being and no receptor within man 
to receive it. Of course, John Wesley has to make these assumptions in order 
to maintain his understanding of faith. 
One observes that these opposing assumptions of John Wesley and Rudolf 
Bultmann are just that: foundational assumptions. Neither is a result of 
empirical. scientific verification and neither could claim a certainty supported 
by empirical science. Just as John Wesley with apparently absolute 
confidence asserts who God is and that and what He reveals, so Rudolf 
Bultmann with every bit as much assurance describes in an a Priori "negative 
way'. who and what God cannot be. John Wesley tells us he has achieved 
his understanding by Holy Scripture aided by enlightened reason and 
inspiration. Rudolf Bultmann seemingly achieved his negative, dogmatic 
understanding by ratiocination. 
John Wesley is in the predicament of not being able to prove that 
anything he says positively about God in any way corresponds to such an 
existent. Thus, that it is divinely inspired is an open question. That it is 
sound reason may also be questioned because we cannot verify that reason 
which is based on the logic and experience of this visible world in fact 
corresponds to what may be the transcendent world, Nonetheless. John 
Wesley reasoned in the sense that from Scriptural premises he drew 
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deductions which he believed were verified by experience. 
However, on the other hand, could Rudolf Bultmann achieve an 
understanding of what God is rationally or scientifically since by his 
proposition one cannot ratiocinate about God via these routes? He could not 
know what he affirms by faith since faith for him does not enlighten 
Intellectually. He seems too wary to have been so conclusive at this point. 
He would probably counter by stating he was not reasoning about God, but 
about man's false imaginations of what man supposes him to be. Perhaps he 
felt if he acknowledged even the possibility of a God and revelation such as 
John Wesley put forward. then the force of his theological declaration would 
be weakened. However. I rather think that the kind of "objectifying" that 
John Wesley engaged In was so objectionable and irksome to him that he was 
sure it could not be true. "' 
FAITh: REVELA11ON 
Though Rudolf Bultmann allows that revelation occurs in faith, it is a 
revelation which bears little resemblance to the classical theological 
understanding. Much of what he discounts about the classical concept of 
revelation had been discussed by the Deists of John Wesley's day. 
Doubtlessly. among other things. he differed from the Deists according to 
philosophical framework. the doctrine of God, and in his re-interpretation of 
revelation as a disclosure of new existential self-understanding. 
However. in effect. both advocated a genuine. Christian religion which did 
not need a supernational disclosure laden with supra-rational content from 
outside the world-historical natural order. 
Deists such as Matthew Tindal typically reasoned that since revelation was 
a mere duplicate of what was already written on the hearts of men. it was 
superfluous. " They were not first concerned to show the scientific 
impossibility of positive revelation but its unreasonableness. "' However, for 
Rudolf Bultmann it was both scientifically impossible and unreasonable. 
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Though the thesis of Conyers Middleton' sA Free Inquiry Into The 
Miraculous Powers asserted that miracles ceased after the close of the New 
Testament period. John Wesley astutely recognized that latent in Conyers 
Middleton' s argument were the seeds (which in fact would flower in the likes 
of Rudolf Bultmann) of the further thesis that no miracles were wrought by 
Christ or His Apostles'. ` 
John Wesley was at pains to defend the reality beyond sense and time for 
reasons, not the least of which was. that the supernatural and the revelation 
derived therefrom were integral to saving faith as he conceived 1t. '2 He 
rhetorically asked. "Is there any conversion that is not miraculous? " (He 
stated he was not able to distinguish between a supernatural and a 
miraculous work). " He argued against Conyers Middleton and affirmed that 
the faith through which the promise comes Is "a power ... to see through that 
veil into the world of spirits, into things invisible and eternal". " He queried 
Conyers Middleton s knowledge of the Beyond. Was his "knowledge any more 
than bare conjecture? he asked. 124 
John Wesley suggested the reason for his ignorance was "You have no 
senses suitable to invisible or eternal objects. "'25If he argued this way with 
the eighteenth century likes of Conyers Middleton who attacked the 
supernatural by innuendo and implication, certainly he would not have been 
happier with the direct denials of Rudolf Bultmann. 
Even though the era of historical and biblical criticism was only just 
beginning in John Wesley's day, the disparity in theological enlightenment 
between his age and Rudolf Bultmann s can be overstated. Though living 
through the catastrophe of two world wars and the complexity of modernity, 
Rudolf Bultmann s confidence in his modern theology assumes the air of the 
late nineteenth-twentieth century optimism which viewed man as finally "come 
of age". Interpretations, such as John Wesley's, which themselves were 
confident in their affirmations, are summarily dismissed as age-encrusted, if 
not obsolete. Like those in the eighteenth century who viewed the ages prior 
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to themselves as outdated in comparison, in some ways Rudolf Bultmann in 
the twentieth century displayed an attitude of centuricentrism. Even in his 
own day, John Wesley was accused by "John Smith" of returning to "old and 
exploded expositions" of the past seventeenth century. 126 John Wesley 
comments in regard to John Taylor's attempted refutation of the doctrine of 
original sin that after 1700 years a sweet-tongued orator arose who had more 
wisdom than all past ages. '' 
As pertains to the issue of the miraculous and supernatural reality. John 
Wesley was not uninitiated and not undecided regarding the fundamental 
assumptions which then and now undergird the criticism of supernatural 
revelation and the miraculous. He had read George Campbell's Dissertation 
On Miracles which examined David Hume's argument in his short treatise "Of 
Miracles". " David Hume already had anticipated the doctrine of "analogy" 
(the recognition of anything proceeds by comparing It with our current 
experiences of life and our understanding of the way things work) which is 
one of Rudolf Bultmanri s presuppositions in his denial of supranaturallsm. 121 
The passing of two hundred years has not advanced Rudolf Bultmann's 
evidence or argument to the point that John Wesley would be required by 
necessity to abandon his position. In fact, Rudolf Bultmann does not In a 
single work attempt a reasoned debunking of the supernatural and 
miraculous. However, his disparagement of them is expressed throughout his 
writings. One might say with justification that one of the motivations of his 
total theological formulation Is to deliver Christian faith from the supernatural 
and its dependence upon it. As Schubert Ogden and Karl Barth show, the 
problem that Rudolf Bultmann determined faced him as a theologian was how 
to explicate for modem man, who assumes a scientific and technological 
world-view, the understanding revealed In the New Testament which assumes 
a mythological world-picture. 13° He confidently assumes that In the light of 
der Zeitgeist with Its current philosophical and scientific thinking a polemic 
against the supernatural was quite superfluous. "' If John Wesley conversed 
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with Rudolf Bultmann, would he issue to him the challenge he made Thomas 
Church to prove there was no supernatural power at work among his 
hearers? 132 
It is highly doubtful whether or not either theologian could offer the other 
sufficient reason or evidence to persuade him to accept the position contrary 
to his own. Each theologian examined reality and assimilated it according to 
an already assumed philosophical, biblical, and theological world-view (albeit, 
Rudolf Bultmann does not accept that his analysis is a "world view"). 
FAITH: CONFIDENCE OR DOUBT? 
A marked contrast between John Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann's 
understanding of the nature of saving faith is observed in their consideration 
of whether saving faith is "confidence" or the surrender of confidence. 
Assuredly for John Wesley saving faith is an assured. Divine persuasion 
registered within a person that a particular, favourable state of relations exists 
between God and the believer (God is favourably disposed toward "me"). ` 
Contrariwise, Rudolf Bultmann, not without the flavour of Martin Luther. 
asserts the opposite: faith is the abandonment of all security. For him, 
security is indicative of the old existence and the attitude of "care". The 
person who tries according to "this world" to make his life secure in terms of 
or by himself is one who turns away from the Creator. He has "dread" which 
is unresponsiveness to the future and an unwillingness to surrender to what 
is a mystery to him. Because he cannot bear to look into the void, he rejects 
the call to decision to risk himself and seeks a possession (what Is In John 
Wesley's theology an Inner "conviction") which he attempts to call his own 
and from which he takes comfort. For Rudolf Bultmann, faith is not a 
matter of exchanging a wrong security for a new right security. Faith is not a 
matter of being convinced Intellectually or emotively. Faith is inherently 
uncertainty -- a constant striving, a never having arrived, a constantly being 
threatened by the past and being made anxious by an unpredictable future. 
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That John Wesley was, particularly in 1738, a man who could not bear to 
live in uncertainty before God and who tried to secure his life before Him, is 
borne out in the Journal entries. His fear was essentially a psycho-spiritual 
fear. According to the Journal, he feared death and his own dying as it was 
inextricably bound to the God who would judge the dead. However, rather 
than thinking he secured his life according to a sinful theological explication, 
he believed after Aldersgate he was finally viewing himself according to the 
Scriptures. 
The anxiety or dread envisaged by Rudolf Bultmann dovetails a 
psychological fear of death with a technical, existential, philosophical 
exposition of ontological uncertainty. Though he approached the paradoxical 
nature of faith in relation to the common experience of anxieties and troubles 
like Martin Luther, Rudolf Bultmann differed from Martin Luther in that 
Martin Luther allowed faith to have experiential certainty. 19 
Nonetheless, Rudolf Bultmann has articulated in a compelling way a 
concern which persons recognize as their own and with which they struggle. 
He makes a powerful case for the radical insecurity of man's existence. 
Whether or not it is man's only or primary concern is not immediately 
relevant. 
Both theologians interpret literally. as far as it goes, the Apostle Paul's 
argument that faith surrenders its confidence In its own power and renounces 
the attainment of righteousness by its own strength. Rudolf Bultmann 
expands upon this using the existential description to "light up" man's 
fundamental Insecurity in an existential relation. John Wesley uses the 
description of man's spiritual and moral inability to keep the will of God to 
show his insecurity before God. 
In coming to the positive translation of the term faith as "confidence". 
John Wesley translates the Scriptural term in a literal fashion, whereas Rudolf 
Bultmann interprets it according to existential, philosophical analysis. 
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Each theologian further explicates authentic faith on the basis of his prior 
assumptions regarding the nature of history and ontological transcendence. 
On the grounds of an existential philosophy and a historical-critical 
philosophy of history, Rudolf Bultmann states that no personal mind or will 
who foreknows the future and is able purposefully to intervene in or to 
orchestrate historical events according to a willful intention and desired 
outcome is outside or inside history. Even if the existence of such a Being 
were possible, man does not know about it and so practically the situation is 
unchanged. There is no Guarantor of the future in whom man can be 
confident. Therefore, one cannot predict with confidence one's future based 
on one's past and present. 
Rudolf Bultmann does profess that the analysis of one level of history 
(what Wilhelm Dilthey referred to as "outer history"), which includes a process 
of single events connected by a chain of cause and effect, renders results with 
scientific objectivity and dependability. He acknowledges there are certain 
"powers" (human passions, socio-economic needs, and ideas) which operate on 
historical process and of which one can become aware. 135 
However, in regards to ascertaining historical meaning (the "inner" history), 
the objectivity of "natural science" cannot be obtained and is, in any case, an 
unsuitable method for determining meaning. 
Yet, history on both levels for Rudolf Bultmann is ultimately 
unpredictable, blind, and incalculable. The influential "powers" at work in 
natural history can be the ultimate result of little more than a fickle fate. 
Man has no clue or axiom at his disposal for assessing why some are rich 
and others are poor, or why one's character develops one way and not 
another. Moreover, man has no universal guidelines or standards which are 
predictive of a "mind" or direction of history and which can be used 
accordingly by him to align himself. 
Therefore, human life is insecure because there is no intelligible 
correlation between the transcendent Beyond and human history. Whether or 
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not life is anything but unpredictable is doubtful. This is a poignant 
perspective of existence which is not wholly unexpected from one who lived 
through the first half of the twentieth century in Germany. 
Nonetheless. this view is not without its difficulty. On the one hand, he 
wants to assume that principles of causality and predictability of the order of 
natural history ("outer history") operate so that single events are not without 
connection and are connected by the orderly chain of cause and effect. On 
the other hand. the very existent understanding that asserts that this is true 
paradoxically affirms that the universe and world is a riddle which 
encompasses man as darkness and the uncanny. 
Can the very pre-understanding that presupposes the world to be 
enigmatic, unpredictable, and blindly devoid of universal laws concomitantly 
and consistently seek and confidently assert the reality of cause and effect 
which bespeaks an understandable and predictably effectual relationship 
between events? If one affirms that one aspect of history is predictable and 
another is unpredictable, does not one say in so many words that the 
universe as a whole is incalculable? Why should we expect to find any order. 
historical or otherwise, In an Incalculable and whimsical universe? Why 
should we believe anything differently than that the order we suppose we 
perceive is ultimately merely an illusion? On what grounds is the existential 
pre-understanding, which knows the universe to be essentially incalculable 
and cryptic. willing to believe there is a real metaphysical principle of 
causality governing events which links them invariably and constantly, and 
not willing to believe there is phenomenal succession which is invariably 
linked to a metaphysical, transcendent God? Does not Rudolf Bultmann 
when he confidently denies that security is a genuine possibility for the man 
of faith unconsciously affirm a concept of faith which has an implicit 
security? More particularly, he accepts that things can be trusted to be as he 
asserts them to be. In other words, there is a negative security to faith in its 
confident assumption that human life is assuredly incalculable and 
412 
Indeterminable. " 
Indeed, is there not an implicit negative confidence and security in faith's 
acceptance of and resignation to a Beyond which it trusts and counts on as 
not only being invariably uncertain and indeterminable, but also encountering 
the Individual in the way proposed? 
To what degree is the assurance expounded by John Wesley compromised 
by the several, subtle theological shifts to which he subjected it? The saving 
faith which one could be confident saved (or excluded him) in 1745 was 
different from what he could be assured of saving (or excluding him) In 1748. 
One could be "certain" the inner confidence that ones sins were forgiven was 
necessary for justification in 1745 but not in 1748. So that what constituted 
the formal cause of salvation in 1745 was not exactly the same formal cause 
in 1748. 
Since the inner conviction which constituted justification's threshold 
shifted three times over his evangelical career, the assurance of faith which 
was thought to be inner certainty is in retrospect seen to be to some extent 
uncertain. How are John Wesley's Methodist successors to determine which 
is the "true" view? As saving faith was the Holy Spirit's inner message to the 
believer, had John Wesley garbled the words? 
How dependent were those who received the Holy Spirit's inner testimony 
under John Wesley's ministry, upon John Wesley's interpretation of it in 
understanding the nature of the inner impression? Assuming the Holy Spirit's 
word does not vary, how do we distinguish the Holy Spirit's message to the 
inner person from the interpretation placed upon the inner conviction by John 
Wesley? 
For Rudolf Bultmann. human life is insecure for another reason. Man is a 
temporal being constantly threatened by death. That faith which seeks to 
lessen or cover over facticity' -- such classical Christian teachings as 'John 
Wesley's, - which affirm that this world's momentary affliction will be followed 
by an eternity of happiness --deprives life of its existential meaning. This is 
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an impressive point in that the over-easy assurance of "heaven" may minimize 
or suppress the gravity of factual death and deny persons the opportunity to 
deal realistically with and let their understandings and living be addressed by 
their mortality. 
In terms of Rudolf Bultmann s own description of what an authentic 
existentiell encounter is, the threat of death is constant and ever present for 
the existent; yet, for faith it loses its dread. One achieves In faith a 
detachment from dread. Though one has dread, it is as if one did not have 
it. They are "they that weep; as though they wept not". There is a similar 
paradox in the classical Christian view of John Wesleys. 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, faith at once resolves to accept one's 
"throwness" toward death and yet no longer Is Intimidated and afraid of death. ' 
In part the quality of the "dead" seriousness of such men as Richard Baxter 
or John Wesley, was each one's personal sense that he was a "dying man to 
dying men". "' 
Of course, for John Wesley faith Is felicitous not merely because it 
overcomes the fear of death but because in its doing so historical and eternal 
death are actually conquered (for Rudolf Bultmann faith's overcoming of death 
is not actual. Irrespective of persons, physical death Is the terminus). Indeed, 
the recognition that the man of faith is at any moment subject to death is 
present. However, the distinction between John Wesley and Rudolf Buitmann 
seems to be that for Rudolf Bultmann> the dread and threat of one's death are 
ever-present though one is detached from them; for John Wesley. the factive 
recognition that one is death-bound is present but the dread of death is 
actually removed. Nonetheless, one notes that the removal of fear may be 
only temporary or intermittent because the onset of sin may revive fear. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, who has de-supernaturalized death by detaching it 
from so-called mythological "second death". the existent's dread is moored to 
his mortality. For John Wesley. God's eternal Judgment and the possibility of 
the "second death" which is connected with guilty sin is man's overriding 
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source of fear. Saving faith delivers the believer now from this Judgment, 
freeing him now from this principal source of fear from which even present 
death gets its sting. 
Neither theologian's option of natural death or the "second death" as a 
terminus which qualifies man is founded upon indisputable evidence subject 
to final verification. To verify either claim entails dying -- and even then, if 
death is the immediate cessation of all consciousness forever, one would not 
be in a position to be able to provide verification. 
FATTH: A POSSESSION? 
According to Rudolf Bultmann, faith is not a "possession" but a profession 
of Jesus Christ. It is decisive agreement to the Christian claim. It is 
professing the proclamation by laying claim to it for oneself. 
Notwithstanding, though Rudolf Buitmann denies faith as a "possession". an 
element of possession is Involved In his concept In that one owns the 
proclamation as applying to oneself. " However. he expressly excludes the 
nuance of possession which he-describes as being able to control or have a 
predictive understanding or management of God. 
In contrast, saving faith for John Wesley Is the conveyance of a 
supernatural reality -- the resurrected Jesus Christ and His gracious love -- 
into the believer's actual possession which he previously did not have. '-19 
Further, John Wesley would not accept that faith Is managing God but rather 
a participating In God's management of the believer. 
FAITH: RENUNCIATION/ OBEDIENCE 
While both theologians allow that "faith" means "trust% each qualify the 
sense in which it does. John Wesley "emphasizes faith as "assurance" (or 
"evidence") that "Christ loved me, and gave himself for me". allowing that the 
"trust" which is "a childlike confidence in him" follows upon this 
"assurance". "° Both accept that "faith" can mean trust that God will perform 
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his promises or trust in God's miracle-working power. Though "faith" as 
personal reliance upon Christ :s death is not the primary saving sense in 
Rudolf Bultmann s conception, he can describe faith's primary meaning for 
the Apostle Paul as "trust" in the sense of radical surrender to God's will. "' 
He re-interprets the terms pisteuein, pisteuein eis, and pisteueln epi in 
accordance with pisteuein oti to mean to "believe that". Consequently, faith is 
de-Christologized so that it does not express the classical Protestant meaning 
of soteriological confidence In the Person Jesus Christ. Though Rudolf 
Bultmann does not always designedly and consciously delineate the one faith 
In its two movements or two voices, one can discern. if one may call it such, 
an active and a passive voice. He states that faith Is primarily "obedience". "' 
His full-orbed understanding of faith as "obedience" seems to include two 
aspects which can be systematized (albeit, Rudolf Bultmann does not do so) 
into a passive and active voice. 
In this regard, he is reminiscent of Martin Luther who said that in order 
for God to save He must damn. For when lightning strikes, said Martin 
Luther, it both slays the man and turns his face toward heaven. "' Likewise, 
for Rudolf Bultrnann, faith is also both submission to God's judgment, the 
renunciation of all boasting (the passive voice), and also "acceptance". 
"confession", the laying hold of the world above (the active voice). "` Faith as 
obedience is radical, pure surrender in which one turns away from oneself 
and renounces one's own existence and lays oneself at God's disposal for the 
act to which He summons one. 14.1 This renouncing is at the foundation a 
rejecting of the past world-view, the old Greek "subject-object" ontology. rather 
than a repentance such as one finds in John Wesley. Nonetheless, both 
theologians give place in the process of salvation to a disowning and 
disclaiming of one's "own righteousness" and past sinful state. 
At any rate, their concepts are different in several ways. The moment of 
acknowledgement and disavowal of past sin would be described by John 
Wesley as "repentance' and would precede, as in typical Roman Catholic 
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theology, faith, since the two were distinct in thought. 14' Although Calvinists 
affirmed that repentance followed faith and Martin Luther is ambiguous on 
the issue, Rudolf Bultmann diverged from them all by declaring "renunciation" 
to be equated with faith. "' 
Furthermore, one must note that given these differences, "renunciation" for 
Rudolf Bultmann is not equivalent . to the traditional understanding of 
"repentance". His system allows no room as John Wesley and other 
Reformers do for the psycho-spiritual sorrow of contrition for wronging God. 
Though both theologians declare that man is judged, Rudolf Bultmann 
disavows any judgment of moral wrong and does not relate it to the fear of 
eternal Judgment and hell. 
Faith for Rudolf Bultmann is also an "obedience" in the active voice of 
"confession" or "acceptance of the kerygma". In contrast to "renunciation" 
which denotes passive resignation, "acceptance" signifies the active resolve to 
"give credence" to the proclamation. 14e "Acceptance" Is the assertive, volitional 
decision to take the divine grace for oneself. "' It is an urgent, non-thinking. 
volitional resolve to accept an imperative command. In comparison. John 
Wesley's concept of active faith is a penitent reception of an Inner Impression 
in the soul transmitted from God. 
Consequently, faith's emphasis for Rudolf Bultmann may be characterized 
as decisive reflex. For John Wesley, it is ready reception. ' Whereas for Rudolf 
Bultmann man is essentially agent in faith. for John Wesley man is primarily 
subject, one who is dependent. John Wesley stresses the gracious activity of 
the transcendent, personal God in Jesus Christ within the receiving 
individual's inner man. Notwithstanding this, one hastens to say Rudolf 
Bultmann's faith is not without its sense of reception and John Wesley's not 
without its decisive urgency. 130 
Faith for Rudolf Bultmann `accents the individual's, reactive, impulsive 
taking of a word spoken to him. "Obedience" projects itself and comes to its 
own self-understanding on account of its "forethrow". Taking into account the 
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fact that Rudolf Bultmann does state that faith is God's "gift". we, 
nevertheless, conclude that his proposal ultimately leaves the burden of 
obtaining the new self-understanding with man himself. The nature of mans 
existence lies primarily with man's decisive choice of perception rather than 
with a super-objective, autonomous, sovereign God with an unfettered will. 
The human self determines how the proclamation is to be understood and 
invests it with any meaning it is to have. Contrarily. according to John 
Wesley, the Gospel meaning is both revealed and communicated to the 
individual by God. Only secondarily is the human will -- enabled by God's 
grace -- involved. 
However, one might wonder if John Wesley, in his close identification of 
God's saving activity with mars psychological sensitivity, had also left the 
obtaining of faith to a subjective human perception. Theologians like Rudolf 
Bultmann abandon the notion of "supernatural" activity as superfluous, 
reducing the obtaining of faith implicitly and essentially to human activity. 
Though Rudolf Bultmann does seem to accept that some occult "force" (mans 
inhabits the proclamation, this does not alter the judgement that obtaining 
faith rests primarily upon mars volitional activity. John Wesley's faith in 
true Protestant fashion claims pre-eminently to be the result of divine activity 
(though, not all classical Protestants will agree with his qualification of the 
claim since he asserts the free response of an empowered will). Admittedly, it 
is difficult to demonstrate that it is anything more than human activity. 
The passive activity of Rudolf Bultmann s proposed faith demonstrates an 
unqualified submission to and acceptance of a command. Upon whose 
authority is the imperative issued? How does one know that the proclamation 
which encounters one is a demand of God's to be obeyed in faith? Rudolf 
Bultmann states that one does not know prior to faith. Ms ignorance is 
integral to faith. The one who is encountered by the demand has no reason 
or criteria by which to discriminate between this command and other 
commands. 
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Nonetheless, one may observe that the demand is not completely devoid of 
rational support. It has an implicit reason for Its acceptance: it says so. 
Nevertheless, how can one know without a prior judgment that the 
proclamation is a demand to be obeyed and not simply a proposition to be 
taken literally? Can one really expect It to be proclaimed or approached as 
an ultimate Word of God when no one knows, avows to know, or can know 
outside his own decision that it is the ultimate Word of God? Rudolf 
Bultmann wants It to have Word of God status in the traditional sense while 
at the same denying It to have such. He wants to understand the 
proclamation as having intrinsic authority while In reality giving it only the 
ascribed authority it receives from one willing to accept it as an authority. 
One might say that. Rudolf Bultmann's proposition Is a caricature and de- 
supernaturalized version of a traditional argument represented by John 
Wesley. In approaching the traditional argument. Rudolf Bultmann assumes 
that there have not been and are no, correlating reasons or accompanying 
visible- historical world evidences or mighty wonders from a "supernatural" 
realm which attest or confirm the proclamation as the Word of God. Given 
this assumption, when the proclamation was proclaimed by the traditionalist 
to be the Word of God, all that Rudolf Bultmann would in fact accept could 
be known as transpiring was that human words were being, spoken and 
human words were being received and interpreted. From this demythologized 
perspective, the ultimate rationale for the traditionalist position would reduce 
to no more than is proposed by Rudolf Bultmann: the Word of God Is the 
Word of God because it is accepted to be such. Rudolf Bultmann believed 
this was all that one could finally say because there was no objective, world- 
historical evidence that one could or ought to produce to demonstrate and 
authenticate the preaching as the Word of God. 
However. there is still a subtle difference between a traditionalist such as 
John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann.: For John Wesley, faith was more than 
the determination to view something as truth that may or may not be so. 
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Faith entailed the conviction that the proclamation was an operative, inherent 
truth prior to existentiell, saving faith as well as in saving faith. Faith was 
not a Invitation to determine the proclamation's quality or nature by human 
fiat, but to realize the nature that it already was. 
It is concordant with John Wesley's theology to accept that the Scriptural 
testimonies of the apostles Paul and others did not so much call others to 
take them as the Word of God but they declared them to be the Word of God 
which must be taken as such. For the Word of God Is the Word of God not 
merely because it is taken for that in faith, but because it attested itself in 
time space as being God's Word. 
John Wesley would not accept Rudolf Bultmann's contention that if any 
verification of the proclamation had occurred, faith would be annulled because 
it would not be radical dependence but trusting in the flesh. On the one 
hand, he did not accept that miracles provided *effectual" or "conclusive" proof 
which necessarily forced faith, although they could be supportive of and 
congruent with faith. '5' Nevertheless, attestation by miracles did not 
contravene the spiritual principle and the liberum arbitrium involved in belief 
and disbelief. One might doubt that John Wesley's faith is as easy a 
proposition as Rudolf Bultmann might make it out to be. The unbeliever in 
Rudolf Bultmann's system confidently knows there are no miracles. However, 
the unbeliever in John Wesley's understanding confronts a situation in which 
an inexplicable, extraordinary event presents him with more than one 
possibility for decision and action. 
Though John Wesley affirms there is no final, conclusive proof for faith, he 
accepts that faith was given evidence of its supernatural origin, not only in 
New Testament times but throughout history. Faith was no less empty of 
supernatural, sensuous verification (most particularly in inner experience) In 
the eighteenth century person than in the New Testament believer, 152 
Moreover, saving faith's result in changing a sinner from darkness to light 
and its manifestation in the outward man was a self-evident testimony to 
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God's extraordinary activity in the realm of visible history. '' 
One may wish to argue that what he claims to be "evidence" of the 
supernatural must nevertheless be believed to be such. " Further, even if 
such evidence appeared to be wondrously "inexplicable". it would not 
necessarily be proof that it was "supernatural". It might be a happening 
which reason would one day explain. Moreover, some would question John 
Wesley by asking: Given a supernatural occurrence, in what way could it be 
linked to his particular theology? 
Contrariwise, according to Rudolf Bultmann, faith offers no corroborating 
attestation to the words which summon it. Ironically, he belongs to an 
existential movement which rebels from passive obedience to unquestioned 
authority; yet, he calls for an absolute obedience to an authority which may 
not be questioned and which has no criterion in visible history to commend it. 
Certainly, he has a rationale for accepting one authoritative claim rather 
than another. John Wesley accepts a supernatural God and other 
assumptions prior to saving faith on mainly theological grounds; Rudolf 
Bultmann makes a pre-decision to decide preceding existentiell resolve to 
accept the proclamations authority on philosophical and scientific grounds. 
He can assert that obedience disavows critical thinking and assessment of 
criteria because such thinking to which one has to assent has already 
occurred as prior groundwork to unquestioning faith. Hence, has he really 
overcome the problem of "two faiths"? 
FAITH: INDIVIDUAL 
In any event, the power of both of these theologies lay in their bringing 
anew in their own generations "genuine religion", "authentic existence" to the 
Individual. As a sort of moderate realist. John Wesley, in distinction from 
Rudolf Bullmann, perceived an individual's justification by faith to be a single 
species of the general. universal salvation of God wrought in Jesus Christ. 
He pictured salvation as existing in reality on a general. transcendent, 
421 
supernatural level in which the past event of Jesus Christ's death is an ever. 
active, ever-present, ontological reality. Among other things, for example. 
atoning salvation was subsisting and prevailing for all of humankind in that 
all persons are cleared from the guilt of Adam's actual sin and are invested 
with the power of arbitrium to resist temptation. l"5 
Contrarily, Rudolf Bultmann is adamantly "nominalist" in that he rejects 
that existential reality resides in "universals". generalities, or what appertains 
to a metaphysical realm. Existential reality is only in the specific, individual 
existent case. It is only in the concrete, historical happening where God's 
demand is encountered. Man cannot know what God has done in the 
metaphysical realm and cannot, therefore, see himself as a specific instance of 
a generalization. 
Allowing metaphysical universality as John Wesley does presents the 
difficulty of verifying that in fact an occurrence is a specific manifestation of a 
general, transcendent reality. On the other hand, can Rudolf Bultmann hold 
that every individual who encounters the proclamation is alike judged and 
called into question without the assumption of a generality of which each is a 
specific instance? 
In centring "authentic existence" in individual, concrete, existence. Rudolf 
Bultmann achieves a radical disjunction between individuals. His existential. 
philosophical assumption is that if an individual existent were a species of a 
general class, he would be just another object In a world of objects, thereby 
losing his utter uniqueness as a human being. '" The strength of this 
existential plea is In its portrayal of the uniqueness and specialness of each 
individual. This is an appeal not discordant with historical Protestant 
theology. 
However, does he overplay this uniqueness? Assuredly. his commendable 
goal is to exalt the special place and unique being of each "I". Each "I" is 
irreplaceable and never interchangeable. In order to make his point, does he 
not over-dramatize the individual's uniqueness to the detriment of the 
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biological, psychological-spiritual, and sociological similarity between 
individuals and their kinship with natural life in the world? 
Moreover, congruent with the Enlightenment but in contrast to classical, 
Protestant theology, he is preoccupied with man's specialness rather than 
God's. Going further, one wonders if the uniqueness and value he wants to 
accord individual man does not even supplant the uniqueness and value 
usually accorded the classical, Christian God. 
In addition, must one accept Rudolf Bultmann's premise that unless one 
construes existence in ezdstential-ontological terms, true faith can not be an 
individual reality? Must one accept that if his premise is true, man's 
individuality is lost and absorbed in the world? 
May not similarity and distinctiveness co-exist? The distinctiveness of 
each person and the individual nature of justification is assumed in John 
Wesley's theological understanding. Because the transcendent, personal "God 
was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself'. then one could conclude 
Christ "loved me, and gave himself for me". Because God loved all and Christ 
died for all, then God also loves each and every one. 
Be that as it may. John Wesley's individualization does not comprehend 
man in Rudolf Bultmann's manner as an utterly distinct being. John 
Wesley's individualization lies in the fact that, one, each and every person, is 
accountable as a sinner for his own sin before God -- "he stands utterly guilty 
before God". " His sin is only his own sin and is attributable to no one else. 
He alone must answer for it before the God who personally confronts him 
regarding it. 
God in Jesus Christ reveals Himself individually to the guilty, penitent 
sinner and speaks to him personally words of pardon. Every person who will 
believe may hear the Voice say specifically to him, "thou, even thou, art 
reconciled to God". 1 According to John Wesley, each and every person is 
particularly loved, chosen and marked out to be the especial recipient of God's 
gracious beneficence in such a manner that each person is treated as though 
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he alone and no one else Is the sole subject of Jesus Christ's atoning work. 
God's focus is drawn narrowly upon the solitary individual just as Jesus 
singled out the haemorrhaging woman from the pressing crowd. Thus, John 
Wesley envisaged the intimate, antiphonic conversation, 'Thou art the man! I 
want thee for my Lord". "' 
Furthermore, the strength of both John Wesley's and Rudolf Bultmann's 
interpretation of faith is their emphasis on the necessity of faith being 
individual awareness. For neither was genuine, saving faith an affirmation or 
knowledge of a generality or abstraction. True faith did not exist for me until 
the object of faith was made "mine". For both, faith was the self-knowledge in 
which the individual person must know himself addressed by God in the 
historical present. Faith gave to the individual a new self-consciousness in 
the immediate present which he had not previously had. For both, faith was 
an event which happened to the individual so that he knew he was engaged 
by the Transcendent in his most essential being. 
For John Wesley, it meant having an inner, supra-sensuous apprehension 
of what was described above: that Christ "loved me, and gave himself for 
me". The "I", the corporealized spirit in world time-space, becomes conscious 
that he himself is the focal point and object of God's redeeming activity In the 
here and now. 
For Rudolf Bultmann, the new self-understanding Is the individual 
understanding his "now" as a "now" which is qualified by the proclamation. 
The event for Rudolf Bultmann is the sinner choosing to accept that the 
proclamation is real "for me" and. In accepting it, realizing that God has 
judged and graced me and qualified my existence. This sense of being 
qualified by the demand of the "'Thou" in the historical, concrete "now" was 
faith's new "self-understanding". 
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FAITH: GIFT/ DECISION 
In formal construction, both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann argue for 
a paradoxical faith which is both a "gift" and a "decision". Although, they 
both assert that God gives faith, how they conceive this giving is quite 
different. John Wesley declares that both the gift and the decision to receive 
the gift were directly attributable to the immediate activity of the sovereign, 
gracious God. " Nonetheless, man was at the same time ultimately entirely 
free to choose to believe. There was a mysterious, unfathomable interplay 
between the two mutually exclusive factors such that neither free grace nor 
free will was jeopardized. He was content to entrust the perplexity to the 
secret counsels of God. However. Rudolf Bultrnann dissolved the conundrum 
by arguing that divine grace and freedom were not mutually exclusive factors 
but a unity. 
Both theologians were chary of speculation. However, each had his own 
conception of what constituted speculation. Rudolf Bultmann disavowed 
interest in the issue of ontological free will versus determinism. He was not 
concerned with what he viewed as the speculative, philosophical discussion of 
how this world's potentialities of the fate to which man is exposed could be 
reconciled with the ability to choose one's destiny freely. He was not grasped 
by the concern of why some hear the preaching and some do not; why of 
those who hear, some believe and some do not. 
He attempted to avoid the ancient knot and the sinful speculation of the 
likes of John Wesley by distinguishing human, existential freedom from the 
human, factual question of whether man is free or bound. However, has he 
not just substituted one metaphysical argument for another? He assumed 
inviolably that to exist as a human being is to be invested with the absolute 
freedom to make and existentiell decision. One is free to surrender oneself to 
the demand. Man is free because he knows in his free surrender he is given 
back himself to be the person he is meant to be. 
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Regardless of the factual situation of whether or not man is free, 
determined, or free and determined, he is free in his own self-understanding 
and in his self-perception of himself and his situation. Basically. he 
maintained that though intellectually the issue defied solution, man could 
choose to act on the basis that he does have free will. Because he can 
proceed upon this assumption, he does have a certain free will. His authority 
for this is consciously finally human: the freedom man knows he has he 
knows he has because he knows he has It. John Wesley argued rather that 
there must be free will because he believed Scripture and human reason 
dictated it. 
In a sense. from one angle, Rudolf Bultrnann and John Wesley argued in 
a similar fashion for free will. They both appreciated that the free 
will/ determinism debate was an enigma which led to an inconclusive cul-de- 
sac; nevertheless, neither could or would envisage life without free will. 
Rudolf Bultmann's proposal is a positive attempt to avoid man's 
stultification and to prompt man to seize the opportunity rather than be 
seized by it. He proposes that man take on the universe. For man does not 
have to be merely a leaf In the contradictory winds of outward conditions and 
forces, but may be free in spite of them to determine his own future. 
On the other hand, Rudolf Bultmanri s scheme does still beg the issue. Is 
man really free simply because he says he is free though by any other name 
he is actually bound? Moreover, his formulation cannot boast of superiority 
over John Wesley's on the grounds that it is not metaphysical. Indeed. his 
view could be seen to strain to the breaking point human understanding and 
self-perception and its relation to reason and empirical reality. 
However, the same could be said of John Wesley's viewpoint. Rudolf 
Bultmann - could argue that because John Wesley grounds his understanding 
and existence on mythological assumptions about God, then a disjunction 
between psychological human self-perception and reality results. 
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Be that as it may, John Wesley's explanation is not any more divergent 
from what is actually known regarding this issue than Rudolf Bultmann's. 
Moreover, it is not without an advantage of a built-in logical guarantee: the 
Scriptural God. 
Furthermore, Rudolf Bultmann assumes for the sake of this argument that 
the ontological status of man's freedom is ambiguous. One can argue that 
his aggressive denial elsewhere of a personal, omnipotent God leads him away 
from this ambiguity into a position in which the existence of true, ontological 
free will is more improbable and more incongruous. This in turn impugns the 
true value of an "existentiell" freedom. 
John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann have different problems, neither of 
which is less mysterious, regarding faith as "gift/ decision". ' One difficulty for 
John Wesley 's theology is how the guilty sinner who is devoid of all moral 
and spiritual power to choose God is able to choose freely to receive in faith 
God's saving grace. - How can he keep intact at once the integrity of man's 
radical depravity and free will and God's sovereignty? 
Rudolf Bultmann s hybrid, demythologized view is divergent from that of 
classical Protestantism. He holds' that the individual has an "innate" 
"fundamental will" which is free to make an existentiell decision but which is 
covered up by the "sporadic actual will" which is under the sway of the flesh. 
Only by being confronted -by the saving proclamation - and in resolving to 
accept it is mans fundamental will exercised. 16' f° 
Though the proclamations encounter provides the occasion for existentiell 
free will, from where does this ability for existentiell freedom come? How does 
the proclamation evoke the freedom of will which was covered up? Since the 
gracious proclamation, does not convey or transfer to the sinner any ability to 
choose virtue, new quality or strength, this existentiell ability to choose must 
in actuality arise from the believer. Otherwise, in Rudolf Bultmanri s terms 
the free decision would not be free. Nevertheless, he still maintains that 
without the proclamation which opens to man the new possibility, the man 
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would not have the opportunity to exert his "fundamental will" against the 
"sporadic actual will" and choose the new possibility. 
Nonetheless, in my opinion, he does not satisfactorily account for why and 
how the individual under demand suddenly has the ability to reject the sinful 
past he heretofore has always chosen and can now resolve to act in freedom. 
Moreover, how can one who has as a sinner always chosen himself be free to 
recognize the proclamation as an offer of forgiveness? To assert that an 
individual is enslaved factually to sinning and yet has existential freedom does 
not rise above the scholastical manoeuvering from which he is trying to 
escape. 
Ultimately, for Rudolf Bultmann, the material ability to determine to 
accept the proclamation as the Gospel derives from the individual whose free 
choice it is. He and John Wesley agree that the individual does have and 
must have free will to choose saving grace. Both have similar problems in 
accounting for this free will. Contrary to classical Protestantism. Rudolf 
Bultmann's explanation reduces to the assumption that every person. even 
under the sway of the flesh, always has the innate free will as a constitutive 
of being human which original sin does not destroy. He differs from John 
Wesley at this point in not attributing the guilty sinner's power to choose 
grace to the positive, immediate, outgoing influence of God upon the will. 
Whereas both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann describe how faith is 
both "gift" and "decision", John Wesley, in spite of opinion to the contrary in 
his own day, in contrast to Rudolf Bultmann, shows that he puts primary 
weight upon God's sovereign and gracious, active role in faith and secondary 
weight upon man's free decision. The overriding, critical factor for him is 
God's unmerited grace. 
Notwithstanding this, he differs from mainstream. classical Protestantism 
in holding that the guilty sinner chooses to receive justifying grace. If 
anything, the challenge for him is to demonstrate convincingly how mari s free 
will can still have authenticity and integrity within his assumptions of God's 
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sovereign grace. 
On the other hand, though Rudolf Bultmann insists on faith's "gift"- 
nature, its "gift"-nature depends not on the fact that it literally bestows 
anything on or contributes to the individual in an objective, outgoing 
presentation, but that it may be conceived by the believer as a "gift". The 
determining, critical factor in the event of faith for him is the free, human 
decision which itself chooses to receive a statement as a Gospel-proclamation 
and perceive it as a "gift". 
He uses the term "decision" in a literal, referential sense while he uses the 
term "gift" in a figurative. symbolic sense. "Gift" is really just an Interpretive 
meaning derived from "decision" taken as a literal act. One may question the 
analogy Rudolf Bultmann uses to explain "gift" in which the one who 
surrenders himself to a friend sees his friend as giving him his life. In the 
case of the two friends one is dealing with the interaction of two purposive 
human beings. However, the case is altogether different when speaking of the 
interaction between an individual and a proclamation. 
If one could put it in these terms, John Wesley views God's gracious 
activity -as the "efficient" cause and mars free decision as the "final" or 
secondary cause. Contrariwise, in Rudolf Bultmann's system mans personal 
resolve is the *efficient" cause'and God's grace is the "final" cause. For him 
faith is the willing-self willing to live. For John Wesley. faith is God enabling 
the will to give God the occasion to save. In trying to wed an existential 
"voluntarism" with a classical Protestant emphasis on sovereign grace, Rudolf 
Bultmann leaves the Protestant teaching subservient to existential 
"voluntarism". A sovereign and mighty, personal God is replaced by a 
sovereign, virile human will. 
JUSTIFICATION: NEW STATE '- 
"Justification" for both John Wesley and Rudolf Bultmann as well as for 
classical Protestantism is not only a momentary event but also a radically new 
429 
state of existence into which the individual is introduced. " Rudolf 
Bultmann's formulation of this state is founded upon an imaginative and 
complicated interpretation of the eschatological preaching of Jesus and Paul 
which he takes as mythology construed existentially. This state assumes a 
conflation of what John Wesley and classical Protestants have perceived as 
two acts of justification. Rudolf Bultmann identifies what he accepts as God's 
one and only act of judgement with the eschatological "last Judgement" which 
he asserts already occurs in the salvation-occurrence. In this event. the 
Individual is judged and "rightwised". "World history" of the old age" "ends" 
for the Justified believer so that he is "removed" out of "this world" of chronos, 
events, and objects. He is introduced into a believing existence of a new, 
eschatological history. This eschatological existence. between the "no-longer" 
and "the not-yet". describes the "how" of man's existence and not the 
"what". ` 
The Jewish apocalyptical teaching which conceived of the eschaton as a 
cosmic, temporal-spacial event Rudolf Bultmann interprets as mythology 
which Paul "historicized" as individual occurrence of concrete existence. 
Therefore, concomitant with the "esehaton", the state of justification is outside 
of time and this world's existence but present now in concrete existence. Upon 
this assumption is founded the nature of believing existence. 
Certainly, for John Wesley the act of present justiflcatlon envisages a 
judgment being rendered in the here and now. However. present Justification 
is not the final eschaton now revealed nor the literal end of time. The New 
Testament statements regarding God's acts of judgement Rudolf Duftmann 
conflates but John Wesley takes in the traditional twofold manner of present 
and final justification. " According to John Wesley, the instantaneous, 
punctiliar moment of present justification opens into a fundamentally new. 
temporal existence which itself is lived out in a chronological procession 
toward an ultimate eschatological justification which will follow the real end to 
the temporal, visible realm as we know it. 
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Therefore, for John Wesley. the new life proceeding from present 
justification correlates with the actual condition of life in world-time. Not so 
for Rudolf Bultmann. Believing existence cannot correspond positively with 
any particular condition in world-time. ' His position arises from his desire 
to overcome the German theological situation of his day in which he perceived 
Christianity was too closely identified with the then present-day culture. For 
how could one know that Christian existence was necessarily connected with 
the visible world? What criteria would one use to determine It? flow would 
one know he had the proper criteria for doing so? 
Rudolf Bultmann s critic is torn between two possible interpretations. If 
believing existence is valued as the "better" existence, the 'authentic' 
existence, the existence where man finds himself in contradlstncUon to the 
old existence bound to chronos and this world, then is he not promoting a 
believing state which is severed from the objective. material world of space- 
time? 
Consequently, is he not implying a dualism reminiscent of Gnosticism to 
which the transcendent existence is absolutely distinct from "this world's' 
existence and In which the former is deemed "authentic" (rightwised) and the 
latter material existence "inauthentic" (sinful)? 10° That is, the existence that 
cannot really be known as an existence is valued as superior to that which is 
at hand. That raises the query: How may we know that it is superior if we 
cannot have the self-consciousness that we are in this state and do not have 
criteria by which to judge it? In addition. his emphasis on existential. 
eschatological existence appears by the word of it to exalt in regard to 
authentic existence individual self-understanding and downplay individual. 
objective perception in the visible world. 
However, at the same time, the critic could read him as paradoxically 
exalting the value of this world's scholarly currency--empiricism. scientille 
method, and reason -- by allowing it to be the final arbiter of the intellectual 
content, not only of "this world" but of the transcendent sphere. It would 
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seem that "this world" of sinful existence, with its dread and uneasiness 
always and forever immediately present to the individual, is, therefore. 
"greater" than the eschatological existence which can never be known to the 
individual. 
Pursuant to this. Rudolf Bultmann grants substance not to believing 
ezdstence but to sinful existence. Man's sinfulness, his greed, acquisitiveness, 
and his seeking to secure himself by himself Is readily visible In "this world". 
Strictly speaking, it is not known as sin until one believes; yet. a certain 
attitude or disposition In "this world" is directly correlated to the term "greed" 
which may be manifested In this visible world as "sin". He does not Identify 
other outward, personal behaviour traditionally recognized as immoral as 
"sinful". In contradistinction to this. there is no such locus in visible existence 
which may be identified with justification and believing existence. 
As Martin Luther before him. Rudolf Bultmann speaks of the justified 
believer as simul ustus et peccator. His particular formulation arouses some 
interesting concerns. He appears not to explain satisfactorily how lie can be 
a sinner who wills to secure himself by himself in the same moment that lie 
renounces himself in faith. Further. how can he be an unabated sinner 
viewing the world with the old ontology at the same time as he renounces the 
old self-understanding and views the world with the new. existential self. 
understanding? The only existence that is visible is sinful existence so that 
even if he had renounced himself in faith he would still be seen only as one 
securing himself in terms of "this world". 
Of course, the traditional Protestant understanding of the believer who is 
at once "old man"/ "new creature" is not without a contradictory nature. 
Notwithstanding this. Rudolf Bultmann differs from Martin Luther in that 
Martin Luther accepted that the "old man" could be increasingly mortified In a 
way that could be seen in world-time history. 1°' One can argue that since 
sinful existence for Rudolf Bultmann is the only factual existence. It Is the 
mode of existence which is seen and known always to triumph because 
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nothing to the contrary has or is ever known. That faith overcomes NUils 
world" is not actual because the two realms never in fact intersect in order 
that the one may be seen to conquer the other. 
One may find in John Wesley even after Aldersgate a nearness to Greek 
dualism in his suspicion of this world's legitimate passions and enjoyments. 
However, in comparison to Rudolf Bultmann s conception of an utterly isolated 
eschatological existence, what in the framework of "the old ontology" could be 
conceived as a spiritualizing dualism was from Rudolf Bultmann s 
existential-ontological perspective just another expression of "this world's' 
existence. 
Rudolf Bultmann s view represents a considerable departure not only from 
the view of John Wesley's but also of other Protestants and Catholics. In 
regards to the life of faith, John Wesley might find Rudolf Dultmann's position 
akin to the Catholic. mystical idea of living by "naked faith"; that is. living by 
a faith which was stripped both of love, peace. and joy in the Holy Spirit. 
John Wesley contended that the believer lived by a "luminous" faith. '' More 
specifically, he understood the state of justification to constitute an Invasion 
of this visible world by the transcendent God. Though the heavenly kingdom 
and "this world" were absolutely and qualitatively distinct spheres. `this world" 
was not strictly Isolated from God and His realm. "This world" and man in 
his totality of visibility. his somatic existence including his inner and outer 
nature, are the arena of God's gracious renewing activity. 
He demonstrated in his sermon "On Divine Providence" that nothing in 
man's earthly life is too great or too small for God's effectual attention. " 
Indeed, God is so interested in mans fleshly life that He might even deviate 
from His own laws in order to work and involve himself In a particular 
person's situation. Though His being was not visible, yet the signs and marks 
of His invisible activity were read in the occurrences and extensiveness of 
"new births". the developing spiritual virtues, and moral, social behaviour. 
and unusual demonstrations. ''" 
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Certainly, for John Wesley "the new creation" was of a quality which could 
be weighed and judged against the "old creation" and found superior. ", 
However, it is questionable whether John Wesley was consistent in his 
affirmation of this visible world. As has already been mentioned. he tended to 
cast a negative and suspicious eye upon sensuousness, even sensuousness 
which glorified God. "' Without a full appreciation of a contradiction, he. 
nevertheless, stressed a sensuous faith and Its accompanying fruits to be felt 
within the believer. Notwithstanding the Inconsistency. one could argue that 
Christian faith and its consequence as espoused by John Wesley elevated to 
the sacred the sphere of mans material existence with his sensuous faculties 
and outward social environment. 
In contradistinction. Rudolf Bultmann's exposition trivializes and 
emasculates the transcendent by removing it from tangible history. Schubert 
Ogden lets him speak and defend himself by saying that because God's 
transcendence is not made immanent he avoids the charge of mythology. "" 
From my viewpoint, by quarantining the transcendent. he by Implication 
admits with an air of fatalism either that this visible world can only be what 
it is. and/or that it is acceptable as it is. The power of God through faith is 
not really able to transform this "old age" with its sin and evil and turn it into 
the "new creation" of moral, personal and social righteousness. If Rudolf 
Bultmann is right, one must look for an adequate explanation of the origin of 
the uniquely, Christian motivation to value the sick. and develop hospitals, to 
educate the ignorant, and develop schools, in general. to care about and for 
the material needs and circumstances of those who lack. want. are oppressed 
and/or suffer and to believe that He is able to redeem man from evil. 
For John Wesley, a saving faith without resultant inward and outward 
fruits causally linked was no faith at all. If Rudolf Dultmann tried to get 
God's realm and believing existence disengaged from this world. John Wesley 
was Insistent on engaging them. His assessment of the Moravians In this 
regard might well apply to Rudolf Bultrnann. He claimed they let Inward 
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religion "swallow-up outward in general". 
Furthermore, the espousal of a transcendent God removed from this world 
would be -- and was -- abhorrent to John Wesley. Eighteenth-century 
rationalistic Deists accepted that, except to clarify natural religion. 
supernatural revelation was illegitimate and unnecessary to the natural order. 
There is little practical difference between this thinking and Rudolf 
Bultmann's. 
On the wings of present justification. John Wesley envisaged God working 
holy reformation in the inward and outward man--sinful existence was to 
become holy existence. Final justification was God's in-built constraint to 
ensure that man cooperated in God's work. 
While considerable differences of opinion exist between contemporary 
theologians as to the manner in which God is immanently involved in the 
world, nonetheless, theological fashion today rejects Rudolf Hultinann's and 
neo-orthodoxy's relegation of God to utter transcendence. 
Be that as it may, Rudolf Bultmann's theology of Justification by faith 
sought to extricate from difficulty this God who was said to be involved in Ulis 
world. For he took seriously the modern concern of how a God active in this 
world could be reconciled with atrocities, catastrophic evil, and global 
devastation. Moreover, he challenged the authority and basis for identifying 
God with a particular, relative political social, or religious --in John Wesley's 
case--system or ideology. He pointed out the inconsistencies of the theologies 
which ignored the role of a supernatural, transcendent God but. nevertheless. 
assumed one when they gave their Christian ethics dogmatic status. 
Perhaps John Wesley over identified a mark of God's activity with inner. 
human "feeling" and visible, natural life. At any rate. In identifying God's 
working in "this world" with an inner. sensuous signification he was to 
historical continuity with Catholic mystics. Martin Luther. the Pietists, the 
English Puritans, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. to a less extent. Perhaps no 
notable Protestant theologian prior to or contemporaneous with John Wesley 
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made more than he of the link between evangelical, justifying faith and inner 
"feeling". 
Rudolf Bultmann would fault John Wesley for treating "faith" and the new 
creation" "according to the flesh" because he tried to make it an object of 
empirical observation. " Had not John Wesley fallen into mythological 
speaking by representing the unworldly and divine as the worldly and human? 
Upon what basis, Rudolf Bultmann might ask, could one draw conclusions 
about the nature of the transcendent God's work from observed, finite 
happenings? Even if it be granted that God has worked in a particular 
manner in a particular context, how and on what grounds. could one 
generalize this manner of working to other situations? 
JUSTIFICATIONS STATE OF EXISTENCE: LOVE 
Rudolf Buitmann speaks of love as an ontological possibility of existence 
and a concomitant of believing, eschatological existence. " MWhen the Person 
In faith no longer wills for himself, he loves now because he exists for others. 
Faith does not result in the addition of anything "- a quality, a supernatural. 
ontological essence, a power. or an attitude -- to the believers nature. 
Whatever human nature's knowledge, ability, or propensity to love prior to 
faith, so is it after faith. According to Rudolf ßultmann. the acceptance 
of the proclamation provides the person with the opportunity to will for others 
rather than to choose himself. The only difference between love In unbelieving 
and believing existence is ones own decision toward the proclamation. 
Indeed, he follows classical Protestant thought in so far as he aMrms that the 
acceptance of God's saving act allows one to love. However, he dl(ferentlates 
himself from classical Protestantism by disavowing that faith ushers to an 
additional essence which is the Indwelling God who Is love. 
Love for him was measured more by its intensity, earnestness and totality 
of the believer in love than by the kind and content of the love. however. be 
could declare that for faith, love becomes the "dominant and sustaining forcc" 
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of one's life. If "sustaining" means "to maintain" or "keep going". one would 
wish for more clarity on how to reconcile this love with a faith of the 
"moment". 
In contradistinction to him. John Wesley espoused a more sophisticated 
concept of love. Love's essence for him has first an ontological relation to the 
"vertical" and transcendent dimension. Saving faith receives the God of love 
when God in the reconciling Jesus Christ comes into a man through the Holy 
Spirit. For, as Martin Schmidt aptly brings out, love for John Wesley has its 
fons et origo In God. God's love floods the believer's life enabling him to be 
restored to the loving union with Him for which he was Intended. " 
Concomitantly with this holy union, God imbues the believer with Himself 
and, therefore, with His essence of love which becomes a part of a newly 
recreated nature. For him love is a quality transferred Invisibly by God but 
really received by the believer. 
In contrast to Rudolf Bultmann, love according to John Wesley was not 
directed just from man to man but in the first place between God and man. 
The absence of this dimension of love between man and the personal God in 
Rudolf Bultmann s theology distinguishes his theology from that of classical 
Catholicism and Protestantism. For John Wesley, love's one intention is "to 
love God and man". 
Moreover, the new quality of love which epitomized the new creation also 
had a peculiar divine intellectual and moral content. This divine. moral 
content was expressed by the new Law. '" According to Rudolf Dultmann, love 
is not filled with moral or ethical content. With a likeness to Martin Luther 
melded to an existentialist revolt against established, authoritative norm's', he 
read the new existence as release from external. formal authority. Love did 
not (it need not) provide the Christian with a new code of right and wrong. 
Every person knows what he ought to do already from the contextual 
situation. This is consistent with his conception of a faith which brings no 
new knowledge with it, religious or otherwise. 
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Rudolf Bultmann does not explain how It is that everyone knows what Is 
right in any particular situation, nor why It Is that everyone knows what is 
right yet does what is wrong. Further, one Is not clear as to whether or not 
Rudolf Bultmann wants to say that whatever any Christian believer believes is 
right in a particular circumstance actually is "right". 
Does he argue in a circle? How does everyone know what Is right except 
that an everyday, normative. societal understanding of morality is 
presupposed? Is it not from this "everyday" "talk" that he proposes to deliver 
the Christian? 
"Love" for John Wesley was more than a philosophical. re-direction of the 
will. It was a supernatural quality, a dispositional attitude and an affection of 
the soul. True, as for Rudolf Bultmann. It was a matter of intensity and 
concentrated singleness of involvement. However. love for him was more all. 
embracing of the total Christian pursuit In that love pursued "the oneº end of 
our life in all our words and actions"; that is, to love God and man. ` The 
intensity and dominance comprehended more than the earnest will "" love 
Informed and engaged the whole heart and life -- lips. understanding. spirit 
and strength as well as the outward actions. As a direct effect of saving faith. 
it was tangibly "felt" within the person as well as manifested in outward 
actions. 
John Wesley's conception of the state of the new creation resulting from 
saving faith is essentially cheerful, pregnant with expectation. and confidently 
victorious. The realism of the continuation of and fight against sin after 
justification is more than counteracted by his assurance of the advancement 
of holiness. The development of this qualitatively improving life which 
produces fruits of peace, love, joy will blossom until God may give complete 
triumph over all sin -- even before death. 1° At the eschat. on. unrestricted 
union and co-habitation will result between God and man forever. 
Was John Wesley's hopeful confidence regarding what he believed God 
could achieve in this life overly zealous and Incredible? Interestingly. wluit 
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was in typical Catholic and Protestant understanding reserved for the 
eschaton, John Wesley envisaged as already occurring now. Herein he 
deviates from classical Protestantism. and also from Catholicism in that the 
perfection which Catholics envisaged as possible for a select few by process of 
God-enabled doing. John Wesley foresaw as God's desire for all as a gift of 
faith. ` 
He seems to be uncommonly alone among theologians in theological 
history in regards to his singular. doctrinal formulation. Because of the 
peculiarity of this teaching. Its questionableness is not to be denied. 
Furthermore, it in turn encourages a cautious appraisal of his theology. 
Christian perfection in part was an expression of the dawning of his 
radical faith in the living and immanently present supernatural God with 
whom nothing is impossible. Was he partly pressed Into cleaving to the 
doctrine of Christian perfection in his combat with the Moravian and strict 
Calvinists? He drew the logical inference that allowing anything less than 
Christian perfection was a capitulation to the view that sin remained by 
necessity in believers until glorification. Accepting the strict Calvinist doctrine 
was to accept that all Christians in all ages do and will commit sin as long as 
they live. "God forbid we should thus speak. " John Wesley exclaimed. "' 
His defense that one could not be worse. if not better, for expecting God to 
deliver him from all sin has its merit. 18' Namely, one's vision or expectations 
are directly related to ones performance. Moreover, It does not close the door 
on what the-God-with-whom-nothing-is-impossible can do in a believers lire. 
However, one has to weigh this against any tendency to produce 
accompanying spiritual hypochondria, to induce excessive burden of needless 
guilt, and spiritual pride. Furthermore, though his theology of "faith working 
thru love" might be precariously balanced in reason and theoretical argument. 
can the balance be maintained in practice without reducing down to 
"moralism" and "legalism"? 
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Colin Williams warns that if John Wesley's bifurcation of sin were not kept 
in view, the definition of sin as a conscious violation of God's law could easily 
lead to harbouring "unexamined prejudices and inward sins". Moreover. Colin 
Williams sees danger in the implicit individualism of this definition because it 
hid holiness Implications for social relations in John Wesley's followers. 
While the definition is individual-centred, that this feature inhibited 
Methodists from being socially responsible is debateable. However, if one 
seeks a definition of sin which also encompasses corporate. socio-pollucal sin, 
then John Wesley's is insufficient. 
The teaching that the justified state leads to an entirely sanctified state 
seemed to be controversial from the start, not the least among the 
evangelicals. Moreover, it was a difficult and elusive doctrine to inculcate. In 
1772 John Wesley wrote to Charles, "almost all our preachers in every circuit 
have done with Christian perfection". The preachers' reserve toward Christian 
perfection shows up in contrast to the reception of Justiilcatlon by faith. '" 
Was it partly because only relatively few had an experience with it? 
Moreover. John Wesley's doctrinal exposition of it was inchoate. Ills 
description of the tension of sin in the believer Is stated with a cogency, a 
convincing realism and authenticity which overtakes his sketchy, positive 
formulation of entire sanctification. Furthermore, because of the singularity of 
his doctrine, he lacked the substantial, corroborating support and 
augmentation from the body of Puritan and evangelical resources which lie 
had previously drawn upon to fortify other doctrinal presentations. 
In arguing for the necessity of Christian perfection, did John Wesley 
proffer a false alternative? Either the believer seeks Christian perfection and 
experiences a victorious life over sin, or he does not accept and seek it and 
rests in his justification, resigning himself to sinning that grace may abound. 
For one not to accept John Wesley's formulation of entire sanctification does 
not necessarily mean that one does not affirm holiness or that the justified 
will pant less after it. One might cite George Whitefleld and William 
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Grimshaw who were cautious about John Wesley's teaching of perfection but 
led exemplary lives. 
Just the same, John Wesley's theology was ever-buoyant and 
confidently anticipatory of God's re-creating possibilities in the JusU led 
persons new life. Was it his avowal of Christian perfection that enabled such 
a confident outlook in the impossibility-working-God or his experience and 
understanding of this God which enabled such anticipation of full salvation? 
What role did an assured, Augustan age play in the rise and prosperity of 
such a sanguine theology? 
To those high or low, regardless of hopeless or humble station or 
situation, his theology promised victory over sin, the perfidious, enslaving 
enemy of life. His theology asserted the unshakable conviction that God 
present through the Holy Spirit could transform the justified persons inner 
and outer visible life and, consequently. the Church's and the natlon's. 'M 
For Rudolf Bultmann, the new, graced existence is not one without Its 
optimism, albeit one which In contrast to that of John Wesley's had felt the 
chastening lashes of modern scholarship and global devastation. If the 'new 
creation" in relation to visible chronos-history for John Wesley might be 
portrayed as the early dawn breaking in upon the old ages darkness and ever 
brightening to the noon day of the eschaton. the unbelieving existence in 
relation to world history for Rudolf Bultmann Is a perpendicular shaft of light 
against an unending murky spacescape. It is hope with and against a 
background of unmitigated uncertainty. In contrast to severe existentialism. 
he was unwilling to consign mans state to total despair. Authentic existence 
could give man hope and freedom in his angst. '" Herein he is striking a 
chord faithful to Martin Luther and to the historic Christian proclamation. 
Nevertheless. authentic existence does not reverse or ameliorate than s 
factual situation. Therefore, Rudolf Bultmanri s optimistic proposal pales next 
to his pessimistic resignation to this visible world's inexorable. evil reality. 
Has he succeeded in his desire to overcome the nihilist critique in a telling 
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and convincingly adequate way? Are his God and believing existence enough 
to counteract and rise above mans overpowering, debilitating perplexitks and 
offer substantial comfort and help in his struggles and ambiguities? 
Having accepted atheistic, existential assumptions. Rudolf ßultmann has 
prejudged eschatological existence's status as faint and anaemic next to the 
potency and virility of existentialism's description of existence In this visible 
world. His interpretation is contrary to the image of God vanquishing and 
redeeming His creation as affirmed in both the Old and the New Testaments 
as well as in historic Christian tradition. In his courageous attempt to save 
Christian faith from its would-be cultural executioners, one could argue he 
left it more vulnerable and weak than he found it. 
One advantage of his interpretation of believing existence Is that critics 
would be hard put to locate any hypocrisy in the believers new existence. 
Nonetheless, they might have contempt for Its "pie-1n-the-sky" thesis which 
neither expects nor gets resultant, tangible fruits in the tangible world. 
Seeking to extricate Christian faith from the culture, he in turn leaves 
Christian faith dangerously free to be tethered to any prevailing cultural ethos 
that has consensus. In this respect. Christian existence becomes subject to 
the bane of existentialism, the "everyday". 
JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH AND SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING 
While John Wesley's theological interest in justification and its practical 
implication and resulting new life was directed to the common, 'everyday' 
person, Rudolf Buitmanri s explication of justification was noemattcally 
orientated. As Thomas Aquinas before him sought to rationalize the Christian 
faith with the then fashionable Aristotelian philosophy, one of Rudolf 
Bultmanri s implicit, fundamental aims (although he would not appear to be 
happy in this judgment) was to attempt to reconcile the Christian Gospel to 
modern, atheistic, philosophical critique (Feuerbach) and existential 
philosophical analysis (particularly Heidegger). Like Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
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he desired to justify intellectually the Christian faith to the outside, critical 
intelligentsia and academicians. '" As John Wesley intentionally wrote for the 
"plain" person, so Rudolf Bultmann wrote for the scholar. 
The fruits of John Wesley's labours are visible and have been assessed for 
two hundred and fifty years. However, the effect of Rudolf Bultmann s 
proposal of justification on modern Christianity will be diMcult to assess. In 
attempting to evaluate him, we may ask to what degree his formulation has 
renewed disillusioned Christian scholars or convinced sceptics to decide for 
the Christian proclamation. How many more than before, as a direct result of 
his work, now view Christian faith as intellectually viable and credible? 
Perhaps even more important, how many have realized and testify to the 
authentic life to which he has directed us? Whether or not and how his 
theology might be related to it, one does observe that the traditional Christian 
denominations In the United States and Great Britain which have been more 
Influenced by his work and that of others like him in the last thirty years 
have increasingly not flourished during this period. 
Rudolf Bultmann ostensibly undertook to bring the New Testament and 
faith to the bar of modem science and rationality, bringing the former into 
line with the later. In mounting his polemic against classical theology and in 
order to establish his existential theology. he wields and applies two different 
conceptions of science: "outer". natural science and "inner". historical science 
(theology's realm). He assumes that every science develops the given pre. 
understanding it has already as a result of Its pre-scientitlc relation to its 
particular field of objects. 187 A particular relation to some subject matter has 
its own particular method (e. g. natural or historical science); namely. Its own 
conceptuality, its way of showing its objects and justifying its statements., " 
The systematic illumination of some subject matter is "scientific" according 
to Rudolf Bultmann if its particular method or interpretation is "the only 
appropriate one" to that field. "" Essentially, he maintains that theology is 
"scientific" if its object, faith in unity with God's eschatological act. Is 
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disclosed by means of the existential analytical method. 
How has he arrived at theology's object upon which a pre-scientific 
relation is established and his methodology constructed? Have not Rudolf 
Bultmann's own presuppositions of the nature of God pre-determined the 
nature of the pre-scientific relation and the kind of "scientific' conceptuality 
he can find congruent with this object? Further. Is it not an exercise In 
question begging to determine conclusively beforehand what phenomenon is or 
is not possible for Christian theology (particularly. when the New Testament 
testimony purports to be of an extraordinary nature) and. thereby, to 
construct structures accordingly which discover only what one has determined 
in advance could be discovered? One reason for highlighting this is that 
Rudolf Bultmann is less than fair in portraying his theology as "science` and 
others (which would include John Wesley's) as superstition. 
Not only does Rudolf Bultmann presuppose certain presumptions of the 
nature of God, but also en route to establishing theology's object. he assumes 
a prior "scientific" understanding of reality which further delimits and 
conditions the conception of theology's field of object. For Instance. he 
assumes that the scientific theologian must explain any testimony or event in 
terms of factors ordinarily immanent In history. He has accepted this as an 
axiomatic pre-condition before he surveys the subject matter of Uieology. 
What if the theological field of object Is reported and asserted to be of an 
extraordinary nature in which events and phenomena. though historical 
occurrences, transcend what may ordinarily be accounted for by factors within 
history? 
John Wesley did not consciously approach the New Testament or his 
search for religious understanding deductively. His was consciously an 
inductive approach in keeping with the one expressed by Karl Barth. Karl 
Barth called into question Rudolf Bultmann s method of approaching the text 
with a prior decision as to the measure and limits of Intelligibility and non. 
intelligibility. Rather. one should be openly looking for and patiently following 
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the text's self-disclosure. "* 
Of course, Rudolf Bultmann's point which he fired back at Karl Barth. and 
would at John Wesley. was that he could approach the text as little as any 
others without presuppositions and questions. Though, as we have afrmed. 
his point is well taken and theology has followed him rather than Karl Barth 
at this point, it does not follow that his presuppositions are the right ones 
and Karl Barth's and John Wesley's are the wrong ones. Moreover. we must 
consider the possibility that some presuppositions more than others directly 
and substantially distort the text's self-disclosure. As a consequence. we 
must consider allowing the text's self-disclosure to correct or annul our 
presuppositions. 
John Wesley appreciated the fact not dissimilar in logic from Rudolf 
Bultmann's thesis that the methodology needed to apprehend a particular 
reality must vary according to that reality. Specifically, natural phenomena 
are perceived by employing the physical senses: supernatural phenomena 
must be apprehended by the super-sensuous spiritual senses. If Rudolf 
Bultmann's definition of "scientific" theology is that conception which is 
appropriate to its object of study, then one can argue that John Wesley's is at 
least as "scientific" as his. A point he would not concede. 
Moreover, one could at least raise the question whether or not and how 
inexorable loyalty to a "scientific" assumption, for example, the thesis or 
"immanence", can be justified in the wake of anomalous data which challenge 
its inner, logical integrity and throw it into dispute? At what point does one's 
resolute adherence to a natural, finite, "scientific" assumption. regardless of 
conflicting data, become idolatrous dogmatism and exalt a finite assumption 
to an "eternal" standard? The two theologians would go roundabout In 
accusing each other of elevating to an absolute what each considered to be a 
human word. 
Rudolf Bultmanri s "scientific" pre-conceptuality assumes a rigorous 
empiricism by which he judges classical, theological rationalizations as 
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inappropriate. 1 ' However, he facilely and unfairly exempts the existential. 
theological analysis -- particularly in regards to salvation event "" from 
empirical judgment on the grounds that it is of a different conceptuality than 
the natural sciences which are subject to scientific empiricism. He assumes a 
false alternative: either (a) one speaks illegitimately of God and the things of 
God in propositional form because one abortively assigns to Him a truth of 
universal validity which one claims is verifiable by empirical science. or (b) 
one speaks validly of God from one's own concrete existence. 
John Wesley did accept that Scriptural affirmations were propositions 
pointing to a reality which did not necessarily legitimately lend itself to the 
same procedure of verification as natural phenomena. To declare that one 
cannot speak in theological propositional truths because they are such that 
they cannot be shown to be empirically true not only straps a false demand 
on theology, but also may be seen to judge it by a conceptuality alien to it. 
In principle, John Wesley did not accept a truth of the invisible world with 
the same confidence with which he accepted a truth of the empirical world 
because the invisible truth could be tested by natural sensation. Rather. he 
accepted the truth of the invisible world because it was known ad confirmed 
by faith and the spiritual senses. For him, one did not have to demand 
scientific, empirical proof in order to have confidence in rational. theological 
affirmations because theological faith conveyed its own convincing evidence. 
However, Rudolf Bultmann on the basis of this description would question 
whether these two realms could be given equal credibility and weight or 
inspire equal confidence. 
Rudolf Bultmann argues that a rational, theological proposition that claims 
to speak of God in a "general truth" and, therefore, purports to be a would-be 
scientific proposition, must by necessity fail to be authoritative. However. at 
the same time he proposes that a rational, theological statement conceived In 
a philosophical context (the salvation proclamation. the lynchpin of his 
theological enterprise) which cannot be supported by any reason. experience. 
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historical or scientific proof is of such authority that it demands the 
individual's unquestioning obedience. Yet this is deemed by him the 
"scientific" theology. 
Notwithstanding this, though John Wesley and Rudolf Dultmann conceive 
of theology differently, they both still accept that theology applies to a realm 
with a distinct conceptuality from the natural, visible realm. In both cases. 
faith is still the means by which man transcends this visible. natural world. 
Viewed from the outside, the visible world of both their respective centuries. 
their proposals of Christian faith were to some extent assaults on reason" 
Nonetheless, Rudolf Bultmann argues that the existential approach to 
theology Is the unique formulation for the existence of modern man who can 
no longer take Scripture literally -- that is, accept its propositions as 
objectifications of the divine (Göttliche) -- and who has developed a 
sophisticated scientific mindset. Curiously, however. according to Rudolf 
Bultmann, the apostle Paul in the first century. as man supposedly In the 
twentieth, rejected literalism. He prepared the way for the New Testatnent'a 
criticism of its mythological assertions by understanding his theology 
eschatologically and existentially (in the vein of Rudolf Bultmann's proposal). 163 
Immediately after Paul's day the Gospel was misconstrued according to Greek 
ontology and interpreted in a literalistic, mythological fashion. This 
misconstruction correlated with civilization's primitive and scientifically 
undeveloped level of human thought: yet. Rudolf Bultmann maintains man's 
coming of age in modern times warrants Paul's existential programme. 
This scheme raises several questions: if the eschatological. existential 
understanding was suitable to Paul and Christians in the Brat century. why 
was Paul such a failure at transmitting it? If Paul was such a failure, why do 
his letters form the basis of the New Testament and why does he appear as 
the spearhead of the Christian mission? Moreover. why was Paura 
eschatological understanding not appropriated In the intervening centuries by 
human thought more common to it than that of the disparate twenUcth 
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century? 
An implicit assumption of Rudolf Bultmanri s that the development. 
evolution. or maturity of human civilization and thought necessarily 
necessitated a corresponding "literalist" or "existential" view Is not 
demonstrated. Why out of twenty centuries were such dissimilar centuries as 
the first and twentieth receptive to the eschatological. existential theological 
understanding while the other centuries were not? If the New Testament was 
interpreted existentially, why does not at least a residue of this Interpretation 
appear and persist in consequent Christian theology? 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, much theological water has flowed under the proverbial 
bridge since John Wesley. Modern commentators are wont to emphasize the 
discontinuity between then and now. Indeed, because of his theocentric 
commitment, John Wesley could be described as a mediaeval man similar to 
Martin Luther. He affirmed that the gracious, personal trinitarian God Is the 
gravitational centre in which all things have their being and cohere. lie is the 
unifying principle under which all is subsumed and the axis around which all 
of human thought and existence revolve. 'Man is measured by Haim and not 
He by man. 
Contrariwise, Rudolf Bultmann could be described as a modern man In 
the sense that he was a child of the Aufklärung. This concurs with Karl 
Barth's assessment that he is to be viewed in the context of the 
Enlightenment. '` Amassing steam in John Wesley's day, the Enlightenment 
sought to restore man to his true value and importance by locating the key to 
and conquest of genuine, human knowledge, understanding, and existence full 
of meaning in man himself. Specifically. Rudolf Bultinanri s commitment is 
summarized in his statement that theology is anthropology, namely. In order 
for man to know God he must first understand himself and his existence. 16 
Despite that. John Wesley is by no means devoid of the elevation of man 
and Rudolf Bultmann does not ignore the exaltation of God and Ills saving 
event Jesus Christ. 
Though John Wesley on the whole eschewed fine, theological distinctions. 
the distinctions he made show an immediate kinship with a Puritan and 
Reformed scholasticism which, influenced by Middle Age scholasticism. were 
given a Protestant twist. However, as Rudolf 13ultmann s theology 
demonstrates, if the use of metaphysical subtlety was a characteristic of a 
mediaeval man, Rudolf Bultmann could still qualify. If an empirical spirit was 
a mark of a modern man. John Wesley was not lacking it. 
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Be that as it may, even if Rudolf Bultmann may be described as "modern" 
and John Wesley as "mediaeval", one is by no means compelled to view Rudolf 
Bultmann's formulation of justification by faith as an irreversible and 
qualitative advance (as In the field of physical scientific theory) which better 
and more accurately accounts for the data than the "mediaeval". While John 
Wesley's understanding will not be accepted merely because it has claims to 
historic, Christian and Protestant tradition, neither should it be rejected out of 
hand because of that. 
In general, John Wesley did not concern himself with the Intellectual 
perplexities of faith per se. He seems to have considered the intellectual 
quarrels of the "men of learning" with saving faith and genuine Christianity to 
be more appropriately a mark of spiritual blindness of heart rather than of 
intellectual difficulty. 
On the other hand. Rudolf Bultmanri s formulation addressed Itself to the 
Christian faith's need to be viable without forcing modern. thinking persons to 
the sacrificium intellectus. His motive is to be commended and seen as a 
genuine attempt to respond to formidable modern challenges. 
Form and historical criticism and existential interpretation were 
sophisticated methods which allowed him to dismiss many stumbling blocks - 
- including most of the classical characterization of the historical Jesus. One 
is not far wrong in saying that in making belief "reasonable", he left no reason 
for belief. Ironically, in his re-interpretation, he not only rids Christian faith 
of some of its stumbling blocks, but also of its raison d'Ftre. Jesus Christ. 
Consequently, he paradoxically left a huge intellectual stumbling block -- 
which to me seems just as large as John Wesley's -- at the critical crunch 
point of his theology: that a community's human impression which it does not 
accept as referring to factual truth regarding a man Jesus of ambiguous 
significance be accepted as the authoritative Word of God which demands 
one's total renunciation and obedience. 
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While the traditional theology that accepts New Testament "mythologies' 
literally is deemed credulous and obsolete, Rudolf Bultmann exalts his 
irrationality to the acceptable and the sacred. He supplants one "irrationality" 
with another "irrationality". Nonetheless, he suggests the use of the terms 
"irrational" and "numinous" are a necessary protest against theological 
"rationalism" and "moralism". "' 
His proposal gives the impression of being a sort of caricature of the 
traditional Christian proclamation. Though it safeguards his claim, he fences 
off the Gospel proclamation from intellectual incursion by stating that one 
may not even ask "why" regarding it. This is perplexing coming from an 
academic who in every other context vigorously promotes the asking of 'why'. 
However, it is not unlike the attitude of John Wesley who. though he did not 
banish reasoning from investigating, accepts that there is a point beyond 
which reasoning endangers itself. 
Neither theologian wanted genuine faith to rest ultimately upon reason or 
external evidence. Religious authenticity which no one could destroy Iles in 
the individual subject man; namely, in the individual's concrete existence 
(Bullmann) and In the individual's inner experience (Wesley). 
Both theologians believed that their theological expositions of faith were 
uncovering or re-covering for their own generations the faith of the primitive 
New Testament church. 1B7 John Wesley's theology of justification by faith is 
historically continuous with the English Puritans, the Church of England 
Homilies and Articles, the German Moravians and the sixteenth century 
Reformers. Though Rudolf Bultmanri s theology of justification is in form 
similar to Martin Luther's, drawing from such other influences as Wilhelm 
Herrmann and, of course, Martin Heidegger. he forged a unique theological 
content essentially distinct from classical Protestantism and, for the that 
matter, classical Christianity. "" 
Is Rudolf Bultmann a defender of Christian faith? He is, if one does not 
interpret this as meaning he seeks to protect or preserve some historical. 
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orthodox theological content which over the ages has endured as a 
description of Christian faith. Nonetheless, he could think of himself as a 
preserver of Christian faith from the standpoint that he was uncovering and 
once again faithfully disclosing the kerygma hidden since the apostle Paul. 
However. from a classical Catholic-Protestant perspective, he betrays and 
overturns genuine Christian faith. ' He insisted that theology had no 
alternative but to accept the demise of the traditional Christian conception 200 
Likewise. John Wesley's vision of restoring genuine, primitive faith to 
Christianity brought its own threat to established theological understanding. 201 
In setting forth his description of Christian faith recovered, his account like 
Rudolf Bultmann s called into question the common, established opinions 
which were the meat of the "vulgar" and the "everyday talk" of the "they" 
which had concealed the truth rather than revealed it. From the dominant 
eighteenth century theological perspectives, John Wesley's theology of 
justification by faith was also viewed as a danger and detriment to historic 
Christian faith ' 
Blaise Pascal commented that the great battle of Christianity through all 
the ages is "being fought by two invisible armies, as they struggle to dominate 
the minds of men. The one army we might rightly call Supernaturalism; the 
other. with equal accuracy. we shall designate Naturalism. " This dichotomy. 
though it needs qualification in the light of Rudolf Buitmann s theology which 
in some sense defies these alternatives, is still instructive in providing an 
index for the essential, contrasting tendency of an essential distinction 
between these two theologies of justification by faith. 
Rudolf Bultmann, just as John Wesley. affirms the reality of God who is a 
power beyond man. However, studiously avoiding referring to God or God's 
realm as "supernatural". he prefers the term "transcendent". The term 
"supernatural". being for all intents and purposes for him equated with the 
term "mythological". conjures up the image of the classically conceived New 
Testament God with all the attending metaphysical descriptions and signs, 
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wonders, and miracles attributed to Him. In other words, It was essentially 
the God John Wesley asserted was powerfully present and working in the 
experiences of those of the eighteenth century evangelical reformation. 
Integral to Rudolf Bultmanri s theology is a God who is beyond man and 
"this world" but who does not fit the description of the New Testament God 
classically. literally conceived. Does Rudolf Bultmann conceive this God to be 
a power not only beyond man and this natural world but also beyond and 
outside the whole cosmos? Or is God a power beyond man and this natural 
world yet one who is within the universe? 
The latter sense seems appropriate because he, reminiscent of the 
eighteenth century "supernatural" rationalists, wants to acknowledge an 
"infinite" and a "Beyond" that he in his working assumptions can presume is, 
nevertheless, congruent with a closed universe and rational, empirical 
suppositions. It would seem Rudolf Bultmann s insistence on the importance 
of the believers encounter with the Irrational, mysterious Word is incongruous 
with its relatively factual unimportance juxtaposed to the real importance of 
the rational and empirical. 203 
While Enlightenment ideas have become democratized in the twentieth 
century, commentators may exaggerate the problem of the Christian faith and 
the "supernatural"/ mythological as a uniquely twentieth century problem. 
Although Rudolf Bultmann's particular conception was unknown to John 
Wesley, John Wesley was not unfamiliar with a scepticism about the 
supernatural and a conception of God similar to Rudolf Bultmann's. He 
spoke of those who affirmed a God and also accepted that there was nothing 
but matter. ' 
Though Rudolf Bultmann would challenge John Wesley's comment that 
the one who believed in this God did not believe the Bible, nonetheless, a 
crucial issue playing its way in counterpoint through the comparison of their 
two theologies of justification is this: can the portrait of the supernatural God 
which the plain, natural sense of the New Testament describes be believed to 
453 
set forth the authentic God, or can an outside, imported philosophical and/or 
anthropological conceptualization of God in the light of which the New 
Testament description of God is to be read be believed as setting forth the 
authentic God? 
John Wesley, who believed in the former in his expression of justification 
by faith, did not have to wait for the nineteenth and twentieth century and a 
Rudolf Bultmann to style him "deluded" and a "madman" who believed a 
"cunningly-devised fable". ' Some of his own contemporary observers were 
quite willing to do that. 
By Rudolf Bultmanri s prime, almost two centuries had transpired since 
John Wesley's day, and the most current thinking from the various scientific 
disciplines, including historical criticism, history of religion studies, and 
"scientific" philosophy has been brought to bear upon Rudolf Bultmann's 
description of justification. Nonetheless, he is no less sheltered from the 
query as to whether or not his understanding of justification by faith may also 
be a trick of the devil to make Christianity look ridiculous. 
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Wesley's Life Mission. part 2. trans. Denis Inman, p. 78. 
4. See above. p. 3 Bultjnann, Theology, vol. 1, pp. 270f. 
5. See above. ,-p. 
3; Martin Schmidt also notes John Wesley's 
affirmations of the two fundamental doctrines of the Methodist 
movement as justification and perfection; Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2, 
part 2. p. 156. This can be widened to include other major 
themes; Schmidt, John Wesley. vol. 2. part 2. p. 172. According to 
Martin Schmidt, John Wesley's immediate eulogists highlighted his 
vital concerns as justification, regeneration, and perfection; 
Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 2. part 2. pp. 200,210. 
6. See above, pp. X. Wesley, Letters, vol. 2, p. 39; vol. 7, p. 216. 
Colin Williams quotes Gordon Rupp as saying that "from beginning 
to end John Wesley believed and preached justification by faith 
only .... Nevertheless, as 
he put it, that holiness was his point. " 
Williams, Wesley s Theology, p. 176; Martin Schmidt observes John 
Wesley's exaltation of love above faith; Martin Schmidt. John 
Wesley: A Theological Biography, 2 vols. (Nashville. New York: 
Abingdon Press, 1972-1973) Vol. 2: John Wesley's Life Mission, 
part 1, trans. Norman P. Goldhawk, p. 207; vol. 2, part 2, p. 55. 
One must be careful to avoid thinking that because love could be 
stated to be more glorious than faith, faith was less vital and 
integral to salvation for John Wesley. One must try to keep in 
mind when and to whom and in what context John Wesley penned 
certain remarks. In the early stages of his evangelical theological 
career. he could write in 1746 to The Rev. Mr. Church, who 
censured the preaching of justification by faith for undermining 
good works, that whereas faith was the "door" of religion, holiness 
was "religion itself'; Wesley, Works, ed. T. Jackson, vol. 8, p. 472. 
However, in 1784 he answered his rhetorical question about what 
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religion is to his Roman Catholic nephew Charles by saying that 
religion is "faith working by love": Wesley, Letters, vol. 7, p. 216. 
By and large. faith and love were inextricable co-essentials of the 
religion and Gospel he preached so that usually when he stressed 
the one he stressed the other. As he advised in 1774, "But let 
your eye be single. Aim still at one thing-- holy, loving faith, 
giving God the whole heart. " Wesley, Letters, vol. 6, p. 113. 
John Wesley seems to overstate his case in his comparison of faith 
and love in the 1750 sermon "The Law Established Through Faith: 
Discourse 2" wherein he sets forth the greater excellency of love 
over faith and states that faith is the "grand means of restoring 
that holy love". "the sole end, of every dispensation of God". Wesley, 
Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. vol. 2, pp. 38-40. This fear of 
Antinomianism is probably responsible for the overstatement. See, 
Albert Outler's comments. Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. 
vol. 2" pp. 2f. 
Nonetheless. his essential proposal that faith's end is to "restore 
man to the love from which he was fallen" and that love is the 
highest of all graces is mentioned elsewhere (e. g., in 1777 before 
the Humane Society: see. Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, 
vol. 3, p. 405. 
7. "World-history" is Bultmann s term: Bultmann. History and 
Eschatology. p. 36. 
8. Colin Williams says John Wesley affirms that salvation is the "total 
work of God" and that we can be in "real though not total 
possession of it now"; Williams. Wesley's Theology. p. 41. 
9. See above. p. 14 ; Though Martin Schmidt quotes John Wesley's 
statement that "grace is the source" and Colin Williams notes that 
it is grace which restores us to God's favour (this being the death 
of Christ), neither discuss explicitly John Wesley's careful 
delineation of "cause" and "condition"; Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2, 
part 2. pp. 12.203; Williams, John Wesley's Theology, p. 74. 
10. Colin Williams assessment confirms this when he states that John 
Wesley's central interest in the doctrine of Christ is in what Christ 
has done and can do for us: Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 89. 
11. Schubert Ogden states that Bultmann conceded that the New 
Testaments objective statements indicate that it understood the 
cross as a mythical event. Bultmann held that the christological 
ascriptions are best interpreted not in terms of their objective 
contents but as statements of existential significance. Schubert M. 
Ogden. Christ Without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of 
Rudolf Bultmann, (Dallas: SMU Press. 1979) p. 78. 
Colin Williams comments that John Wesley normally just assumes 
the orthodox formulations of the person of Christ. 
12. In reference to what has been already stated, Colin Williams 
observes that when John Wesley treats Christ's work as the 
Mediator he discusses Christ's deity and twofold nature as God and 
man. Accepting the orthodox Christological formulations, he 
asserted the vital necessity of the deity of Jesus; Williams, 
Wesley's Theology, pp. 85,908: Both Colin Williams and Martin 
Schmidt notice his defense of the deity of Jesus against the 
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SocInians and Deists; Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 2, part 2, p. 110; 
Williams, Wesley's Theologiy, p. 91, footnote 48. 
Martin Schmidt includes a fascinating account of an attack against 
John Wesley which ran in the London Magazine in 1760. The 
critic advised John Wesley that one must sharply distinguish 
between the words of Jesus himself and their record by his 
disciples in formulating theology for the present day; Schmidt, John 
Wesle , vol. 2. part 
1, pp. 165f. 
13. See discussion above. Section Two, Chapter Two, "Two Faiths": 
Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth. vol. 2, pp. 95-97. Discussion of Rudolf 
Bultmann's theology has centered none the least around his 
understanding of Jesus of Nazareth and His relation to the 
salvation-occurrence. As was stated, Karl Barth asked whether 
Rudolf Bultmann wished to stress the salvation-occurrence as "The 
Christ Event" or "The Christ Event". In other words, asks Schubert 
Ogden. must one become convinced of Christ's significance before 
he can discern the meaning of the cross? Ogden, Christ Without 
Myth, pp. 80f. 
Karl Barth states that Rudolf Bultmann does wish to a 
considerable extent to stress that the saving act of God Is an 
historical event -- it is linked with the name of Jesus of Nazareth 
and His life and death. However, to ascribe the historicity of the 
Christ-occurrence simply to the fact that It began In the life and 
death of the man Jesus and derives its name and title from Him -- 
but is actually located not in Him -- Is insufficient according to 
Karl Barth. Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, vol. 2. pp. 95f. 
For Karl Barth. that which causes the transition from the "old" 
determination to the new determination must be located in the life 
and death of the man Jesus of Nazareth. It is In him that we find 
"the content, the substance. the backbone ... In a word, the 
principle of the Christian message". Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, 
p. 96. He does not believe it is congenial with the New Testament 
to see Jesus Christ's importance only as he enters into the 
kerygma and finds obedience among its hearers. Christology and 
the doctrine of Christ must have independent significance in and of 
itself and not simply be dethroned and merged Into soteriology. 
Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth. pp. 96f. 
For instance. Karl Barth argues that the cross and resurrection 
the total Christ event -- would seem to have objective. Intrinsic 
significance of Its own and not only as it has significance "for us" 
which is derived by from soteriology us in the here and now. 
Christology is the prior and determining factor rather than the 
reverse as Rudolf Bultmann has it. Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, 
p. 110. 
Schubert Ogden asserts that Rudolf Bultmann has been widely 
misunderstood to deny "all real continuity" between the Jesus of 
history and the crucified Christ of the kerygma. He is right in 
defending Rudolf Bultmanri s affirmation of the necessary place of 
the historical Jesus and His historical cross for existentiell faith. 
Jesus *s death on the cross raised the question of decision for the 
apostles. namely. that Jesus was the messenger bringing God's 
final. decisive word. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, pp. 81f. 
However. Schubert Ogden concedes that Rudolf Bultmann fails to 
express adequately "the 'objective' reality of the revelatory event 
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Jesus the Christ" as critics such as Karl Barth maintained. He 
disagrees with critics such as Karl Barth that the lesson to be 
learned is that we need some other and more "objective" christology 
but rather that we must improve upon Rudolf Bultmann s. Ogden, 
Christ Without Myth, pp. 158f. 
14. Schubert Ogden acknowledges that Rudolf Bultmann affirms that if 
we simply follow the New Testament's objective statements, the 
cross is undoubtedly understood as a mythical event. Ogden, 
Christ Without Myth, p. 78. 
15. As a radical, traditio-historical critic who was at the forefront of 
those using the Formgeschichte method, Rudolf Bultmann has 
engaged In Innovative and formidable research. He has made 
elaborate and painstaking attempts to determine what aspects of 
the Gospel accounts might be the oldest historical traditions. He 
claimed to bifurcate those which consisted of Jesus' words from the 
later tradition consisting of apostolic accretions. He tried to ferret 
out which of the oldest traditions were actually original and which 
were later developments by comparing the forms of biblical 
pericopes with the certain, recognized fixed forms of literature. 
However, Rudolf Bultmann admits it Is an Investigation fraught 
with difficulty which Is carried on with great caution. In employing 
a research methodology, one must reckon with the possibility that, 
given its own presuppostions and subjective assumptions, the 
researcher before be has begun has already been predisposed to 
certain conclusions. 
On the assumptions that the words of Jesus are many times not 
his own but theological Interpretations, and the outlines of Jesus 
life are but editorial creations, one is little surprised that Rudolf 
Bultmann concludes that we are not able to know the course of 
Jesus life: His inner development. His "human personality" (still 
less any divine character), the origin of the content of his and his 
followers' preaching. much less the question of his "messianic 
consciousness". In one sense, Rudolf Bultmann can claim that the 
science of historical criticism cannot make final, determinative 
decisions about Jesus: yet, he. in effect, makes a definitive 
profession by rejecting that the testimony to Jesus may be literally 
true. 
One might at least entertain the possibility that the historical 
person Jesus could not be integral to the salvation-occurrence for 
Rudolf Bultmann because he could not in his mind or research 
solve the problem of Jesus. Hence, he could proceed only by 
discounting His relevancy. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, pp. 41, 
48.52,54. 
16. See above, p. 272; Karl Barth finds Rudolf Bultmann inconsistent 
because he believes his interpretation is unfaithful in regards to the 
place he accords Jesus' death. See footnote #13 above for a more 
complete statement. 
Fritz Buri also believes that Rudolf Bultmann s stress on God's 
saving act in Jesus of Nazareth is inconsistent because it is at 
odds with his "demythologizing interpretation". He wonders if he 
has not set a limit to what he previously presented as an unlimited 
demand for demythologization and existential interpretation. For 
when Rudolf Bultmann appeals against the claims of philosophy to 
the unique event of Jesus Christ as the specific possibility for 
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human existence, he is "falling back into mythology" which he is 
trying to overcome. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 106f. 
Schubert Ogden has a similar concern. He argues that Rudolf 
Bultmann cannot maintain at once an emphasis on unlimited 
demythologization and also on salvation as present only to faith in 
God's saving act in Jesus of Nazareth. For if the Christian faith is 
demythologized and interpreted existentially as man's original 
possibility of authentic self-understanding, then it must be 
independent of any particular historical occurrence. 
If the second proposition above is true. and Christian faith is 
necessarily linked with a particular historical event, then it cannot 
be man's original possibility of authentic historicity. Ogden. Christ 
Without Myth, p. 117. Schubert Ogderi s suggested improvement 
on Rudolf Buitmann's proposal is to affirm that the event of Jesus 
is but the representation in the form of a single human life of 
man's original possibility of existence which God has always made 
available to man. 
Rudolf Bultmann's inconsistency aside, his emphasis on the 
centrality and indispensability of the death of Jesus, contrary to 
Schubert Ogden 's suggested amendment which circumvents this 
necessary emphasis, is faithful both to the stress of the New 
Testament and to the Reformation. 
17. Note Karl Barth's statement on Rudolf Bultmann's return to Martin 
Luther and the Reformation. Bartsch, Kerygtna and Myth, pp. 90f. 
18. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 105. 
19. It is interesting to speculate whether Siren Kierkegaard's trenchant 
comment may be relevant to Rudolf Bultmann's problem with 
Jesus. He observed that if we read in the New Testament that God 
wills that every man should have $100,000.00, we could easily 
enough understand the statement. Likewise, the New Testament 
was not at all more difficult to understand than this proposition. 
Rather, the difficulty is in that it does not please us. Rather than 
dare say "1 do not wish it" -- at least to say it in this way -- the "professor(s)" defends himself by having recourse to the pretence 
that God's will is so difficult to understand, he studies and 
researches and so on. In other words, muses Siren Kierkegaard, 
he defends himself by hiding behind folios. Sfsren Kierkegaard, The 
Last Years Journals 1853 - 1855, ed. and trans. Ronald Gregor 
Smith, (London: Collins, The Fontana Library, 1968). pp. 334f. 
20. See Section Two, Chapter Two, "Two Faiths": Karl Barth expressed 
these views in a letter to Bishop Theophil Wurm on 29 May 1947. 
Bernd Jaspert, ed., Karl Barth - Rudolf Bultmann Letters 1922 - 
1966. trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark. 1982) pp. 142f. 
21. Wollhart Pannenberg. Jesus -- God and Man, trans. Lewis L. 
Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe. (London: SCM Press, 1968), p. 24. 
Schubert Ogden. while affirming the role of the "objective" reality 
of the "event Jesus the Christ", does not so much see Rudolf 
Bultmann's christology ushering in the dissolution of Christianity. 
Rather, he has provided a foundation upon which theologians such 
as Schubert Ogden can build. Therefore, he goes beyond Rudolf 
Bultmann and asserts that it is necessary to affirm that authentic 
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existence can be realized apart from faith in Jesus Christ or in the 
Christian proclamation". Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 144. 
22.1 am somewhat puzzled by Colin Williams assessment of John 
Wesley's teaching of the atonement and the "Moral Influence 
Theory". On the one hand, he rightly affirms that for John Wesley 
the Pattern of Christ as the way we must imitate can be a 
possibility only for those who are justified by faith in the objective 
event of God's provision of his Son as the atoning sacrifice. 
On the other hand, he says that the "Moral Influence Theory is 
then drawn firmly into Wesley's picture of the Christian life. " 
According to my general understanding, this theory locates our 
justification in the "loftiest love" kindled in our heart as a result of 
God's display of love in the passion of Christ on the Cross. See, L. 
W. Grensted, Doctrine of The Atonement, p. 104. 
As an evangelical, John Wesley did not use this theory to explain 
the atonement. Indeed, he did speak of following Christ as Pattern 
after justification. However, when speaking this way, he was not 
seeking to explain the atonement by using the "moral Influence 
theory". See. Williams, Wesley's Theology, pp. 79,83; see above 
discussion "The Ground of Justification", : pp. 10ff " 
Colin Williams did not apparently observe the use of the 
"satisfaction" theory In John Wesley. 
On a different note, he sees a weakness of John Wesley's over 
individualistic doctrine of the atonement in his underemphasis on 
the "Christus victor" image. Interestingly, this is the image which 
Rudolf Bultmann employs and which Colin Williams views as 
being able to bring us to a deeper awareness of the evil forces that 
grip corporate life; Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 89. 
23. Schubert Ogden echoes this point and rightly states that Rudolf 
Bultmann held that Paul turned to these foreign concepts because 
they enabled him to express more adequately than the Jewish 
cultic and juristic thinking the meaning of the crucifixion. Ogden. 
Christ Without Myth, p. 78. Paul wanted to convey that Christ's 
death overcame the power as well as the guilt of sin. 
However. one may question that the "dying and rising" motif is 
borrowed from Gnosticism and that Hebrew thinking was 
inadequate to express God's victory over sin. Karl Barth comments 
that Rudolf Buitmann's doctrine of the cross "looks suspiciously 
like Catholic passion mysticism". Bartsch. Kerv>rma and Myth. vol. 
2. pp. 99. 
At any rate, both Rudolf Buitmann and John Wesley emphasize 
that the Cross meant freedom from both the guilt and the power of 
sin. 
24. He wrote to Karl Barth that it is not possible to establish first that 
Christ's crucifixion is the saving event and then to believe, but that 
the crucifixion could be seen as the saving event only in faith. 
Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 94. 
Karl Barth judges that the New Testament speaks of the cross as 
something which is wholly and entirely outside of the believer, 
something without hirn and in spite of hire. Rudolf Bullmann 
assure us, as Schubert Ogden points out, that if we view it in this 
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way we are viewing the cross mythically. Bartsch, Kerygma and 
Myth. vol. 2, p. 99: Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 79. 
Rudolf Bultmanu s interpretation seems to diminish the aspect of 
God's sheer. unmerited gracious initiative acting before any activity 
of man. 
25. In both Old and New Testaments, righteousness is linked with God 
the Judge. Psalms 7: 11 states, "God is a righteous judge.... '. 
Psalms 9: 8 says "he judges the world with righteousness"; Romans 
2: 2 and 3: 6 and its context in chapter three speak of God as 
Judge. However. Rudolf Bultmann would see these as applying 
only to God's eschatological verdict. See ensuing discussion in 
text. See also, Dictionary of the New Testament, s. v. "dikaiosune" 
by Gottlob Schrenk, pp. 176f; 196: 204f. 
26. While Martin Schmidt leaves John Wesley holding one justification 
(a conclusion based only on occasional early statements in John 
Wesley). Colin Williams properly acknowledges John Wesley's 
adherence to a twofold justification; Schmidt, Wesley. vol. 2, part 1, 
p. 43; vol. 2. part 2. p. 76; Williams, Wesley's Theology, pp. 67f. 
27. Colin Williams corroborates this when he states that for John 
Wesley justification was an "objective" work in that it did not arise from a change in us but from God's word to us -- "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee"; Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 71. 
28. See above discussion under sub-heading "The Meaning of 
Justification to the Individual", p. 225 ; Colin Williams as well as 
Martin Schmidt also note that justification for John Wesley is 
"forgiveness". Colin Williams likewise appreciates the caution with 
which he uses the word "imputation". Though he could speak of 
our sins not being imputed against us, he did not speak of 
"imputed righteousness" (in the historic Protestant sense); Williams. 
Wesley s Theology, pp. 70f; Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2, part 2, p. 109. 
29. See, Althaus, Martin Luther, p. 235. 
30. Gregory Dix. in his essay "The First Four Centuries: Hellenism, 
Judaism, and Christianity". makes the point that the Jewish 
instinct asserts a God who reveals Himself in the moral life. See, 
Edward Gordon Selwyn. ed., A Short History of Christian Thought: 
A Volume of Essays (London: Geoffrey Bless. 1949), pp. 19,38. 
31. Karl Barth notes that Rudolf Bultmann says that the New 
Testament addresses man as a sinner and shows him that he is 
powerless to pull himself from this fallen state. Bartsch. Ke a 
and Myth, pp. 92f. 
Martin Schmidt in setting forth one of John Wesley's sermons 
allows us to hear John Wesley say that it is precisely sinners who 
are addressed by the Gospel. Further, he shows that John Wesley 
repudiated the imagination that one could be justified by virtue of 
one's own achievements, by works of the Law. See above 
discussion. "Who Are Justified? The "Ungodly", p. 62; Schmidt, John 
Wesle , vol. 2, part 2, pp. 17.152. 
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32. That for John Wesley the Law's first and real purpose is to convict 
man of his sin is acknowledged by Martin Schmidt; Schmidt, John 
Wesle , vol. 2. part 
2, p. 54. Furthermore, as Colin Williams 
brings out. God seeks to bring man under the judgment of the law 
so that he may become aware of his fallen condition. God's means 
for awakening the sinner is usually through the preaching of the 
law; Williams. John Wesley's Theology, p. 58; See above discussion, 
"Who are Justified? The Guilty 'Ungodly'", . p. 68. 
33. Wesley. Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, p. 13. 
34. See above, p"_, 237; Schubert Ogden notes the "extraordinarily high 
regard" Bultmann has for Heidegger's scientific accomplishment in 
his analysis of human existence in Sein und Zeit. He agrees with 
John Macquarrie that the ontology of human existence that 
Bultmann presupposes in almost all his theological work is the one 
developed by the early Heidegger. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 
45f. 
Karl Barth comments that Rudolf Bultmann appropriates Martin 
Heideggers philosophy of existentialism which provides him with a 
certain prior understanding with which to approach the New 
Testament texts. Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, pp. 113f. 
35. John MacQuarrie. Martin Heidegg er, p. 28: Howe O. Thomas, Jr.. 
"Critique of Sin" (University of Bristol, 1984) pp. 9af; John 
MacQuarrie. An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger 
and Buitmann, The Library of Philosophy and Theology (London: 
SCM Press. 1955). p. 70. 
36. Thomas, "Critique of Sin", p. 9; Macquarrie, Existential Theology, 
p. 104. 
37. Macquarrie. Existential Theology. p. 103. Schubert Ogden points 
out a distinction here which Rudolf Bultmann made between 
existential philosophy and existential theology. Though philosophy 
recognizes that man does not always in fact realize his authentic 
existence. it assumes this existence is at all times capable of 
realization. According to Rudolf Bultmann. the New Testament 
asserts that man has lost the factual possibility. Ogden. Christ 
Without Myth, p. 73. 
38. Martin Heidegger speaks of man "fleeing" and turning toward the 
entities within-the-world and getting absorbed in them. See, Roger 
Waterhouse, A Heide per Critique: A Critical Examination of the 
Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, Harvester 
Philosophy Now, Roy Edgley, gen. ed.. 15 vols. (Sussex: Harvester 
Press. 1981). p. 90. 
Moreover. this also incorporates Heideggers idea of the individual 
man understanding himself according to the everyday publicness of 
the "they": that is, allowing his understanding to be dictated by the 
averageness of "the many", the crowd, the public mass. 
39. Rudolf Bullmann. Essays, p. 12. 
40. Ibid. pp. 12f. 
41. Ibid. p. 13. 
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42. Ibid. 
43. See above discussion. under. Who are Justified? The Guilty 
'Ungodly" As Martin Schmidt says. guilt is the primary, the most 
important. factor in sin for John Wesley. Guilt is sin's indictment 
against us which consequently sets up our need for acquittal which 
is attainable only in the Cross; Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 2. part 
2. p. 14. 
44. Rudolf Bultmann. Existence and Faith. p. 256. 
45. In his 1931 essay "The Crisis in Belief", in the context of the 
sinner's qualification prior to Christian faith, he brings in guilt. See 
also his 1936 essay on 'The Meaning of the Christian Faith in 
Creation'. Ibid. p. 220. 
46. Bultmann. Existence and Faith, pp. 219f. 
47. When Rudolf Bultmann seeks to explain how a sinner is guilty, he 
typically draws an analogy to the relationship of the individual man 
to his fellow man. Ibid, pp. 219f; Bultmann. Essays. p. 13. Is this 
appropriate? Is this relationship of one Individual to another in- 
dividual homologous to the relationship of the individual to the 
transcendent God. the Thou? In what way Is it appropriate to 
speak the same of one becoming guilty in relation to a non-person, 
an unknowable God, as becoming guilty in relation to a person? 
See above discussion, p. 206. 
48. In passing, one notes the similarity between this question of man's 
guilt before the Thou 's demand and the concern of why the 
individual encounters the saving proclamation as the authoritative 
demand. 
49. Martin Schmidt remarks that John Wesley agreed with "John 
Smith' that faith is rational assent. Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2, part 1, pp. 201f; Wesley. Letters, vol. 2, p. 46. 
50. Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief, Frank Baker, vol. 2. p. 483, 
Bultmann. Faith and Understanding I, p. 56. 
51. Schubert Ogden also points this out by quoting Rudolf Bultmann's 
statement that the propositions of faith are not general truths". 
Ogden. Christ Without Myth. p. 66. 
52. Wesley. Letters, vol. 4, p. 349. While Martin Schmidt does not 
seek to analyze thoroughly John Wesley's understanding, he sees 
well his general acceptable pattern. He states that for him full faith 
`is knowledge. perception and acknowledgement all in one, because 
it takes account of facts, submits to them, grasps them in their 
internal and mutual consistency, and translates them into its own 
life. " Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2, part 2, p. 13. 
53. John Wesley had absorbed some of the Latitudinarian temper. Karl 
Barth attributes Rudolf Bultmanri s "constant simplification of the 
Christian message" to the influence of his mentor Wilhelm 
Herrmann. See, Thomas. Wesley's Understanding of Theological 
Essentials and Opinions, p. 38; Bartsch, Kery rna and Myth, p. 
123. 
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54. Martin Schmidt points to John Wesley's correspondence with 
Bishop Warburton and his assertion that right opinions were a 
slender part of religion since God did not begin His work (usually, I 
would add) in the understanding but in the heart. Wesley, Letters. 
vol. 4. pp. 346-49; Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 2, part 1, p. 224. 
55. See John Wesley's plea for making allowance for others who differ 
according to intellectual or educational background. Wesley, Works. 
ed. -in-chief, Frank Baker, vol. 1, pp. 444f. 
56. Schubert Ogden also mentions that for Rudolf Bultmann any 
alternative outside his conception reduces faith to mere intellectual 
assent. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 122. 
57. Wesley, Letters, vol. 4, p. 349. 
58. John Wesley said to Dr. Warburton that "God generally speaking 
begins His work at the heart". Wesley, Letters, vol. 4, p. 348. 
59. Wesley. Letters. vol. 4, p. 348. 
60. Wesley, Works, ed. T. Jackson, vol. 7, pp. 231ü: He believed 
heathens, who though they lack Scriptural light, could be taught 
the "essentials of true religion" by the inner voice of God. Wesley, 
Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 3, pp. 494f. 
61. Althaus, Martin Luther. pp. 55f. 67. Rudolf Bultmann goes beyond 
Martin Luther in allowing ostensibly that reason knows no general 
propositions of God. 
62. To my mind. this is not inconsonant with Jesus' call to love God 
with "a11 your heart. soul, mind, and strength". 
63. This problem is related to the substantial inconsistency that 
Schubert Ogden finds in Rudolf Bultmann's theology. Specifically, 
his argument asserts that if Christian faith interpreted solely 
existentially is man's original possibility of authentic self. 
understanding. then it must not be tied to any particular historical 
occurrence. If it is tied to a particular historical occurrence, then 
it may not be interpreted entirely as man's original possibility of 
authentic historicity. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 117. 
64. If man in the moment of faith cannot use rational discrimination, 
certainly he has used it at some point In time prior to faith in 
reasoning through and accepting the philosophical pre. 
understanding which authentic faith assumes. Faith could not 
arise if it were not for the substantial groundwork of a "scientific" 
rational analysis. 
65. In accord with the above, does not Rudolf Bultmann also accept 
two "resolves" as necessary to faith? Ones existentiell self-under- 
standing which comes as a result of one's resolve to accept one's 
existence as Being-toward-death (according to Martin Heidegger 's 
discussion) precedes a second existentiell understanding in which 
faith decides to accept Jesus as God's revelation. 
66. ßultmann. Existence and Faith, p. 293. 
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Eschatological Term% pp38Sf. f: Ogden, Christ Without myth, p. 68; 
Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 142. 
69. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 112. 
70. See. Ibid. pp. 112f; Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 142. 
71. See. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 25f; Karl Barth is impressed 
that what really irks Rudolf Bultmann about "mythological think- 
ing" is its `objectifying". Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 106. 
72. Wesley. Works. ed. T. Jackson, vol. 7, p. 231. This point is 
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accordance to John Locke, John Wesley accepted that all 
knowledge proceeded from the senses; Schmidt. Wesley, vol. 2. part 
2. p. 73. See also. Williams. TheoloýV. p. 31. 
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Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 55. 
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Ogden 's avowal of this. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 113. 
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Ogden. Christ Without Myth. p. 117. 
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30f. 
77. Wesley. Works, ed. T. Jackson. vol. 7, p. 232. 
78. Althaus. Martin Luther. p. 18; Bainton, Here I Stand. p. 219; F. C. 
Copleston. Aquinas (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1955). p. 52. 
Though both Martin Luther and John Wesley affirm that "faith" 
gives this knowledge, they differ as to when this "faith" is given. 
While Martin Luther understands the enlightenment to come with 
justification, John Wesley allows that even a natural person can 
have this enlightenment through a general faith; see, Wesley, 
Works. ed. T. Jackson, vol. 7, p. 233. 
79. See relevent discussions. Section Two. Chapter Two. "Revelation 
and Pre -Understanding". pp. 237f f; Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, 
p. 108; Jaspert. Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 106. 
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85. See above discussion. Section Two. Chapter One, "Righteousness: 
An Eschatological Term", particularly pp. 18? ff, 237 ; Karl Barth 
remarks rightly that demythologizing is only a "by-product" of 
Rudolf Bultmann's methodological approach of translating the New 
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87. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 71. 
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92. Wesley. Works, ed. T. Jackson, vol. 7, p. 228. 
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Mind: Readings in Philosophy. ed. G. N. A. Vesey (London: George 
Allen and Unwin. n. d. ), p. 122. 
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expressions differ In significance or connotation, but refer to one 
and the same phenomenen. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul 
Edwards, editor in chief. 8 vols. (London: Collier-MacMillan 
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Shaffer. p. 339. 
97. Ibid. p. 124. 
98. Note the appearance of his monographs "Faith as Venture" of 1928; 
The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Theology of Paul". 
1929; his review of Adolf Schlatter's Faith in the New Testament of 1929; -Me Historicity of Man and Faith" of 1930. Charles W. 
Kegley, ed., The '! neology of Rudolf Bultmann (London: SCM Press, 
1966). pp. 296-98. 
99. This is everywhere agreed upon. See above discussion, pp. 78f ; Schmidt. Wesle , vol. 2. part 1, p. 203; vol. 2. part 2, p. 31; Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 65. 
100. See above discussion, The Ground of Justification", pp. j3f; Colin 
Williams emphasizes throughout his book that for John Wesley 
faith is "a personal relationship to the living Christ", Williams, 
Wesley's Teology, pp. 68f. Martin Schmidt concurs by stating that faith is "the constant communion between God and man, an 
uninterrupted communication which draws the whole of life into its 
sphere of influence". Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 2. part 2. p. 71. 
Moreover, faith in Jesus Christ unites the believer with the total 
vitality of Jesus Christ's being; that is, with the divine life itself. 
Schmidt. vol. 2, part 2, p. 209. 
The sense of faith as being "spoken" to by God or "seeing" God in 
Christ reconciling the world is also noted: Williams, John Wesley's 
Theology, pp. 64,71. 
101. See above discussion. "The Ground of Justification', p. 13. = ; Martin Schmidt brings out well this point. He aipirms that 
according to John Wesley faith's proper object is Jesus Christ, and through Him God. Christian faith rests entirely on the power of Jesus' life. His death and its merits, and His resurrection. Schmidt. %Vesle , vol. 2. part 2. pp. 13f. 
102. Macquarrie. Existentialist Theolo y, p. 90. 
103. Ibid. p. 109. 
104. See above discussion, pp. 131f ; Colin Williams stresses that for 
John Wesley man has no natural ability to do anything to return to 
God. But God through prevenient grace is at work within the 
natural man to enable him to make a free response to his 
transforming presence. This is clear. However, even though Colin 
Williams can say tersely that faith for Wesley is a "gift" and that 
justification "arises ... from a word of God to us -=Son, thy sins be forgiven thee". the impression I receive is that Colins Williams 
prefers to accent the nature of faith as the God enabled response 
to what God has already been accomplishing in the willing penitent 
rather than what He is about to give. He says, "Faith opens the 
door for the continuing work of God within us" and again "Faith is 
the opening of the life to Christ". 
Colin Williams portrays "faith" as more of a mediate rather than 
the immediate gift of God which John Wesley was apt to 
emphasize. What goes missing In Colin Williams account is the 
supernatural gift's radical nature as over and against man, distinct 
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from him, coming "downward" from outside man's world, so that 
what is possessed of God in the eternal dimension, now decisively 
invades man and is transferred into mans possession. See, 
Williams. Wesle , pp. 47f. 69-72. 
105. See above. pp. 311f ; Bartsch. Ker'y ma and Myth, p. 97. 
106. Further. Burl says that Rudolf Bultmann's presentation of Christ in 
terms of his "existential significance" de-historicizes the New 
Testament's statements concerning the cross and resurrection so 
that they are reduced to dispensable mythological expressions of 
authentic self-understanding. Moreover. he says that Rudolf 
Bultmann s theory of myth as the expression of self-understanding 
cannot adequately account for the meaning of myth for the earliest 
New Testament community. The atoning sacrifice and resurrection 
which appear to modem interpreters as myth and the expression of 
a self-understanding are assumed to be to the man of the New 
Testament the actual occurrence on which his self-understanding is 
based. Ogden. Christ Without Myth. pp. 108f. 
Schubert Ogden points out that Rudolf Bultmann wants to say that 
God's action is `objectively" "hidden" in the proclamation and is 
discernible only by one who opens himself to it in faith and love. 
However, as he does say by way of qualification. this is not to be 
understood as `mythology" (one with a view such as John Wesley) 
understands it as an event which happens alongside other events 
in the continuum of worldly occurrences. Ogden, Christ Without 
Myth, p. 92. 
107. Roger Scruton, Kant, Past Master Series, gen. ed. Keith Thomas 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). p. 26. 
108. Rudolf Buitmann. Faith and Understanding I. pp. 101,140. 
109. See above. i p. 314; Schubert Ogden acknowledges that 
Rudolf Buitmanri s description implies that faith itself is something 
other than "piety" or "feeling". Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 
22f. 
110. The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, Alan Richardson 
and John Bowden (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983). s. 
v. "Mysticism" by E. J. Tinsley. 
111. ibid.: Schubert Ogden argues that the description of "mysticism" for 
Rudolf Dultmann is unjustified. "Self-understanding" does not 
suggest a "feeling" or "ecstasy" involving a flight from history but 
that which takes place in history. This characterization of "feeling" 
as a "flight from history" assumes the existentialist presupposition 
that faith as a "feeling" is a "flight from history". At any rate, this 
criterion which Shubert Ogden uses to judge Rudolf Bultmann 
regarding mysticism is just one criteria among others that must be 
considered. See, Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 67. 
112. Helmut Tielicke among others argued that Rudolf Bultmanri s 
thinking "stands in the tradition of Bewusstseinstheologie 
(Schleiermacher. Ritschl. Herrmann)". Schubert Ogden may be 
right that to assert this is to misunderstand profoundly Rudolf 
ßultmann's intention, but certainly there is a resemblance between 
him and them. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, pp. 65f. 
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113. Althaus, Martin Luther, p. 60. 
114. Colin Williams accurately sets forth John Wesley's understanding of 
faith as a 'divine conviction God works in the soul". He strikes a 
cautious note about confusing "assurance" with an emotional 
feeling and relying upon experience. His judgment is based on the 
many years of Methodist experience and is a modem reflection on 
the conviction's abuse. 
However. John Wesley does not surround with caution his lifetime 
affirmation of faith as an inner, divine impression. He acknowledges 
it may be abused, but is more apt to be on the other end defending 
it and the experience of it. See. "The Witness of the Spirit: 
Discourse 2". in Wesley. Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 1. p. 
293. 
Colin Williams appears to draw a false distinction. Because, as he 
rightly says. John Wesley withdrew his belief that a sense of 
pardon was necessary to justification, John Wesley, consequently 
also saw that not to do so would make justification dependent 
upon feeling. Upon this premise, Colin Williams bases his 
assertion that "Wesley was aware that it is just as wrong to make 
an internal condition (of right feelings or tempers) as it is to make 
an external condition (of right actions or works) a necessary basis 
for justification .... Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 106. 
While it may be true that John Wesley recognized it would be 
wrong to require some internal condition for justification, for him 
to withdraw the sense of forgiveness as necessary to justification 
was not to withdraw the necessity of a divine, Inner sense (that 
'Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me") In order to 
receive justification. He united saving faith and "experience" up to 
the last decade of his life when he then seemed willing to give the 
benefit of the doubt to a person who, from all accounts. had true 
faith but never the inner sense of faith. One must pay heed to the 
refinements to which John Wesley submitted justifying faith over 
his life. 
Though he does not intend to correct John Wesley. Colin Williams 
inadvertently might do so by warning that making an internal 
condition necessary for justification can become a salvation by 
works. Moreover. he alerts us to the danger which John Wesley 
recognized later to a certain extent that an ill-conceived internal 
criterion may cause those who have not experienced it to despair. 
Refer to Colin Williams discussion in Wesley's Theology, pp. 105- 
114; see above. Section I. Chapter Three. 
115. Martin Schmidt supplies Dr. John Whitehead's eulogistic remarks 
that in John Wesley's theology faith in Jesus Christ united the 
believer with the divine life itself, Schmidt, Wesley. vol. 2. part 2. 
p. 209. 
116. John Tinsley makes a distinction between the two kinds of 
mysticism. New Dictionary of Christian Theoto y, s. v. "Mysticism" 
by Tinsley. 
117. See Karl Barth's statement to him that what materially impressed 
him about Rudolf Bultmann's comments was that for him "the 
really irksome thing about 'mythological thinking' turns out to be 
Its 'oblectifyinC. Jaspert. Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 106. 
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Michigan: Win. B. Eerdmans, 1984). p. 54. 
120. Wesley, Letters. vol. 2, p. 213; Brown. Miracles, pp. 71f. 
121. See John Wesley s staunch defense of miracles in his sermon, "On 
Divine Providence". He said. If it please God to continue the life of 
any of his servants he will suspend that or any other law of 
nature. " Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2. p. 546. 
Martin Schmidt includes in his discussion John Wesley's retort to 
Bishop Warburton 7s argument that miracles belonged to the early 
days of Christianity. John Wesley affirmed that he was convinced 
that miracles could happen just as well today as formerly, if God 
so willed. Nobody should try to limit the Holy Spirit. Schmidt, 
Wesley. vol. 2. part 1. p. 224. 
Colin Williams notes that John Wesley held that one of the ways 
the Holy Spirit brings believers to a conviction of sin was "normally 
through preaching and miracles". Williams, Theology, p. 98. 
122. Wesley. Letters. vol. 4. pp. 40f. 
123. Ibid.. vol. 2. pp. 381f. 
124. Ibid.. p. 383. 
125. Ibid. 
126. Wesley. Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 26, p. 169. 
127. Wesley, Works. ed. T. Jackson. vol. 9. p. 291. 
128. Wesley. Journal. vol. 5. pp. 303f; Brown, Miracles, p. 90. 
129. Brown. Miracles, p. 99; John Wesley, who was less than 
complimentary toward David Hume, said, "David Hume ... the most 
insolent despiser of truth and virtue that ever appeared in the 
world". Wesley. Journal, vol. 5. p. 458. It is doubtful whether 
Rudolf Bultmann would have more greatly inspired him. 
130. Ogden. Christ Without Myth. pp. 22-42; Bartsch, Kerygma and 
Myth, pp. 106f. 
131. Schubert Ogden is unimpressed by attempts to break Bultmanri s 
demand for demythologization and establish "mythical events" such 
as the resurrection as objective historical events. He finds all 
arguments. e. g. Karl Barth's which he says assumes that because 
such events are possible they are actual, specious and are such 
that "any unbiased mind would regard as indefensible". Ogden, 
Christ Without Myth. pp. 135f. However, it must remain to be 
seen if Schubert Ogden can prove such events were not objective 
historical events. 
132. WVesley, i. etters. vol. 2. p. 251. 
133. Martin Schmidt states that for John Wesley faith is "personal 
certainty and confidence that God has saved the believer. through 
Jesus Christ. from eternal damnation. " Moreover, it is "a filial con- 
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fidence in God's love". He observes that in John Wesley's letter to 
Thomas Church he argues that the love of God is the elixir of life. 
the remedy' for all the evils of a disordered world which spreads 
abroad peace and joy. Further, he urges that the one whom Jesus 
has saved from sin is firmly convinced, although not every moment. 
that nothing can separate him from the love of God in Christ 
Jesus. See. Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2. part 1, pp. 195,203: vol. 2. 
part 2. p. 14. 
134. Althaus. Martin Luther, pp. 60ff. 
135. Bullmann, History and Eschatology, pp. 116f. 
136. Blaise Pascal reflected. "It is not certain that everything is 
uncertain. " Blaise Pascal. Pascal Pensees, trans. with an intro. by 
A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
1977). p. 214. 
137. See Richard Baxter's comments. Hugh Martin, Puritanism And 
Richard Baxter (London: SCM Press, 1954), p. 151. 
138. Schubert Ogden confirms this when he states that for Rudolf 
F3ultmann the factual possibility of a new life which is opened up 
by faith is not the believers possession but rather that which must 
be laid hold of by decision. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 63. 
139. Colin Williams states that John Wesley affirmed that we can be in 
real possession of salvation now. Williams, John Wesleys 
Teology, p. 41: see discussion above, Section One, Chapter One, 
The Scope of Salvation". 
140. Wesley. Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. vol. 2. pp. 161f. 
141. Bultmann, Essays. pp. 59.175. 
142. See above. Section Two. Chapter Three, endnote 52. Bultmann, 
Theology, vol. 1, p. 314. 
143. Bainton. Here I Stand. p. 64. 
144. See above. PP- 294f- 
145. Ibid. 
146. Authorities agree that, for John Wesley, repentance (the "porch of 
religion") both always preceded faith and was a necessary condition 
of saving faith. Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. vol. 1. p. 
419; Wesley. Letters, vol. 7, p. 222; Schmidt, Wesley. vol. 2, part 2. 
pp. 31.54; Williams. Wesley's Theology, p. 59. 
Repentance was a profound awareness and despair about one's 
own sin. It was a conviction of one's lostness and a trembling 
before the threatening judgment of God. Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2. 
part 2, pp. 31.54; Williams, Wesley's Theology, p. 59; see 
discussion above, Who are Justified? The Guilty Ungodly", pp. 69f, 
endnote 38, 
147. Colin Williams states that both Luther and Calvin included two 
movements In justifying faith: (1) repentance (2) trust in Christ. 
Further, he says that "repentance works" for them are works of 
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faith. Gordon Rupp. in an interview. stated that scholarly opinion 
was divided regarding Martin Luther's understanding of 
repentances place. Students personal interview, Cambridge, 22 
September 1986. 
Strictly speaking. John Calvin did not view repentance as part of 
faith but distinct from it and a fruit of saving faith. See, Colin 
Williams discussion. Wesley's Theology, pp. 59-66; John Calvin, A 
Compend of the Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. Hugh T. 
Kerr (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 94f. 
148. The two aspects of faith or "obedience". the surrender of one's self- 
contrived securities and the renunciation of attempting to acquire 
one's life, and the "yes" response to the word of proclamation are 
mentioned, mainly by implication, in Schubert Ogden s explication 
of Rudolf Bultmann's theology; Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 
61.86. 
149. This is not contradicted by Schubert Ogden s discussion when he 
states that the proclamation in commanding us to believe in the 
death and resurrection of Christ as the eschatological occurrence 
asks the individual whether he is willing to understand himself as 
the word instructs him. Ibid.. p. 86. 
150. Colin Williams speaks of John Wesley's conception of faith in terms 
of both "reception" and "acceptance". He observes that faith 
involves a "synergism in which God creates in man the freedom to 
receive or resist his grace. He appreciates especially John Wesley's 
contribution in breaking the deterministic framework of the logical 
doctrine of predestination by showing that God's grace works at 
every stage within us to enable us to respond freely to his 
presence. This is an important point. 
However appreciative one may be of this point. clarity regarding 
this "synergism" will help us in trying to get John Wesley's accent 
right. Saving faith for John Wesley was two movements of grace 
and one movement of response. He emphasizes God in His 
sovereignty offering the supernatural gift of faith, when He wills, to 
the inner man which He graciously strengthens in order to receive 
film. This stress which includes the two movements of grace is 
given inadequate treatment in Colin Williams assessment of 
justifying faith. I have discussed John Wesley's conception more at 
length earlier in the dissertation. See. Section One. Chapter Four. 
"Saving Faith As a Gift/ Decision and as a State", pp. 131f f. See, 
Williams. Wesley's Theology, pp. 70-73. 
151. John Wesley said. "So certain it is that no miracles whatever which 
were ever yet wrought in the world were effectual to prove the most 
glaring truth to those that hardened their hearts against it". 
Wesley. Letters, vol. 2. pp. 260.258f. Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief 
Frank Baker. vol. 11, pp. 310II: 
152. Dr. John Whitehead. John Wesley's friend and early biographer, 
affirmed that he had proved Christian experience to be a reality 
which claimed and secured for itself no less a validity than the 
external. sensuous reality. Schmidt. Wesle . vol. 2. part 2. p. 209. 
153. Wesley. letters. vol. 2. p. 263. 
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154. Martin Schmidt cites Thomas Rutherford's criticism that John 
Wesley's appeal to inner assurance, derived from the Holy Spirit, 
avoided further testing because it had its central point in 
indeterminate "feeling". Wesley, Letters, vol. 5, p. 364; Schmidt, 
Wesley, vol. 2. part 1, p. 171. 
155. Wesley, Minutes, 1744, p. 6. 
156. Schubert Ogden also comments that rather than representing God's 
act as one objective happening alongside others, Rudolf Bultmann's 
existential analysis understands God's act as a fully personal act 
objectively hidden and perceivable only where there is 
corresponding change in the self-understanding of the perceiver. 
Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 93. 
157. Wesley. Works. ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. vol. 1, p. 198. 
158. Ibid.. p. 199. 
159. Ibid.. p. 198. 
160. See my relevant remarks in endnote #151 
161. I3ultmann, Essays, p. 52; Howe O. Thomas, Jr., "Rudolf Bultmann's 
Interpretation of Paul's Understanding of the Law" (University of 
Bristol: Essay. June. 1985); This is confirmed by Schubert Ogden 's 
observation that. according to Rudolf Bultmann, "fallen" man 
cannot free himself but only the kerygmatic Word of God can 
awaken his self understanding. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, pp. 
23,74f. 
162. Colin Williams charts the progression of John Wesley's belief 
regarding the Instantaneous experience of conversion. In 1738 Peter 
138hler convinced him it was instantaneous. On the authority of 
A. S. Yates. he notes he modified this to a "sounder" view that there 
Is irreconcilable variability In the Holy Spirit's operation In the 
souls of persons. 
Colin Williams allows that for John Wesley a conversion may be 
"an instantaneous crisis event" or a "more gradual change"; yet, it 
was always accompanied by the awareness of real change. 
. Williams. Wesley s Theology. pp. 10117 
John Wesley's teaching on this point might be clarified and shar- 
pened. Involved in faith is both time and experience. As far as 
'experience". I have already argued that "saving, faith" was 
ordinarily "experiential". He did acknowledge ' that God 
'imperceptibly works in some a gradually increasing assurance of 
His love". However. these are rather "those exempt cases"; Wesley. 
Letters, vol. 2. pp. 46f. 
Regarding the time factor in "saving faith", John Wesley consis- 
tently conceived justification to be instantaneous. He did not 
disavow exceptions but they were exceptions and not the rule -- a 
point which Martin Schmidt corroborates. Citing experience as his 
evidence. John Wesley told "John Smith" that the twelve or thirteen 
truly pious persons with whom he was acquainted, knew "the day 
when the love of God was first shed abroad in their hearts". 
Wesley. Letters, vol. 2, p. 47. 
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Martin Schmidt sums up nicely the gist of the dispute between 
John Wesley and "John Smith" as the question whether faith had a 
clearly defined beginning. John Wesley argues that it does. 
Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2. part 1. p. 202. 
On another issue, I am unclear as to Colin William's judgment 
regarding justification as a "state". He states that John Wesley 
emphasizes that justification is not a "state", but a moment-by- 
moment relationship. Is this to say he stresses that it is not a 
"state"? Or, though accepting that it is a state, he emphasises its 
moment-by-moment nature? It would seem that if it Is a 
relationship, then it Is "a state of being related". 
Colin Williams remarks the relationship of justification is moment- 
by-moment and not a "once-for-all event" which would then make 
us independent of Christ. Actually, it is a "once-for-all" event in 
that it occurs and is complete in a punctiliar moment. However, it 
also continues in time to be maintained moment-by-moment by 
continual dependence on Christ. See above, Section One, Chapter 
Four. p. 139; Williams, Wesleys Theology, pp. 68f. 
John Wesley, though by the 1770's guarded in his affirmation, 
consistently accepted from the beginning to the end that 
justification was a state which was "inexpressibly great and 
glorious". Wesley, Works, ed. T. Jackson, vol. 10, p. 389; Wesley, 
Letters, vol. 5, p. 265. 
163. In setting forth Rudolf Bultmann's understanding of the new 
existence. Schubert Ogden confirms that what the New Testament 
means by eschatological existence Rudolf Bultmann means by 
existentiell self-understanding. This existence in which one lives in 
freedom from the past and openness for the future is what Paul 
speaks of as being a "new creation", or John as having passed from 
death to "eternal life". What separates the New Testament from 
Jewish apocalypticism is its conviction that the time of salvation 
has already broken in and the life of the world to come is even now 
a reality for the believer. Particularly in Paul and John, we find 
the demythologization of apocalyptic eschatology. The decisive 
eschatological occurrence is not an imminent cosmic catastrophe 
but the fact that God is now judging the world in Jesus Christ. 
Though it is implied, Schubert Ogden does not draw Rudolf 
Bultmann's equation between God's judgment and justification. 
Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 62; See above, Section Two, 
Chapter One. pp. 191-93. 
164. John Wesley's acceptance of both a present and a final justification 
apparently goes unnoticed by Martin Schmidt. On at least two oc- 
casions. he states John Wesley's position as holding "one and one 
only" justification. Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2, part 1. p. 43; vol. 2. 
part 2. p. 76; see above. Section One, Chapter Four, "Final 
Justification". 
On the other hand. Colin Williams rightly assesses John Wesley 
view as "double justification". He notes that while he accepted 
sanctification as a condition of "final" justification, it was not to be 
viewed as an achievement which merits salvation but as a gift. 
Williams. Wesley's Theology, p. 68. 
165. See above. Section Two. Chapter Three, pp. 319f . Karl Barth asks him if all the New Testament has to say about life In faith can be 
subsumed under the rubric of "detachment from the world". Karl 
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Barth does not believe that this ° does justice to the life of faith as 
gratitude and response to - grace. , Further, this new existence is 
connected with the Lord who stands over and against us and Is 
there before we are. Bartsch. Kerygma and Myth. p. 94. 
166. Schubert Ogden thinks that when Rudolf Bultmann speaks of the 
life of faith as the life of radical freedom from the whole sphere of 
what is objectively visible and controllable, he does not mean the 
dualist's devaluation of "sense" or "matter". Rather, he means an 
attitude of "inner distance from all worldly attachments". That is, 
he means the dialectical attitude of Paul of having wives but living 
as though they had none". Though if I understand Schubert 
Ogden rightly, I concur that Rudolf Bultmann does not intend to 
devalue "sense" and "matter". However, for my reasons given in the 
ensuing argument in the main text, I, nevertheless, believe he does 
devalue them. See, Ogden, Christ Without Myth. p. 62f. 
167. Paul Althaus states that Martin Luther held that good works were 
necessary as a witness of faith and therewith give glory to the 
heavenly Father. Althaus, Martin Luther, p. 249. 
168. Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, pp. 210ff. 
169. Martin Schmidt comments, "Thus for him there was nothing in life 
outside the sphere of God's Influence. * Schmidt, John Wesley, vol. 
2. part 2. p. 204; Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2. 
pp. 535-550. 
170. Colin Williams mentions the Scriptural. "objective" marks or tests 
which John Wesley used for corroborating the experience of 
assurance. As he says, these would be certain to follow the faith 
relationship to Christ. Williams, Wesley's Theology, pp. 110r. See 
above. Section One, Chapter Four. "The Fruits of Faith". 
171. As one example, please note John Wesley's letter regarding the 
change in the colliers of Kingswood. Wesley, Works, ed. T. 
Jackson. vol. 13. p. 309. Martin Schmidt states John Wesley was 
convinced that genuine religion was able to heal all the evils and 
all the miseries of a disordered world, making man happy and 
spreading peace and joy all around it. Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2. part 2. p. 70. 
172. In his sermon on 'The Repentance of Believers", he does not 
distinguish between pure and inordinate "desire of earthly things or 
pleasures". Rather, "desire" in general Is cast In a negative light. 
Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, p. 338. ' 
173. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 93. 
174. Indeed. John Wesley did study the experiences of the justtlkd 
seeking to draw generalizations about God's pattern of working 
based on his repeated observations. 
175. Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 51. 
176. Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2, part 2, p. 
55. 
177. Although this paper cannot treat adequately John Wesley's under. 
standing of "Christian perfection", a comment regarding Colin 
Williams' assessment is relevant to this matter of holy loves 
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content as moral. Colin Williams asserts that perfection as 
freedom from sin is not measured by "objective moral standards" 
but "unbroken conscious dependence upon Christ". He says John 
Wesley rejected putting perfection on the basis of "objective 
standards of justice" when he distinguished between two kinds of 
sin, sin measured absolutely by the "perfect law", and sin viewed In 
terms of conscious separation from Christ. 
He is correct In saying that perfection was viewed as moment-by- 
moment communion with God in Christ. However, one must take 
exception to the implication that John Wesley set moral standards 
over and against this personal relationship with Christ. Rather 
than conflicting, these two were in accord with one another. 
Indeed, John Wesley argued that if one obeyed Jesus Christ 
completely and followed Him alone, then one would also satisfy the 
Law of God; Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2, part 
2, pp. 16,54f. 
As John Wesley declared in his sermon "The Law Established 
Through Faith: Discourse 2", love to God fulfils the "whole negative 
'law" (including, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill") as well as the "positive" law. This fulfillment was not to the 
external part only but also cleansed the heart from vile affections: 
Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, p. 42. 
Colin Williams is right in saying that rising to a required moral 
standard of holiness did not, according to John Wesley. merit 
salvation. However, John Wesley viewed the fulfilment of the 
moral standard as arising from God's love to us and our grateful 
love to Him. 
Furthermore, rather than differentiating between the sin of breach. 
ing the "perfect law" and the sin of breaking communion with 
Christ as Colin Williams maintains, John Wesley distinguished 
between the "perfect law" (the Adamic law which encompassed both 
wilful sins and sins of "infirmity") and wilful sin ("a voluntary 
transgression of a known law"). Man was culpable for wilful sin "- 
which would include a wilful breach of a moral commandment "" 
and not for those of ignorance, mistake, or disease. H. O. Thomas, 
John Wesleys Understanding of Essentials/Opinions, p. 157. 
Please refer also to Colin Williams discussion In Ms. Wesle s Theology, pp. 175-179. 
178. Wesley, Letters, vol. 4, p. 299. 
179. Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, p. 120. 
180. See Colin Williams' discussion of this; Williams, Wesley s Theology, 
pp. 174ff. 
181. Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2. p. 112. 
182. Wesley. Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker, vol. 2, p. 169. 
183. Wesley, Letters, vol. 5. p. 314. 
184. John Wesley's hopeful vision of what God could do was expressed 
in the 1744 Conference Minutes: "Q. What may we reasonably 
believe to be God's design, in raising up the Preachers, called 
Methodists? A. To reform the nation, more particularly the 
Church: to spread scriptural holiness over the land. " Wesley. 
Minutes, 1744, p. 9. In reference to what John Wesley's "optimism 
of grace" and his doctrine of Christian perfection means to the 
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Church's understanding of its mission, Colin - Williams approvingly 
quotes the exhortation that "we dare set no limit to what the grace 
of God can do for a man here and now". Williams. Wesle s 
Theology. pp. 204,78. 
185. Karl Barth acknowledges the rightful commendation that Rudolf 
Bultmann has received because he has, broken, out of the existen- 
tialist scheme, particularly in his declaration of the necessity of the 
saving event Jesus Christ for authentic life. Ogden. Christ Without 
Myth, p. 103. 
186. Karl Barth cannot but help see in Rudolf Bultmanris concern for 
making Biblical exegesis relevant ' and interesting for its culture 
despisers an apologist's concern (of Schleiermachers stature). He 
states that he has shown an "unmistakable pastoral concern for 
modern man with his electricity and atomic physics". However, he 
comments that Rudolf BuItmann and his disciples are annoyed at 
his being called an apologist. Karl Barth sees this aspect of his 
work as not the most important side of his work but a "notable by 
product". Bartsch. Kerygma and Myth, pp. 118f. 
To me. though it may be argued that it is not Rudolf Bullmann s 
only or indisputable, primary theological motivation, his theological 
project with its existentialist interpretation and demythologizing 
implies that the "translating" of the Gospel in the context of our 
day is integral to the project. John Macquarrie sees Rudolf 
Bultmann as basically an "apologist" whose primary motive in his 
work is to recommend the Christian kerygma to the uniquely 
modern situation. Schubert Ogden rejects this assessment. 
Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 171. 
Rudolf Bultmann accused Karl Barth in 1928 of failing to enter 
into debate with modern philosophy. Dogmatics, he argued, "must 
have the coming generation In mind In relation to both pastors and 
congregations. What are the thoughts that live today behind our 
educated people and in our papers? Must theology always arrive 
after the event? " Jaspert, Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 39. 
In 1952. Rudolf Bultmann wrote to Karl Barth, "This problem (the 
problem of "translation")--and naturally you fail to see this--entails 
the task of making Christian proclamation Intelligible to modern 
man in such a way that he achieves the awareness that tun res 
a 'tur ("your own cause is at stake"). " Further. he declared that 
because modern thinking is no longer, mythological it is shut otr 
from the New Testament whose thinking is mythological. That this 
is the case gave the spur to his hermeneutical efforts. ` Jaspert. 
Barth - Bultmann. pp. 88,95. 
Martin Schmidt sees John Wesley as one set over and against the 
spirit of his age in contrast - to someone like Friedrich 
Schleiermacher who was an advocate of the harmony between 
Christianity and the universe. Schmidt, Wesle , vol. 2. part 2. pp. 
2141. 
187. Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology. p. 47. ' 
188. Ibid.. p. 48. 
189. Buhmann, Existence and Faith, p. 64. 
190. Jaspert. Barth - Bultmann Letters, p. 95. 
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191. Schubert Ogden's discussion illuminates the fact that Rudolf 
Bultmann conceived of the "common basis" necessarily presupposed 
by all the ways in which modem man understands himself to be 
constituted as part of the world-picture formed by natural science. 
The common understanding of modem man is to view the world as 
a lawfully ordered unity "closed" to the interference of non-natural 
agents. The method of science and the world-picture correlative 
with it make the New Testament's "mythological world-picture" 
untenable for modem man. 
Schubert Ogden disputes John Macquarrie's criticism that Rudolf 
Bultmann, accepting the nineteenth century pseudo-scientific view 
of a closed universe, assigns anything not acceptable to the modern 
mind to the realm of myth. He claims that John Macquarrie does 
not take into consideration Rudolf Bultmann s distinction between 
science's results and science's method. While this is a distinction 
one must keep in mind, I do not think this negates John 
Macquarrie's point and the argument that Rudolf Bultmann s 
understanding of the scientific method by definition excludes the 
reference of worldly happenings to transcendent and supernatural 
causes. Ogden. Christ Without Myth, pp. 31-35. 
192. John Wesley remarked that "men of learning" persuaded themselves 
they were free from "superstition, the disease of fools and cowards. 
always righteous overmuch .... "; Wesley, Works, vol. 1. pp. 253f. 
193. See above. Section Two, Chapter One. pp. 191-93,208f : Schubert 
Ogden notes that Rudolf Bultmann asserts that Paul's implied 
demythologization of Gnostic and mystery ideas and John's elimina- 
tion of apocalyptic eschatology demonstrates that the New Testa- 
ment both permits and requires existential interpretation (using 
Heideggers conception). Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 64. 
194. Bartsch. Kerygma and Myth, pp. 90f; Karl Barth states he is baffled 
by Rudolf Bultmann who maintains he is rooted in the 
Reformation, particularly Luther. but who has adopted the theme of 
the anti-Reformation, or at least the un-Reformation. By that he 
means that Rudolf Bultmann was, in the manner of the 
Enlightenment. preoccupied with the new understanding of man 
and the world based on reason and revelation to the extent that 
the sole theme of theology. the message of the Bible. was relegated 
to the background. 
Theology was engaged in a discussion with a court of appeal quite 
foreign to the message. Theology's authority rested in the fact that 
it seemed to be establishing or to have established itself in the eyes 
of that court. 
While Schubert Ogden is correct in saying that Rudolf Bultmann's 
theology is informed by a different ontology from that of the 
Enlightenment and other theologies which partook of its spirit. he. 
nevertheless, shares its spirit, assumptions and procedure. Ogden. 
Christ Without Myth, pp. 65-66. 
While I essentially agree with Karl Barth, one may clarify his 
Judgment. Rudolf Bultmann gave prima facie a high profile to the 
message of the Bible. However, the result of interpreting it 
according to the hermeneutic of the philosophical, existential. 
ontological analysis meant that it was relegated to secondary 
importance behind that of the philosophical understanding. 
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195. Karl Barth wonders, and I think rightly so, whether the New 
Testament proceeds as Rudolf Bultmann conceives it, by beginning 
with man's subjective experiences, with man as the recipient of Its 
message. Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, p. 92. See also Rudolf 
Bultmann s and Karl Barth's exchange regarding this issue of 
anthropology"; Jaspert. Barth - Bultmann Letters. pp. 98f. 106. 
Schubert Ogden acknowledges that the criticism which sees the 
existential interpretation inevitably leading to a dissolution of 
theology into anthropology is not without a point. He further notes how Rudolf Bultmann courts such a charge by quoting his saying 
that "every assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion 
about man and vice versa". Ogden. Christ Without Myth, p. 148. 
196. Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I. p. 321. 
197. Upon reflecting about the rise of the Methodist Society, John 
Wesley says he could not but observe, "This is the very thing which 
was from the beginning of Christianity. " John Wesley, The 
Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley, gen. ed. Richard 
P. Heitzenrater, textual editor Frank Baker, Vol. 9: The Methodist 
Societies: History, Nature and Design, ed. Rupert E. Davies 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989). p. 258. Martin Schmidt affirms 
that right through John Wesley's life his steady aim was the 
restoration of primitive Christianity to the present age. Schmidt. 
Wesley, vol. 2. part 2. p. 187; vol. 2, part 1. p. 239. 
198. Karl Barth seems to highlight these two particular theological 
influences. * Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, pp. 122f. 
199. Actually, the judgment of one to the "left" of him, Fritz Buri, was 
that his theology involves a "complete destruction of the traditional 
Christian conception of Heilsgeschichte". Ogden. Christ Without 
Myth. pp. 106,37. 
200. Ibid.. p. 37: see also, p: 42. 
201. In his Farther Appeal, he reminds the Church of the fate of the Old Testament Israelites and warns England against toying with God's 
offer of grace. See, Schmidt, Wesley, vol. 2, part 2. p. 78. 
202. Dr. Tapp Interpreted Methodist doctrine and practices as tending 
"to the destruction of souls" and "as scandal to Christianity'. 
Tyerman, The Life and Times of The Rev. John Wesley, vol. 1. p. 
330. George Home insinuates that if Methodist doctrine prevailed. 
church order would cease along with "certainty in the faith'. 
Horne, Sixteen Sermons, p. 67. 
203. This assessment is aldn to the summary judgment of Schubert 
Ogden's that by arguing both that authentic historicity is factually 
possible only in Jesus Christ and that demythologization is 
unqualifiedly necessary, Rudolf Bultmann "completely nullifies his 
own constructive proposal for a solution to the contemporary 
theological problem. " Finally, he returns the verdict on his theology 
that it is internally inconsistent. Ogden, Christ Without Myth, p. 
125. 
204. Wesley, Works, ed. -in-chief Frank Baker. vol. 3, p. 493. 
205. Ibid., vol. 11, p. 176. 
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APPENDIX 
UNBELIEVING AND BELIEVING EXISTENCE: 
THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH 
Rudolf Bultrnann argues that the new understanding of faith and 
"believing" existence arises out of the old self-understanding and "unbelieving" 
existence. The heathen talk about God and search for him. Although when 
they speak of or to God, they are not really speaking to God because they are 
not speaking to the true God who is only known by faith. Nevertheless, their 
speaking of God reveals a certain understanding of themselves, and 
understanding delivered over to the enigma, the overmastering power. ' In 
their search for God and the answer to their quest given in their formulations 
of God, they erect an illusion. Nonetheless, they show a knowledge of being 
claimed of the moment combined with the desire for freedom. 2 It is just such 
persons who can understand God's revelation. Rudolf Bultmann declares that 
this man can come to God precisely because he is a sinner. ' Indeed, this 
"unbelieving" existence does not have access to God. but. nonetheless. It 
knows of God. It does not have access to God because It has constructed 
this world of an existence which understands itself without faith 4 Even 
unbelieving existence, the self-understanding as a being with historical 
existence, known of the specific moment with its demand just as does faith. 
The distinction Is that faith is obedient to the judging and forgiving Word of 
God whereas unbelief disobeys the specific moment. " This understanding 
counteracts the notion which John Wesley held that man has a special 
"organ" or a "better self" ithin him that is responsive to the divine. This is 
what faith denies. * 
The pre-understanding out of which faith arises and its bearing upon faith 
Is further illumined by Rudolf Bultmann's discussion of the crucial and 
relevant relationship between philosophy and theology. The strategic common 
ground of philosophy and theology is that they share the same object. man. 
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Albeit, philosophy views man as "the natural man" and theology sees him as 
"the man of faith". More particularly, both the existential philosophical 
description of man and theology refer to certain phenomena; I. e., the historical 
nature of existence and decision-making character of existence. ' That is, the 
structural elements of existence and the analysis presented by existential 
philosophy are valid for existence in faiths. Faith asserts that it is unbelieving 
existence which comes to faith. ' All theological Christian concepts contain the 
understanding and being that belongs to man as he exists at all. ` Theology 
must rely on the existential analysis of man if it -wants to make faith clear in 
a conceptual way. " 
Throughout our study of Rudolf Bultmann. we have, noted that he has 
taken over Martin Heideggers existential-ontological "analysis. ' For Instance. 
Rudolf Bultmann acknowledges Martin Heidegger's concept of "authentic 
possibility of being" informed his own concept of "future" as well as clarifying 
his concept of sin. ' Indeed, faith does not change man's nature into 
something else, possess any new demonstrable qualities. '- supplement. or 
correct philosophy. Philosophy does not allow"for correction because it claims 
to cover existence as a whole (theology can 'only correct at single points 
substituting "love" a' 4MZ! ý for anxiety). - Theology must either accept. 
reject, or ignore it. " 
The question arises: are not existence In faith and existence apart from 
faith such different things that it is impossible to speak of existence as the 
common theme of theology and philosophy? " Rudolf' Bultmann answers that 
philosophy knows of unbelief and faith. The philosophical description of the 
structure of existence perceives clearly the, phenomenon theology 'calls 
unbelief, it just calls it freedom. Philosophy knows of faith because it knows 
of the questionableness of human existence which Is an essential part of its 
freedom. 's Existential analysis knows of the possibility of laying hold of man"e 
authenticity in the decision and in the resolve that belongs to his' existence. 
However, existential analysis does not specify but remains 'open, - to what 
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particular thing is resolved. '' It knows ontologically of the possibility of faith's 
concrete, personal existence but not what occurs In faith's ontic or 
existentiell. concrete, personal existence. " 
Rudolf Bultmann uses the analogy of friendship to illustrate the 
distinction between what philosophy knows ontologically and existentially and 
what theology knows ontically and eldstentielly. A friendless person knows 
what friendship is but on the other hand does not know It. Furthermore, 
once he finds a friend, he does not know any more about friendship than he 
previously did. What he does know is his friend and himself anew. In 
knowing his friend in the "event" of friendship, the events -- the work. 
struggle, joy, pain -- become "new" in the sense that is' valid and visible only 
to him. " Speaking of philosophy, he states, "Precisely when It knows the 
determination for freedom by which existence asserts control of Itself, it knows 
of another possibility, the rejection of that determination. "' 
What kind of knowledge of faith does philosophy have? "It knows it as a 
lost. meaningless possibility. " says Rudolf Bultmann 20 It is lost because 
human existence which persists in this freedom has its actuality only In it. lt 
is meaningless because everything that has meaning for philosophy Is defined 
in terms of existence in this freedom. Therefore, when it hears of faith 
referred to as an ever present possibility and reality, it can understand by 
faith only a resolve being realized within existence determined by freedom. 3' 
In contrast, faith understands itself as a specific resolve. a specific 
decision in a concrete situation which is determined by the Word of 
proclamation and the neighbor. Faith declares that this specific resolve 
reconstitutes the basic conception of existence so that henceforth an existence 
in faith exists alongside the existence outside faith. This specific claim is 
faith's offence and is unprovable. 
Since faith is an eschatological event and an act of God which affects 
man, as justifying faith "it Is not a phenomenon of ' existence" which is 
demonstrable. ' The man of faith remains in existence and does not have a 
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new structure of existence created for him; yet, the man of faith comes out of 
existence. out of unbelief. Moreover, faith, an eschatological event In which 
reconciliation becomes a reality. "leads back - to the ' original creation". 




possibility of faith as original obedience, of which philosophy knows, is made 
actual In the Christian faith. ""' 
Rudolf Bultmann concludes his argument with the, following propositions: 
pre-Christian existence includes a pre-understanding , of 
the Christian 
proclamation. As philosophy explicates this understanding of existence It also 
explicates this pre-understanding. When this analysis Is introduced Into the 
work of theology, it becomes a new statement because Its character as pre- 
understanding Is made clear. ` On the other: hand, the pre-understanding 
cannot understand faith because it Is not provable,, through reason. In 
addition, since faith's character is a continual overcoming of unbelief. then 
faith and the development of an understanding, In faith can be theologically 
explicated only in continual debate with, the, understanding of natural 
existence. ..... 
Because there is no other existence than that which constitutes Itself In 
freedom. the formal structures of this existence are valid for all human 
existence. Therefore. they are valid for existence, confronted by the 
proclamation, whether existence outside of faith and or for existence In faith" 
Rudolf Bultmann keeps the question present before him of whether or not In 
fact theology after all corrects ontological analysis -and proposes an ontology to 
compete with philosophy. He resoundly answers, "Nol" . Existential analysis 
determines that death is the phenomenon within-man's existence that allows 
man's limitation to become visible and is the limit that constitutes him a 
totality. When theology gives death's function to the proclamation, which is 
encountered within existence, theology: Is not,,. saying ; that the existential 
analysis of death is "false". The man of faith still experiences his limitation In 
death; but death loses its power for him In that he sees that death means an 
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"either/ or" for man in the sense of judgement and grace. "Thus, theology 
recognizes the intimate connection between death and the revelation of God, " 
concludes Bultmann2e It understands that God encounters the natural man 
in death and the encounter with revelation means death for the natural man. 
It means that "love is an absolute surrender of the I and only as such 
'overcomes' death". " 
Regarding faith's new understanding. Rudolf Bultrnann asks, "What 'more'. 
then does the man of faith know? " Exactly this, he replies, that revelation 
has encountered him, that he really lives, that he Is "graced" and Is really 
forgiven and always will be. ' He knows that by faith his concrete life in work 
and in joy, in struggle and In pain is "newly qualified". He knows that 
through the event of revelation the events of his life are new in that they are 
valid and visible to Him. 29 Faith does receive a "clarification" of profane 
existence not visible to philosophy. This is such that existence appears as 
"always already graced". Indeed, philosophy can understand it in the formal 
sense, as one can understand the eye-opening experience of friendship, yet 
only faith understands (in the existentiell sense) profane existence as gracedJO 
EVALUATION OF UNBELIEVING -- BELIEVING EXISTENCE 
We have already encountered most of the issues that arise in this 
discussion of "unbelieving/believing" existence but a few further comments are 
in order. Rather than contemplating in the manner of Martin Luther this 
unbelieving knowledge as a knowledge of God in his attributes, e. g. as 
omnipotence and eternity. Rudolf Bultmann envisages this knowledge as a 
knowledge of being claimed by an enigmatic, infinite power. '! Nevertheless. 
Rudolf Bultmanri s reasoning is patterned after Martin Luther's "theology of 
the cross" (theologia cnieis). For to Martin Luther, like Rudolf Bultmann after 
him, the true, proper knowledge of God (his "backside") Is only disclosed to 
man in the cross of Christ. 32 
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Traditional Catholic and many classical Protestant thinkers would agree 
that philosophy and theology share a common interest in man; yet, some 
would maintain that God is the true object, of theology. Karl Barth sharply 
dissents from Rudolf Bultmann and goes - so far as to argue that philosophy 
has an understanding of Christian theology's object, God in Jesus Christ. 
In advancing his thesis that theology arises out of a philosophical pre- 
understanding, Rudolf Bultmann ' again assumes that the existential- 
ontological philosophy provides the accurate analysis of mar's existence as it 
is and that existential, dialectical theology which arises from it is Scriptural. 
New Testament theology. One has firstly to be "converted" to this existential 
philosophical position in order for one to accept that existential theology 
arises out of philosophy. Indeed, the polemical undertone and prevailing 
assumption throughout Rudolf Bultmanri s theology Is that man prior to faith 
exists in sin because he views man from a misguided ontological framework 
which sees him as an object among other objects. Rudolf Bultmanri s greater 
point is that theology -can arise only out of "graced" human existence and 
cannot be conveyed in the discursive communication of a transcendent, 
personal God. 
Rudolf Bultmanri s distinction between philosophy's ontological 
understanding of faith and faith's existentiell understanding is a useful one. 
Here again are existentially expressed echoes of Martin Luthers distinction 
between a "general" knowledge of God and a "proper" knowledge of God 33 
Rudolf Bultmann believes he can concomitantly retain and keep Martin 
Heideggers philosophy undiluted while superimposing the Gospel upon it. 
Martin Heidegger posits that the resolve to accept one's existence as Being- 
toward-death is authentic existence. In making this resolution, another 
possibility has been forgone. We may rightly assume that when -a 
Heideggerian who does not have faith resolves to accept his Being-toward- 
death. then this resolution is not the decision of "faith" which resolves to 
accept Jesus as God's revelation. However, this Heideggerian resolution gives 
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a new self-understanding and authentic existence. Now this bestowing of a 
new self-understanding and new existence is exactly what the resolution of 
faith is reputed to offer man. If the acceptance of the proclamation Is reputed 
to do what Heideggers resolution to accept ones Being-toward-death does. 
why do we need both theology and philosophy? In assuming both an 
uncorrected existential-ontological philosophy and an existential theology, Is 
not Rudolf Bultmann implying that man must achieve two new self- 
understandings? Why do we need two conversions when one would do? 
However, if we are to view both philosophy and theology as vital to mari s 
new existence and man must accept his Being-toward-death and the 
proclamation, wherein is the distinction in substance and practice between 
the two self-understandings? In other words, what is the difference between 
Heideggers authentic existence and Rudolf Bultmanri s "justification by faith" 
in regards to both the essential nature of the existentiell encounter and the 
spiritual, psychological and empirical life of man? Does the distinction In 
essence reside in no more than one being "claimed" by a proclamation? If the 
main distinction between the two is that in one case man must decide to 
accept death while in the other case he must resolve to accept Jesus Christ, 
but the practical and empirical, yes, the eternal ramifications of both are the 
same, then what is the compelling reason(s) for accepting theology's 
proclamation as mandatory and essential? According to Rudolf Bultmann, 
theology must be mandatory or else we would have to assume that man could 
achieve true existence without faith in the proclamation. Since theology is 
mandatory for genuine existence, then we must conclude that theology 
demands from or offers to man something more than simple acceptance of 
death. If this is so, then it Is sound to deduce that only theology can give 
man what he needs to make right his existence. If theology makes 
philosophical existence right, then theology corrects philosophy. 
One wonders if Martin Heidegger would agree with Rudolf Bultmann that 
the proclamation takes over death's function in philosophy. Indeed, Rudolf 
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Bultmann quite naturally would like it both ways: he does not want to 
condemn existential analysis of death as "false". That would be self- 
condemning. He is absolutely committed to existential analysis. In fact, we 
must conclude that faith alone In the proclamation is Insufficient for 
"justification" and a new self-understanding without the existential pre- 
understanding. Nevertheless, one infers that he holds that existential analysis 
of death is not entirely "true" and adequate. The proclamation, In a sense, 
supersedes death's function. It makes death obsolescent because it does 
what Heideggerian death does and more -- it reveals God. Rudolf Bultrnann's 
ultimate "reason" for asserting the absolute necessity of the acceptance of the 
proclamation boils down to this: this syntactical arrangement of words called 
the "proclamation" is incumbent upon man only because the words say so to 
man -- neither because they refer to an authoritative, personal (human or 
super-human) referent nor because they have any philosophical, scientific, 
logical, psychological, spiritual, or practical justification. 
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